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Abstract
Since the late 19th Century, the military in Mexico has been an important instrument of 
the executive branch of government to maintain political stability. In the 1880s, 
President Porfirio Diaz created the basis of a system of civil-military relations based on 
Presidential control (as opposed to civilian control). Since then, the Mexican armed 
forces have developed a unique bond with the President, remaining accountable and 
exclusively subordinated to this branch of power and no one else.
Despite the Mexican Revolution in the first quarter of the 20th Century and the 
subsequent process of democratization after 1988, Diaz’s basic principle has not been 
broken. In fact, the military’s separation from the political arena after the Mexican 
Revolution inexorably strengthened its moral capital, gaining the population’s approval 
to participate in areas that surpass its conventional duties. This has made the executive 
branch become increasingly reliant on the armed forces to make certain policy 
commitments seem trustworthy, especially in areas where civilian agencies have 
consistently underperformed, such as the combat of organised crime and ordinary 
policing. This is definitely a unique characteristic within Latin America, where 
democratization has rarely been accompanied by an increasing role of the armed forces 
on internal affairs.
By using deductive reasoning and historical narrative, the argument will propose that 
the rules governing the system of civil-military relations in Mexico are counterintuitive 
with the idea of democratic consolidation. It will also suggest that the current system of 
civilian control has become even more vulnerable due to the capacity of the military to 
resist and even reverse civilian initiatives to improve supervision over their expanding 
roles. To test these hypotheses, the argument follows closely the military’s 
counterinsurgency policy and its increasing participation in law enforcement 
institutions.
I declare that this thesis consists of 95,888 words (excluding references).
Jesus A. Lopez-Gonzalez
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Introduction
Contemporary concepts of democratic control of the military by civilian authorities 
focus on the capacity of the president and the representative powers of the State to 
define, supervise and evaluate policy performance on internal security, external defence, 
civic action or any other function that involves direct participation of the armed forces. 
R. Kohn (1997) argues that in principle, democratic control over the military is absolute 
and all encompassing: no decision falls under military control unless it has been 
expressly or implicitly delegated to them by elected civilian leaders. ‘Missions assigned 
to uniformed personnel are based on convenience, tradition, effectiveness or military 
experience and expertise. Civilians make all the rules and they can change them at any 
time’ (Kohn 1997:142).
Along the same line of argument, D. Pion-Berlin (1991) argues that democratic civilian 
control requires unconditional support to [any democratically elected] civilian authority, 
in which the armed forces submit to the will of political authorities. It also needs a 
minimum constitutional consensus enabling civilian elites to build and maintain civilian 
supremacy (Pion-Berlin 1991). S. Fitch (1998) goes a step further by specifying the 
essential characteristics of democratic systems of civil-military relations. These include 
strict military subordination to democratically elected elites, policy control or civilian 
supervision of missions delegated to the armed forces and full accountability of the 
military to the rule of law. (Fitch 1998).
Fitch (1998), Pion-Berlin (1991) and Kohn’s (1997) approaches are based on the 
understanding that one of the permanent duties of new democratically elected civilian 
elites consists of preventing the armed forces from gaining political territory. It is 
possible to consider that Latin American historical experience regarding civil-military 
relations emphasizes the normative and prescriptive content of their arguments. In any 
case, this is not a recent concern in the civil-military relations literature. In fact, it has 
been present for decades (Lasswell and Stanley 1997) if not centuries (Sun 2003). S. 
Huntington summarised it by arguing that while other social forces can only pressure 
the government, the military can literally replace government (Huntington 1968). P. 
Feaver (1999) described it is a simple paradox1: ’’The very institution created to protect 
the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity” (Feaver 2003:4).
1 For a more recent discussion of this paradox, see D. Acemoglu (2008)
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Therefore, any deviation from Kohn’s absolute and all encompassing parameters can 
hinder the quality of civilian control, and therefore, of democracy altogether.
By applying this definition to contemporary civil-military relations in Mexico, it is 
possible to build a case around the firm control presidents have exercised over the 
armed forces in the last 80 years. The absence of coups, military participation in 
external missions and the willingness of the officer corps to stay away from the political 
arena confirm the existence of a high level of institutionalisation of military roles in the 
political system and the firm subordination to the president’s authority. If we expand 
the scope of the analysis to include other countries in Latin America, Mexico is clearly 
an oddity. The vertical and undisputed presidential control over the armed forces was 
far from being common on the continent, where military hierarchies turned, more than 
once, into key political actors2. In that sense, the influence of Mexico’s military on the 
political system was not defined by the threat of a coup or their capacity to impose 
tutelage over policy issues3. Mexican soldiers have even abstained from making public 
their discontent with a particular policy trend4. On the contrary, their policy 
interventions have been historically performed on behalf of the ruling elite and 
subjected to the Executive’s leadership. Therefore, rather than politicisation of the 
armed forces, Mexico’s pattern of civil-military relations is closer to militarization of 
politics (Camp 2003).
For comparative studies, this set of unique features defining civil-military relations has 
meant that mainstream theoretical discussions on the subject have generally ignored the 
case of Mexico5 M. Desch argues that studying the civil-military relationship is, by 
itself, a complex endeavour6.1 would add that being an exception, the Mexican case is 
unappealing for theoreticians. Mexico’s characteristics of civil-military relations did not
2“During the last 50 years, every country except Mexico and Costa Rica has had al least one significant
period of military rule; most have had multiple military governments and military coups.” (Finch 1998:1) 
For a complete discussion on military tutelage see A. Stepan (1988)
4 According to Pineyro (May 24, 2005), the military typically conveys privately its position (positive or 
negative) on a given issue to the president and his cabinet.
5 Philip (1985:78) argues that a significant distinction between South American military officers and 
Mexican officers is that the former owe their loyalties to their own institutions, whereas Mexicans 
willingly have committed to civilian politicians and leaders.
6 M. Desch argues that analysts generally disagree about how to define and measure civil-military 
relations as the dependent variable. It is not easy to identify whether conflicts regarding civil-military 
relations respond to intra-civilian struggles for power, intra-military fights or civil-military coalitional 
wars. Furthermore, there are no clear criteria to define whether civil-military relations are good or bad 
across countries. (Desch 1999:3)
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fit O’Donnell’s bureaucratic-authoritarian approach (O'Donnell 1973) or Stepan’s new 
military professionalism and military tutelage model (Stepan 1973; Stepan 1988). 
Moreover, it does not coincide either with the historical political armies explanation of 
Kees and Dirk (Kees and Dirk 2003) or other theoretical explanation that build on the 
military as a visible political actor.
Even when the so-called third wave of democratisation brought tighter forms of civilian 
control over the military in Latin America (Huntington 1995)7, contemporary literature 
on this topic still lacks discussion of the Mexican case. Most academic studies on this 
field have taken an inductive approach and rarely specify a suitable theoretical 
framework to start with. Additionally, research on the armed forces in Mexico has 
historically attracted the attention of a limited number of scholars. Lack of interest was 
often associated with the apparent dislike of the Mexican military towards the academic 
inquiry, and their tendency to isolate themselves (Ronfeldt 1984). On this issue, 
Roderic Ai Camp affirms that the Mexican Military “has [consistently] erected 
obstacles to outside examination” (Camp 1992:12). No doubt, before the approval of 
The Freedom of Government Information Law in 2003, getting first-hand material from 
the armed forces was a very difficult endeavour. Professor George Grayson8 of William 
and Mary College told this author that studying the armed forces often required intricate 
connections with the political elite, given the fact that gaining the trust of military 
officers was not an easy task (Washington DC, September 15, 2005).
However, this trend seems to be changing. Along with the creation of the Federal 
Institute of Information Access (IFAI) in January 2003, the military opened up their 
corporate information in an unprecedented way. Data on military statistics, budget 
allocations, education system, personnel, weapons, geographical distribution, 
recruitment, human rights, doctrine and military missions can be consulted on their 
website or requested directly through the System of Information Requests (SISI)9. By 
doing so, the armed forces unlocked a wide avenue for new research on civil-military
7 S. Huntington argues that, in general, new democracies have achieved important progress in bringing 
the armed forces under more stable or democratic forms of civilian subordination (Huntington 1995)
8 He was the first scholar who disentangled the internal structure of the Mexican armed forces in a 
document prepared for the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (Grayson, 1999)
9 For a detailed explanation of the SISI, see the presentation of its founder and director, Mr. Alonso 
Lujambio, at the Woodrow Wilson Center on June 29, 2007. Lujambio, Alonso. “Mexico's Constitutional 
Reform on Transparency & Access to Information
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event summarv&event id=241802.
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relations in Mexico that may well fill the gaps left by previous scholarship10. The issues 
I look at in this research are partly built on these new sources of information. It also 
takes a creative combination of competing approaches in the study of political 
institutions to address some of the loose ends of the system of civil-military relations in 
Mexico.
I particularly look at the increasing number of public security responsibilities that the 
last four presidents of Mexico have delegated to the armed forces since 1989 and the 
consequences that such policy trend has generated for both: the system of civil military 
relations and the process of democratic consolidation. On this issue, leading scholars on 
the study of the Mexican armed forces, have proposed that a growing military agenda 
does not mean a significant transformation in the long standing balance of power 
favouring civilians within the system of civil-military relations (Camp 2005; Benitez 
2000 and Pineyro 1999). I am challenging their viewpoint on the subject in this thesis.
I would also like to provide evidence suggesting that the armed forces have not only 
effectively resisted, but also reversed civilian initiatives, the president’s included, to 
improve supervision over their expanding roles in the polity; digging into their past 
record of violations of human rights or punishing those officers that have been found 
guilty for similar charges by specialized government agencies. The underlying question 
here is why the executive power in Mexico opted to delegate a wide variety of missions 
of public security to the armed forces, even at the expense of delaying or obstructing 
democratic consolidation?
I. The historical context
Military participation in areas that exceed the realm of national defence11 was a constant 
occurrence in the history of Mexico during the largest part of the 20th Century. Except 
for a minor role played by the Mexican armed forces in the Second World War, military 
missions have been predominantly centred on internal security and social policy roles. 
This differs from what has occurred in the South American region, where often active 
members of the armed forces occupied the first row of politics. In contrast, Mexico’s 
military officers have kept a low political profile, subordinated at all times to the 
president’s authority.
10 See Medellin, Alejandro “Revelan los secretos del Ejercito mexicano” El Universal. October 16,2003
II National Defense is understood as the protection of the territorial integrity, the nation and its political 
institutions against potential or real external aggressions.
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The origin of strict military subordination to civilian authority can be traced back as far 
as El porfiriato12 (1876-1911). Formal control by the president over the armed forces 
was recognised by Article 24 of the Constitution enacted in 185713 and the Internal Law 
of Military procedures — Ordenanza Militar—  that, at least in principle, should have 
governed internal military procedures, including military promotions (Lopez -Portillo y 
Rojas 1921). However, neither legal provisions nor incipient efforts to professionalize 
the military carried out during the 1880s was successful in completely governing the 
behaviour of the institution and its membership (Kelley 1975). President Diaz’s 
unorthodox approach to civilian control was mainly based on informal measures that 
often included the continuous availability of political and business opportunities to 
high-ranked military personnel. As a matter of fact, the military remained subordinated 
to Diaz’s authority not because it was respectful of the presidential institution, nor to an 
issue of obedience to the Constitution or the law. Instead, civilian control over the 
military greatly depended on Diaz’s personal abilities to keep the rifle and the sword 
away from the political arena. In the long run, Diaz’s massive political meddling 
weakened discipline and almost destroyed the promotion of unity and the creation of the 
so-called espirit de corps.
The shortcomings of this form of civilian supremacy became evident when the army 
failed to address a rural uprising commanded by Francisco I Madero in 1910 and 1911. 
Discipline and organization broke down altogether; tactics and strategy were not always 
the optimal choice to mount a proper counterrevolutionary campaign. Furthermore, the 
bad relationship and poor coordination between military officers and local political 
authorities hindered the capacity of the regime to put together a cohesive strategy to 
defeat the insurgents (Vanderwood 1976; Portilla 1995). The outcome of the struggle 
did not take long to become manifest. After six months of battle, the federal army was 
finally defeated by Madero’s Ejercito Libertador.
12 I acknowledge that the term “el porfiriato” has been used to define a period in Mexican history that 
includes political, social, economic and cultural aspects. However, the use of the term in this thesis refers 
mainly to the way President Diaz shaped the system of civil-military relations during his protracted term 
in office.
13 Online database of The Constitution Society, which is a private non-profit organization devoted to 
research and public education on the principles of constitutional republican government. 
www.constitution.org/cons/mex 1857.txt
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In seems Diaz’s regime could not hide the irony of his own approach to civil-military 
relations. Politicised militaries may generate some protection against coups but 
eventually made them more vulnerable to revolution (Philip 1985). Under such 
conditions, the military may be loyal and subordinated to civilian authority but unable 
to perform its unique professional role14. In the end, President Diaz’s approach to civil- 
military relations became counterproductive and amazingly costly for the military and 
the political regime as both disappeared altogether after the brief presidency of 
Victoriano Huerta in 1914.
The task of rebuilding civilian supremacy took almost 30 years. During that period, 
informal procedures to separate the military from the political scenario, although 
intended at some point by President Carranza between 1917 and 1920, were discarded 
in order to maintain the military’s allegiance to the political regime. From 1920 until 
1946, each of the four elected presidents that succeed Alvaro Obregon in the presidency 
—  being all army generals and veterans of the revolution — actively pursued a policy 
that aimed at transforming the armed forces into a cohesive body, subjected to a single 
political command as a primary requisite for political stability.
No doubt, many of the rules governing the system of civil-military relations changed 
after the revolution. However, it seems that the essence of the older days remained 
somehow untouched. The end of el porfiriato in 1911 did not imply a transition to 
democracy, but the institutionalization of a different variant of authoritarian power. This 
meant that the nature of missions Presidents delegated to the armed forces was not 
entirely different from those performed during Don Porfirio’s rule. President Lazaro 
Cardenas (1934-1940) had the army involved in tasks such as building schools and 
basic infrastructure. It also granted the armed forces a key role during the 
nationalization of the oil industry in 1938. Both policy roles imprinted a nationalistic 
and progressist twist to the missions delegated to the armed forces in the political
14 Under not particularly different conditions, a similar story was repeated 40 years later in Cuba and 
Nicaragua in 1976. After 40 year of rule of the Somoza dynasty, the Nicaraguan National Guard felt too 
much under the control of the dictator and became unable to confront the challenge that posed the 
Sandinista Front of National Liberation in 1978. Diaz’s and Somoza’s military establishments were not 
strikingly different. Both were closer to a politicised organization that combined weak military leadership 
at the top with a number of professional officers at the middle of the structure who usually remained at 
the margins of real command.
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system. The good name and moral capital15 the military enjoys today, was built during 
Cardenas’ sexenio. Still, not all missions delegated to the armed forces were of social 
assistance nature. President Miguel Aleman, the first civilian to reach the executive 
power in 1946, used the armed forces to disrupt by force a number of union movements 
that did not share his orientation on economic policies. Years later, President Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos used a similar policy during the strikes of the railways union and other 
organizations that wanted to desert the control of corporativist branches of the ruling 
party. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz took the application of national security principles to the 
extreme by sending the military to crush the student movement in 1968 and incipient 
guerrillas in Chihauhua and Guerrero in the late 1960s. Such policies were maintained 
during the sexenios of Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillo, whose policies of 
internal security annihilated the urban and rural guerrilla in Mexico, in what is known as 
the dirty war. In 2006, the Special Prosecutor of Social and Political Movements of the 
Past, Mr. Carrillo Prieto, concluded that the Mexican Army participated in at least 12 
massacres, 120 extrajudicial executions, 800 forced disappearances and more than 2,000 
acts of torture along with an unquantifiable number of violations of human rights 
between 1965 and 1982. The special prosecutor found the armed forces and the federal 
government responsible of crimes against humanity, terrorism and 
genocide.(FEMOSPP 2006: IX and X)
Therefore, it seems that the idea behind the process of institutionalization was not so 
much to make the military politically neutral as some experts on Mexican civil-military 
relations argued (Lieuwen 1968; Lozoya 1970; Boils 1975), but to make it a powerful 
state agent, highly respectful of its popular origin; proud of its revolutionary past and 
closely aligned to the objectives and commands of the executive power. In other words, 
the type of civilian control imposed by the post revolutionary regime over the military, 
kept several characteristics of its predecessor in a way that clearly favoured the 
interests, often of partisan nature, of the incumbent president. In time, this relationship 
became self-reinforcing as the executive power had the use of an efficient policy 
instrument that, given the hierarchical and organizational characteristics of the military,
15 On moral capital, I agree to the conceptualization made by J Kane (2001) as to define moral prestige -  
whether of an individual, an organization or a cause- in useful service. In terms of civil military relations, 
the moral capital of the armed forces represents a ‘resource for political agents and institutions, one that 
in combination with other familiar political resources enables political processes, supports political 
contestants and create political opportunities’. (Kane 2001:1)
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was always eager to follow orders without hesitation16. In response, presidents 
committed to respect and promote the corporate interest of the armed forces by 
approving generous military budgets, modernisation programmes and excluding the 
judiciary and legislative branches of power from substantial supervision over the army 
and navy. Therefore, the system of control that has prevailed in the country over the 
armed forces is closer to a form of presidential control, rather than civilian in strict 
terms.
In essence, as long as missions delegated to the armed forces were allowed to be 
autonomously performed and did not blatantly overlap with those performed by civilian 
agencies, civil-military relations were kept calm and steady for the ruling elite Once 
more, as occurred during el porfiriato, problems with the system of civil-military 
relations only became obvious when the military was unable to address the maderista 
revolution. Likewise, problems with the current system only became visible when 
President Carlos Salinas asked the armed forces to participate in tasks of public security 
and anti-drug trafficking operations which, up to 1989, had been historically performed 
by civilian agencies. In practice, this meant bringing the military into the drug war to 
replace inefficient and corrupt police bodies as well as to respond to international 
pressures, particularly from the United States government, to increase the capacity of
17the Mexican state to disrupt the supply of illicit drugs to the American market .
In the light of the current structure of public security in Mexico, it seems that President 
Salinas’ new policy approach to counteract the power of the drug cartels opened a 
window of opportunity that the military quickly seized, not just to augment their 
intervention to counter drug trafficking, but eventually to intervene in every comer of 
federal and state police agencies. In fact, since 1989, the military has gradually 
acquired many of the functions that once belonged to the Attorney-General’s Office. It
16 In a recent interview, former president Luis Echeverria explained this relationship in relation to the 
events of 1968 and the student movement. “Now and then the great determinations to the Army come 
from the President, who is the chief commander of the Army”. On the question of did you, as Interior 
Minister, have communication with the Secretary of Defence during the clash between the students and 
the army on October 2, 1968?, Echeverria answered: “no, the secretary of defence never deals with the 
Interior Minister or the undersecretary, he deals directly with the president”(Cardenas Estandia 2008:77).
17 For U.S. pressures on Mexico for the issue of drug trafficking see: (Craig 1980; Van Wert 1986; 
Arriaga 1988; Castaneda 1988; Cornelius 1988; Barajas de la Vega 1990; Toro 1990; Alizal 1991; 
Zagaris and MacDonald 1992; Gonzalez 1996; Lemus 1996; Marquez Pererira 1996; Gaytan Guzman 
1997; Bewley-Taylor 1998; Velez Quero 1999; Velez Quero 1999b; Wiarda 2000; Mendoza Chan 2001; 
Ramos Garcia 2003)
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also gained the faculty to lead the reform of federal police bodies; and in a matter of 
years the military became powerful enough to dominate the intelligence apparatus of the 
state (Freeman and Chillier 2005). The military has gained power and autonomy vis-a- 
vis civilian law enforcement bodies. This remains unchecked by the judiciary and 
legislative power. Furthermore, its capacity to act autonomously has also grown as “on 
leave” or retired military personnel have come to dominate federal, state and even local 
police bodies. Additionally, the armed forces have increased their capability to act 
independently as numerous retired or on-leave officers lead federal, state and local 
institutions of public security. In fact, and irrespective of political affiliation, 
presidents, governors and city mayors have increasingly opted to involve the armed 
forces in order to contain criminality and maintain public order. An approach that 
clearly became noticeable in 1989 (Turbiville 1997). Since then, the armed forces have 
become the second largest employer of Mexico’s centralized public administration with 
nearly 300,000 positions (130,000 more than in 1989 and 200,000 more than 1980). 
Finally, the presidential defeat of the PRI after 71 years in office did not lead to a shift 
in the ongoing policy of militarization. In fact, it was during the administration of 
Vicente Fox when the Attorney-General’s Office appeared, for the first time in history, 
as a mere extension of the Defence Ministry.
Puzzling as it sounds, the militarization of the system of public security shared the same 
time and space as an apparently opposite process. While the political system transited 
to more democratic conditions of electoral competition, meantime, policing duties, 
traditionally led by civilian agencies, went under the control of the military. Mexico’s 
recent developments on civil-military relations offer a challenging case to study. That is, 
how democratically elected politicians can use pre-democratic arrangements of civilian 
control over the military to address pressing policy issues, even at the expense of 
postponing, delaying, if not ignoring, the construction and true renovation of law 
enforcement institutions based on civilian leadership (Negroponte 1999), an 
instrumental element for the consolidation of Mexico’s young democracy.
II. Research question, methodology and aims of the study
This thesis analyses the process by which the military has come to intervene in the 
system of public security in Mexico. It also addresses the repercussions that such
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participation is likely to engender in the process of democratic consolidation. The 
questions I attempt to answer are: 1) why did the armed forces begin to expand their 
sphere of influence as the country’s political system abandoned the long-existing 
hegemony of a single political party?; 2) in which ways did the reform process of 
civilian-based police agencies change civil-military relations?; and 3) how does 
militarisation of public security affect the prospects of democratic consolidation in 
Mexico?
I hypothesise and later demonstrate that granting primacy to the armed forces in tasks of 
public security heightened the long-standing authoritarian characteristics of the system 
of civil-military relations, which have also triggered negative consequences in relation 
to the overall process of democratic consolidation. First, while politicians may be 
willing to make costly policy decisions inspired by short-term horizons, the military 
responds to a different logic. If something has been clearly observed in the current 
drive of militarization, it is that once functions have been delegated to the armed forces, 
it is very difficult to return them to civilian agencies. This is particularly clear when we 
observe the transformation the army has gone through in regard to its structure of 
promotions, organization, educational system, deployment and training of troops to 
address organised crime and public insecurity. Second, it seems clear that by delegating 
direct policing functions to the armed forces, which have been historically an 
autonomous and restricted state agent, the ruling elite opened a wide window of 
opportunity for their participation in the entire system of public security. In fact, since 
President Salinas’ initial decision to involve the army in the war against drug trafficking 
in 1989, this institution has taken over a multitude of functions of the Attorney- 
General’s Office, has led to the reform of federal police bodies, has become dominant in 
the intelligence apparatus of the Mexican State, and obtained, since then, the ability to 
displace civilian authorities from state and municipal police departments.
I will argue that the incentives created over time by tighter electoral competition have 
reshaped the preferences of pragmatic politicians. They expect to profit from the high 
moral capital of the armed forces, by sending soldiers to address pressing policy issues, 
such as the expansion of public insecurity, the increasing focal points of insurgency, and 
of course anti drug trafficking operations. As a result, military intervention in public 
security is not only a portrayal or representation of the government’s true will in
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relation to national security issues, but also happens to be what the population hopes for 
or expects. I will argue that the problem lays not so much on the intervention of the 
military in the system of public security, but on the unaccountable and non-supervised
1 Rway in which such participation takes place 
Methodology
I address these issues by looking at the historical and institutional roots of the system of 
civil-military relations in Mexico. For that reason, I began this research by examining 
the original agreement that gave birth to the strict (formal and informal) rules of civilian 
control over the military, established during the protracted rule of Porfirio Diaz (1876- 
1911). From that period, I examine the details of the way this original agreement kept 
its basic characteristics throughout the 20th Century, passing by the Mexican 
Revolution, the consolidation of the post-revolutionary regime, the cold war and the 
period known as the dirty war (1968-1982). After 1989, I address the onset of 
militarization of public security as framed during the administration of President Carlos 
Salinas. I look at the transformations that such policy shifts produced in the overall 
configuration of civil-military relations in the years that followed. The last two chapters 
describe in detail the government’s approach to combating organised crime and 
counterinsurgency, which represent the mayor driving forces fuelling the increasing role 
of the military in the system of public security.
In simple terms, this thesis presents an analytic narrative19 to explain the reconstruction 
of state power in Mexico after the Revolution and the way the executive branch shaped 
its relationship with the armed forces to address specific internal policy objectives as 
opposed to conventional missions of deterrence and national defence. In view of the 
fact that civilian control over the armed forces in Mexico has consistently avoided the 
participation of government agencies other than the presidential office, this thesis deals 
mainly with two major institutions (actors): the executive power and the armed forces. 
It identifies their goals and preferences, as well as the formal and informal rules that 
influence their behaviour (Levi 2002:4).
18 See S. Arzt (2003)
19 M. Levi (2000) argues that an analytic narrative is an effort to clarify and make explicit the approach 
adopted by numerous scholars trying to combine historical and comparative research with rational choice 
models
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Thus, through a historical narrative, I identify the strategies of the executive power 
towards the military to achieve specific policy objectives prior and after the process of 
democratisation. I assume that while the system remained dominated by authoritarian 
conditions of political participation, the president’s first choice was to maintain the 
political status quo. Therefore, the military represented a valuable asset to deter or 
eliminate the emergence of organized political opposition, whether this resistance aimed 
towards the executive’s chosen policies or to the nature of the political system. 
However, as the system started to democratize in the late 1980s, the executive’s 
priorities changed in important ways. The need to keep political enemies under control 
was no longer seen as a priority. Instead, the main concern was to win the allegiance of 
the citizenry under the new rules and conditions of democratic electoral competition. 
Democratisation did represent a critical juncture in Mexico’s recent history that shifted 
a longstanding equilibrium favouring the executive power over the armed forces. 
Furthermore, democratization did not diminish the role of the military in the political 
system as has arguably occurred in other countries of Latin America.
I explain the resilience of the authoritarian characteristics of the system of civil-military 
relationships in Mexico by looking at the long-cultivated moral capital of the military in 
Mexican politics. This characteristic makes the intensive use of the armed forces to 
address the shortcomings of civilian government agencies a widely accepted measure to 
the public. Contrary to conventional wisdom or logical expectations (Hunter 1997; 
Call 2002), democratization ended up increasing the importance of the military in 
national politics. Within this new panorama, the ruling elite continuously portray the 
extensive use of the military in police and national security agencies as the ultimate 
proof of their commitment to the rule of law and the combat of organised crime. On the 
military side of the equation, I address the way the armed forces adapted their 
organisation to changing political conditions and preferences of the incumbent president 
in order to protect its moral capital and promote its corporate interest.
Under this logic, a rational choice approach along to an historical institutionalist 
perspective appears relevant to address the different dimension of this phenomenon. 
Historical institutionalism (HI) views political development as a path-dependent 
process: following one path channels further development down the same direction 
(Ikenberry, Lake et al. 1988; Levi 1997; Pierson 2004), which often precludes other
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choices from taking place (Hunter 1997). As N. Pedriana (2005) argues, this does not 
necessarily mean that once an initial path is chosen, future actions and outcomes 
become predetermined or automatically “locked in” (Pedriana 2005:360). It rather 
means that the probability of continuing movement along the same path increases with 
each subsequent step in the chosen direction. Reversing course is thus not impossible, 
but increasingly unlikely (Steinmo, Thelen et al. 1992; Thelen 1999). Likewise, a 
rational choice approach offers a compelling understanding of the incentives that fairer 
conditions for electoral competition had on elected politicians’ preferences concerning 
the use of the armed forces in sensitive tasks of public security, such as counteracting 
drug trafficking or containing insurgency.
The empirical evidence regarding the way this process evolved suggests the military’s 
vertical and undisputed subordination to the executive power is path dependent and 
crafted in time. In contrast, the horizontal expansion of military missions, meaning the 
invasion of military agents into areas traditionally dominated by civilians, is 
intrinsically linked to a changing political environment that affects objectives and 
preference formation of ruling elites. Therefore, a creative combination that attempts to 
harness the strengths of each approach seems adequate to disentangle the puzzle that 
inspires this research.
As will be explained in detail in Chapter 1 ,1 bind together rational choice and historical 
institutionalism in a model that explains the inner workings of Mexico’s system of civil- 
military relations. By a model, I understand a ‘schematic statement of a theoretical 
argument, a hypothesized parsimonious abstraction of “reality” that depicts deductively 
sound, systematic, regular relationships between specified aspects of reality and helps to 
explain that relationship’ (Biithe 2002:482). The model I propose is divided into three 
levels of a pyramid where a distinctive principal-agent relationship takes place. At the 
top of civilian control, the relationship between the executive power and the military 
remains strong and unequal, favouring the authority of the president. However, at lower 
levels of the government structure, where the armed forces interact with other state 
agencies, the relationship was reversed by the new set of responsibilities they have 
acquired since 1989. At this point, civilian law enforcement agencies happen to be 
subordinated to the armed forces, or at least supervised by them. In that sense, 
empowering the armed forces in public security not only reinforces their role as the
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privileged and reliable agent of the president to combat criminality, but also converts 
the military to become the principal vis-a-vis federal and state law enforcement 
institutions. At the bottom of the pyramid, the relationship is virtually nonexistent or 
irrelevant for the system of civil-military relations, as the legislative or the judicial 
branches of power do not formally supervise the armed forces. It is at this level where a 
major obstacle to the construction of a more democratic civil-military relationship 
resides.
Aim of the Study
This thesis takes as starting point the historical and institutional foundations of 
Mexico’s system of civil-military relations to explain the role of the armed forces in the 
political system and its relation with the executive power. It delves on a specific form of 
civilian control over the armed forces -in what I call exclusive subordination- to explain 
the undisputed authority of the president and the way this characteristic enables the 
horizontal expansion of military mission in the political system beyond their 
conventional expertise. My research aims at investigating how this form of control not 
only resisted the push that democratization made over several political institutions and 
practices after 1989, but also reinforced the dependency of elected officials to portray 
the participation of the military as a clear sign of commitment to address pressing policy 
issues such as the combat to organised crime and the containment of subversion.
III. Sources of information
The core of the historical narrative constructed in chapters 2 to 5 is built on a myriad of 
information sources. Apart from the encompassing and detailed studies of Roderic Ai 
Camp on Mexican civil-military relations, the literature dealing with this topic is 
somewhat limited. Therefore, I looked at a number of secondary sources containing 
historical accounts of this period: books and papers where I found bits and fragments of 
the relationship between the armed forces and the executive power. On this issue, I 
found useful bibliographic material generated by the armed forces themselves, such as 
la Revista del Ejercito and some internal booklets provided by retired officers and the 
navy attache in London. I also consulted the database of The New York Times, as their 
envoys in Mexico were prolific on registering the tight relationship between the 
Mexican president and the military, particularly during the 1940s, 50s and 60s. I visited
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the Hemeroteca National, where I searched specific numbers of El Universal and El Sol 
during the 1960s to elaborate on the jaramillista and the student movement of 1968.
Theses and specific collections
The second source of information were the theses of Mexican and American officers 
who had studied Master’s degrees at universities and colleges linked to the US 
Secretary of Defence. Their views were instrumental in understanding the way 
American and Mexican officers conceptualise the military in terms of its doctrine and 
character of their missions. I also consulted M.Sc., B.Sc., and unpublished doctoral 
theses at the archives of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the History 
Department of the Autonomous University of Puebla and El Colegio de Michoacan in 
Morelia, which have been quite prolific in the generation of research on armed 
movements in Mexico. I found very enlightening interviews of students who managed 
to talk with high-ranked army officers on issues directly connected to the core argument 
of this thesis. On contemporary bibliography, I ran searches periodically on Google 
Scholar on militarisation, Mexican Armed Forces, drug trafficking, counterinsurgency 
and other keywords that often provided interesting clues to updated studies, conference 
papers and unpublished material. I also made an intensive use of press articles on the 
issue of drug trafficking and militarisation of public security, which has become a 
widely covered issue by the Mexican public opinion in the last ten years. On this 
subject, I centred my attention on three newspapers that have efficient online search 
engines: La Jornada, Reforma and El Universal. Occasionally, I also consulted Milenio 
and La Cronica. Weekly magazines were also a source of valuable material, especially 
Proceso, which has closely covered the activities of the armed forces since 1976. Their 
articles and material were helpful to build the argument of Chapter 6 and 7 that deal 
with the dirty war and more contemporary guerrilla movements.
Archives and official data
The opening of the archives of the DFS in 2001 represents an invaluable source of 
original material on the politics of national security in Mexico. Even though its 
consultation is restricted, as the archive remains under the guardianship of the Centre of 
Research and National Security (CISEN), the material provided by its custodians on
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Ruben Jaramillo, Lucio Cabanas, Genaro Vazquez, the Action Revolutionary 
Movement (MAR), the Communist League 23 of September; Arturo Gamiz and the 
Revolutionary Action Group; Los Halcones and the White Brigade were instrumental to 
document what I call the politics of national security during the presidencies of Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillo. 
Likewise, during my visits to the Mexican Archives, I also requested the public 
versions of intelligence dossiers of key political figures of the period under study. 
That was the case of Alfonso Martinez Dominguez, Mayor of Mexico City during the 
Corpus Thursday massacre dated June 11, 1971; General Hermenegildo Cuenca Diaz, 
Secretary of National Defence 1970-1976; General Marcelino Garcia Barragan, 
Secretary of Defence 1964-1970; General Miguel Angel Godinez Bravo, Chief of 
Military Staff 1976-1982; Colonel Manuel Diaz Escobar, Chief of the group known as 
“Los Halcones”; Javier Garcia Paniagua, Director of the Federal Directorate of Security 
1976-1979. Half of those dossiers were prepared by personnel of the CISEN and the 
Unit of Transparency of the National Archives by direct request of this author. Each 
dossier contains between 500 and 1500 pages. I also explored the archives of the 
Secretary of Defence (SEDENA), located in Gallery 2 of the National Archives 
building. These documents are open to free consultation and contain intelligence 
dossiers made by the armed forces concerning guerrilla operations in Guerrero as well 
as the army’s counterinsurgency tactics. Contrary to my experience in the US National 
Archives, the Mexican National Archive lacks an efficient catalogue. Therefore, the 
researcher often receives boxes full of documents that may or may not be related to the 
issues that are being researched, making the task of consulting the archive very time 
consuming.
In a similar way, I checked online documents posted by the Mexico Project of the
91National Security Archives . I conducted several visits to the National Archives of the 
United States, kept at the University of Maryland during 2005 and 2006, especially in 
what concerns classified communication, analysis and studies generated by US embassy
20 A public version is a revised report of intelligence dossiers of individuals or movements as they were 
elaborated by the Federal Directorate of Security or other intelligence agencies of the Mexican 
Government. These reports do not contain personal information of those that were subjected to 
surveillance, such as addresses, telephone numbers, lover’s names, etc. These documents are elaborated 
by personnel of the National Archive on request of researchers though the IFAI
21 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/mexico/
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personnel and military attaches in Mexico that were later sent to the State Department 
from 1905 to 1974.
The last two chapters are mainly based on information I requested from the armed 
forces through the IFAI. I made 49 requests of information to the Army, Navy and the 
Attorney-General’s Office on a variety of issues. I must say that the military many 
times tagged the requested information as restricted. However, it seems army personnel 
in charge of responding to information requests were particularly open during the first 
weeks of the implementation of this policy late in 2003.1 thank such extra cooperation, 
as the information provided on the distribution of army forces in the country, policy of 
promotions and the list on on-leave or retired officers working in federal, state and 
municipal agencies of public security were vital for the elaboration of tables and graphs 
presented in chapter 7 and 8. Similarly, I consulted the statistical appendix of several 
annual presidential addresses to the Nation, which contain information on budgets and 
performance of federal agencies, the armed forces included.
Interviews
In general, chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 contain several interviews with military personnel, 
active, on-leave and retired officers who were willing to share their views on the system 
of civil-military relations and their experiences in their direct participation in operations 
against drug trafficking, guerrilla movements and public security. In the last section of 
the thesis, the reader will find a complete list of the interviews I conducted during the 
course of this research. Still, it is important to say that given the nature of the topic, it 
was often difficult to find officers willing to discuss their experiences on such issues. 
Thanks to the intervention of the former leader of the senate, Mr. Enrique Jackson 
Ramirez, and the federal deputy Jose Alberto Aguilar Inarritu, a number of retired and 
on-leave officers agreed to talk to me. The people I chose to interview where those who 
had had direct contact with the issues that I examine in depth in those chapters, 
specifically the foundation of the Federal Directorate of Security and its role in the 
political system; the relationship between the executive power and the armed forces; the 
so-called guerra sucia (dirty war); the counterinsurgency policy and strategy of the 
Mexican Government; military counter drug-trafficking operations and the active 
participation of the military in the tasks of public security. That was the case of General 
Ramon Mota Sanchez, chief of staff of the Secretary of Defence (1978-1980) and
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Chairman of the Senate’s Defence Commission during the LVI Legislature; General 
Miguel Angel Godinez Bravo, chief of military staff of president Jose Lopez Portillo; 
General Armando Palmerin Cordero, undersecretary of defence under the Presidency of 
Vicente Fox; General Homero Gamboa, member of the security staff of President Luis 
Echeverria, Vice-Admiral Rafael Galvez Ibarra, who was part of the team in charge of 
the foundation of the Federal Preventive Police during the presidency of Emesto 
Zedillo. In all cases, I prepared a detailed script to guide the interviews, according to the 
background information I had for each case. However, I frequently found the 
interviewees unwilling to address my questions directly, so I opted to let them talk on 
the issue freely, while asking them to be more specific on certain issues.
The thesis was also enriched by a number of interviews I made with high profile 
politicians, such as Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, deputy attorney general for the war 
against organised crime during the presidency of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon; 
Fidel Herrera Beltran, Governor of Veracruz; Emeterio Lopez Marquez, former 
Attorney General of Veracruz; and other public servants who commented on the nature 
of civilian control of the military in Mexico and their experiences dealing with the 
Secretary of Defence. I conducted several interviews with members of congress who 
had participated in the Commission of National Defence. I also interviewed activists 
and leaders of prestigious human rights organisations working in Mexico and 
Washington DC. However, the most fascinating testimonies I got were in the prison of 
Santa Martha Acatitla, where the deputy director of the Federal Directorate of Security 
(DFS), Commandant Sergio Espino Verdin, faces a 90-year sentence for his alleged 
participation in the assassination of Enrique Camarena Salazar in 1985. I also 
interviewed inmates Samuel Raza and Francisco Tejeda Juarez, both former agents of 
the DFS. Their insights into the role of the armed forces and the DFS in the dirty war 
and the campaign against drug trafficking were essential for the construction of the 
argument in Chapters 6 and 7.
IV. Outline of the thesis
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents theoretical considerations in 
traditional and more contemporary studies of civil-military relations in Latin America. 
It addresses the shortcomings of the existing literature to deal with the Mexican 
experience. In the last section of the chapter, I propose a constructive dialogue between
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historical institutionalism and rational choice to address this gap in the existing 
literature. I argue that historical institutionalism is able to disentangle the resilient 
nature of control the executive power enjoys military officers; while a rational choice 
can be useful to reveal how the process of democratisation in Mexico heightened the 
incentives of elected leaders to militarise the system of public security.
Chapter 2 is the first of five historical chapters. In this chapter, I analyze the way 
civilian control over the military was originally imposed during e/ porfiriato (1876- 
1911). I focus on the informal methods for maintaining the loyalty of the officer corps 
and Diaz’s approach on military professionalism. This discussion is important as el 
porfiriato set a path-dependent trajectory on the nature of civil-military relations that 
could not even be changed by the tremendous rupture with the past that signified the 
Mexican Revolution.
In Chapter 3, I set out the basic picture of the Mexican Revolution, the destruction of 
Diaz’s army and the resurgence of a system of civilian control over the armed forces 
that institutionalized their exclusive subordination to the president as it occurred during 
el porfiriato. It also looks at the characteristics of the regional security complex where 
Mexico is located and the way this geopolitical position defined the internal role of the 
military: imposing public order, addressing political and electoral conflicts and 
promoting economic development. This is in contrast to more traditional conceptions of 
national defence.
Chapter 4 discusses mainly the sexenio of Lazaro Cardenas. The first section of this 
chapter deals with Calles’ political downfall that, given the dominant role he had played 
since the assassination of Obregon in 1928, resulted in the ultimate test of loyalty of the 
armed forces to the executive power. The second part focuses on the political uses of 
the armed forces to support specific and sometimes controversial reforms and policy 
paths chosen by President Cardenas between 1938 and 1939. I also look at the 
presidential term of Manuel Avila Camacho and the positive effect that the war scenario 
in Europe brought to the armed forces in terms of technological modernization and 
military professionalism. The last section explains how, after 1946, the military found 
itself trapped in a political system where their external defence role was secondary 
while its internal missions were closely identified with the preservation of the regime, 
which, to some extent, was the outcome of its own struggle.
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Chapter 5 introduces a further dimension of the system of civil-military relations. It 
analyses the increasing partisan use of the military during the presidency of Miguel 
Aleman, particularly against the independent union movement. It this chapter, I also 
address the role of the Federal Directorate of Security as the first informal mechanism 
devised by civilians to assist the armed forces to combat those considered as enemies, as 
well as to supervise their missions. In the second section, I look at the extreme partisan 
use of the military during the incipient guerrilla movements in Morelos and Chihuahua, 
as well as the long-term impact that the repression of the student movement in 1968 
generated in the political system. Finally, I analyse the nature of military missions after 
1960 by evaluating the capacity of the armed forces to adjust to the changing 
preferences of the executive power, while safeguarding their corporate interests.
Chapter 6 analyzes the excessive use of force presidents Luis Echeverria and Jose 
Lopez Portillo directed against the student, rural and guerrilla movements in the 1970s, 
in what was supposed to be a partial conferral of internal political affairs to the military, 
intelligence agencies and police bodies. I also address the way the military changed its 
structure and way of acting to avoid damaging their public image as a result of the 
president’s intention to control political dissent. To illustrate this process, I will 
examine the role of the armed forces during three major internal security events that 
took place in the 1970s under the presidency of Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez 
Portillo: the massacre of June 10th, 1971, known as Corpus Thursday; the 
counterinsurgency policy employed by the armed forces in Guerrero to crush the armed 
groups of Genaro Vazquez and Lucio Cabanas; and the participation of the armed forces 
in the campaign against the urban guerrillas, specially their role in the persecution of the 
Communist League September 23.
In Chapter 7 ,1 draw attention to the current counterinsurgency role of the armed forces 
and the ways the conflict in Chiapas changed the traditional approach of the military to 
counteract guerrillas in the country. I will concentrate on the way the army in Mexico 
modified its internal structure of promotions, deployment and training of troops as a 
way to improve the containment of insurgency, particularly in the southeast region. 
Second, I will look at the informal mechanisms the army has at its disposal to defuse 
any institutional attempt to review its past record of abuses and violations to human 
rights that could represent a direct damage to their corporate interest. On this issue, I
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suggest that democratisation in Mexico strengthened the political leverage of the armed 
forces at different levels of the structure of political power. This situation is consistent 
with the type of exclusive subordination of the armed forces, and poses serious 
questions regarding the ability of Mexico’s democracy to consolidate in the upcoming 
years. In the final section, I appraise the challenge that represents the recent terrorist 
attacks of the EPR to the abilities and real capacities of the Mexican state to contain this 
sort of guerrilla.
In chapter 8 ,1 look at the enhanced role of the military in the system of public security. 
The first part takes on the historical background of the participation of the military in 
counteracting drug trafficking. In this section, I deal with the longstanding pressure the 
United States have exerted on the Mexican government to improve its capacity to 
combat the power of the drug cartels. In the second section, I weigh up the possible 
motivations President Salinas considered prior to his decision to delegate the load of the 
strategy to counteract the illicit traffic of drugs to the armed forces. I particularly delve 
into the transformation this new role generated in the organisation of the armed forces, 
especially regarding its yearly budget allocations, geographical distribution of personnel 
and internal structure of promotions. In the final part, I explore the presidency of 
Vicente Fox and how the great expectations of change that prevailed during his 
campaign in terms of democratising the system of civilian control over the military 
ended up enhancing militarisation even more, and therefore, weakening the current 
process of democratic consolidation.
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Chapter 1. Civil-Military Relations in Mexico: A Theoretical Framework
“The civil-m ilitary challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough 
to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate 
enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do. Peter D. 
Feaver (1996:1).
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss traditional and more contemporary approaches to civil-military 
relations. I aim to identify which theoretical tools are relevant to explain the role of 
Mexico’s armed forces in the political system; their longstanding relationship of 
subordination to the executive power and the way democratic consolidation has been 
affected by its expanding role in the system of public security. For that reason, I find it 
best to divide this chapter into three sections. First, I explore traditional theoretical 
approaches of civil-military relations and civilian supremacy as well as their usefulness 
to address the Mexican case. In the second section, I address historical institutionalism 
and rational choice approaches on contemporary civil-military relations. In the third 
and final part of the chapter, I present a theoretical framework that combines the 
strengths of the historical institutional analysis with a model based on a simple 
principal-agent relationship. I will argue that this synthesis is useful to address the 
characteristics of civilian control over the military in Mexico.
Historical institutionalism and rational choice are the most relevant explanations for 
civil-military relations in Latin America after the last wave of democratisation, and they 
complement each other while offering a convincing explanation to the question that 
inspires this thesis. I argue that an analytic narrative can effectively address the 
theoretical inconsistencies of traditional approaches on civil-military control when 
applied to the Mexican case. It is useful to uncover not only the complex historical 
patterns of direct and indirect military influence in politics, but also the incentives 
presidents have considered at the time of delegating to the military missions that 
differed from those of national defence.
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1.1. The traditional view on civil-military relations.
Either to support or to attack his arguments on civil-military control, Huntington’s 
seminal study, The Soldier and the State, is perhaps one of the most cited books in 
contemporary literature on civil-military relations (Feaver 1999). In fact, through 
Huntington’s approaches and those of scholars who oppose his perception on civil- 
military control, it is possible to address the normative, structural and cultural focuses 
that characterise the literature on this field in the second half of the 20th Century. 
Bearing this in mind, I will discuss three main characteristics of Huntington’s 
prescriptive study on objective control and military professionalism to address the 
relevance of traditional civil-military relations literature for Mexico’s case. When 
speaking of traditional, I make extensive allusion to studies and theoretical explanations 
that addressed civil-military relations in Latin America prior to the democratizing wave 
of the 1980s and early 1990s.
1.1.1 The importance of objective control
S. Huntington argued that the best way to achieve the subordination of the armed forces 
was by turning the military establishment politically neutral through encouraging “an 
independent military sphere.” The objective is to make difficult for political groups to 
involve the armed forces in their own struggles for power (Huntington 1957). This 
could be achieved by recognising the autonomous field of military professionalisation. 
He named this strategy objective military control.
Huntington explained that modem warfare requires highly specialised military skills, 
which are practically impossible to acquire when the armed forces have a close 
involvement in political matters. In that sense, a wise decision would be to promote the 
conditions for military professionalisation in the art of national defence that reflect their 
special status as experts in the management of violence. It was expected that this policy 
could compel the armed forces to abandon other missions that are not compatible with 
the protection of the state against its enemies. Huntington hoped that by promoting 
professionalisation of the armed forces, political intervention could be erased from the 
military’s routines and most important, from the “military mind.”
The antithesis of professionalisation of the armed forces would be subjective control, by 
which the ruling elite turns them into an instrument for the achievement of political
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objectives. However, subjective control is dangerous because it opens the door of 
politics to military participation and stops the armed forces from developing their own 
independent commitment to political non-interference. It also hinders the possibilities of 
achieving an efficient military apparatus capable of defending the nation against 
external or internal enemies in what Huntington calls “military security” (Huntington 
1957).
In general, Huntington’s approach to civilian control did not escape criticism on a 
variety of issues. In fact, through Huntington’s observations, the literature on civil- 
military relations became remarkably prolific in the 1960s and 1970s. To begin with, S. 
Finer claimed that speaking favourably of military professionalism as a way to promote 
apolitical military establishments could not be empirically proven right. The German 
and Japanese cases after the 1930s are notorious. S. Finer (1967) argued that the whole 
weakness of Huntington’s thesis was that everything was made to rest upon a very 
special definition of professionalism, and by pure deduction from this, of a so-called 
‘military mind.’ Finer insisted that Huntington’s arguments were essentialist: ‘If 
soldiers are observed to act in ways consistent with these concepts of professionalism 
and the military mind, so much the worse of the soldiers: they are not completely 
professional, not purely military’ (Finer 1962:22). In contrast, Finer concludes that if 
the armed forces are not to intervene in the political arena, they must believe in an 
explicit principle: the principle of civilian supremacy.
On similar grounds, S. Fitch (1998) argues that, historically, military professionalisation 
in Latin America has resulted in more institutionalised military intervention in politics 
and higher levels of military autonomy. Fitch’s conceptualisation of military 
professionalisation does not differ significantly from Huntington’s in terms of technical 
development, training system, corporate identity, responsibility and others. However, 
Fitch points out, I think correctly, that the negative correlation between 
professionalisation and political intervention is basically an empirical question open to 
investigation (Fitch 1998:3).
As indicated by Fitch, there are important similarities between the Mexican case and 
Huntington’s concept of subjective civilian control (Serrano 1995). Different to other 
experiences in Latin America, the armed forces’ role in the political system was 
established within the governmental apparatus as an unconditional ally of the executive
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power. After 1934, the military in Mexico was neither a political competitor nor an 
autonomous political actor. This characteristic has clear historical and institutional 
reasons. The first antecedent of civilian supremacy was established by Porfirio Diaz 
during his protracted rule of 34 years in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. As it 
will be observed in Chapter 2 and 3, President Diaz’s informal model of military control 
was later institutionalised by Presidents Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obregon and 
Plutarco Elias Calles, also known as the architects of the post-revolutionary regime. 
This generation of leaders made of the preservation of political stability one of the 
pillars of military duties.
In this line, D. Rueschemeyer et.al. (1992), argue that Mexico experienced a late 
consolidation of the state power (Rueschemeyer, Huber et al. 1992). This had occurred 
by the late 1920s, when the military elite that emerged victorious from the 
Revolutionary War agreed on the institutional framework of the new and modem 
Mexican State. R. Camp (1992) rightly points out that it was during this period that the 
leadership of the militias that triumphed in the Mexican Revolution understood that 
political stability could not be achieved if  charismatic caudillos were allowed to 
participate in politics from their military positions. To address this problem, the post­
revolutionary elite agreed to transform the armed forces into a loyal and professional 
agency, subjected to a single political command as a primary requisite for future 
political stability.
This political agreement had formal and informal institutional underpinnings: first by 
institutionalising the role of the armed forces in the Constitution and The Organic Law 
of the Armed Forces, and second, by having the new generations of officers internalise, 
and socialise in, the values of patriotism and loyalty to the political institutions created 
by the Revolution, including strict obedience to the commands of the executive power 
(Ackroyd 1991; Wager 1994). It seems clear, as M. Serrano (1995) argues, that the 
political climate prevailing in the years that followed the end of the armed struggle was 
suitable for bringing the armed forces into a strict form of civilian control (Serrano 
1995). In time, the principle of civilian supremacy, as Finer (1962) defined it, became a 
constant in the political landscape.
On the face of it, military missions in the political system acquired two specific 
dimensions. On the one hand, the military devoted their human and material resources
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to perform social policy1 tasks in what may be called the developmentalist (Fitch 1998) 
and civilianist nature of military missions2 (Moskos, Williams et al. 2000). On the 
other hand, the armed forces assumed the partisan role of keeping in check real or 
potential enemies of the political regime they had helped to create. This responsibility 
was shared by federal and local police bodies as well as specialised intelligence 
agencies with operative capacity under the supervision of the President and the Interior 
Ministry (Aguayo 2001). Under these two referents, Mexico’s military developed its 
own approach to military professionalism, especially designed to improve their 
performance in social and internal security missions. Their social policy role was closer 
to “objective control”, while the utilization of the armed forces to repress political 
opponents fits better the subjective kind of role as described by Huntington.
Public perceptions of military missions reflect this dual nature as well. The armed 
forces constructed a rock-solid reputation as the “patriotic nation-builders” (Wager 
1994:3) and one of the most efficient instruments of the state to promote development. 
As shown in Table 1.2, in spite of their partisan role and increasing public security 
responsibilities, the military remains as the best-rated government institution of the 
country3. Although scarce records of public opinion polls exist, focusing on military 
reputation during the 1960s and 1970s, there are no elements to suggest this could have 
been radically different among the general public to what is now, not even in states 
where the army carried out harsh counterinsurgency campaigns as a result of the 
suspected presence of guerrilla movements (GCE 2008).
1 Military accounts focusing on the armed forces’ political culture of the 1940s and 1950s show that these 
tasks became the preferred mission of the army’s leadership as they enhanced their reputation and the 
institution’s social capital. (Wager, 1994)
2 Mexico’s military roles in the political system were closer to General Juan Peron’s ideal concept of 
“integral professionalism,” which stressed the participation of the armed forces in a wide range of 
missions in support of the government program of national development.
3 J. Kane (2001) argues that moral capital exists only through people’s moral judgments and appraisals 
and is thus dependent on the perceptions available to them (Kane 2001:2). It is precisely this high 
reputation or moral capital of the armed forces what makes top policy makers (president, governors and 
city majors) more willing to delegate a variety of missions in the military as a way to portray their 
commitment to address pressing policy issues, such as crime and public insecurity.
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Table 1.1
Legitimacy of the state in Mexico: confidence of citizens in institutions
Percentage of Respondents Giving Positive Evaluation
Institution 1988 1998 2000 2008
Family 84 92 92 92
Church 62 77 75 77
Schools/university 60 64
Army/Navy 32 45 49 53
Business 22 52 41 45
Television 37 36 38
Unions 14 24 25
Newspaper/Media 25 29 24 50
Police 12 33 23 25
Law/Courts 32 31 22 28
Congress 16 28 21 23
Political Parties 29 20 20
Sources: The idea for this table was originally taken from Camp (2003:55) and later 
complemented with information from GCE (2008). Altogether, the sources are: Este Pais, 
August 1991,4; Laurence Parisot, “attitudes About the Media”: A Five Country Comparison,”
Marta Lagos, “Actitudes economicas y democracia en Latinoamerica ” JEste Pais) January 
1997: Table 16; “Democracy Through Latin American Lenses,” Grant, Hewlett Foundation,
Principal Investigator, Roderic Ai Camp, June 1998 and GCE (2008).
Although Huntington’s reference to subjective and objective control helps to identify 
the character of the system of civil-military relations, it does not provide enough 
elements to address specific characteristics that emerge from the empirical research. 
For instance, formal and informal rules governing the relationship between civilians and 
soldiers, as they were created after the Mexican Revolution, may comply with the 
prescriptive notion of objective civil-military control. Mexico’s military has been long 
subordinated to the executive power. Moreover, the undisputed subordination of the 
military’s hierarchy to Vicente Fox, the first elected president of a political party 
different to the PRI after 70 years in office, confirmed that military’s loyalty was not 
chained to the post-revolutionary political elite, but to presidential authority. Still, as 
will be detailed throughout the course of this research, the missions that either 
authoritarian or democratically elected civilian elites have delegated to the armed 
forces, particularly after 1989, suggest that their aims and means remain inherently 
authoritarian. Furthermore, the dangerous consequences that Huntington identifies as 
potentially evolving from subjective control did not apply entirely to Mexico’s 
experience. This is, in spite of the partisan character of military missions, often 
disguised as guarding the internal order; the armed forces did not turn into a visible 
political player.
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To Huntington’s credit, it seems true that the excessive participation of the military in 
internal affairs or areas that did not belong to their natural expertise hindered their 
capacity to achieve “military security,” as he rightly predicted. In other words, the 
incapacity to face an external or internal enemy, as it most likely occurred during the 
Zapatista uprising in 1994. In this category also enter the attacks to core Pemex’s 
infrastructure in June and September 2007 by the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), 
and certainly their inability to prevent the terrorist act presumably perpetrated by 
organised crime gangs during the Independence Day celebrations in the city of Morelia 
in 2008, uncovered the shortcomings of the Mexican armed forces to deal with a more 
organised and better funded form of insurgency and terrorist groups.
1.1.2 The structuralist critique
A second source of criticism of Huntington’s approach came from structuralist authors. 
For the case of civil-military relations in Argentina during the mid 1960s, G. O’Donnell 
(1976) added that acute conditions of political conflict (mass praetorianism) triggered 
by high modernization pushed the armed forces to intervene in the political arena. They 
aimed at re-establishing public order and securing favourable socio-economic 
conditions to economic development. Under conditions of great political instability and 
economic stalemate, the armed forces assumed that the main threats to national security 
transpired from the “socio-economic battlefront.” Therefore, it opened a new set of 
possibilities for professionalisation that were not related to a traditional vision of 
external defence but of training in faulty policy areas.
G. O’Donnell (1976) argued that this position created a credo that underscored 
economic development as a prerequisite for low levels of social conflict. “So, national 
security will not be attained and the armed forces will not have accomplished one of 
their fundamental goals. From this, it naturally follows that development is the very 
essence of national security” (O'Donnell 1976:209). In time, the newly acquired 
knowledge or the “new military professionalism” reinforced the belief among military 
officials that they had a superior capacity to confront social and economic problems. In 
that sense, civilian control grew weaker as the problems caused by high modernization 
reshaped the nature of military professionalisation, which in turn, generated the most 
intense and comprehensive type of military intervention on politics. From this, 
O’Donnell concludes: “because of their professionalism, not in spite of it,
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professionalized armed forces manifest a high probability of taking upon themselves the 
responsibility of overcoming recurring civil-military crises by the way of the installation 
of a new political regime.” (O’Donnell 1976:227)
S. Huntington himself recognised years after releasing The Soldier and the State, as A. 
Stepan and others pointed out (Stepan 1973; Pion-Berlin 2001) that the origins of 
military coups could not be entirely explained within the military organisation, but in 
the structure of society (Huntington 1968), and above all, by seeing the causes of 
politicisation of the armed forces in the disputes for power among social groups, and the 
impossibility of the ruling elite to satisfy increasing social demands through formal 
institutions. Huntington’s reformulation made his analysis closer to the structuralist 
approach (Pion-Berlin 2001). On similar grounds, W. Hunter (1997a) argued that 
strong civilian control is difficult to sustain, especially in countries where the armed 
forces have sought to expand their internal role in times of domestic political and 
economic crisis.
For the Mexican case, this discussion may lead us to consider that it could have been the 
absence of acute social tensions presumably generated by modernization policies in 
countries like Argentina that prevented Mexico’s military from politicisation. After all, 
the so-called golden years of the authoritarian domination of the PRI (1940-1968) were 
characterised by high levels of economic growth and relative improvement of living 
standards (Loaeza and Segovia 1987). Therefore, it can be argued the political 
institutionalisation of the authoritarian regime was flexible enough to meet the 
increasing political demands of a society that was certainly becoming more complex, 
but not necessarily involved in political issues.
For decades, the recipe of high political institutionalisation and selective partisan 
participation of the military in the resolution of political conflicts provided a sufficiently 
plausible explanation for Mexico’s political analysis. However, as the authoritarian 
regime started to experience a process of deinstitutionalisation of its structures of 
political control, apparently as a result of democratisation, the balance of power shifted 
towards more military participation to placate rising expressions of social discontent 
(Meyer 1996). Mexico’s experience on civil-military relations did not contradict 
theoretical expectations that military intervention rises when the institutionalisation of 
the military surpasses that of political parties and other civilian institutions. (Lowenthal
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and Fitch 1986). However, it does not seem to support the thesis that this intervention 
necessarily generates the politicisation of the military.
The structuralist literature does not seem to explain why Mexico’s armed forces avoided 
politicisation when economic stalemate and political tensions reached dangerous levels 
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. As for other countries on the continent, 
Mexico’s democratic transition, coupled with the need to reform the conditions of 
electoral contestation, liberalised, privatised and marketised an economy highly 
dominated by the state (Huntington 1995). However, the president’s control over the 
armed forces proved resilient even in the midst of acute economic restructuring and 
political crisis. In my view, the socially painful and probably “politically irrational” 
policies of Mexico’s economic reform (Santin Quiroz 2001) along with the 
deinstitutionalisation of the authoritarian regime in the 1990s, made military 
participation more likely to occur within the scope of the president’s policy choices. 
Nevertheless, such increasing participation did not change the strict nature of 
subordination to the Executive power. On the contrary, as it will be explained in detail 
in Chapter 7 and 8, this extreme form of civilian supremacy, in what I call the principle 
of exclusive subordination of the armed forces to the president, has been fiercely 
defended by the military itself.
1.1.3 External/Internal determinants of civil-military control
A third and last form of criticism to Huntington’s approach, with implications for this 
thesis, is centred on the normative characteristics of objective control. These arguments 
are partly summarised in M. Desch’s (1999) work. He argues that civilian control over 
the armed forces cannot be achieved solely by centring on the organisational 
characteristics or their normative bias4. Such a categorisation does not explain the
4 Normative institutionalists argue that norms and values within organizations are useful to explain the 
behaviour o f members of a particular organisation. Political actors tend to reflect more closely the values 
of the institutions with which they are associated, as stated by (Peters, 1999:25-37). For normative 
institutionalism, preferences are formed within the institutional environment rather than determined from 
external sources. Institutions mould their own participants, and supply systems of meaning for their 
members in political, economic or social spheres. On decision-making, normative institutionalists argue 
that institutions have a repertoire of solutions that are ready to be applied to a set of potential problems. 
(March, 1989). In that sense, Huntington’s objective civilian control would specify clear grounds of 
action for the armed forces and would defme their values and missions through professionalisation and 
socialisation with the civilian elite and the citizenry. Therefore, the military would not participate in the 
political arena because their commitment to professionalisation would prevent it. Huntington’s model of 
objective control subtracts political intervention from military’s “garbage can” as a route of action to 
address a specific problem. The value of Huntington’s study is that it set a starting point to discuss
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impact that the broader political system generates in the armed forces’ role. For M. 
Desch, it is important to ask what functions the armed forces are called to perform. 
Building on Stepan (1973, 1988), M. Desch argues that the military, as an organisation, 
responds to the nature of domestic and international threats. In other words, the nature 
of the missions defines the character of the relationship between civilians and soldiers 
and the military’s role in the political system5. Therefore, countries that face a 
challenging agenda of security based on external threats tend to have better control over 
the armed forces, while those that cope with the internal enemy generally experience 
problems to keep the military away from politics. A military apparatus with an external 
role is better suited for objective civilian control, as constant professionalisation would 
be the basis of achieving “military security.” In turn, a military centred on internal 
missions would be condemned to play an active political role against the internal 
enemies of the state, making civilian control problematic. When the external or internal 
environment is ambiguous, militaries will recur to their doctrines, which specify 
whether to with or diverge from civilian leaders (Desch 1999:17-19).
M. Desch’s characterisation of military control combined structural and international 
determinants of civilian control within a “bounded rationality” vision of the military as 
a complex organisation. In my view, the importance Desch granted to doctrine for 
military decision-making did not escape the normative bias for which he had originally 
criticised Huntington’s first characterization of objective control. Still, Desch’s 
emphasis on doctrine is a reminder of the importance of political culture in the 
definition of civil-military relations (Mares 1998; Mares 2000). Political culture, 
understood as “people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and 
evaluations of their country, and the role of the self in the system” (Diamond 1993:7), 
creates a series of incentives and routines that neither the armed forces nor civilian 
ruling elites can easily disregard. The cultural notion of civil-military relations helps to 
define the “all encompassing” space for each particular case of civilian control. In the
different approaches of civilian control in consolidated democracies, countries undergoing democratic 
transition, and dictatorships.
5 Alfred Stepan (1973) challenged the virtues of objective control or the professionalisation of the armed 
forces on normative grounds. He argued that the nature of the threat facing the nation would determine 
the scope of the military’s professionalisation program. By studying Brazilian and Peruvian military 
regimes, A. Stepan found that professionalisation could also foster weak civilian control if the new skills 
acquired by the armed forces overlap with those of the civilian leadership. His idea was not entirely 
original. Finer (1962) had already argued that a motive for intervention could also transpire from 
professionalism. This is especially when military leaders feel that they alone are competent enough to 
establish security as they see it, both economically and socially. (Stepan, 1973)
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end, as D. Mares argues, political culture may not be able to determine entirely the 
character of the relationship between soldiers and civilians. However, it says a lot when 
some attitudes represent a clear threat to civilian supremacy (Mares 1998).
Still, the impact of the external/internal dimension on the nature of civilian control in 
Mexico may not pass the test of empirical enquiry either, particularly after 1946. 
Apparently, the external security priorities of a country that shared 2,000 miles of 
border with one of the super military powers of the Cold War could be assumed to lead 
to the transformation of its external defence priorities and the nature of military 
professionalism. However, in the light of the size of military expenditures, personnel as 
well as missions delegated to the armed forces during those years, it is clear that such a 
transformation did not take place. Mexico did not assume an active role in the 
American anticommunist crusade on the continent. In fact, Mexico’s foreign policy 
entered in conflict on more than one occasion with the US position in Latin America 
(Pastor and Castaneda 1988). The good relationship of the Mexican government with 
Castro’s communist regime eliminated the possibility of significant sponsorship of a 
Cuban-Soviet guerrilla movement in Mexico. Again, unlike other countries on the 
continent, particularly in Central America, Mexican rules just conveniently channelled 
the continental paranoia of the communist threat to justify fierce combat against 
marginal and badly organised domestic insurgencies. According to J. Rochlin (1997), 
Mexico’s ruling elite opted to selectively unleash the armed forces upon its own 
citizens, who grew increasingly restless due to electoral fraud, pronounced economic 
inequality, and social injustice in Mexico’s post war period (Rochlin 1997).
The evidence from those years bears out his observations. Between 1946 and 1980, the 
military acted on least 32 occasions (table 1.2) to contain political movements that, in 
the understanding of the executive and the intelligence services of the state, threatened 
the political stability of the country. These included suppressing industrial and labour 
disturbances, rural political conflicts, electoral fraud allegations, disagreements between 
the president and state governors, incipient guerrilla movements, student revolts, and 
any political event that could not be effectively channelled through the regime’s 
political institutions.
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Table 1.2
Mexico’s military operations on internal security 1946-1980 (1)
Place Year Origin Military action
Sinarquista
Movement
Monterrey 1946 Labour Violent Disruption o f strike
MichoacanUniversity
Demonstrations
Morelia 1949 Student Violent Disruption
Mexico FPPM 
Opposition Party
Mexico city 1952 Electoral
disturbances
Violent Disruption o f riots
Railway workers 
strike
Mexico City 1956 Labour Violent disruption o f strike
Polytechnic Student 
demonstrations
Mexico City 1956 Student Violent Disruption
Telephone workers 
strike
Mexico City 1956 Labour Temporary Replacement o f  
workers.
Mexico UNAM 
Demonstrations
Mexico City 1960 Student Street patrolling
Peasants revolts Coahuila 1960-
1965
Rural
disturbances
Patrolling
Guerrero FPPM 
Opposition Party
Guerrero 1960-62 Electoral
disturbances
Violent Disruption o f riots
Peasants Revolts Guerrero 1960 Rural
disturbances
Violent Disruption
Peasants revolts Oaxaca 1961 Rural
disturbances
Patrolling
Peasants Revolts Puebla 1961 Rural
disturbances
Patrolling
Peasants Revolts Guerrero 1962 Rural
disturbances
Patrolling
Insurgency Morelos 1962 Guerrilla C ounterinsurgency 
operations or Low Intensity 
Conflict
Peasants Revolts Veracruz 1963 Rural
disturbances
Patrolling
Demonstrations 
against corruption of 
local government 
officials
San Luis 
Potosi
1964 Civil Society 
demonstrations
Patrolling
Puebla 1964 Labour Violent disruption of strike
Insurgency Guerrero 1965 Guerrilla Counterinsurgency 
operations or Low Intensity 
Conflict
Insurgency Chihuahua 1965 Guerrilla Counterinsurgency 
operations or Low Intensity 
Conflict
M ichoacanU niversi 
ty D em onstrations
Morelia 1966 Student Street patrolling
PR I G overnor 
cam paign
Sonora 1967 Electoral
disturbances
Street Patrolling
PR I G overnor 
cam paign
Baja
California
1968 Electoral
disturbances
Street Patrolling
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Table 1.2
Mexico’s military operations on internal security 1946-1980 (2)
Place Y ear O rigin M ilitary  action
Tlatelolco S tudent 
Riots
Mexico
City
1968 Student Violent disruption of riots
Railway w orkers 
strike
Durango 1972 Labour Violent disruption of 
strike
Railway w orkers 
strike
Oaxaca 1972 Labour Violent disruption of 
strike
Railw ay w orkers 
strike
Coahuila 1972 Labour Violent disruption of 
strike
Oil w orkers strike Veracruz 1972 Labour Violent disruption of 
strike
U niversity of
Tlaxcala
D em onstrations
Tlaxcala 1973 Student Street patrolling
S ugar cane w orkers 
revolt
Veracruz 1973 Labour Violent disruption of 
strike
Insurgency 
(G enaro Vazquez)
Guerrero 1966-
1972
Guerrilla C ounterinsurgency 
operations or Low 
Intensity Conflict
Insurgency (Lucio 
C abanas)
Guerrero 1966-
1974
Guerrilla Counterinsurgency 
operations or Low 
Intensity Conflict
C om m unist League 
23 of Septem ber
Mexico
City,
Guadalajara,
Monterrey
1972-
1981
Guerrilla Counterinsurgency 
operations or Low 
Intensity Conflict
Source: Rochlin (1997), Ronfeldt (1984), Camp (1992), Disturbances in Mexico in Recent Years. 
August 12, 1968. General Records o f  the Department o f State, A -1292 NARA. AIRGRAM from the 
American Embassy to The State Department. October 16, 1966. General Records o f  the Department o f  
State, A-381 NARA. DFS 100-24-18/6713/F251. DFS 100-24- 18-67/16/F104. DFS 100-25-1-68/5/F1-2. 
DFS 100-25-1-68-L5/F25-27. DFS 100-25-1-68/L5/F35.
O f the 32 military interventions listed in Table 1.3, at least ten claimed several civilian 
lives (Ronfeldt 1984; Rochlin 1997; Aguayo 2001; Fernandez Menendez 2001; Scherer 
Garcia and Monsivais 2004; Cardenas Estandia 2008). They all exhibited the limited 
ability o f the military apparatus to deal with social unrest by means other than the 
blatant use o f force. It also illustrates common characteristics among authoritarian 
regimes, that is, their weak tolerance of political dissent (Bies 2000:2). Both elements 
explain why military intervention to subdue social unrest functioned as a safety valve at 
the service o f the political elite, rather than as a well-planned and permanent 
government policy to contain political pressures from below.
Ironically, Rochlin’s (1997) thesis did not differ from the m ilitary’s own vision of the 
time. That also identified the sources of national security threats in the acute conditions
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of poverty and underdevelopment6. In any case, I suggest that the political role of the 
armed forces not only kept civil movements and organisations under inspection, but also 
conveyed a powerful message to political actors, including governors and city mayors, 
that the president had the means to enforce his will lead over them, even at the expense 
of the reputation, social capital and corporate interests of the armed forces. Therefore, 
Mexico’s experience with militarization challenges Desch’s (1999) external/internal 
dimension for the definition of civilian control. It seems inadequate for explaining why 
the participation of the armed forces in tasks of internal security during the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s did not compromise the authority of ruling civilian elites or involve 
the armed forces in the political arena.
In sum, it seems that the level of institutionalisation of the military in the political 
system, their partisan role and the socialisation of strict norms of civilian control made 
explanations based on structural factors, external or internal security threats and 
normative explanations of military professionalisation unsuitable to address the 
characteristics of civilian control in Mexico. These approaches are unable to address 
the impact that the historical alliance between the ruling elite and the military’s 
hierarchy created over the roles of the armed forces in the political system.
Mexico’s case regarding civil-military relations challenges modernisation theory 
expectations that capitalist development eventually transforms pre-democratic patterns 
of political behaviour (Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Powell 1966; Pye 
1966; Huntington 1968; Verba, Nie et al. 1971). Within a landscape of social unrest, 
the Mexican case suggests that civilian control of the military within an authoritarian 
system can be deliberately sustained and even strengthened. This is especially so when 
military involvement is expected to yield some advantages for ruling elites, 
democratically elected or not, to address pressing policy issues (Acemoglu 2002). That 
is the case for the war against drug trafficking, counterinsurgency, and the mounting 
levels of violence associated with organised criminality that Mexico has experienced 
since the early 1990s (Elizondo 2003). Moreover, the study of Mexico’s military did 
not support the thesis that social and political unrest, triggered by faulty economic
6 In 1985, Colonel Jorge Carillo Olea observed that “Mexico does not have external enemies... Mexico’s 
problems are inside its borders, recognizing that the source of many of these originate from outside the 
country and have great deal to do with social justice... where is the government not capable of 
guaranteeing average standard measures and norms of justice and democracy? This is the problem of 
National Security.” (Quoted in Rochlin 1997:157)
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performance, necessarily results in independent intervention of the armed forces in the 
political scene.
Theories focusing on the prescriptive notion of objective control or Huntington’s 
Occidentalised perception of military professionalisation also experienced problems in 
adjusting the Mexican case to its predictions (Huntington 1957). In fact, the kind of 
professionalisation adopted by the armed forces since the Revolution has been 
consistently used by the president to justify greater military participation in areas not 
strictly related to national defence. Furthermore, the extensive use of the Mexican 
armed forces to control political conflicts is inconsistent with explanations that assume 
that a military apparatus with partisan missions will be inclined to articulate alliances 
with social sectors as a way of winning political leverage. If something has been clear 
in Mexico’s historical accounts is that the military’s hierarchy only pays attention to the 
commands of the executive power. Along this line, differences between civilian control 
over the military and other countries in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s were 
more than just a matter of degree, but structured in the constitution, role beliefs, 
doctrine and political culture that made the struggles for political power an inhospitable 
ground for military officers.
1.1.4 Domestic understandings of civil-military relations
In my view, not even the specialised literature on this topic has escaped the 
complexities of this relationship. Understandings of the military’s role in politics have 
ranged from those that see minimal military intervention outside national defence to 
those that perceive a military apparatus deeply involved in the political arena. For 
instance, early studies focusing on Mexico’s civil-military relations developed in the 
1960s and 1970s affirmed that the “political role of the army has all but disappeared” 
(Lieuwen 1968; Lozoya 1970; Boils 1975). In contrast, R. Benitez-Manaut (2003) 
argues that the military in Mexico is not an autonomous actor; its political influence is 
marginal as it depends entirely on the commands of the executive power. The extreme 
view is that of A. Gupta (2003), who claims that the military in Mexico has been “the 
great champion of democracy and harbinger of peace. It keeps close and healthy 
relationships with the political regime. It is well integrated with the Executive without 
risking its autonomy or independence.”(Gupta 2003 :xvi).
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A second branch of the literature did observe some specific political roles of the armed 
forces. Authors such as Pyneiro (1985), Camp (1992 and 2005) and Ronfeldt (1984) 
constructed empirically sound accounts that show how the armed forces never 
completely abandoned the political arena7. Their considerations identified the 
significance of the army’s political roles, even though these were often performed under 
the supervision of civilian ruling elites and strong political institutions (Ronfeldt 
1984:294). For this part of the literature, the loyalty of the armed forces to the 
executive power and their missions on internal order or social policy did amount to 
"subtle” or “indirect” political interference. Their approaches made clear that a military 
apparatus could be politically influential, even when it does not threat civilian stability 
in power. The bottom line is that coincidence of interests between the armed forces and 
the Executive blurred clear-cut manifestations of an autonomous military influence in 
politics. In other words, although the military followed the commands of civilian ruling 
elites, they thereby also be defended their own corporate interests.
Although, it is easier to agree with studies that address the military’s firm subordination 
to civilian elites with caution, important lessons can be learned from the strong 
historical background of the extreme visions. Both analyses coincide in asserting the 
importance of the historical roots of Mexico’s civilian control over the military to 
explain the long-term stability and security Mexican presidents have enjoyed ever since 
the end of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). (Lozoya 1970; Ronfeldt 1984; 
Lowenthal and Fitch 1986; Varas and Joint Committee on Latin American Studies 
1989; Camp 1992). My research builds on the same historical and institutional referents 
to explain the particularities of stable civil-military relations in Mexico. I shall return to 
this connection in the final part of the chapter.
1.2 Contemporary approaches to civil-military relations
1.2.1 Historical Institutionalism: “modes of transition”
The downfall of military regimes changed civil-military relations studies in Latin 
America in the 1980s. Based on a historical institutionalist framework, modes of 
transition literature started to gain ground in the field. For these approaches, the past or
7 Either by appointing “on-leave” military personnel to key positions within civilian ministries or 
providing intelligence information to the ruling elite on potential political conflicts that could have 
required military intervention.
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“from where one is coming from” is important in explaining the degree of military 
subordination to successor civilian authorities after the democratic transition process 
(Aguero 2000:69).
Modes of transition literature argues that civil-military relations in Latin America are 
path dependent, crafted through years of evolution and deeply influenced by the way 
political power was handed to civilians after the authoritarian period (Trinkunas 2001). 
Democratic transition processes are important because they are turning points or critical 
junctures that open opportunities for change that civilians may use to their own 
advantage. In the light of these views, modes of transition scholars have built sharp 
analytic and empirically tested studies. They explain why Brazilian or Chilean armed 
forces were able to leave power in better condition than those who suffered acute 
economic shocks or were defeated in war by an internal or external enemy, for instance: 
Argentina in 1982, El Salvador in 1992, Panama in 1989 or Haiti in 1994. In that sense, 
the nature of the transition explains the degree of autonomy and prerogatives the armed 
forces may be able to keep under the new democratic arrangement.
Therefore, military juntas or dictators that faced transition in the midst of scandal, 
organisational disarray or deep social grievances generally found far more complicated 
to maintain their privileges in the upcoming political regime. Under such 
circumstances, prospects for future democratisation are more likely to occur. 
Conversely, military hierarchies that controlled the timing of the transition process 
found it easier to retain some prerogatives and secure autonomy (Hagopian 1990; Karl 
1991). It seems that favourable conditions for the armed forces in post-authoritarian 
agreements generally allow them to retain political decision-making leverage despite 
civilian supervision (Call 2002). On the same issue, A. Stepan (1988) explains that 
persistence of military prerogatives such as their participation in intelligence agencies or 
high military presence in the cabinet creates conditions of military tutelage rather than 
civilian control. Tutelary powers insure military leverage over key policy issues in the 
new political agreement that imply limited room of manoeuvre for incoming ruling 
elites.
Charles T. Call (2002) takes the argument of modes of transition to the extreme, in what 
he describes as “war transition.” His argument departs from the logic that a military in 
shambles as a result of defeat in war has minimum capabilities in imposing an agenda of
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transition on incoming civilian rulers. Defeat in war or transition-by-collapse portrays 
the worst scenario a military dictator or “junta militar” can face. It opens wide windows 
of opportunity for civilians to institutionalise control over the armed forces and 
demilitarise the internal security system. His approach is consistent with traditional 
historical institutionalists’ views that tend to see change as a sporadic event that often 
requires strong disruption to take full shape. For this scholarship, change occurs in 
times of crisis, rather than being continuous and incremental (Ikenberry, Lake et al. 
1988; Cortell and Peterson 2002). Therefore, cases like Argentina 1983 and Chile 
1990 are paradigmatic for this approach as they reflect opposite sets of opportunities 
that each military elite enjoyed during the transition period. It explains why the military 
in Argentina virtually disappeared from the political arena while Pinochet’s army kept 
some clout in Chilean politics (Galleguillos 1998).
Call’s study is relevant to this discussion because it focuses on the functions the military 
is able to retain on internal security after the transition to democracy. It also represents a 
good benchmark for comparing the Mexican case to other countries on the continent 
and to assess the usefulness of this literature.
The Charles Call Model
By including variables such as: 1) the role that the constitution grants the military 
regarding tasks of internal security; 2) the number of senior police officers with formal 
military education; 3) military participation in intelligence agencies 4) main preventive 
police forces; 5) legislative oversight over main police forces, 6) legal jurisdiction over 
police personnel and 7) formal police doctrine, Charles Call constructed an index of 
security that measures the level of militarisation of the internal security system before 
and after the democratic transition in 18 Latin American countries (Call 2002:8). 
Wisely enough, Call did not include the Mexican case in the matrix.
The results of his analysis give reasonable support to his initial expectations and 
generally, with those predicted by the “modes of transition” literature. That is, countries 
that experienced “war transitions” such as Argentina 1982, El Salvador 1992, Haiti 
1994 and Panama 1989, scored the highest in terms of overall changes regarding civil- 
military relations: 10, 14, 12 and 13 points respectively. The other side of the coin is 
illustrated in Brazil 1985, Chile 1990 and Colombia 1958, as no relevant changes were
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achieved (3, 0 and 0), allegedly, due to the protagonist role the armed forces were able 
to assume during the transition period. Different characteristics o f democratisation or 
“modes of transition” perhaps explain the differences.
Figure 1.1
Internal security changes upon democratisation, 1985-2000: pre-transition and 
post transition
□B Salvador 91 
■Panama 99 
□Halil 94 
OAiyonOnaSS 
■Guatemala 94 
□Nicaragua 90 
■Bolivia 91 
□Brazil 98 
■Paraguay 9» 
□Uruguay 98 
□Pam 90 
■Ecuador 90 
■Venezuela 90 
■Chile 90 
■Colombia 99 
■Honduras 90 
■Mexico 99
Source: Charles T. Call (2002). M exico’s result was reached by using the methodology specified by the 
author; for such purposes I consulted the Mexican Constitution to address variables 1, 4, 5 and 6. For 
variables 2 and 3 , 1 requested a set o f  data to M exico’s armed forces through the IFAI. The information 
requests numbers are 0000700043003 and 0000700039703. These requests can be consulted by the 
reader directly at www.ifai.org.mx. For the last variable, I consulted the number or retired generals 
heading federal and state police academies: IFAI petition 0000700034603.
Running this model and including Mexico in the matrix yields interesting results. 
Mexico would score (-5), and it would be, by far, the lowest score ever achieved by any 
country that experienced democratic transition on the continent in the last 50 years. In 
practice, this score means that Mexico remilitarised its system o f public security during 
and after the process o f democratic transition. As observed in the figure 1.2, this is 
again an odd characteristic in the Latin America landscape.
Call’s model quite visibly captures the uneven nature o f democratic development in 
Mexico. That is, free and open electoral competition does not match the capacity o f the
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
Countries
52
ostate to enforce the law or what Linz and Stepan (1996) call Rechtsstaat where there is 
stalemate or even regression. What is more interesting in this exercise is the high 
degree of change that Mexico experienced in terms of the militarisation of public 
security. Contrary to Call’s study cases, democratisation in Mexico did not transpire 
from a sudden change in the political landscape. Still, the relationship between civilians 
and soldiers changed importantly, even to a higher degree than those countries that 
experienced a “war transition.” How is this manifest shift explained? It appears that 
by overemphasising path dependence and critical junctures to explain post democratic 
civil-military relations, the modes of transition literature rate too low the capacity of 
autonomous state elites to gradually and incrementally shape civil-military relations in a 
way that fits their short-term political interests.
On this issue, W. Hunter (1997; 2001) convincingly constructed a rational choice based 
explanation that shows how competition for votes in post-authoritarian Brazil created 
powerful incentives for ruling elites to bring military hierarchies under more democratic 
forms of control. Hunter argues that the wave of democratisation in Latin America 
created incentives for ruling elites to contest the military’s control over key policy 
issues of the country. High military budget allocations hinder the capacity of goal 
seeking politicians to allocate resources in policy areas that portray strong electoral 
appeal. In other words, by reducing military expenditures, goal-seeking politicians may 
obtain extra resources to allocate in patronage and pork barrel politics. W. Hunter 
continues with the argument that the armed forces rarely enhance a politician’s electoral 
fortunes. “This is especially true in contemporary Latin America, where the military 
have little currency to trade in the electoral area” (Hunter 2001:44).
As far as the Mexican experience is concerned, I agree with Hunter’s argument in 
relation to the incentives for change that democratisation generates in the system of 
civil-military relations. However, it appears that Hunter’s argument fails to consider 
that voters could also welcome participation of the military in areas that exceed national 
defence. Again, the political culture element cannot be taken out of the equation. 
Hunter’s “Latin American” generalization does not appear to give justice to the 
Mexican case on civil-military relations and civilian control. The bottom line is that
8This word implies that the government and the state apparatus are subject to the law, that areas of 
discretionary power are defined and increasingly limited, and that citizens can turn to courts to defend 
themselves against the state and its officials.
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democratisation by itself does not determine the preferences of politicians or voters 
towards minimising military participation on issues that may surpass the realm of 
national defence. It seems that the institutionalisation of a fixed balance of power 
favouring civilians and a positive image of the military in the eyes of the population 
may also determine the likelihood of military intervention in other policy areas. In any 
case, Hunter’s analysis challenged in some ways the historical institutionalist accounts 
that expected little or no change in civil-military relations in Brazil after the democratic 
transition (Stepan 1988; O'Donnell 1994).
The Mexican case is different, because democratisation did not evolve from a military 
based regime. This characteristic excluded the military from the overall process of 
democratisation. In that sense, democratic forces in Mexico were not combating the 
armed forces but the authoritarian conditions of electoral competition. Under these 
conditions, the military in Mexico passed unnoticed from mainstream pressures for 
democratisation. In fact, during the mid 1990s, military action to counteract public 
insecurity gained ground not only at federal level but also between state and local 
governments, irrespective of their party allegiance9(Turbiville 1997; Arzt 2001). 
Turbiville (1997) asserts that by 1996, almost every state in the country had at least 
some type of military intervention in public security. My own research indicates that by 
2003, half of the 32 chiefs of state police in the country were on-leave or retired military 
officers. This condition alone shows how opposition parties were eager to combat the 
long electoral hegemony of the ruling party and, at the same time, support the 
participation of the military in public security. It appears that in the minds of elected 
officials and civil society in general, military participation in public security and 
democratisation are not mutually exclusive.
Given that the military was not considered an enemy to democratisation, politicians, and 
particularly the president, had incentives to involve the armed forces in areas where 
policy performance was particularly defective, as is the case of law enforcement. In that 
sense, the protracted period of transition facilitated the military to participate in these
9 In spite of party allegiance, elected officials appointed retired or on-leave army generals to lead state 
and local police agencies, as occurred when the first elected mayor of Mexico City and one of the most 
critical voices of the PRI rule in Mexico, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, appointed General Salgado Cordero as 
his Secretary of Public Security in 1997.
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functions by serving the interests of goal-driven politicians. Empirical evidence points 
out that both characteristics occurred during the 1990s.
Furthermore, “modes of transition” approaches generally neglect the impact that broad 
socio-economic and international conditions exert over political actors. The U.S 
president, the congress and different U.S. agencies have consistently placed continuous 
pressure on their Mexican counterparts to improve their ability to disrupt drug 
trafficking and combat organised crime. Such pressure has diminished every time the 
armed forces have come to perform public security tasks, particularly in the border 
region (Bertram 1996; Dunn 1996; Andreas 2000; Andreas 2000a; Shelley 2001).
From this discussion, it seems clear that a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the 
Mexican case should rely on the strengths of either rational choice or historical 
institutionalism. In the following section, I present a theoretical framework that 
incorporates traditional and more contemporary literature on civil-military relations to 
disentangle the unique characteristics of civil-military control in Mexico.
1.3. The theoretical framework
1.3.1 “Exclusive subordination” and the politics of military missions
The framework I propose to address the Mexican case of civil-military relations is based 
on a notion of the distribution of power between the president and the armed forces. 
The main characteristic of the model is what I call the dual nature of civilian control 
over the military in Mexico. At the first level, this is civilian control; the relationship 
between the president and the armed forces remains strong and unequal, favouring the 
authority of the executive power. However, at lower levels of the public administration, 
where the armed forces interact with other state agencies, the relationship changes 
importantly, basically as a result of the new set of responsibilities the executive delegate 
to them. At this point, civilian law enforcement agencies happen to be subordinated to 
the armed forces, or at least supervised by them. This feature takes place by appointing 
military personnel to head civilian police corporations or creating new police bodies 
based on military human resources, as it is the case of the Federal Police or President 
Felipe Calderon’s Security Task Force. In that sense, empowering the armed forces in 
public security not only reinforced their role as the privileged and reliable agent of the
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president to combat criminality, but also converted the military into the principal vis-a- 
vis federal and state law enforcement institutions10.
As it occurs at the top of the power relation, The Legislative and Judicial levels of 
government continue to have little effect on the military. The military remains 
accountable to Congress only in terms of the exercise of yearly budget allocations 
through the Federal Supreme Audit Bureau. Furthermore, the Legislative power has the 
ability to approve or modify yearly military budget allocations proposed by the 
executive and approve the promotions of military personnel to ranks above Colonel. 
However, escalating military endowments and total approval of military promotions in 
the last 10 years suggests that legislative power has not intended to limit the action of 
the armed forces in any sensitive way.
Figure 1.2
Dual Civilian Control Model
First Level
Civilian DominantExecutive
Power
Second Level
Federal and 
state Police 
Bodies Military
Dominant
Military
Autonomous
Legislative and Judicial Power
Source: Own elaboration
First level (The Exclusive Subordination)
A historical institutionalist approach can explain how the early institutional arrangement 
governing civil-military relations created firm dependent tendencies that ensured 
military subordination to the executive’s authority. It seems that modes of transition
10 The main justification for this policy shift is found in the National Development Plan (1988-1994) 
where President Salinas agreed to the participation of the armed forces to assist federal police bodies on 
counter-narcotics operations. Allegedly, this was because personnel in the Attorney-General’s Office had 
consistently abused their public function by protecting organised criminals (Arzt 2001).
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literature and historical institutionalism in general are right, as civil-military relations in 
Mexico have remained stable for the last 80 years.
Attitudes, beliefs, doctrine and formal institutional rigidity of civilian control over the 
military in Mexico may well support historical institutionalist expectations. Still, this 
kind of path-dependent subordination does not guarantee democratic civil-military 
relationships, because it excludes the supervision and accountability of legislative and 
judicial bodies of military missions. In other words, democratic civil-military relations 
require a dynamic relationship between the second and third levels of the model.
I call this unique form of civil-military control “exclusive subordination.” In the light 
of the Mexican experience, it seems this form of military control can only prevail when 
rules governing civil-military relations define the full authority of the president over the 
armed forces. This authority is not just a de jure condition but also a de facto  
recognition of the military hierarchy in regard to the leadership of the president (Huber, 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1997). Presidents who enjoy exclusive subordination over the 
military may be willing to grant extra autonomy to the armed forces, if needed, to act 
against drug trafficking, terrorism or guerrilla movements, in part, because the civilian 
ruling elite, particularly the president, does not feel threatened by an expanding military 
agenda. The characteristics of the Mexican case appear to belong to this category. Peru 
during the Presidency of Alberto Fujimori may also come close it. Other than these two 
cases, “exclusive subordination” is not a common feature in Latin America, because 
mutual trust between the armed forces and the civilian elite is difficult to find in 
countries that have experienced a military rule.
In that sense, I identify three basic features of the principle of “exclusive subordination” 
that characterise the first level of the Dual Civilian Control Model and can be useful to 
place Mexico into a comparative analysis:
1. Mutual trust based on a long-standing and tacit pact of no aggression between 
the military and the executive power.
2. Clear constitutional rules that define the president as the supreme chief of the 
armed forces and make the armed forces accountable only to the executive 
power.
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3. The presence of an executive power with a high level of autonomy to deal with 
issues of national security vis-a-vis civil society organisations and the legislative 
power.
A historical institutionalists perspective is relevant to explain why the first characteristic 
of the proposed model is difficult to attain where the armed forces have confronted the 
process of democratic transition from a disadvantageous position or experienced a “war 
transition” (Call 2002). Argentina in 1982, El Salvador in 1992, Panama in 1989 or 
Haiti in 1994 belong to this category. Empirical evidence indicates that civilian rulers 
in these countries were more interested in limiting the scope of action of the military in 
public security rather than empowering them. In Argentina and Uruguay, the military 
apparatus even had problems to preserve its corporate integrity in the years that 
followed the transition period.
The principle of “Exclusive subordination” cannot exist if the military keeps a high 
level of autonomy from the executive power. The case of Ecuador is in this category. 
In this country, even when the Constitution grants the president full authority over the 
armed forces, informal rules of the game matter too, making the military an important 
referent of power as it often holds dominance on issues of internal and national security 
(Fitch 1998). It is clear that under such conditions, the Executive has no incentives to 
empower an institution that already enjoys a high degree of autonomy. Finally, the role 
that Congress plays in Colombia in terms of military supervision cancels the basis of the 
“exclusive” subordination type. Meanwhile, the failed coup against President Hugo 
Chavez in 2002 raised serious doubts about the Military’s core loyalty to the executive 
power in Venezuela.
In sum, the presence of these three characteristics together is not easily found in Latin 
American countries. This makes the Mexican case very atypical in the region. This odd 
combination explains in part why civil-military relationships in Mexico challenge 
common sense on the role the armed forces should play in a process of democratic 
transition.
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Second Level (The Politics of Military Missions)
In contrast, the horizontal expansion of military responsibilities at the second level of 
the dual civilian control model depends on characteristics of the political environment. 
For this part of the analysis, a rational choice approach is relevant to address how goal- 
seeking politicians shape civil-military relations according to their rational calculations 
and the limits the institutional structure sets on each actor’s behaviour.
Rational choice theory centres on actors, single or collective, as the unit of analysis. It 
assumes that individuals have a well-defined set of preferences that represent the 
relative desirability of outcomes generated by actions (Chai 2001). Preferences of 
individuals are basic, consistent and capable of being roughly ordered. In that sense, 
given actors’ preferences and alternative strategies from which to choose11, they will 
select whatever gives them the best chance to reach their goals (Geddes 1995).
The cornerstone of the rational choice approach is to identify which goals drive actors’ 
actions. These are also known as first order preferences or actor’s “maximand.” The 
task of identifying the “maximand” is an exercise of observing the actor’s choices, 
because it is assumed that rational actors reveal their preferences through actions. If the 
analyst misperceives actors’ goals, then their behaviour will differ from that predicted 
and the analysis may end up losing focus completely (Geddes 1995). However, 
preferences and interests do not always match. Rational actors do not always do what 
they want, but what is possible (Dowding and King 1995). Under these circumstances, 
institutions, formal or informal, define the collection of possibilities or routes of action 
that actors can take. By doing so, institutions or more formally, “the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction*4 (North 1990) represent both the rules of the 
game and shape actors’ preferences by defining allowed routes for action.
Applied to civil-military relations in post democratic transition environments, this 
implies that political officeholders may have some clear set of preferences on military
11 Rational players are expected to prefer more material goods than less. Politicians would like to see 
their careers progress rather than end and ruling parties would prefer to remain in office rather than losing 
it. However, not all the options are available, because institutions or the rules of the game define which 
paths can be taken to achieve specific objectives. For that reason, institutions are important, because by 
determining what is possible and what is not, they also shape individual preferences. Thus, institutions 
do not determine an actor’s preferences, but they do affect individual and collective choices. Hence, 
political behaviour is structured by institutional rules and does not flow directly from preferences. 
(Immergut 1997)
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roles. These preferences are not predetermined, but dependent on the characteristics of 
the environment and experience. The main interest or “maximand” for new civilian 
democratic elites may be centred on preventing the armed forces from regaining 
political power or exerting political influence beyond reasonable levels. Hunter (1997) 
explains this in terms of fear. That is, when elected politicians fear that the armed 
forces can endanger political stability, they may be less inclined to delegate functions to 
them that could strengthen their political leverage.
However, this priority may be radically different for polities where ruling elites do not 
fear a military takeover. In such cases, the maximand may consist of maintaining 
acceptable levels of popularity that enable them to maintain a high party differential12 
(Downs 1957). It seems the institutional environment that includes “exclusive 
subordination” inhibits W. Hunter’s “fear factor.” In that sense, exclusive 
subordination may create the conditions in which the Executive choices favour the 
enlargement of military intervention in areas that transcend national defence. On this 
issue, D. Mares argues that military participation in antidrug trafficking operations in 
Mexico does not threaten civilian control, but is rather one of the benefits of civilian 
control (Mares 2003:67).
As changes occur at the second level of the Dual Civil-Military control model, they 
affect the relationship between police agencies and the armed forces and not necessarily 
the relation between the Executive and the Military. A principal-agent framework is 
useful to picture how this relationship works. All principal-agent relationships are based 
on a formal and informal contract obligating the agent to act on behalf of, and in 
response to, the principal (Kramer 1999). They are also characterised by informational 
asymmetries that the principal is often dimly able to understand. In the Mexican case, 
the military appears as the expert in the management of violence while the contract 
binding the executive and the armed forces is defined by the nature of the exclusive 
subordination75. Furthermore, “most principal-agent approaches assume that civilian 
principals are goal oriented, and then measure cost in terms of whether the activity 
diverts from re-election efforts” (Feaver 1996; Kramer 1999; Feaver 2003). Under 
these conditions, the Executive power may be interested on taking advantage of the
12 The benefits that the voter expects to receive from voting in one direction rather than the other.
13 For a detailed explanation of this game and its application to Mexico’s civil-military relations, see 
Appendix 1.
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vertical, professional and hierarchical characteristics of the military as an organisation 
(March and Weissinger-Baylon 1986). Therefore, it can delegate to them the 
implementation of policies that have historically carried high transaction costs14 in 
Mexico, as is the case when combating organised forms of criminal activities. By doing 
so, they may also expect to gain electoral allegiances, just as general rational choice 
theory may predict15. The proposition behind this process is simple: “the greater the 
cost of not delegating, the more civilians will delegate” (See Appendix 1).
1.4. Conclusion
For the Mexican case, the original institutional agreement governing civil-military 
relations explains the characteristics of Mexico’s firm civil control over the military. 
However, changing political preferences of the executive power have mattered too, as it 
was the incumbent president who decided the scope and range of military missions. 
Therefore, while the firm subordination of the armed forces to the president is based on 
formal and informal institutions, the definition of military missions responds to a 
different logic. It is attached to the nature of a political agenda and the Executive’s 
preferences.
It seems that the principle of “exclusive subordination” and “the politics of civil- 
military relations” represent the two interacting realms that define contemporary civil- 
military relations in Mexico. For analytical purposes, this initial differentiation is useful 
to understand the impact of formal institutions over the formation of preferences and 
choices of ruling elites concerning the scope of military missions. All things 
considered, Mexico’s record on civil-military relations shows that exclusive 
subordination remained constant, while the horizontal expansion of military 
responsibilities came and went.
It appears evident that the politics of civil-military relations made little impact on the 
preferences of incumbent politicians while the regime was dominated by authoritarian 
politics. However, they became paramount as the regime began the transit to 
democracy. In other words, under authoritarian conditions of electoral competition,
14 Transactions cost are understood as “anything that impedes the specification, monitoring, or 
enforcement of an economic transaction.”
15 David Mares argues that the national hysteria over the drug “threat” is a strong incentive for politicians 
and law enforcement agencies to use the military as a signal to voters that they are “tough” on drugs. See 
(Mares, 2003)
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civilian elites were not particularly concerned on the impact that military missions could 
generate on voting behaviour, because there were no real competitors to the 
incumbent’s hegemony. However, under democratic conditions of electoral 
competition, missions delegated to the armed forces became an important referent 
shaping the public image of office holders. This is particularly clear when incumbents 
are able to present military participation as an indication of commitment to combat 
pressing policy issues, as seems the case of public insecurity and police reform.
In sum, the dual model of civil-military control incorporates the “modes of transition” 
explanation that formal and informal institutions determined the strong path dependent 
subordination of the armed forces to the executive power. By using rational choice, it 
allows the model to explain the expansion of military missions into the system of public 
security.
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Chapter 2, Articulating Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations
during El Porfiriato andMaderofs Revolution (1876-1911)
“All excuses fo r  revolt should be avoided: bread or the club, this 
should be the rule; for the greatest act o f  justice which a prince 
should perform is to sustain himself”
Paolo Sarpi
Introduction
From a civil-military relations perspective, President Porfirio Diaz’s military defeat in 
1911 presents a puzzle. How did a set of scattered and disorganised guerrillas defeat a 
formidable army with at least three decades of continuous institutional development? 
Madero’s Ejercito Liberator surrendered Mexico’s internationally respected military 
forces after less than six months of battle. In the end, as F. Katz (1986) has noted, the 
porfirian army was one of the few in Latin America ever to be overwhelmed in 
conventional and guerrilla warfare by revolutionary troops, alongside those of Bolivia 
in 1952, Cuba 1959 and Nicaragua in 1978.
Many studies have detailed the downfall of Porfirio Diaz’s rule from economic, 
political, social and even international perspectives. (Calvert 1969, Brading 1980; Katz 
1981; Knight 1986; Hart 1987; Meyer 1991; Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1993; Gamer 
2001) However, descriptions of the military side of the story are scarce and at some 
points contradictory. For instance, F. Katz (1981) argues that Diaz’s army was weak, 
even backward. According to Katz, President Diaz opted to keep a relatively weak, 
non-professional and under-funded army as a way to ward off the political hopes of 
ambitious generals. Following Katz’ reasoning, Diaz was far more concerned with 
potential disloyalty among the officer corps than with a civilian-led armed uprising. His 
fears were evidently well founded. According to E. Lieuwen (1968), Mexico suffered 
the curse of predatory militarism1, given that “more than one thousand armed uprisings 
plagued this unfortunate republic in its first century of nationhood” (Echenique 1894; 
Lieuwen 1968; Ballard-Perry 1978:341).
1 Lieuwen’s findings agree with Colonel R. Echenique’s research that tracked all military events that 
occurred in Mexico since its independence in 1821 until 1876 (Echenique, 1894).
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In contrast, J. Kelley (1975) argues that Diaz invested notable effort in building a 
modem professional army, especially in the areas of education and training for new 
officers (Kelley 1975). Kelley’s claims coincide with one of the first comprehensive 
studies on Mexico’s military. E. Lieuwen (1968) argued that President Diaz 
professionalized the armed forces by improving their capabilities, providing better 
training and weaponry and building its esprit de corps (Lieuwen, 1968:3). In other 
words, Diaz employed the familiar strategy of distracting the army from politics by 
keeping it busy with military duties2. Alan Knight agrees with F. Katz about the 
relatively small size of the army under el porftriato and with the low military budgets 
after 1888. However, it is not clear whether this policy resulted from creating a more 
efficient armed force that did not need a large membership to fulfil its missions, or if it 
was part of a pragmatic policy aimed at relieving pressure upon public finances by 
reducing military budgets. A more recent study made by Santiago Portilla on Diaz’s 
downfall reveals the patent incapacity of the Federal Army to contain Madero’s 
insurrection (Portilla 1995). However, his conclusions are not particularly different 
from those of Vanderwood (1976) .
This chapter aims at clarifying the character, functions and missions performed by the 
armed forces during this important period of Mexico’s history. It also attempts to 
identify path dependent characteristics that emerged in el porfiriato and still define 
civilian supremacy in contemporary civil-military relations in Mexico. Under this logic, 
the narrative that unfolds in the four sections of this chapter departs from characterising 
Diaz as a pragmatic politician who enjoyed full control of state structures. Thus, the 
first section chronicles the origins of Porfirio Diaz and the path he followed to 
consolidate his power. The second part concentrates on the political role of the military 
and the participation of the generalship in the configuration of political power, including 
Diaz’s informal methods for maintaining loyalty of the officer corps. In the third 
section, I present Diaz’s approach to military professionalism, its progress and structural 
weaknesses. Finally, I evaluate the ways in which politics and Diaz’s military 
professionalism influenced the performance of his loyal but inefficient military force 
during the six months of Madero’s Revolution.
2 According to R. Rodriguez, a historian of the period, Diaz declared that he intended to make a 
professional organization of the armed forces, whose level of expertise and administrative capabilities 
could be comparable to the best armies of the world. (Rodriguez, 1904)
3 Even though Paul Vanderwood wrote extensively on this period of Mexico’s history, S. Portilla (1995) 
did not cite any of his works.
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2.1 Civil-military relations in elporfiriato: the historical context
The end of the short-lived empire of Maximiliano and the triumph of President Juarez’s 
militias over the French army in 1867 set in motion a long process of the restructuring 
of the country’s armed forces. During the two years that followed the evacuation of the 
French Army, also known as La Republica Restaurada, President Benito Juarez 
disbanded the large military apparatus, because its payroll imposed serious financial 
burdens upon a country on the verge of bankruptcy4. According to J. Creelman (1911), 
Juarez dismissed more than two thirds of the army, without making the slightest effort 
to provide employment or pensions for the multitude of officers and men suddenly 
thrown upon their own resources (Creelman 1911). If lack of public resources was in 
itself enough reason to restructure the armed forces, Juarez also intended to weaken the 
political ambitions of regional military commanders with enough standing among their 
troops to destabilise the young regime. In the light of history, it seems that Juarez’s 
policy had mixed results. Between 1867 and 1872, various military units were 
disbanded and most high-ranking military officials looked for other professional 
horizons (Cosio Villegas 1971; Ballard-Perry 1978:34). Some returned to civilian life 
and became businesspersons or big landowners, hacendados. Others, not being career 
soldiers, sought political positions and later joined Juarez’s administration. Finally, as 
Juarez had feared, a coterie of generals did conspire against his rule and eventually 
managed to seize political power. Porfirio Diaz, their leader, became the president of the 
country in 1876 and remained at the top of the political organisation of Mexico for the 
next 34 years.
Porfirio Diaz was a regional caudillo who commanded Juarez’s liberation forces in the 
east and gained early recognition for his military skills5. Captured twice by the French 
Army, Diaz escaped to lead the resistance in the east and south. His victories against 
the French in Miahuatlan and La Carbonera were considered by some commentators of 
the time as outstanding military feats (Garcia Naranjo 1930). Nevertheless, history 
shows that Diaz’s main passion was not soldiering, but politics. Charisma, high
4 In his book, La Sucesion Presidencial, Madero (1907) described Juarez’s problem. He argued that 
Juarez’s most important problem consisted of disbanding a military force beyond the necessities of a 
country in peacetime and experiencing a serious lack of economic resources. (Madero 1907:88)
5 P. Gamer argues that Diaz was not only praised for being the only Mexican commander to rout the 
French army, but he was also lauded for his administrative and personal qualities: financial probity, 
military discipline, moral rectitude and the absence of either public or private scandal. (Gamer 2001:49)
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political ambitions and a clear understanding of Mexico’s political reality were rare in 
Mexican politicians of the late 1800s, but Diaz definitely had these qualities. His record 
in office indicates that he was never bothered to assume a public political stance on 
issues that could fix his place along the political spectrum. The words “liberal” or 
“conservative” did not neatly defined his ideology, even when he fought for Juarez’s 
liberal cause in the 1860s (Knight 1986). According to Gamer (2001), Diaz was 
simultaneously able to be conservative and liberal, pro-foreign and nationalist, Masonic 
and Catholic (Gamer 2001).
Uncompromised by political principles or ideology, Diaz was a pragmatic politician 
who centralised power at the expense of institutional development and respect for law 
(Thomas and Ocasio-Melendez 1984). His mle was ‘committed to a maximum 
programme of economic growth and self-employment according to the scientific laws of 
Auguste Comte’ (Calvert 1969a:52). Nevertheless, the path he took to reach the 
presidential office was not free of obstacles. By 1872, General Diaz had tried and failed 
to defeat President Juarez in the Presidential election of 1867 and 1971. In the face of 
failure, Diaz rebelled, claiming electoral fraud and constitutional violations. In 1871, 
Diaz launched the Plan de la Noria and received substantive military support from loyal 
generals who had already tried to destabilise Juarez’s administration. Nevertheless, La 
Noria uprising showed serious problems with coordination and it soon lost its initial 
vigour (Lopez -Portillo y Rojas 1921). A few months later, loyal forces of the President 
defeated it. Juarez died soon after, and his successor, Sebastian Lerdo, offered Diaz and 
his loyal generals amnesty, which he accepted in 1872.
Still, military or electoral setbacks did not change the intensity of Diaz’s political 
activism. By knitting alliances with high ranking military officers, local political chiefs 
and emerging social movements, Diaz kept building political support. By the time 
President Lerdo was about to finish his term in office in 1876, Diaz launched the 
Tuxtepec Rebellion, allegedly, to thwart Lerdo’s aspiration to seek re-election (Rowe 
1912). Unlike previous uprisings, the Tuxtepec Rebellion succeeded and the history of 
successful military uprising would not be repeated until 1911, when Madero’s 
insurgence ended 34 years of uninterrupted peace.
Given the record of a country that had faced foreign invasions and civil war since 
independence, Diaz’s creation of political stability was no small achievement. The Pax
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Porflriana, as this period is known, set the environment for the creation of the basic 
rules, formal and informal, of the system of civil-military relations. Right from the 
start, the military became the guarantor of Diaz’s rule and through it, he managed to 
establish the monopoly of organised force, and centralised the power of the state 
(Rueschemeyer, Huber et al. 1992).
2.1.1 Military missions
In the absence of civil or international conflicts, the military evolved into an internal 
security force, the equivalent of a federal police. Their responsibilities included 
suppression of small rebellions, pacification and eradication of bandit gangs operating 
along roads joining the large haciendas with villages and cities. As in most 
dictatorships, army officers throughout e/ porfiriato also had direct responsibilities for 
combating the political enemies of the regime; missions that often required intelligence 
gathering. According to W. Dirk Raat (1976), the task of eliminating radicalism and 
restraining revolutionary nationalism involved an elaborate national and international 
espionage network and police structure6. Illegal means to achieve these objectives 
included kidnappings, summary executions and continuous violations of civil liberties. 
An example of how this system worked is an unfortunate incident that is chronicled in 
most of the literature of this period. According to Rafael de Zayas Enriquez — a judge, 
journalist and close observer of el porfiriato—  local police forces apprehended a group 
of conspirators on the verge of an alleged military uprising in Veracruz scheduled to 
explode in late 1879 (Zayas Enriquez 1908). When the Governor of Veracruz, Luis 
Mier y Teran, informed Diaz about the events and requested directions on what to do 
with the prisoners, Diaz, so it is said, responded: “Matalos en Caliente” (kill them in 
the act) and Governor Teran followed the order at once (Taracena, 1983:165). The 
incident caused a great scandal in the country and reverberated abroad. However, the 
way President Diaz managed this event in the press conveyed the idea that insurgent 
leaders were to be treated harshly and no trial or investigation would save them from 
execution.
Other than this, Mier y Teran was typical of collaborators that Diaz treasured during his 
time in office. Deep devotion and servilism shown by governors and political chiefs to
6 “U.S. and Mexican consular officers coordinated much of the field work, hiring private detectives and 
working in close cooperation with state governors, military commanders and federal authorities on both 
sides o f the border. (Dirk Raat, 1976)
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Diaz is commonly remarked in most historical literature of the time7. Still, not all of 
Diaz’s collaborators were as docile and obedient as the Governor of Veracruz. 
According to official records compiled by Daniel Cosio-Villegas, relations between 
Diaz and his loyal generals were not as smooth during his first term (1876-1880) as they 
would become in subsequent years. Generals often demanded prompt payment of 
soldiers’ salaries and extra resources to control the regime’s enemies. For instance, in 
one of his regular communications with Diaz, General Pedro Hinojosa, military chief in 
Chihuahua, informed him that stubborn guerrilleros were always ready to start a new 
civil war. Therefore, a constant influx of resources was essential for keeping soldiers’ 
morale high and rebels under control. General Trevino and General Canales in 
Coahuila and Nuevo Leon often complained bitterly because of delayed and insufficient 
payments to their troops. Others, like General Antonio Rodriguez, would even complain 
to Diaz because they were unhappy to see how soldiers had no alcohol or cigarettes. 
Even when public funds were far from abundant, financial rewards to Diaz’s senior 
army officers was never neglected. In return, the president demanded, “to be always 
ready to crush any rebellious movement in the act” (Cosio Villegas, Calderon et al. 
1955).
2.1.2 Military budgets and personnel
Military budgets were a major constraint upon public finances during Diaz’s first term 
in office (Roeder 1973:57). However, these pressures soon faded. According to 
information retrieved from the National Material Capabilities Data 1816-1985 (March 
and Weissinger-Baylon 1986), during the administration of Manuel Gonzalez (1880- 
1884), the army’s budget was no longer the highest in the public administration, since it 
was less than that of the Ministry of Economic Development (Fomento). After 1884, 
the robust economic growth that Mexico experienced virtually eliminated any constraint 
on public expenditure. Foreign investment alone grew thirty-fold during el porfiriato. 
E. Lieuwen (1968) argues that Diaz’s system was self-reinforcing. The military 
provided the order necessary for economic development and economic development 
provided the revenues that kept the military loyal (Lieuwen 1968:3). Considering the
7 Zayas Enriquez also wrote that Teran’s devotion to Diaz was such that “if Don Porfirio had asked him to 
throw himself into fire, he would have done so happily.”
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economic development that el porfiriato achieved, Lieuwen’s observation seems 
accurate8.
Figure 2.1
Military expenditure and size of military personnel during el porfiriato (1876-1910)
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University of Michigan, and Detroit, MI: Melvin Small, Wayne State University, 1990. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter­
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As observed in Graph 2.1, military expenditure during Diaz’s first term in office 
declined until 1878 but increased consistently after 1880 and reached its peak in 1892. 
After this point, both military expenditure and military personnel began to decrease. 
During this period, the army suppressed uprisings in Nayarit, Sinaloa, Veracruz and 
Chihauahua; however, as Diaz consolidated political control, social unrest virtually 
vanished from the national scenario. Thus, pure military actions were limited to 
pacification missions against the Yaqui and Mayo tribes in the north o f Mexico9 (Hu-de 
Hart 1984; Velazco Toro 1986:243). Occasionally, it fought bandit gangs in the 
countryside; stifled unrest in towns or villages or crushed labour strikes at D iaz’s 
demand (Gutierrez Santos 1955). According to data on military expenditures and 
military personnel, Diaz had by 1890 the largest military force in Latin America with
8 Huntington (1968) describes economic development during el porfiriato as “phenomenal:” mineral 
production quadrupled, scores o f textile mills were built, sugar mills constructed, oil production became a 
leading industry and foreign trade and tax revenues increased tenfold.
9 Virtually all historians and diplomatic attaches agree on the effects that a new and expanding network o f  
railways and improved telegraphic communications had on the armed forces’ mobility and capabilities 
Katz, F. (1981). P. Macedo (1905) argues that communications enabled the government to make its 
authority and force felt in the most remote part o f  Mexican territory and repress whatever sign o f  
perturbation or revolt in as many days as it takes to arrive there.
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nearly 36,000 men, including soldiers and staff. It was one o f the better-funded armies, 
and had the second highest ratio o f soldiers to 1,000 inhabitants in the region10
Figure 2.2
Ratio of soldiers to 1,000 inhabitants in Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, 
Brazil and Peru in 1890
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University o f Michigan, and Detroit, MI: Melvin Small, Wayne State University, 1990. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter­
university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09903
If  the military and los ruralesu represented the repressive power o f the state, governors 
and jefes politicos (political chiefs) completed the puzzle o f control. The mission was 
“to keep the centre happy; and the centre is happy as long as there is no revolution and 
too many bandits in the countryside.” 12 With these conditions met, Diaz would tolerate 
corruption, inefficiency and even banditry by his subordinates as long as peace and 
order were preserved. Loyalty, rather than civil responsibility, was the chief 
desideratum (Knight 1986:17). As a result, public and political order became a credo 
for governors and political chiefs. The so called secret police was hardly “secret” as it
10 It is important to note that this figure does not include the National Guard, which in countries like 
Brazil was larger than the military apparatus itself.
11 Along with the federal army, Diaz had also the rural militias or rurales. These armed groups were in 
charge o f  safeguarding towns and villages connected to the fast-growing railway network, by far the most 
important economic muscle o f  el Porfirato. The rurales were common people, sensitive to local realities 
and loyal to native political leaders and federal authorities. Los rurales did not wear uniforms but they 
could be easily recognised from their fine mounts and dashing charro outfits (Knight, 1986:33). The 
rurales became an effective channel o f  public control outside o f  Mexico City. The rurales and armed 
forces were the regime’s main instruments to keep public order.
12 P. Vanderwood argues that Los Rurales acted as a sort o f preventive police, an instrument o f  D iaz’s 
political machinery to maintain the status quo, while the military was rather employed in extraordinary 
cases, when in was necessary to crush the rebels. (Vanderwood, 1983).
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was highly visible in several states. For instance, in Yucatan, Governor Olegario 
Molina recruited 700 agents to monitor political activities in the capital, in a period 
where Merida had nearly 50,000 inhabitants. In Puebla, Governor Mucio Martinez 
often used police officers disguised in civilian clothes to spy on political adversaries. In 
1907 Enrique Creel, governor of Chihuahua, created a secret police force to keep a close 
eye on alleged political enemies (Knight 1986). Later, as Mexican Ambassador to the 
United States and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Creel continued coordinating all 
espionage activities at the national level (Dirk Raat 1976). Ironically, the State of 
Chihuahua, Creel’s centre of influence, became the main point of activity of Madero’s 
rebellion. Neither federal authorities nor Creel’s secret police or system of intelligence 
could prevent, or even foresee, the size of the upcoming social turmoil. Moreover, at 
the time of Madero’s rebellion, Enrique Creel was serving as interior minister. There 
was the impression among the governing class that he lacked the muscle and 
intelligence required to confront the insurgency (Gamboa and Pacheco 1977:177)
2.2 Civil-military relations: the political side
Powerful as President Diaz was, plain authoritarianism was not his preferred approach 
to governing (Molina Enriquez 1985:186). One of the most prolific commentators of el 
porfiriato, Daniel Cosio Villegas, recognised that Diaz changed as time passed. “The 
uncultured and ambitious subversive of the Restored Republic became a talented 
politician and statesman”13. Cosio Villegas agreed with Francisco Madero: “he was 
superior to all of his contemporaries” (Madero 1909). Indeed, Madero’s 
characterization of Diaz could not be more accurate. Diaz was superior to all of his 
contemporaries, but he was also indebted to some of them. The army generals and 
regional political leaders who had led him to office expected rewards for their services. 
This group, also known as the taxtepecanos, comprised of veterans of the War of 
Reform, the French Intervention and the battles that preceded Diaz’s conquest of power 
(Castaneda-Batres, 1989:29; Camp 1995). As for Diaz himself, most of his trusted 
allies were generals forged in battle, with little if any formal military education.
Right from the beginning, the military wing of the tuxtepecanos was involved in 
keeping the armed forces under control while Diaz consolidated his political position.
13 Quoted in Benjamin (1984:348)
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In return, President Diaz generously rewarded their loyalty. For instance, General Luis 
Torres kept the governorship of Sonora for twenty years. General Juan N. Mendez 
became Governor o f Puebla and was later replaced by General Mucio Martinez, who 
held the governorship for eighteen years; General Prospero Cahuantzi served as 
Tlaxcala’s governor for twenty-six years and the list continues (Cosio Villegas, 
Calderon et al. 1955; Camp 1995). Others, like Generals Geronimo Trevino and 
Francisco Canton received regional railways concessions (C. Beals 1932:225; Turner 
1993:293).
Table 2.1
Political positions granted by President Porfirio Diaz to his political allies between 
1876 and 1880
Individual Position
Francisco Canedo Governor o f  Sinaloa
Rafael Cravioto Senator from Hidalgo
Lazaro Garza Ayala Governor o f  Nuevo Leon
Martin Gonzalez Governor o f  Oaxaca
Manuel Gonzalez Flores Governor o f Guanajuato
Carlos Diez Gutierrez Governor o f San Luis Potosi
Pedro Hinojosa Secretary o f  War
Juan Nepomuceno Mendez Governor o f Puebla
Francisco Mena Zacarias Secretary o f  Public Works
Luis Mier y Teran Governor o f  Veracruz
Carlos Pacheco Secretary o f  Development
Luis E. Torres Governor o f  Sonora
Geronimo Trevino Zone Commander o f Monterrey
Source: Table constructed with data taken from Camp (1995:63)
Years later, the list o f loyal allies continued growing as regional political leaders or 
caciques found no option but to rally behind the dictator. That was the case o f General 
Bernardo R eyes— nephew of Diaz’s Secretary o f War— who won Diaz’s sympathy for 
his successful campaign against General Naranjo and Tevino’s political influence in 
Coahuila and Nuevo Leon in the late 1880s. Reyes’ political career then skyrocketed. 
He became Governor o f Nuevo Leon in 1887 and stayed in power for nearly two 
decades. In 1900, Diaz named Reyes as his Minister of War, replacing General Pedro 
Hinojosa, who had held the position for fifteen years. Reyes was the first non- 
tuxtepecano to hold this cabinet position.
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During his brief tenure at the War Ministry, General Reyes created the Second Reserve, 
a civilian volunteer militia that accounted for 30,000 recruits. His admiration for the 
German army strengthened the relationship between the two countries. Reyes’ new 
ideas and projects in the armed forces deeply contrasted with the lack of initiative and 
submission of his immediate predecessors, General Manuel Gonzalez and General 
Hinojosa. However, Diaz’s civilian collaborators, los cientificos, soon noticed the sharp 
contrast and advised the aging dictator to disband the Second Reserve as it was 
beginning to resemble Reyes’ own military machinery. Distrustful as Diaz always was, 
he forced Reyes to resign and sent him back to the governorship of Nuevo Leon (Dirk 
Raat 1977:89). The Second Reserve was dissolved by a presidential decree in 1906. 
Despite the seriousness of the incident, loyalty to the president among the military 
leadership was not fragmented and General Reyes left Diaz’s cabinet in an honourable 
way. Nevertheless, his fate was the exception, not the rule. Between 1880 and 1900, 
Diaz expelled 500 officers and discharged 25 out of his 100 generals for 
insubordination. No trials or hearings were needed, only the President’s judgment. And 
in extraordinary cases, insubordinate officers confronted sedition charges and faced the 
firing squad (Beals 1932;Vanderwood 1983:126).
Along with the policy of purging the military from “subversives,” President Diaz 
reorganised the armed forces into 11 military zones in 1885, each with two or three 
subordinate jefaturas, with about 600 men each. Chiefs of military zones enjoyed high 
status in the government (Grayson 1999). However, Diaz frequently transferred zone 
commanders, so they and their civilian counterparts would find it difficult to conspire 
against him (Lieuwen 1968; Gamer 2001). In fact, Diaz would not just transfer the 
head of the military zone, but all the chain of command up to the rank of regiment chief- 
officer (Cosio Villegas, Calderon et. al. 1955). This policy fragmented military 
regionalism and prevented the creation of standing allegiances between battalions and 
officers. Furthermore, zone commanders were positions reserved to division generals or 
“divisionarios” who often enjoyed the full trust of the president.
This type of informal control over the armed forces was prevalent throughout el 
porfirato and constituted the first antecedent of an effective, if  not entirely orthodox, 
method of civilian control over the military. In the absence of a defined doctrine or 
education system that could teach recmits discipline and loyalty to the state, Diaz 
resorted to non-institutional means of securing the allegiance of officers.
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Based on the results achieved during his government, it seems clear that Diaz secured 
the allegiance of the generalship by inflating the economic and political price that 
seditious generals would have to pay in the event of a failed military uprising. As 
virtually every historical account of this period affirms, the military was in no sense an 
autonomous political actor. It took its orders from Diaz and obediently carried them out 
(Knight 1986).
2.2.1 Civil-military relations and the public administration
The early years of General Diaz in office were characterised by the appointment of a 
large number of military officers in public administration positions. By 1880, army 
officers occupied around 78 percent of upper echelon government positions (Lieuwen, 
1968). Ten years later, in 1891, 18 out of 27 governors in the country were still army 
officers. Below the gubernatorial level, real social control rested in the hands of 
political chiefs, whose nomination derived from the direct suggestion of state governors, 
but ratified by the central government. Their formal responsibilities consisted of 
handling political and administrative affairs on behalf of the centre. By the mid 1890s, 
47 out of 300 political chiefs in the country were army officers (Lozoya 1970). 
However, as President Diaz consolidated his position of power, military personnel 
disappeared from the political and administrative arena. After the elections of 1884, 
Diaz began to entrust important cabinet positions to professional civil servants who had 
gained their experience under the administrations of Juarez, Sebastian Lerdo and even 
Maximiliano. That was the case of former Lerdista, Ignacio Mariscal, who was Diaz’s 
Secretary of Foreign Relations. Matias Romero, a well-known Juarez adviser, was 
named Mexico’s ambassador to the United States and Manuel Dublan, the new Minister 
of Finance, had once been a member of Maximiliano’s cabinet.
By appointing civilian professionals to key cabinet posts, Diaz harnessed government 
action to the most powerful social groups, which eventually favoured specific domestic 
and foreign economic interests. Most importantly, the civilianisation of his rule 
conveyed to the population, regional political leaderships and the military itself that the 
political realm was within the purview of civilians, not of military men (Camp 
1992:16). According to R. Camp (1995:126), 54 percent of first-time officeholders in 
1884 had had a military career. However, this share felt to 9 percent in 1909. This 
policy of demilitarizing the public administration can be neatly appreciated in Graph
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2.1. Informally, however, Diaz continued opening congressional spaces for military 
officials as a way to satisfy their short-term ambitions. Still, the impotence o f congress 
during his long tenure in office rendered deputies and senators marginal to the national 
power structure. In fact, these positions represented no more than a sign o f political 
standing, suggesting closeness with the dictator.
Figure 2.3
Army-educated personnel occupying a government post as percentage of total 
public service 1876-1911
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Source: Data taken from E. Lieuwen (1968) and R. Camp (1991).
Beyond their symbolic presence in the national congress, army officers disappeared 
from high administrative positions. In fact, the number o f governors with military 
background decreased from 17 in 1889 to eight in 1903. Only survived those who 
displayed administrative talents in addition to military skills (Knight 1986). 
Nevertheless, the tuxtepecanos ’ influence never disappeared from the armed forces. 
Even though old age had depleted their ranks by the last years o f the Diaz regime, they 
still monopolized the top-ranking generalships14. Similar to Diaz, most o f them were 
not professional military officers. According to J. Kelley (1975), only a handful o f the 
old generals could distinguish between the political arena and the battlefield, and thus, 
set a poor example for rising young officers. By the time the armed movement 
commanded by Madero came about, the army was under the leadership o f aging and 
unprofessional generals who were o f little use to defend the regime. I will return to this 
issue in the final part o f the chapter when I address the causes o f D iaz’s military defeat 
in 1911.
14 Based on J. Kelley’s research, the average age o f  the six Division Generals listed on the roster as still 
on active duty was 77. (J Kelley 1974:128)
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2.3 Civil- military relations: the professional side
Improvement in military education was a major policy during elporfiriato. In fact, the 
contrast between earlier efforts to professionalize the army to Diaz’s achievements 
while in office is striking. Even when the first military school was funded one year after 
independence in 1822, the number of graduated officers was extremely low. According 
to military records, the first class to graduate from the military academy had 16 
students. By 1833, the turnout was even lower: 12. Ten years after the war with the 
United States, in 1858, the academy reached a record high of 22. Wars and coups were 
the main obstacle. Cadets often interrupted their studies as they were called to suppress 
uprisings or fight a foreign aggressor. That was the case in 1828, 1829, 1840, 1841, 
1844, 1846, 1847, 1858, and 1863. Furthermore, the Military Academy closed its doors 
during the War of Reform (1858-1860) and the French Intervention (1862-1867). It is 
no wonder that prior to Diaz, most military officers owed their commissions and 
promotions to circumstances other than martial training.
The Pax Porfiriana changed this pattern. No war, internal uprising, or revolution 
interfered with the training of officers. Under such conditions, the Military College 
generated, on a regular basis, graduates who entered active duty right after leaving 
school. By 1887, 53 technical and 134 line officers graduated from the Military 
College. In 1888, during the President’s annual address to the nation, Diaz stated that 
the Military College had graduated enough officers to fill every vacancy in the army. 
In fact, by the turn of the century, half of the army officers, approximately 4,500, 
acquired their qualifications in the Military College (Jerram 1899). According to J. 
Kelley (1975) and E. Lieween (1968), Diaz hoped to instil military professionalism in 
the rising generations of officers as a way to divert them from the political arena15.
15 To head military education, the Dictator appointed General Sostenes Rocha. General Rocha was a 
respected professional military man. He had been educated in the Military Academy during the turbulent 
1850s and owed his reputation to his heroic defence of President Juarez’s rule in 1871 against Diaz’s 
failed revolt of La Nona. Rocha’s’ nomination to become president of the Military Academy reflects two 
central elements of Diaz’s governing style. Even though Rocha had been a declared enemy of Diaz, the 
dictator was willing to grant him an important role in the reconstruction of the federal army. Rocha’s 
appointment showed that Diaz was not one to hold a political grudge, but was willing to use the talent at 
hand. Second, Rocha’s return from exile reflects the lack of military professional expertise in D ia z ’s 
inner circle. After all, “El Director del Colegio Militar” was not a position that could be trusted to any of 
Diaz’ loyal but self-made generals. During this period, Rocha set up the Military School of Medicine; 
ordered the settlement of a permanent army garrison in the territory of Baja California; imposed the first 
military code of the country (Ordenanza Militar) and put to work the first weapons factory in Mexico 
City. After Rocha’s resignation in 1886, General Juan Villegas occupied his position. As in the case of
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Still, pure military education was one of the weaknesses of the military college 
(Valades, 1977:64-66). L. Perez (1979) argues that theoretical studies pursued at 
Chapultepec (Military College) had little relevance to Mexico’s needs. Preparation 
focused on external defence, despite the country’s long history of domestic unrest. A 
second problem was the system of promotion. Most upper-echelon positions in the 
army were only available to those who enjoyed Diaz’s trust, so senior offices usually 
got their rank because of favouritism16. In fact, Diaz’s manipulation of assignments, 
appointments and promotions helped to create an officer corps that was more sensitive 
to political expediency than to military efficiency (Perez 1979). For those who had the 
goodwill of the president, life was sorted out. Generals were often honoured guests at 
Presidental parties and would be seated next to Diaz in public parades and national 
celebrations. Most high-ranking military officers were also hacendados or large 
landowners. Government protection to run their business was never denied. Diaz often 
stated that “all men of arms [making exclusive allusion to military officers] have the 
right to the paternal protection of the state” (Beals 1932).
While this system worked fine for the old generation of officers, it became problematic 
afterwards for the new graduates of the Military College as it made it very difficult for 
them to secure a promotion without the direct recommendation of Diaz. According to 
Vanderwood (1976), few graduates of the Military College reached the rank of general 
during elporfiriato. In fact, one year before the onset of Madero’s revolution, Diaz’s 
military command was still monopolised by his old military cronies (most of them aged 
70 or over). The overrepresentation of Diaz’s generation in the upper end of the 
military’s command structure clearly indicated his intention to keep young and 
professional soldiers away from positions of responsibility. If politically efficient, this 
way of controlling the military created a serious problem. Since hierarchy and discipline 
were not entirely defined by rank, zone Commanders often circumvented the orders of 
military chiefs by consulting Diaz or the War Ministry directly. This attitude and 
disregard of authority and hierarchy proved harmless while the military did not face a
Rocha, Villegas was also a renowned general who had fought Diaz during the Tuxtepec Rebellion. 
Villegas stayed in charge of the Military College until 1900 when Joaquin Beltran replaced him.
16 For instance, Article 361 of the Army’s “Ordenanza” (Internal Law) specified that no military officer 
could be promoted while retired, on leave of absence or employed by a government office other than the 
Ministry of War. However, most Division Generals reached such rank while working outside the 
military. According to D. Fernandez, Pablo Escandon was a respectable civilian who reached the rank of 
lieutenant without even ever knowing a military officer. (Fernandez, 1919)
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situation of war. However, it became deadly when Diaz’s army faced a real enemy in 
1910-1911.
Another problem facing the military at the onset of the century was recruitment. 
Ordinary troops were enrolled by force and received little or no military training; 
“Vagabonds and beggars were rounded up from the city streets... jails were often 
emptied to provide troops. Such conscripts felt no pride, but only fear and hatred for the 
officers. They were garbed shabbily, fed inadequately, trained poorly and treated badly” 
(Lieuwen 1968:5). Not surprisingly, they were notoriously unreliable. J. Guerrero, a 
sociologist of the time, described the troops of Diaz as a contingent of criminals that 
were periodically delivered from state prisons (Guerrero 1901). For L. Rowe (1912), 
the system of recruitment was such as to make the army a kind of penal colony rather 
than a real national fighting force. If convicts were forced to enlist, it is not difficult to 
imagine what ordinary citizens thought about the military life. In fact, forced service in 
the army was one of the most feared punishments (Knight 1986). On the eve of the 
Revolution, William E. Carson wrote: “the regulars are quite untrustworthy and have 
little or no patriotism. The explanation is simple. Most of them are men who as penalty 
for some crime have been sentenced to service in the army, thus forcing them into 
service, ill drilled and with little or no knowledge of the use of fire-arms, so that is 
scarcely expected that they will make good soldiers” (Carson 1909:219).
Endemic corruption among high-ranking officers completes the picture of President 
Diaz’s army. It was no secret that officers who received per diem allowances for their 
men would inflate their numbers by 40 percent in order to pocket the extra money. This 
situation made it difficult to assess the actual size of Diaz’s army. Some commentators 
estimated the size of the army at nearly 40,000 members. Estimations that are more 
accurate cite about 9,000 officers and 18,000 troops (Beals 1930; Creelman 1912, 
Lieuwen 1968). L. Perez (1979) affirms that the size of the military fluctuated between
14,000 and 20,000 officers and soldiers. The American ambassador, Henry Lane 
Wilson, reported that the military seemed to be much less effective than the published 
records indicated; this was due to the existence of skeleton regiments and padded 
rolls17. Yet, according to Diaz’s own calculation, he had no more than 14,000 troops. 
These discrepant figures suggest that not even the regime knew the real size of its force
17 Quoted in L. Perez (1979). Letter, Henry Lane Wilson to Philander C. Knox (8 Feb 1911) 812.00/796
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when it had to suppress Madero’s rebellion. As shown in Graph 3.1, Diaz’s regime had 
the lowest ratio o f military manpower to inhabitant in more than 90 years.
Figure 2.4
Ratio of military manpower to inhabitants 1/1000: Mexico 1821-2000
■ Ratio 
1/1000
1821 1867 1884 1900 1910 1917 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Source: Graph made with information provided by The Secretary o f  Defence through
petition 21805 and (Castro Soto and Ledesma 2000).
By looking at the available statistics, it is clear that after 1892, military budgets rose 
steadily, while the number o f enlisted soldiers continued falling (SEDENA 1979:297- 
303). Even though multiple factors might have played a role on this phenomenon, such 
as the procurement o f modem military equipment or the creation o f new military 
infrastructure, the evidence points in the direction o f widespread corruption and 
administrative carelessness. Under these conditions, the emergence o f professional 
armed forces in el porfiriato was far from becoming a possibility. First, the education 
systems lacked a clear logic o f training and education. Basic military values, such as 
patriotism, honour, discipline and loyalty to the state did not occupy a central role in the 
military’s education system. In other words, the military had no doctrine apart from 
blind loyalty to President Diaz. Second, the close linkage between army officers, 
elected politicians and business communities precluded the creation o f an armed body 
centred exclusively on military affairs. Third, widespread corruption among zone 
commanders deeply limited the ability o f the military to protect the regime from its 
political enemies.
2.4 D iaz’s m ilitary defeat (1910-1911)
In 1908, President Diaz declared to James Creelman, an American journalist, that he 
considered Mexico was ready for democracy, so the time to hand over power to the next
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generation of politicians was imminent (Creelman 1911). Therefore, he said he would 
grant his political adversaries the guarantee of fair elections. As expected, those whose 
intervention in politics had been denied by the regime took the dictator’s words very 
seriously. Francisco I. Madero and his anti-reeleccionista party emerged as the most 
important challenger.
Nevertheless, a few weeks before the election, Diaz broke his promise and imprisoned 
Madero. Weeks later, as it had occurred seven times in the past, Diaz won the 
presidential race. Madero escaped from prison and requested asylum in the United 
States. Shortly thereafter, he launched the Plan of San Luis. His programme called 
Diaz’s rule illegitimate and asserted that Mexico needed to end the rule of generals in 
order to enter the era of civilian rule and democratic politics. He encouraged all sectors 
of society, even officials of the federal army, to rally to his movement, and reminded 
military officers that their duty was to protect and be loyal to the institutions of the 
republic, rather than support tyranny. To the improvised militias that joined his cause, 
Madero promised to grant military ranks to participants and integrate them into the 
National Army (Duncan and Goodsell 1970).
Madero’s movement profited from a prevailing environment of social anger, and rapidly 
found support among the bourgeoisie and middle class groups that resented Diaz’s 
exclusionary policies. A similar situation occurred with thousands of landless peasants 
who laboured on the great haciendas of Morelos, Oaxaca and Guerrero. Francisco I. 
Madero scheduled his attack to start on November 20, 1910 at 6 pm. Given the 
openness of Madero’s plan, the surveillance operations that were put into effect that day 
by Diaz's troops, police bodies and the rurales, came as no surprise. In fact, in 
Tlaxcala, Jalisco and Chihuahua, especially in Guadalajara and the City of Chihuahua, 
local police bodies carried out preventive arrests of alleged insurgents and confiscated 
arms and ammunition. Apart from a few proletarian protests in distant areas and some 
minor guerrilla activity in Chihuahua and Puebla, nothing serious happened that day or 
the week after. In fact, the War Ministry reported that no disorder was recorded in 
Jalisco, Coahuila or Sinaloa.
The disorganised nature of Madero’s movement and Diaz’s quick military response 
suggested in the first two weeks a victory of the federal forces. The US Ambassador, 
Henry Lane Wilson, sent a message to the State Department saying, “Revolutionary
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movement has degenerated into bandit warfare, but the government seems in complete 
control.’’(Vanderwood 1976:562). Conventional military doctrines of internal defence, 
also known as Low Intensity Conflict18, indicate that ruling elites confronting 
insurgency movements must be aware that any military operation can generate serious 
political repercussions (Charters and Tugwell 1989). In other words, guerrilla warfare 
seldom leads to the obliteration of the enemy. Guerrillas fight a mobile war. Their 
tactics are hit-and-run and hardly engage the enemy in pitched battles. Therefore, the 
public-relations dimension of the confrontation is crucial to win the hearts and minds of 
the general populace. This objective is often achieved through steadily discrediting the 
rebel’s political aims in the press. Therefore, military supremacy is essential to 
convince the people at large that sufficient force exists to protect their interest, since 
crushing the enemy in the short term is hardly a feasible possibility (P. Vanderwood 
1976:552). The historical account of Diaz’s response to Madero’s rebellion shows that 
neither public relations nor the combat dimensions of the conflict were efficiently 
addressed by the regime (Portilla 1995:362).
To begin with, President Diaz found the scattered distribution of military troops in the 
country, an essential element of his strategy of internal security, to be very problematic. 
By the time the uprising started to gain momentum (late December, 1910), the regime 
was forced to move entire battalions to reinforce besieged positions. D. Charters and 
Tugwell (1989) argue that counterinsurgency tactics require at least a 6 to 1 superiority 
in manpower in order to succeed. However, Diaz’s total military presence in Chihuahua 
barely reached 1,500 when Madero’s military force accounted for at least 3,00019 by the 
beginning of December 1910. In agreement with the 6-to-l principle, Diaz would have 
needed 18,000 men in the state of Chihuahua alone to defeat Madero’s forces 
(Vanderwood 1976: 560). That was two thirds of the total size of his military force. In 
fact, by the time Diaz capitulated in May 1911, the rebel force consisted of nearly
40,000 armed men. According to Portilla (1995:398), the total force of Diaz (military, 
rurales, police bodies and some national guards under the jurisdiction of state
18 “Low intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or 
psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychological 
pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic 
area and it is often characterised by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.” 
(Command, 1986)
19 There seems to be no agreement on the size of Madero’s troops in Chihuahua by December 1910. 
Figures range from 8,000 (El Heraldo de Mexico December 10, 1910) to 3,000 (El Pais January 6, 1911). 
See Vanderwood (1976:559). In order to apply the 6 to 1 principle of counter guerrilla tactics, I took into 
consideration the lowest figure available.
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governors) accounted to 30,000. It was, by all means, insufficient to confront the 
momentum that Madero’s revolution had already gained.
Recruiting was also a problem for the federal army. While new volunteers increased the 
numerical advantage of the insurgents, the army was experiencing serious difficulty to 
remain cohesive and solid. For instance, the Governor of Zacatecas informed the War 
Ministry that he was unable to provide troops because he needed local police forces to 
guard communities. He also announced that recruitment was impossible, “because 
people sympathise with the rebels”. Similar incidents were reported in other parts of the 
country, where even jefes politicos ’ loyalties rapidly shifted (Portilla 1995).
If recruitment and size of the federal army were a handicap, lack of unity and discipline 
at the top of the military structure completed the picture. In less than three months, 
Diaz appointed three Governors of Chihuahua, hoping to contain the unrest. However, 
he failed each time and made the relationship between the Zone Military Commander 
and civilian authorities even more fractious. A further field where the military failed to 
perform was on intelligence gathering and analysis. Due to the clandestine nature of the 
enemy, effective military actions relied on steady inflows of information on the 
insurgents’ whereabouts, social bases of support and short-term objectives. As 
mentioned earlier, different bodies and government agencies were in charge of 
intelligence gathering. However, it seems that the lack of information about the 
strength of the guerrilla forces represented an inescapable handicap for Diaz ’s military. 
Katz (1985) suggests that governors, political chiefs and army commanders often 
manufactured intelligence reports in order to tell the dictator what he wanted to hear. 
Intelligence, like many other technical functions of the regime, had been politicised, and 
had therefore become worthless for decision-making. According to F. Bulnes (1927), 
Diaz’s decision to capitulate was apparently triggered by intelligence information that 
claimed that Zapata’s militia in the south was powerful enough to sweep the rest of the 
federal forces out of Mexico City. However, Francisco Bulnes argued that Diaz greatly 
overestimated Zapata’s military strength.
Finally, the regime was also defeated in the field of public relations. The series of 
victories of the revolutionary forces against the federal army changed rapidly the views 
of the population concerning the presumed invulnerability of the federal forces. The 
heavy movement of troops fed the impression, particularity among inhabitants of
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Mexico City, that Diaz’s military did not have the muscle to face the uprising. Under 
these circumstances, the early victories of Diaz’s military force against the alzados were 
quickly overshadowed by peasant guerrilla activity in Morelos, Hidalgo, Guerrero and 
Oaxaca. In large cities, such as Guadalajara and Mexico City, organised workers and 
urban middle classes saw in the revolution an opportunity to play a greater political role 
and soon joined Madero’s movement. This hodgepodge united by a common 
opposition to the regime strengthened Madero’s Ejercito Libertador. On May 10, the 
border City of Juarez felt under the control of rebels. This victory ensured the steady 
supply of arms to Madero’s army from the United States and in less than a week, the US 
President, William Taft, had already recognised the authority of Maderistas over the 
border point. Taft’s recognition of Madero’s insurgency force came as no surprise, 
since it was clear the United States had tolerated the supply of military equipment to 
Madero’s forces throughout the confrontation with Diaz’s regime (Hart 1987; Portilla 
1995). Days later, the aging dictator acknowledged his defeat, resigned, and left the 
country.
In sum, Madero’s Revolution lasted less than six months, and was relatively bloodless. 
However, when Diaz capitulated, the federal army had not yet been defeated (Lozoya 
1970). In fact, many of its battalions, particularly in the central region of the country, 
had hardly suffered fatalities as most battles were fought in the northern part of the 
country. Aware of the structural weaknesses of the federal army, it is likely that Diaz 
knew that it was only a matter of time for Madero’s forces to succeed. A protracted war 
against the insurgents would’ve meant, inexorably, the destruction of his industial and 
infrastructure legacy: railways, highways, ports, etc. Furthermore, the political side of 
the war had already been lost. That is, Diaz’s credibility to maintain peace and stability 
in the country had already vanished away. In the end, President Diaz signed the Ciudad 
Juarez Agreement and Francisco de la Barra became interim president. In October 
1911, Madero won the presidential election and became the first democratically elected 
president of the new century.
2.5 Conclusions
The disastrous performance of the federal army during Madero’s Revolution shows that 
political rather than military considerations determined the way in which the armed 
forces evolved during the protracted rule of Porfirio Diaz. Compared to other countries
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in Latin America, where military establishments achieved a superior ability to defend 
the state from external aggression, Mexico’s military focused on combating the 
regime’s domestic enemies. In other words, Mexico’s military did not evolve to 
achieve what S. Huntington calls military security, but was intended to guarantee the 
safety of the ruling elite.
Important changes in civil-military relations took place during el porfiriato. The most 
important was the imposition of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. The 
deference shown by the military elite to Diaz’s authority, even during the last hours of 
his presidency, was a clear sign of subordination (Rowe 1912). In fact, there is no 
record of massive desertion of army officers or soldiers that later adhered to the 
insurgent side, even though there were documented attempts of people close to Madero 
to gain the allegiance of Diaz’s military chiefs (Franco y Gonzalez Salas 1979) 24-39. 
Despite its effectiveness, Porfirio Diaz’s control over the armed forces was flawed and 
built upon shaky foundations. Patronage, bribery and handsome rewards or business 
opportunities to loyal officers remained the means of keeping the military away from 
politics. Even when Diaz’s administration witnessed some advances in military 
professionalism, his military was not prepared to counteract guerrilla movements. The 
army lacked of internal discipline, its leadership had grown old while the rising 
generations of professional officers were prevented from performing management 
positions.
Finally, Diaz failed to forge an institutional bond between the officer corps and the 
state. Indeed, the armed forces were loyal to the President, but as his successor would 
tragically discover two years after assuming the presidency, the federal army was loyal 
to Porfirio Diaz, not to the office of the president. Two years after Madero’s victory, 
General Victoriano Huerta waged a successful coup, assassinated Francisco Madero and 
placed the armed forces at the centre of the political landscape. After this tragic event, 
the task of reinstating civilian supremacy over the armed forces would take nearly 30 
years to be fully achieved. Not surprisingly, it was re-established in a way that 
resembled many of the key characteristics imposed during el porfiriato.
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Chapter 3. El Porfiriato Revisited: the Consolidation of Civilian 
Supremacy in Post-revolutionary Mexico, 1911-1934
Introduction
Since the end of the Mexican Revolution, the executive has had an exclusive and almost 
undisputed authority over the military. This chapter presents a narrative of the 
reconstruction of state power in Mexico after el porfiriato and the way the post 
revolutionary elite redefined civil-military relations in the 1920s and ‘30s. Finally, it 
examines the consequences of this institutional arrangement on the armed forces.
The time frame covered in this chapter opens an interesting case for the analysis of how 
each of the five elected presidents after Madero’s downfall in 1913 contributed to 
institutionalising a vertical and undisputed form of control over the armed forces. I will 
argue that the role of political interests and the policy preferences of the ruling elite 
after 1920 are key elements to understanding the logic behind the reform of civil- 
military relations. It seems clear that the post-revolutionary elite learned the lesson of 
relying too much on informal means of control to keep the sword and rifle away from 
the political arena. Still, they did not hesitate to continue using the military in an utterly 
partisan fashion.
In the second section of this chapter, I will briefly argue that Mexico’s regional security 
complex (Buzan 1991) precluded the formation of a clear defensive orientation in 
Mexico’s military. This part is relevant to explain why the Mexican armed forces 
behaved differently from most of their South American counterparts that by the end of 
the 1910s were regarding each other with a high level of suspicion. In other words, 
Mexico was unlikely to be at war with Guatemala and unable to challenge the United 
States military power. According to the U.S. State Department archives on Mexico’s 
military relations during this period, it is seems this notion was very clear in the mindset
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of the post-revolutionary elite. For instance, while serving as Secretary of Defence in 
1931, Plutarco Elias Calles declared: “the Mexican Army is primarily a police force, as 
the army would be virtually useless against that of the United States [...] moral reasons 
only, and not the condition of Mexico’s military resources and armament, could prevent 
the United States from conquering Mexico.”1
I will argue that this relatively secure geopolitical position ruled out the emergence of a 
conventional conception of national defence in the construction of the post­
revolutionary doctrine of national security. In turn, this characteristic allowed the 
creation of a more profound internal dimension where the armed forces have been 
extensively employed to impose public order, address political and electoral conflicts 
and promote economic development .
3.1 Madero’s brief presidential term, 1911-1913
Diaz’s military defeat in 1911 did not signify an immediate political demise of the 
regime, its institutions, political culture or dominant social groups. Even when Diaz 
negotiated his departure from office from a position of weakness, the outcome of the 
peace process did not entirely reflect such a condition. From the outset, the political 
abilities of the dictator and his associates sharply contrasted with the excessive goodwill 
— some historians may also call naivete — of his successor (Bulnes 1972). To begin 
with, Madero agreed to follow the constitutional procedure specifying that the minister 
of foreign affairs should become interim president in case of death or resignation of the 
acting president (Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1993). Therefore, Francisco Leon de la 
Barra, Diaz’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, assumed the executive power, which he held 
for five months after Diaz’s resignation. Presumably, Madero left the transition in De la 
Barra’s hands to meld the political and economic interests of the upper classes and 
traditional social groups with those of the incoming political regime.
However, for more acute political observers of the time, Madero’s first concessions 
were far too generous (Cumberland 1972:3-22). Defeated in the battlefield, but 
triumphant at the table of negotiations, the rational response of the porfirian elite aimed
1 Rueben Clark, American Ambassador to The State Department. October 24, 1931. General Records of 
the Department of State, RG 812.20/91 NARA
2 G.R Wilson., American Consul to State Department. November 15, 1938. Military Forces in The 
Piedras Negras Consular District. General Records of the Department of State, RG 812.20/181 NARA
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at delaying, if not preventing altogether, the diverse social agenda that had triggered the 
Revolution in the first place. Judging from the tragic death of Madero in 1913 the 
remnants of Diaz’s crew succeeded in this task for a while. First, and with the political 
backing of Madero, President De la Barra ordered the dissolution of El Ejercito 
Libertador, cognizant of the power of the defeated, but still standing Federal Army. 
Among a long series of political miscalculations, Madero’s decision to disband his 
military muscle was the most damaging. Only a small fraction of the rebel forces was 
integrated into active service under a new military force that was known as “Los 
Cuerpos Rurales de la Federacion ” (Lieuwen 1968). Other than this minor role, few of 
the informal militias and their leadership get positions in the public service, not to say in 
the military as agreed in El Plan de San Luis —the Revolution’s manifesto. Not 
surprisingly, division and growing disenchantment with the revolution’s leader started 
to gain ground, particularly among the improvised but politically popular generals who 
were reasonably expecting rewards for participating in the winning side of the armed 
struggle .
If the political arena was not running according to Madero’s expectations, civil-military 
relations did not offer a different scenario. Undisturbed by the arguments of his former 
colleagues in arms, Madero appeared considerably more concerned with securing the 
loyalty of the Federal Army. On this issue, Madero appealed to the promotion of the 
military’s corporate interest as a way of recreating a more democratic relationship with 
the officer corps. In fact, during his first year in office, officers’ salaries were raised 
and promotions were granted to those officers who had been neglected in Diaz’s times 
for lacking proper political connections. Furthermore, the newly promoted generalship 
was given unprecedented room of manoeuvre that aimed at improving its performance 
and professional character. No doubt, this strategy proved efficient in the short term. It 
allowed the new administration to open a space where the armed forces could evolve 
without the extreme political meddling that had characterised the Diaz years.
Eventually — although temporarily —  the Mexican armed forces started to look and act 
more like a war machine than a political interest group. In fact, this attitude proved to 
be instrumental in the survival of Madero’s presidency, particularly when political
3 For instance, General Pascual Orozco in Sonora and Navarro in Chihuahua aired their discontent in the 
press by criticising the counter-revolutionary character of the interim president’s policies. But, their 
grievances found no echo and Madero lost no time demanding total respect for the executive’s decisions.
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tensions in the countryside got out of control as a result of De la Barra and Madero’s 
decision to suspend the long awaited restitution of communal lands (Katz 1979: 34-37). 
To make it worse, President De la Barra sent the Federal Army to combat Zapata’s 
militia as a way of stopping ongoing illegal occupation of land in the states of Morelos 
and Guerrero. It is not difficult to conclude why the policies of the interim president 
soon started to demolish the fragile unity of the revolutionary movement. By the time 
Madero won the presidential election on November 5, 1911, the loyalty of El Ejercito 
Libertador to the executive power was irremediably broken. This was, in part, the 
result of Madero’s stubborn determination to introduce democratic practices without 
changing the Porfirian structures of power, the armed forces included (Knight 
1986:448-466).
Madero’s erratic and contradictory policy soon took its toll. Some of his former 
powerful allies, Zapata and Orozco, rebelled within twenty days after he had assumed 
the presidency. At the same time, there were no clear signs that the President had 
successfully attracted the allegiance of the Federal Army either. It soon became clear 
that the decision to leave the leadership of the Revolution outside of the new political 
agreement interfered with the peace and stability that Mexican society demanded. On 
the contrary, such exclusion left charismatic leaders with great ascendancy among their 
armed men with an appealing objective to resume hostilities: “To fight for the 
unfulfilled goals of the Revolution.”
The consequences of Madero’s choice to terminate his alliance with Zapata and Orozco 
and the measures he adopted to maintain control over the federal army portrays the 
paradox inherent in most approaches to civil-military relations. That is, how to keep a 
military force strong enough to guarantee the defence of the state against its internal and 
external enemies and, at the same time, sufficiently loyal to the civilian leadership to 
remain secluded from the struggles for political power. Eventually, the Federal Army, 
under the expedient command of General Victoriano Huerta, reduced both uprisings to a 
level that could not represent a threat to political stability. It seems that Madero’s 
strategy of reducing political meddling in strict military affairs and the promotion of the 
army’s corporate interest boosted the regime’s capacity to defend itself against 
guerrillas. Unfortunately, for the president’s cause, this strategy was not entirety
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successful in brining under control a praetorian army that was still tightly controlled by 
a handful of Porfirian generals.
Less than a month after Pascual Orozco’s defeat, a faction of the military elite 
commanded by the leader of the counter-revolution, General Victoriano Huerta, carried 
out a coup that put an end to Madero’s impractical politics. Soon after, he was 
assassinated in a well-researched passage of Mexico’s history known as “La Decena 
Tragicd’ (Ross 1970). With Madero’s assassination, the last trace of the Revolution as 
it was planned in 1910 died too. It was also the end of the first real effort —perhaps the 
only one so far — to bring the armed forces under a more democratic fashion of control. 
It is not difficult to suggest that the generalship that betrayed Madero soon concluded 
they were not only fighting the war Diaz refused to continue in May 1911, but also 
sustaining a president with no support other than the military itself. Despite Madero’s 
complacent treatment toward the military elite, his authority was superimposed. No 
new formal or informal mechanisms were created to ensure their loyalty. Furthermore, 
the inability of the president to set minimum conditions of stability— apart from 
eroding legitimacy — made upper classes and managers of foreign capital highly 
skeptical about his capacity to bring peace to the country. It was clear that, when these 
groups were confronted with the choice of supporting Madero or a military regime, they 
opted for the rule of the generals.
At this point, comparisons between Diaz and Madero are relevant to explain how each 
president tackled the civil-military paradox described above. It also clarifies why 
Madero’s attempt to reform civil-military relations did not work as he expected. Unlike 
Diaz, Madero had no military experience and he hardly knew the workings of the 
Federal Army as an organisation. Therefore, he had no unconditional allies within the 
military, and his rule never reached the levels of popularity and political alliances that 
Diaz once had (Beezley, Wolfskill et al. 1979:19). Regardless of the clear signs that the 
army was plotting a coup and the warnings of his political advisors — the Madero 
family included — the president maintained his blind faith in the institutional allegiance 
of the armed forces.
Madero clearly failed to consider that Diaz’s informal method of controlling the armed 
forces was not a capricious choice the dictator made to establish his authority over the 
generalship. On the contrary, the empowerment of Diaz’s trustful agents (tuxtepecanos)
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was, above all, a pragmatic solution to keep under control a semi-professional armed 
body with low institutional cohesion, low differentiation from civil society, and dubious 
loyalty towards the state and its civilian leadership. As explained in the second chapter, 
Diaz’s trusted agents allowed him to have the military doing whatever he wanted and 
the way he wanted. This often allowed him to maintain reasonable levels of political 
stability that could serve as an incentive to attract investment and sustain economic 
growth. Therefore, it seems that Madero’s failure to control the armed forces after 1911 
was not necessarily related to his unwillingness to transform a path-dependent 
relationship he not only considered to be morally wrong but pernicious for proper 
democratic development (Madero 1909). It was rather due to his inability to recognize 
that the military he inherited and empowered within the new political conditions 
responded to a specific style of leadership that he was either reluctant to provide for 
ethical reasons or not even able of truly identify during the two years he remained in 
office. In the end, Madero failed to change the nature of civil-military relations, 
because the inertia from the Diaz era proved to be much stronger that the will or the 
formal powers of the president.
Ultimately, Madero experienced exactly the opposite problems Diaz had at the end of 
his reign in 1910. That is, his rule proved to be less vulnerable to a revolution, but 
poorly equipped to prevent a military coup. His tragic fate also made clear that military 
coups were an inevitable result in the absence of a strong and popular president, as it 
had been the case throughout the largest part of the 19th Century. Twenty years after 
Madero’s assassination, this pattern of political instability changed via a slow but 
continuous development in the direction of a more firm, institutional and secure form of 
civilian supremacy. The following two sections of this chapter deal with this 
transformation.
3.2 Huerta, Carranza, the United States and the internal dimension of 
security
Tracking civilian control over the armed forces after Madero’s assassination until the 
end of Plutarco Elias Calles’ Presidency in 1928 depicts a historical process of 
discontinuities that incessantly moved backward and forward like a pendulum. The 
arrival of General Victoriano Huerta to the presidency in 1913 marked the arrival of the 
armed forces to political supremacy. Unlike Diaz, the new regime did not hide its
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militarism. Huerta’s was truly a military regime. It gave prominence to violent 
solutions to social and political conflicts as opposed to conciliation and negotiation, 
which was Diaz’s preferred method. One of his first actions as president was to replace 
state governors with trusted members of the federal army. A similar situation occurred 
with most the senior positions in the public administration. In fact, even civilian 
members of his cabinet were made Brigade Generals. According to Sherman and 
Greenleaf (1960), Huerta’s regime came close to converting Mexico into the most 
militarist state in the world. His rule was fundamentally counter-revolutionary, as there 
was the clear goal to eliminate all traces of Madero’s liberal experiment and to return (at 
least strive for it explicitly) the country to the good old days of the porfiriato (Knight 
1986a:62).
Not surprisingly, the country’s military apparatus also got significantly enlarged. Once 
more, federal prisons were emptied and the ominous Leva returned as the only feasible 
option to recruit soldiers4. On strictly military issues, Huerta intended to construct a 
professional army of 250,000 soldiers in less than three years. In real terms, this meant 
the creation of a military force almost 7 times bigger than Diaz’s had been in 1910.
Contrary to Huerta’s expectations and that of the political groups that supported his 
presidency— including the US Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson— his arrival to power 
did not bring the expected peace and political stability. Quite the opposite, it led to the 
bloodiest stage of the Mexican revolution. Madero’s assassination made him a martyr, 
and soon his old allies embraced his image to regroup forces, this time under the 
command of Venustiano Carranza, by that time the governor of Coahuila. As occurred 
with Diaz, the most important challenge to the regime came from the north. However, 
this characteristic was, perhaps, the only point of coincidence between Madero and the 
new leader. Carranza’s approach to the Revolution was more pragmatic. He tried to 
avoid Madero’s obvious mistakes such as neglecting the Revolution’s social agenda, 
denying the political positions that would correspond to his followers or leaving the 
Federal Army untouched after peace negotiations.
Carranza’s political pronunciamiento, known as “El Plan de Guadalupe,” was concise. 
It did not call for a social revolution, but merely a statement of general goals for
4 According to L. Meyer (1976), Huerta recruited between 800 and 1000 new soldiers during his first 
month in office.
91
toppling the Huerta dictatorship (Richmond 1979:51). The core of El Plan de 
Guadalupe was that Carranza would be appointed provisional president at the end of the 
armed struggle and elections would be organised once the country was in a position of 
peace and stability. In military terms, Carranza’s war machinery was not far from being 
a second edition of Madero’s Ejercito Libertador. However, it also had important 
differences that are worth noting. To begin with, El Ejercito Constitucionalista was 
clearly divided into three geographical commands that initially responded to Carranza’s 
leadership. General Alvaro Obregon headed the North-west force; Francisco Villa was 
responsible for the Northern Division (Katz, 1979); and General Pablo Gonzalez 
commanded the Northeast forces (Krauze 1997). Forces loyal to Emiliano Zapata 
fought in the south5, but they did not respond directly to Carranza’s orders (Lozoya 
1971).
If not professional, the generalship of "El Constitucionalista” had experience in the 
practice of war. For instance, Obregon had participated in Madero’s revolution as a 
middle-ranking officer, but he gained most of his reputation while fighting the 
Orozquista rebellion during the second half of 1912. By the time the military campaign 
against Huerta erupted, Obregon had become the natural leader of the resistance in 
Sonora. Unlike Villa’s armed force, the Northwest army came into existence under the 
initiative of the Governor of Sonora, Jose Maria Maytorena. The objective of this 
regional army was to provide the State with a standing force capable of maintaining 
control over the territorial claims of Mayo and Yaqui tribes in the region. The Sonoran 
militia was hierarchically organised and disciplined. Its soldiers received their salaries 
directly from the State’s treasury6. On this basis, it is not difficult to understand why 
Carranza took Obregon’s militia as the backbone of the new military force of the 
country, as it was the only group accustomed to receiving orders from civilian 
authorities.
5 Zapata’s objectives were mainly focused on territorial claims of indigenous communities that had been 
summarised in el Plan de Ayala. Collective gain, rather than individual interest, appeared to be the main 
popular appeal of the Zapatistas. In contrast, Villa’s armed force, as with Serrano rebellions, accounted 
for a more diverse composition of interests and objectives of its membership (Knight 1986). Agrarian 
reform played an important role for most of them, as well as old grievances of communities that deeply 
resented the imposition of political chiefs. Unlike Carrancistas and Zapatistas, Villa’s military force 
lacked a political manifesto. This was also an indication of the more individualistic character of their 
demands and political objectives
6 By 1913, this military force had 15 generals, 155 officers, nearly 3,000 soldiers and more than 8,000 
volunteers (Aguilar Camin, H. 1982). They were all commanded by General Obregon, but were 
subordinated to the civilian command of Sonora’s state Governor, Jose Maria Maytorena.
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After sixteen months of relentless battle, Huerta’s illegitimate regime crumbled. The 
initial support his rule got from the United States under the Presidency of William Taft 
was revoked soon after President Woodrow Wilson assumed the Presidency on March 
3, 1913. Almost all historical accounts of this period agreed that the new American 
President saw with suspicion Huerta’s rule and highly condemned the assassination of 
Madero (Wilson-Hackett 1926; Colegio de Mexico. Centro de Estudios Historicos. 
1981; Katz 1981; Knight 1986a). In real terms, Wilson’s animosity towards Huerta 
strangled the inflow of weapons and resources from the United States. This situation 
deeply affected the ability of the regime to keep on fighting the armed subversion. 
Furthermore, the occupation of Veracruz in 1914 by American warships also precluded 
the importation of weaponry from Europe and placed not only Huerta but also Carranza 
in a difficult political situation. It was clear that Huerta could have used and, in fact, 
tried to use, the American invasion to raise some internal support by appealing to a deep 
rooted anti-American feeling among Mexicans (Katz 1981). Contrary to his intentions, 
President Wilson’s actions to harm Huerta’s rule were actually causing the opposite 
effect.
The role of the United States played during this period is central to understanding both 
the external dimension of the Mexican revolution during those years, and the evolution 
of Mexico’s policy of national defence. Despite the deployment of U.S. warships in 
Veracruz and the punitive expedition headed by General Pershing to hunt down Pancho 
Villa in 1916 (Stout 1999; Marcovitz 2003), it seems the United States did not seriously 
consider a war in Mexico as a way of protecting its economic or geopolitical interests in 
the region. Additionally, Carranza seized the window of opportunity opened by the 
Great War. Within the context of global war confrontation, which was later confirmed 
by the famous “Zimmerman Telegram,” it became clear that the United States needed to 
have an amicable relationship with its southern neighbour. Through his political envoys 
in Washington, Carranza demanded both the withdrawal of American soldiers from 
Mexican territory and the recognition of his rule by the American Government to his 
rule.
On civil-military relations, Carranza’s use of diplomacy in the relationship with the 
United States, made evident that Mexico’s policy of national defence was not in the 
direction of developing a strong military force. In fact, the security measures of the
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United States did not call for a well-developed professional military apparatus in 
Mexico. (Pineyro 1985). Compared to other countries in the continent whose military 
were looking at each other with a high degree o f suspicion (table 3.1), the regional 
security complex o f Mexico was pointing in a different direction.
Table 3.1
Latin American wars 1906-1941
Y ear Name P artic ipan ts
1906 Second Central American War Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador 
v. Nicaragua
1907 Third Central American War Honduras, El Salvador v. 
Nicaragua
1932-35 Chaco War Bolivia v. Paraguay
1932 Leticia War Peru v. Colombia
1939-1941 Zarumilla War Peru v. Ecuador
Source (Mares 2001)
In other words, while other Latin American countries were fighting regional wars or 
investing heavily in military professionalism to confront potentially hostile neighbours, 
the Mexican ruling elite was struggling to address the social and political disarray 
dragged since the Revolution, the dissolution o f the Federal Army and the resignation o f 
Huerta from M exico’s presidency in August 1914. Unfortunately, for Carranza and his 
followers, the evaporation o f the last traces o f Diaz’s regime as well as the 
incorporation o f the revolutionary forces into the country’s payroll did not pacify the 
country. For the next 15 years, the main threat to the country’s stability was domestic 
and it came concretely from a multitude o f regional military chiefs or caudillos who 
insisted on influencing the political arena from their respective positions and standings 
in the armed forces. Under these circumstances, it was clear that Carranza’s Plan de 
Guadalupe was efficient in supplying a minimum sense o f order while all revolutionary 
factions had a common enemy. However, this plan was unable to provide a stable basis 
for long-term leadership once the hostilities with the federal army were over.
This situation, in part, explains why the different military factions o f the revolution 
were so eager to welcome the leftovers o f the Federal Army into their ranks. Francisco 
Villa even granted amnesty to all federales (former members o f the Federal Army) who 
were willing to join his militia and banned only those who had taken part in the
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assassination of Madero7. Villa’s proposition could not disguise the fact that he was 
preparing to wage war against Carranza in search of becoming the supreme power in the 
country. Soon after attempts failed to mediate between political contenders, the battle of 
the winners, as A Knight (1986) named it, divided the Revolution into two visible 
factions. General Obregon and General Pablo Gonzalez decided to play the cards of 
Carranza and put their semi-professional military forces at his service. In turn, Villa bet 
for his substantial army, which Zapata promptly joined (Gonzales 2002).
Despite having a greater military force, the stubbornness of General Villa could not 
compete with the apparently superior military skills of General Alvaro Obregon. 
Between May and November 1915, Villa was defeated in three consecutive battles and 
his military force was reduced to a few squads. The same outcome befell forces loyal to 
Zapata, as well as other armed groups that profited form the state of lawlessness that 
reigned after the collapse of Huerta’s rule. The configuration of power that derived 
from Villa’s and Zapata’s military defeat was decisive for the definition of the new 
institutional equilibrium in the following years. Finally, Carranza’s rule was 
considerably consolidated when the United States granted de-facto recognition of the 
new government in October 1915.
Carranza’s victory over Villa and Zapata made clear that military force was the final 
arbiter of politics, particularly in deciding who could serve as president. As a result, it 
provided a minimum of consensus over the leadership of the country and the national 
army. However, it could not do much to tame the political ambitions of a multitude of 
army officers, whose political standing stemmed from their alleged military feats. In 
that sense, the new national army was bom politicised, as most regional military leaders 
continued commanding their troops in a patriarchal fashion. This factor alone kept the 
country under conditions of latent political instability.
3.3 Carranza’s rule and the Constitution of 1917
Despite the problems with control over the armed forces described above, pitched 
battles between contenders gave way to an active debate of ideas in the renovated
7 Formally, ex-members of the Federal Army could only be admitted in the new military institution as 
long as they were graduates form the Military College and were willing to work in the military academy 
as instructors. Nevertheless, informally, an important percentage of ex-federal soldiers and officers were 
integrated into the forces of Villa, Zapata and General Pablo Gonzalez (Knight, A. 1986a).
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Congress. The shape of social reform started to take real dimension when a victorious 
President Carranza called the leadership of the Revolution to redefine the rules of the 
political game in December 1916. The Constitutional Project that Carranza proposed to 
the new Congress incorporated the broad social demands of the Revolution, such as 
labour, agrarian reform and anticlerical provisions on public education (Richmond, 
1979 48-55). The new Constitution gave the Revolutionary ideals a strong legal and 
institutional referent. Reforms included Labour rights (Article 123), Agrarian Reform 
(Article 27), Presidential Power (Article 80 to 93) and even control over the Church 
(Article 130). Civilian supremacy over the armed forces was also clearly stated in 
Articles 16 and 89, which favoured Carranza’s civilist project. Nevertheless, achieving 
peace and stability in the country remained an elusive goal. Two main obstacles arose. 
First, the remnants of Villa’s and Zapata’s armies were still operating in different 
regions of the country, forcing Carranza to keep the armed forces involved in tasks of 
internal security and public order. Secondly, Obregon’s successful military campaign 
against Francisco Villa made him a national figure that tacitly challenged the political 
standing of Carranza.
Therefore, Carranza’s rule confronted the superior need of keeping a powerful military 
machinery to fight internal enemies while also keeping in check the political ambitions 
of regional military leaders. Strictly speaking, Carranza confronted a problem with 
civil-military relations far more complicated than Madero had encountered after Diaz’s 
resignation in May 1911. Regardless of all its flaws, the Federal Army was a highly 
centralised body whose generals or “empowered military brokers” responded to a single 
command. In contrast, the informal militias that composed the new national army after 
1914 lacked a clear sense of broad political or military leadership. In practice, this 
meant that Carranza’s authority over the military depended, once more, on finding 
charismatic brokers or agents who could effectively keep the troops under control and 
aligned to civilian leadership. Wisely enough, Carranza appointed General Alvaro 
Obregon as Minister of War and soon delegated to him the task of reforming the 
military (Hall 1981).
O
Obregon’s record in the war ministry was not particularly impressive .He effectively 
played the role of a broker that Carranza so badly needed to maintain the armed forces
8 Obregon’s first challenge was to reduce a military force of nearly 200,000 soldiers, five hundred
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under control. Despite this fact, Carranza did not offer Obregon any position in the 
cabinet when the former got elected Constitutional President in June 1917 (Loyo 
Camacho 2003). Obregon returned to civilian life in his home state of Sonora, and, 
even when he aired his differences with Carranza’s policies to the press, he made no 
attempt to overturn the regime.
In theory, Obregon’s decision to abandon, if temporarily, the political scene reduced the 
level of political pressures over Carranza’s presidency. However, Carranza lost more 
than he won with Obregon’s departure. Beyond real progress on taming and fostering 
professionalisation in the national army, Obregon’s allegiance to Carranza represented 
an important deterrent to other strong military figures who might have considered the 
possibility of mounting a military coup. Obregon was the most important personality in 
the military and any coup that ignored his political standing was most likely doomed to 
failure. On the other hand, Obregon’s resignation forced Carranza to diversify the 
number of agents or brokers to maintain order within the military. Under such 
conditions, Carranza attempted to control the military elite by buying off loyalties of the 
generalship, not only with generous salaries, but also by ignoring the rapacious 
behaviour of many military chiefs. It was not long before the population once more 
began to become restive because of the behaviour of the new military force.
Furthermore, Carranza’s strategy to control the military did not strengthen discipline in 
the new organisation. The way he tackled civilian control over the generalship was still 
very informal in nature. In fact, it made the impression that buying off allegiances of 
self-interested generals was the only way to control their political ambitions. In many 
ways, Carranza’s regime was still poorly institutionalised and decisive political 
influence was still a commodity of the generalship. The military and its leadership did 
not behave as a military apparatus, but as an armed political party with the ability to 
influence or veto policies, allocate political representatives in states and regions and 
influence the selection of presidential candidates. The following election scheduled in 
November 1920 confirmed this hypothesis. It was no secret that the most influential
generals and an immense number of high-ranking officers. This was essential, not only because it posed a 
problem of control, but because of its heavy burden upon Mexico’s public finances. As War Minister, 
Obregon offered early retirement packages to high-ranking officers who chose to return to civilian life. 
He also launched an initial program of military education that aimed at improving the military skills of 
hundreds of self-made officers and created special premises to repair war materials, established hospitals 
and started to develop Mexico’s air force (Hall 1981). However, poor progress was achieved on military 
expenditures, as almost 72% of the budget was still committed to cover the army’s payroll.
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general of the Revolution, Alvaro Obregon, appeared as the leading presidential 
contender, while Carranza was clearly favouring a civilian candidate in Ignacio 
Bonillas, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States.
From the start, the electoral competition looked unequal for Bonillas. Carranza’s bases 
of social support were not particularly strong. His record on social reform was 
unimpressive. Restitution of land in Morelos and Guerrero was modest. In fact, many 
hacendados that lost their properties during the long years of anarchy that followed 
Diaz’s departure from office had their lands returned by direct presidential intervention. 
The incipient labour movement was not supportive either, as Carranza had, on a handful 
of occasions, dispatched the armed forces to crush strikes9. Actually, Carranza’s 
declarations to workers in 1914 went as far as to say that “Trade Unionism is atheistic 
and an enemy of the Fatherland” (Paniagua 2001:20). This counter-revolutionary 
character of Carranza’s policies helps to explain why organised labour created the 
Confederation Obrera Mexicana (CROM) to favour Obregon’s political aspirations in 
1919. If these signs were not clear enough to portray the low political capital of the 
President, the poor response that Bonillas’ candidacy received from the military 
demonstrated that he had no chance to win the election. To Carranza’s surprise, even 
his trusted friend and head of the National Army, General Pablo Gonzalez, resigned his 
position to run for the Presidency.
Carranza’s choice of Bonilllas tested the loyalty of the National Army towards the 
executive power. It was a test the military would not pass. Apparently, Carranza saw in 
Bonillas’s candidacy the possibility of consolidating civilian domination in the post­
revolutionary period. However, the leadership of the armed forces saw things 
differently. For them, Ignacio Bonillas represented the informal extension of 
Carranza’s rule. Benjamin Hill, one of Obregon’s die-hard supporters and nephew, 
declared that there was no chance for a civilian candidate to triumph in the presidential 
race. For Hill and other military leaders, the country was still in “an era where force 
rules, as it has been shown by the great amount of problems that civilian governors are 
experiencing with military representatives” (Loyo Camacho 2003:58). In contrast, 
Carranza argued that Mexico had suffered enough from the maladies of militarism, 
which had also proved to create political and social unrest, Diaz and Huerta’s rule being
9 For a comprehensive description of labour relations during Carranza’s rule see (Bortz 2000).
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the clearest examples10. There is evidence that Carranza not only wanted a civilian to 
succeed him in the presidency, but also intended to keep Obregon away from the 
political scene (Bailey 1979:85). A high degree of mutual animosity between these two 
figures of the Revolution once more was about to trigger violence in the country.
Clearly, Carranza was mistaken about the sources of political power of the time. The 
hub of the political system had not transited yet to the presidential office, but remained 
attached to the military and its generals. Carranza was the President, but the loyalty of 
the armed forces did not belong to him. Under such conditions, the result was highly 
predictable. When the military had to support one of the contenders, it massively 
followed Obregon and opposed the President.
3.4 The Agua Prieta Revolution and Obregon’s Presidency
A bloodless uprising followed, as nearly ninety-five per cent of the armed forces 
favoured Obregon in what is known as “La Revolution de Agua Prieta”.’ Only the 
young cadets of the Military College remained loyal to the President, but it did not help 
much. Soon after, Carranza experienced the same fate of Madero. He was hunted 
down and assassinated by Obregon loyalists, apparently against Obregon’s wishes 
(Corona del Rosal, 1995). Adolfo de la Huerta, by that time Governor of Sonora, was 
appointed Interim President. A few months later, Alvaro Obregon overwhelmingly 
won the electoral race of December 1920. The tragic fates of Madero and Carranza 
highlighted in retrospect Diaz’s remarkable achievement in subordinating the military to 
his authority for more than thirty years. It was then time for the new political leadership 
of the country to learn from Diaz’s experience if the idea was not to repeat Madero’s 
and Carranza’s mistakes and tragic end.
Considering civil-military relations in the ten years that followed, they did learn. Even 
though there were at least five well-orchestrated military uprisings in the country that 
seriously attempted to overturn the president after 1920 (Table 3.2), Obregon’s coup 
was the last that managed to succeed. From that year, the army started a long and not 
always easy transition toward becoming a more professional military force at the service 
of the state, as opposed to a heterogeneous blend of militias that responded to the
10 Obregon contradicted Carranza by arguing that he had stopped being a soldier years ago and, in any 
case, what he had done during the revolution was to fight the excesses of militarism in the country. “My 
spirit is civilista” was a phrase Obregon continuously used in his speeches.
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interests o f the regional caudillos. Agua Prieta, therefore, marked the end of a 
permanent climate o f social insurrection. It did so partly because the Sonoran elite —  
Alvaro Obregon, Plutarco Elias Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta —  was considerably 
more eager to carry out social reform and certainly had the political capital to 
demilitarise the political system. It also made possible the achievement of whole deals, 
surrenders and submissions of old guerrilla leaders, such Francisco Villa and the 
Zapatistas (A. Knight 1986a:493). Their surrender alone brought a sense of peace to the 
countryside that had not been seen since El porfiriato.
Table 3.2
Major military rebellions, 1920-1940
President Rebellion
date
Size of Rebellion Successful?
Venustiano Carranza 1920 274 generals (97%), vast majority o f  
troops
Yes
Alvaro Obregon 1923 102 Generals (20%), 573 colonels and 
majors (23%), 2,417 other officers (28%), 
23,224 troops (39%)
No
Plutarco E l/a s  Calles 1927 28 generals, 20% o f the troops No
Emilio Portes Gil 1929 5 generals, 30% o f the officers, 17,000 
troops (28%)
No
Lazaro Cardenas 1938 1 general and his private army No
Source: This table was originally made with information retrieved from E. Lieuwen (1968) and later 
corroborated in the following studies : (Quiros Martinez 1928; Dulles 1961; Lieuwen 1968; Lieuwen 
1984; Corona del Rosal 1995)
But why did the famous Sonoran elite want to act like this in relation to the armed 
forces? It seems possible to argue that in a planned and concerted way Obregon, later 
Calles and Cardenas (who was not part of the Sonoran elite but was politically linked to 
Calles), understood that the survival of the political system, their rule and even their 
lives, were tightly attached to securing control over the armed forces. In fact, they 
proved to be highly skilled leaders and politicians. The most outstanding case was 
definitely Obregon, who was also a gifted military strategist. The opposite case was 
Cardenas, who was a brilliant politician but a poorly skilled general (Krauze 1997). 
None of these three personalities were professional soldiers nor — at least before their 
exposure to political power—  members o f wealthy families. Obregon was a muleteer; 
Calles was a schoolteacher and public servant; and Cardenas was a young shepherd 
before he joined Carranza’s army in 1914. This condition precluded a firm attachment 
to a series o f vested interests that allegedly precluded Madero and Carranza from 
committing to a far-reaching agrarian and social reform. In fact, their original position
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in the social ladder reinforced their identification with the demands of large 
underrepresented social sectors that had been consistently neglected by the politicians 
since the independence. There was also a clear strategic thinking; especially in Calles 
and Obregon who were able to foresee the enormous political capital the revolution had 
won among large underrepresented social groups. Not surprisingly, “The Revolution” 
became a highly profitable brand Calles and Cardenas capitalised on later in the 
foundation of the political party that ruled Mexico for the following 70 years.
The Institutionalization of civil-military relations
Once in office, Obregon diversified mechanisms to achieve control over the armed 
forces. He laid emphasis on institutionalising11 civilian control, and reduced the ability 
of generals to influence politics. Since 1920, informal procedures to separate the 
military from the political scenario, as briefly intended by Carranza between 1917 and 
1920, had been discarded as the dominant strategy to maintain the military’s allegiance 
to the political regime. It was then the beginning of the end of the “trustful agents” or 
caudillos within the armed forces. After 1920, loyalty would need to have an 
institutional and normative basis, meaning respect for rules, discipline and doctrine 
rather than personal appeal. On this issue, Roderick Ai Camp (1991) argues that, after 
the Mexican Revolution, the leadership of the triumphant militias concluded that 
political stability could not be achieved if charismatic caudillos, with strong ties to 
military divisions, were allowed to engage in politics from a position of power within 
the armed forces. It was the same conclusion that Porfirio Diaz had arrived at fifty 
years before. However, Obregon and the presidents that came after him opted to 
address the situation differently.
From the start, Obregon adopted a strategy that tackled the political standing of the 
generalship from different angles. First, he deliberately aimed to strengthen labour and 
agrarian organisations that could counterbalance the influence of the military in the 
political arena. The labour and agrarian sectors were organised into political parties, 
such as the Partido Nacional Laborista (PNC) and the Partido Nacional Agrarista 
(PNA) (Carriedo 1992:59). Furthermore, he appointed civilians with no participation in
11 I adopt the definition of Calvert (1969:505) on institutionalization as “applied to non-violent politics 
suggests the creation of institutions within which a particular set of political interactions can be 
maintained”
101
the revolution into key areas of the military establishment and government. As a result, 
well-known members of the labour movement, such as Luis Morones, occupied the 
direction of the army’s firearms factory. The Regencia of Mexico City was also given 
to the Labour Movement (Bailey, 1979:86). Along with a quasi-civilian invasion of 
the military’s high bureaucracy, Obregon became the first President in the new century 
to fulfil his promise to protect the workers’ right to organise strikes12.
A second wide social group that Obregon attempted to attract was the peasant 
movement. This strategy took place by putting into effect Article 27 of the Constitution 
that specified agrarian reform (Gonzales 2002). Obregon redistributed 921,627 hectares 
of land, five times as much as Carranza (Krauze 1997). Furthermore, his increasing 
closeness to civil society organisations, such as trade unions and agrarian organisations 
both counterbalanced the political influence of the military and strengthened the 
presidential institution. It was soon obvious that Obregon was acting more as a 
statesman, looking after the interests of the Presidency as an institution, rather than 
protecting the interests of the army (Wager 1994).
On strictly military issues, Obregon adopted a mixture of draconian and lenient 
measures to establish his authority over the armed forces. Officers and generals who 
were identified with el carrancismo or did not entirely agree with Obregon’s policies 
were either shot or expelled from the country. Not particularly differently from 
Carranza, the new president never hesitated to grant generous compensation to 
guarantee the loyalty of the generalship13 or to make things easy for those who opted to 
return to civilian life, as was the case with Francisco Villa in 1921. In any case, civil- 
military relations did not normalise overnight. Even when Obregon managed to clean 
rival generals from the military, he still had to deal with those that, being obregonistas, 
used their position to plunder communities and regions they were supposed to protect 
(Hansis 1979).
12 His alliance with the labour movement remained functional until June 1922, when the military was sent 
to crush two strikes. Apparently, excessive government protection of labour organizations degenerated 
into widespread corruption and threatened the Neo Porfirian character of Obregon’s rule — promotion of 
private investment and capitalist economic development.
13 This was a problem Obregon identified since his years as War Minister. Apparently, he warned 
Carranza about the effects that brutal, untrained and self-interested army officers could have on the good 
name and progress of the Revolution. According to A. Loyo (2003), Obregon’s office was filled with 
complaints from citizens and local authorities, because of abuses perpetrated by military chiefs. They
i  often requested loans from local banks that they would not pay back, trafficked with gambling 
organizations, allied to hacendados to obstruct agrarian reform and, above all, used their position to 
commit abuses against the civilian population.
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To tackle this problem, Obregon ordered once more the creation of a special 
commission to evaluate whether officers deserved the ranks they claimed they had. 
Another important group of soldiers were transferred to the first military reserve and 
were entitled to collect half of their salaries for up to three months. For instance, 
General Francisco Serrano, Obregon’s Minister of War, offered inducements that 
included allocation of land to those who decided to lay down their arms and return to 
civilian life. According to E. Lieuwen (1968), Obregon sought to achieve a fifty per 
cent reduction of the military’s membership and to cut military expenditure by one 
third. In the first year, the army experienced a reduction of nearly 70,000 soldiers. By 
the end of his administration, the army passed from absorbing forty-eight percent of the 
total government expenditure to thirty-three percent in 1923. The size of the military 
budget throughout the 1920s is a good indicator of the firm determination of the 
political elite to redirect military resources to other social groups (Table 3.3).
By looking at Table 3.3, it seems clear that Obregon and succeeding presidents had 
strong incentives to relieve the public administration of high military expenditures. In 
fact, military budgets decreased almost at the same speed as military personnel did. 
However, as the size of the military consistently reduced, the number of generals 
remained steady or even grew between 1923 and 1929, both being years of failed 
military uprisings. To put in numbers, while in 1917 there were 966 soldiers for each 
general (1/966); in the last year of the obregonista regime, this ratio passed to one 
general to 150 recruits (1/155). This apparently contradictory move is explained by the 
need of the civilian rule to avoid confrontation with the military elite. Furthermore, the 
promotion of a high number of die-hard obregonistas before and after the de la 
huertista uprising was aimed at counterbalancing, in number and power, the political 
standing of the old Revolutionary veterans.
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Table 3.3
Military budget 1917-1940 (budget in millions of pesos and military personnel in 
thousands of soldiers)
Year President Total Budget 
(million
Military 
Budget (million
Military
Budget
Military
Personnel
Number of 
Generals
1917 Venustiano
Carranza
69.6 200 207
1918 253 140 55.5 135
1919 171 81 47.4 155 281
1920 364 176 48.4 137 500
1921 Alvaro
Obregon
684 363 53.0 120 318
1922 820 380 46.4 103
1923 790 265 33.6 85 514
1924 970 413 42.6 66 439
1925 Plutarco 
Elias Calles
1007 311 30.9 52 459
1926 1105 329 29.8 64 398
1927 1080 345 31.9 64 413
1928 1043 337 32.3 69 392
1929 Emilio 
Portes Gil
1002 374 37.3 74 373
1930 Portes
Gil/Pascual
Ortiz
997 308 30.9 70 426
1931 Pascual 
Ortiz Rubio
917 274 29.9 65
1932 941 271 28.8 61
1933 Abelardo
Rodriguez
1029 253 24.6 54 398
1934 1072 243 22.7 54
1935 Lazaro
Cardenas
1208 252 20.9 59 394
1936 1538 266 17.3 54
1937 1530 266 17.4 48 350
1938 1541 257 16.7 54 354
1939 1733 274 15.8 49
1940 1786 352 19.7 49
Source: (Wilkie, 1970:22; 102:103). Version 3.0 o f the National Material Capabilities data set 
developed at the Pennsylvania State University by the Correlates o f  War 2 Project. Lozoya (1971) 
Lieuwen (1968), Hernandez- Chavez (1980) and Toral (1979).
In any case, the transition o f the armed forces from being a protagonist to a subservient 
role was difficult and a good deal o f this objective was achieved when Obregon 
deliberately made no attempt to encourage the participation o f military men in the 
political arena. Candidates with a strong military background did not receive official 
support to run for public office, and Obregon kept only three generals in his cabinet. He 
also publicised that the progress o f an officer’s career would depend upon his loyalty to 
the National Army and the central government, not to allegiance to local military chiefs 
or state governors. In fact, this trend towards diminishing the role o f the armed forces 
in the political arena is reflected neatly by the presence o f office holders in the public 
administration as it can be appreciated in Table 3.4. This shift is not only reflected
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between Obregon and Carranza’s presidency, but in the general trend that continued in 
the following administrations.
Table 3.4
Mexican military officers working in the public administration as percentage of 
entire public service, 1914-1940
Y ears Presidential T erm P ercen t M ilitary
1914— 1920 Venustiano Carranza 46
1920— 1924 Alvaro Obregon 40
1924— 1928 Plutarco Elias Calles 34
1928— 1930 Emilio Portes Gil 29
1930— 1932 Pascual Ortiz Rubio 32
1932— 1934 Abelardo Rodriguez 33
1935 Lazaro Cardenas 24
1935— 1940 Lazaro Cardenas 27
Source: Table elaborated with information irom R. Camp (1992:67)
At the same time, high profile positions and the upper level o f the government gradually 
became the natural dominion of civilian officers. This policy was not entirely different 
from Diaz’s practices during the late 1880s and 1890s. For instance, during the interim 
presidency o f Adolfo de la Huerta, six out o f eight cabinet ministers were active 
members o f the armed forces. This figure declined to twenty-seven per cent with 
Cardenas in the late 1930s. (Boils 1976:175-182)
Furthermore, Obregon’s war minister divided the military force into thirty districts, 
instead of twenty-three as Carranza defined it in 1919. Less than two years later, Calles 
opted to subdivide the military zone once more to thirty-five in 1925 with the objective 
o f limiting the ability o f zone commanders to command a large number o f soldiers that 
could threaten the stability o f the central government. At the same time, the War 
Ministry adopted the Diaz tradition of frequently rotating army generals as a way o f 
preventing any one general from establishing personal influence over a defined sector o f 
the military (Prewett, 1941:613). Apparently, a high concentration o f troops was no 
longer necessary in a mostly pacified country. Behind this strategy was also Obregon’s 
need to reinstate the hegemony of the centre by undermining regional military 
leaderships.
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Along with the measures mentioned above, President Obregon placed great emphasis on 
revamping the system of military education. President Carranza had reopened the 
Military College in 1919, but it was Obregon who started to invest heavily on 
improving it. In general, new courses were created in each of the military colleges and 
instructors were presumably more qualified and better trained. The new education 
system successfully incorporated the revolutionary ideology and placed it at the same 
level as loyalty to the national government. The important element here is that, 
gradually, the abstract concept of the military as defenders of the Revolution evolved 
into a more concrete idea. This was the military as defenders of the government 
institutions that transpired from the Revolution (Carriedo 1992:132). Not surprisingly, 
these polices soon started to widen the gap between civil and military organisations. 
They also placed the executive power as the ultimate representation of the Revolution’s 
heritage.
In any case, while the political elite had no difficulty in defining the type of relationship 
it wanted to establish with the armed forces, high-ranking army generals still disagreed 
with this vision. Despite Obregon’s efforts to professionalize and depoliticise the armed 
forces, the 1923 military uprising headed by Adolfo de la Huerta was a reminder to the 
president that firm subordination of the army was not yet a reality. Once more, the 
presidential succession proved a difficult test of the military’s loyalty to civilian 
authority. Apparently, the sympathy of the president for Plutarco Elias Calles’s 
presidential candidacy was not welcome by other revolutionary veterans with high 
political ambitions (Alessio Robles 1949). The unsatisfied generalship conspired once 
more with the expectation of repeating the success of Obregon’s Agua Prieta 
Revolution (Valenzuela 2002:84), but this time they only managed to attract half of the 
military toward their cause, which, compared to ninety-five percent that had supported 
Obregon in 1920, looked quite modest. Social appeal was also more difficult to attract, 
as public opinion rapidly pictured those that opposed Obregon as being moved by 
purely political opportunism.
At any rate, the rebellious army looked considerably bigger than Obregon’s loyalists 
did. However, this time the political environment in Mexico was different. The 
alliance the president had knitted with the labour and agrarian movement started to pay 
off. Soon after De la Huerta’s uprising turned public, the National Army was rapidly
Ij
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enlarged by thousands of citizens and peasants who volunteered to defend Obregon’s 
rule. The rebellion was defeated in three months. The occurrence of the rebellion had 
a benefit to Obregon in that he and his followers were able to expel or kill those 
generals and middle-ranking officers of dubious loyalty to the central government. 
Besides, De la Huerta’s failed rebellion only reinforced the unity of the armed forces 
and incremented, rather indirectly, the electoral appeal of Obregon’s candidate. A few 
months later, Plutarco Elias Calles won the Presidential race in 1924 without 
difficulty14
Eventually, failed coups and the possibility that the incumbent president might throw 
his support behind his chosen successor gave the regime continuity over several 
policies, civil-military relations included. The De la Huertista rebellion made clear that, 
even when the military had lost an important share of its original budget, the size of its 
personnel and political influence via cabinet positions and fragmentation of military 
zones, it was still not willing to abandon its role in the selection of the “official” 
presidential candidate. However, De la Huerta’s failure showed that the strategy to 
shape the military through institutional measures as opposed to just focusing on buying 
off the loyalty of the military leadership was starting to displace the centre of the 
political system off the armed forces. In that sense, the triumph of Obregon over the 
disgruntled generals and the election of Calles for the following four years gave way to 
more than a redefinition of formal and informal rules of civilian control. It was also the 
consolidation of the measures already taken by Obregon. The capacity that showed the 
regime to resist a military uprising made clear that the supreme authority of the military 
was no longer the generals, but the president.
3.5 The presidency of Plutarco Elias-Calles
Calles continued constructing convenient allegiances with labour and peasant 
organisations to counterbalance the political influence of the armed forces. The 
sustained alliance with CROM and its political arm, El Partido Laborista Mexicano 
(PLM) ensured continuous support from the urban and organised political groups that 
emerged from the Revolution (Cordova 1995). At the same time, agrarian reform was
14 The new president also had a military record, but it was far from impressive. Calles was governor of 
Sonora and Chief of Military Operations in different regions of the country. He joined Madero in 1910, 
fought against Victoriano Huerta in 1913, helped Carranza in the Constitutionalist Army, and fought at 
Obregon’s side at all times.
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intensified. In fact, during Calles’ administration, twice as much land was given out to 
peasants than the already high total during Obregon’s rule.
Military professionalisation continued, this time under the expedient command of 
General Joaquin Amaro, Calles’ Minister of War. Amaro’s reputation as a man of 
strong convictions, discipline and no political aspirations were valuable assets for 
bringing the military under a more structured model of civilian control. Throughout his 
many years as the Secretary of War, Amaro won a reputation as a rigid, tough-minded 
man who was both a strict disciplinarian and a brilliant organiser (Beals 1932). In many 
ways, Amaro set a benchmark for future secretaries of defence as a highly organised 
man, always eager to enforce the will of the President, and at the same time keeping the 
discipline of the armed forces under tight control. At Calles’ request, Amaro focused 
on disciplining the “strong men,” meaning the divisional generals who, being 
revolutionary veterans, had continuously proven to be a nuisance to political stability. It 
seems that the idea was to eradicate the power of the last “brokers” who still kept 
regional troops aligned to their individual interest as opposed to the State and its 
political leadership.
Under this logic, one of Amaro’s first actions was to declare a moratorium on all 
promotions. He reduced the number of regular troops to 55,000 and, by 1926, the 
military budget passed from thirty-six percent of the government’s budget to twenty- 
five percent. It could not go lower, because Calles confronted a different kind of social 
uprising, not over land or political vindications, but over religious issues known as la 
crstiada15.
On the institutionalization of civil-military relations, General Amaro requested the 
Mexican Congress to approve four laws aiming at governing the internal life of the 
military. These laws were: the Organic Law of the Army and Navy; The Law of 
Promotions and Rewards (LPR); The Law of Military Discipline and The law of 
Pensions and Retirement. The Organic Law defined once and for all the military’s basic 
structure and organisation. Its mission was to “defend the integrity and independence of 
the nation, to maintain the authority of the constitution, and to preserve the internal 
order.” Most importantly, the President was recognised as the supreme authority of all
15 For a detailed study of the Cristero movement, see J. Mayer (1976)
108
military forces. While the Organic Law defined the scope of the military’s mission and 
its political leadership, it was the Law of Promotions and Rewards that caused the 
immediate impact. The new law formally protected the integrity and independence of 
the armed forces to operate its system of promotion. This measure weakened political 
intervention in the appointment of generals and other key military positions. The 
enactment of the new law successfully conveyed the idea to the new generation of 
officers that military service required the withdrawal of personal ambition for the good 
of the nation. Gradually, Amaro’s effort toward the creation of a strict military space 
enhanced the corporate identity of the military, understood as a shared sense of unity as 
a military institution. No doubt, Amaro’s personal philosophy was one of the major 
shaping influences on the new relationship between the ruling elite and the armed 
forces.
General Amaro also succeeded on bringing to order those divisional generals who used 
their position within the armed forces as a springboard to politics and personal gain. 
The new scheme stressed the idea that national politics was no place for the armed 
forces. In that sense, Amaro’s famous phrase of “Give up politics or leave the 
military”16 was more than a rhetorical artifice to discourage the political ambition of 
restless army generals. It was the cornerstone of a new institutional agreement between 
civilians and soldiers as commanded by former president Obregon and later on ratified 
by Calles17
Calles’ confidence in Amaro was later justified when the latter opted to close the 
Military College in 1926 in order to redefine the system of military education 
altogether. One year later, the Military College reopened its doors with new programs 
that highlighted the professional formation of military officers and the new doctrine 
aimed at securing the acceptance of discipline of recruits from superiors and undisputed
16 Sheffield, Mexico, NAW, RG59, M274, 812.00/28312, April 7,1927. Quoted in Carriedo (2003:169)
17 In September 23, 1923, and after a series of rumours of upcoming uprisings, President Obregon wrote 
the following letter to all officers of the army “Seldom in the lives of men and expediency found to be 
running parallel... Duty demands from the members of the army a complete abstinence from the political 
conflict and expediency counsels the same abstinence, for it the Army takes no part in the politico- 
electoral campaign,... whatever man who is called upon to represent the Executive Power will have to 
respect the members of the army, which in one of the most transcendental and delicate crisis of our 
national life, will have zealously fulfilled its duty. On the other hand, if... the members of the Army 
forget the dictates of their duty and the suggestions of their own expediency, and take part as military 
political factors, they will be exposed to the contingencies of the contest and will share its vicissitudes” 
U.S Archives RG 29, M274, 812/.00/26468, report to Charge d’Affairs Summerlin in Mexico City to The 
Department of State. Quoted in Hansis (1979:221)
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loyalty of the institution to the executive power (Ackroyd, 1991:85)18. However, 
perhaps the largest achievement of Amaro as War Secretary was the establishment of 
the Superior War College (ESG) in 1927. Its aims were to prepare outstanding officers 
for responsibilities of command and to instil in them the “fruits of superior character” 
necessary to form strong bonds of loyalty to superior officers. The ESG came to be the 
nursery of the future elite of the army and those who would eventually replace the 
veterans of the Revolution. The institutional transformation of the armed forces during 
the 1920s and the high investment that Calles, Obregon and later Cardenas made in 
education ensured that, sooner or later, the military was going to respond to the political 
necessities of the executive and not to the political short-term motivations of politicised 
generals. Finally and as occurred during the presidency of Carranza and Obregon, 
General Amaro continued employing military personnel on road building and other 
public-works projects (Gruening 1968; Carriedo 2005:189), as well as firmly attaching 
the content of his discourse to Calles’ guidelines19.
In the light of what occurred in the 1920s, it is clear the mission that Carranza weakly 
started in 1917 and later Obregon and Calles vigorously continued — demilitarising 
governmental authority — highlights the importance this generation of politicians placed 
on political stability. In the end, containing the political ambitions of the military aimed 
at securing the survival of each presidential mandate as the recurrence of military 
uprisings was still endemic. For instance, despite the great progress General Amaro 
achieved in terms of military professionalism, the ghost of the military uprising 
reappeared as Calles’ presidency approached its final year in office. Moreover, an extra 
complication came into play because of Obregon’s wish to run again for the presidency 
in 1928. As expected, the situation caused discomfort between those veterans of the 
Revolution who saw in the Calles-Obregon formula the intention to keep the presidency 
indefinitely.
However, the political environment in the late 1920s had changed radically. This time, 
Obregon’s support emanated mainly from the organised political groups that his and 
Calle’s administration had strengthened since 1920. The military had gained in
18 According to W. Ackroyd, the Mexican concept of discipline means unquestioning, unyielding 
deference and personal obedience to superiors. This means that no order is questioned and no action is 
taken independently from superiors. (Ackroyd 1991:85)
19 Rueben Clark, American Ambassador to The Secretary of State. October 15, 1931. General Records of 
the Department of State, RG 812.20/90 NARA
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professionalism and the De la Huertista rebellion had helped to clean political activism 
from the military. In sum, the general picture surrounding the political situation of the 
country and the emerging character of the military made it very difficult for the old 
generalship to compete with Obregon’s popularity or to orchestrate a successful coup. 
Despite the poor odds, Generals Amulfo Gomez and Francisco Serrano organised an 
uprising that managed to attract nearly twenty per cent of the National Army. It was 
suppressed by Calles’ rule and Amaro’s expedient intervention within a few weeks. 
Serrano and Gomez faced the firing squad, and a clear message was sent to other 
veterans of the Revolution that a military coup to seize the presidential office would 
meet with little likelihood of success (Corona del Rosal 1995).
Obregon won the presidential election, but weeks after his triumph, a religious fanatic 
ended his life with a bullet in the chest. The assassination of the winning candidate 
placed the country in a state of shock that rapidly raised the expectation for a renewed 
period of violence. Obregonistas were seriously sceptical about the incumbent 
president and more than one suggested that Calles was the mastermind behind the death 
of the elected candidate (Calvert 1969:509; Cordova 1995). However, the political 
genius of Calles helped him through a very tense situation during this period. The 
President met with the elite of the armed forces to ensure agreement on the choice of a 
provisional president to replace Obregon (Dulles 1961). Calles stressed the necessity of 
avoiding the nomination of an active duty officer and advised the military to participate 
with Congress in the selection of the interim president. They finally selected Emilio 
Portes Gil, a well-known obregonista, who had no military background.
During his last address to the nation a few months after Obregon’s death, Plutarco Elias 
Calles made sure to convey his sorrow at Obregon’s assassination. Calles pictured 
Obregon as a true, honest and patriotic man. However, he also said that Mexico needed 
to take advantage of such a tragedy by transcending to the period of caudillismo where 
institutions, and not men, define the future of the country. Calles made it clear that he 
had no intention of remaining in office or of running for the presidency in the future. 
Most importantly, Calles proclaimed himself the guarantor that no caudillio would ever 
get to the presidential chair again.
Apart form defusing an explosive situation, Calles’ most important legacy was 
announced the same day he publicly gave up his political aspirations: the foundation of
the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). The idea behind the PNR was to provide 
the nascent regime an efficient instrument for processing social and political demands 
through institutional means. It also allowed the regime to renovate the country’s 
leadership without risking political instability. The bottom line was that the new party 
represented the end of battlefield contests for the presidency and the need to maintain it 
through the use of force. Therefore, the participation of labour, agrarian and military 
representatives was taken as an imperative. It did not take long for this party to evolve 
into a formidable instrument of political domination at the service of the so-called 
revolutionary elite. The PNR became the seed of a hegemonic party system where the 
line that divided the official party and the bureaucratic structure of the State was not 
easy to identify for the next seventy years. For civil-military relations, the foundation 
of the PNR contributed to the termination of the independent participation of the 
military in the political arena.
With Calles’ support, a well-known Obregonista, Emilio Portes Gil, became interim 
president and General Amaro remained as the Secretary of War. Amaro’s protracted 
service as War Minister allowed the continuation of the process of military 
professionalism. At the same time, the informal position Calles acquired after 1929 — 
as the Maximum Head of the Revolution — contributed to maintaining control over the 
political ambitions of divisional generals. Once more, history was being repeated. As 
had occurred when Obregon was appointed Secretary of War in Carranza’s first cabinet, 
Calles performed the informal role of the powerful broker, the last of the Revolution’s 
dynasty. The message was clear: as Calles had given up his political ambitions, so other 
Revolutionary Generals would have to follow suit. In that sense, Calles represented a 
different kind of broker. He was one with no presidential ambitions, although he 
continued playing high-level politics behind the scene. It was no coincidence that the 
three presidents between 1928 and 1934 often addressed him in official communications 
as Jefe Maximo, that is the maximum chief of the revolution (Macias 1991).
3.6 Conclusion
The end of Madero’s regime marked the collapse of stable civil-military relations built 
on informal procedures. The two decades that followed his downfall in 1913 witnessed 
the definition of new rules governing the relationship between the armed forces and the
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civilian leadership. It seems also clear that the lack of an external threat contributed to 
the emergence of a more intense internal dimension of action for the armed forces.
As presented in this chapter, a second element that shaped the relationship between the 
civilian elite and the military was the Mexican Revolution and the reformulation of the 
Mexican state. However, it is important to underline that even when the institutional 
endowment of the country changed importantly after 1917, the essence of the political 
system did not suffer drastic changes. In other words, the end of el porfiriato in 1911, 
and its temporary revival in 1913 under the rule of Victoriano Huerta, did not suppose a 
transition to a more democratic fashion of doing politics. It rather meant the 
institutionalization of a different variant of authoritarian rule. This became clear with 
the formation of the PNR in 1929 and the implicit allegiance of the military to the 
dominant political groups (bureaucracy, labour and agrarian movement) that emerged 
from the Revolution. At any rate, it was a unique political system, whose leadership 
regarded it as democratic in spite of having the armed forces formally linked to the 
ruling party.
Under this logic, the military passed from being the main source of instability to 
become one of the agents of the executive to protect the regime from its political 
enemies, assist the population in case of natural disaster and cover up the incapacity or 
insufficiencies of other state agencies. The last two characteristics were not strikingly 
different from its missions during el porfiriato. In that sense, it seems that the particular 
way civil-military relations evolved after the Revolution created specific conditions that 
favoured the participation of the military in areas that transcended its conventional 
expertise, always at the request of the executive power. The clearest expression of this 
phenomenon is the current participation of the military in anti drug-trafficking 
operations and missions of public security that will be addressed in detail in subsequent 
chapters. The politics of civil-military relations in Mexico rests on these elements and 
in the significant influence of the philosophy and wisdom of one man: Amaro.
Institutionalisation of military missions and the enactment of the organic laws were also 
important, since the more constrained the military became through norms and rules, the 
lower its capacity was to intervene in the political arena. In the same way, as the 
military behaviour became more regulated — therefore predictable — the president won 
important room to manoeuvre in allocating missions to the armed forces. The
113
cornerstone of the new system was that the military only enforced the wishes of the 
president and remained autonomous from the other branches of the state and civil 
organisations. In that sense, it was more a system of presidential control over the 
military, rather than civilian control. Under these conditions, Mexican presidents have 
found it unproblematic to drive the armed forces to accommodate to their changing 
political preferences. This is in part because they do not feel threatened by an expanding 
military agenda. Under the same logic, the military, as a complex institution, has been 
always willing to reshape the character of its internal procedures to address the 
changing nature of its missions. By doing so, the military protects its corporate interest 
as new missions have always come along with more budgetary resources and greater 
opportunities to participate in areas beyond their strict professional expertise.
Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the thesis that the military in Mexico became 
apolitical after the revolution. It was apolitical only in the sense that was not directly 
involved in the struggles for political power. However, it was made institutionally 
politicised, as the military assumed the duty of playing the cards of the president, 
regardless who that person was and what he stood for. In that sense, the real revolution 
in civil-military relations after 1911 was the elimination of the empowered brokers in 
the armed forces and the institutionalization of the exclusive subordination of the 
military to the executive power. It is also the story of a new rationality that deeply 
constrained the decisions of the generalship regarding the opportunities to seize political 
power through violent means. After the revolution, generals no longer engaged in 
backstage negotiations with politicians or civil society organisations and its role in the 
political system became institutionalised through its own organic laws and autonomous 
system of justice and law enforcement.
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Chapter 4. Defending the Mexican Revolution: Military Intervention in 
Politics, Social Policy and Internal Order (1934-1946)
“The Mexican military forces support the civil 
authorities in keeping order, guard the polls 
during elections, guard railway trains, and keep 
on lookout to prevent revolutionary activities ”L 
Josephus Daniels
US Ambassador to Mexico 1933-1942
Introduction
As observed in the last chapter, the foundation of the PNR in 1929 and the increasing 
separation of military men from public office redefined Mexico’s political scenario in 
the early 1930s. If positive in terms of regime stability, the removal of the military 
from the political arena widened the room for confrontation between the acting ruling 
elite and grass root leaders of the Revolution (Leal 1975:52) — labour and agrarian 
leagues—  whose membership accounted for more than 90 per cent of the ruling party. 
Regardless of the progress achieved during Obregon’s and Calles’ presidencies on 
labour an agrarian reform, the revolutionary tide on policy making started to shift in the 
late 1920s towards a more conservative path. The impact of the Great Depression on 
the overall economic performance of the country had a negative impact on the moral 
capital of the ruling elite and the Revolution as a whole. At the same time, the shift 
towards more conservative polices in the early 1930s increased tensions between the 
ruling elite and peasants’ organisations and unionised workers. In the end, these groups 
were certain that the promises of the Revolution were still largely unfulfilled. By 1934, 
it was clear that labour and agrarian leaders were not only dissatisfied with the 
overwhelming political influence and conservative tendencies of former President 
Calles, but also actively looking to play a more decisive role in the definition of polices.
In many ways, Cardenas’ political victory in 1935 over Calles had a much larger impact 
than his electoral triumph in 1934, mainly because it closed a cycle where the so-called
1 G. R. Wilson, American Consul to The State Department. November 21, 1938. General Records of the 
Department of State, RG 812.20/181 NARA
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caudillos were able to appeal to the armed forces in order to achieve specific political 
objectives to the detriment of the executive’s authority. In other words, it seems that the 
task of taming the military that had started with General A. Obregon under Carranza’s 
Presidency in 1916 finally ended with Calles’ demise in 1935. I will argue that this was 
the result of a multitude of small and big victories of the executive power over the 
protagonist role of the revolutionary generalship. In turn, the new army was no longer 
motivated by loyalties to a particular caudillo. On the contrary, it began to behave as a 
professional unit: ruled by strict codes of conduct; acting independently from civil 
society; hierarchically organised and autonomously managed by officers whose ultimate 
loyalty was to the executive branch of power.
In this chapter, I will argue that having a disciplined and loyal military force allowed 
President Cardenas to delegate to his generals a wide variety of social, political and 
security missions without being pressured by the threat of a military coup. Cardenas 
and his successors maintained the new political equilibrium by taking good care of the 
military’s corporate interest through a strategy that kept both material and ideological 
consistency2. It seems possible to argue that the combination of these two realms gave 
the military a competitive head start that —given the underdeveloped stage of other 
government agencies— made socially acceptable, and even socially celebrated, their 
intervention in areas that, ideally, should be carried out exclusively by civilian lead 
government agencies. That is the case for policing, intelligence and social policy 
missions.
This discussion is important for the overall argument of this study, because it examines 
the overwhelming capacity of the executive power to involve the armed forces in a 
variety of internal missions that not always corresponded to their conventional 
expertise. The first section of this chapter deals with Calles’ political downfall that, 
given the dominant role he played since the assassination of Obregon in 1928, resulted 
in the ultimate test of loyalty of the armed forces to the executive power. The second 
part focuses on the political uses of the armed forces to support specific and sometimes
2 Material matters included salary improvements, appropriate pension schemes, housing packages, 
favourable financial aid, exclusive access to specialised health services and a considerable amount of 
funds assigned to defence budgets that supported, among other things, an ongoing programme of 
professionalisation of troops and modernization of military equipment. On the other hand, the ideological 
phase ran in unison with the myth of the Revolution. That is, the executive power managed to construct a 
positive image of the armed forces through speeches that matched the revolution heritage with the 
orientation of their missions.
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controversial reforms and policy paths chosen by President Cardenas in 1938 and 1939. 
Within this section, I also look at the presidential term of Manuel Avila-Camacho and 
the positive effect that the war in Europe brought to the armed forces in terms of 
technological modernization and military professionalism. The last section explains 
how, after 1946, the military found itself trapped in a political system where their 
external dissuasive role was secondary while its internal missions were closely 
identified with the preservation of the regime it had helped to create.
4.1 The military under Cardenas
Lazaro Cardenas, who was the Minister of War when he won the PNR nomination to 
succeed President Abelardo Rodriguez, was clearly the choice of Plutarco Elias Calles. 
According to E. Krauze (1997), El Jefe Maximo, as Calles was also known, always had 
a profound appreciation for Cardenas : “I love Cardenas like a son” he often said 
(Krauze 1997). Still, for other political personalities of the time, such as Jesus Silva 
Herzog and the US diplomat and historian William C. Townsend, Calles supported 
Cardenas because he thought the young general would welcome his unsolicited political 
advice (Townsend 1952)4. It was no secret that President Rodriguez could not escape 
the image of being identified as a man of Calles after the failed presidency of Pascual 
Ortiz Rubio. This deprived him from a decisive involvement in the selection of his 
successor and reinforced the role of his mentor as the final arbiter of the political arena. 
Under these conditions, Cardenas’ nomination hardly surprised anyone. As early as 
November 1932, the US Ambassador, Rueben Clark, informed the State Department 
that the young general was the leading candidate to represent the PNR in the upcoming 
elections5.
Besides being close to Calles and his political group, General Cardenas also had other 
qualities that made him an adept presidential candidate. Apart from his military
3 According to E. J. Correa (1941), Calles declared that Cardenas would not be able to advance an 
extremist policy: “I know him, he owes everything he is to me, I made him and moulded him and I have 
such appreciation for him that when I see Cardenas I feel the same emotion I have when I see my son 
Rodolfo. I am sure he will hear my advice because we know each other and he cannot be disloyal.” 
(Correa, 1941)
4 According to Miguel Osorio-Marban (1990:356), Luis Cabrera, one of the drafters of the Constitution 
and famous agrarian leader linked to Calles and Obregon since 1916, was convinced that Cardenas was 
the perfect candidate to endorse the principles of PNR and follow Calles’ political direction.
5 Rueben Clark, American Ambassador to The State Department. November 4, 1932. General Records of 
the Department of State, RG 812.20/104 NARA
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credentials, Cardenas was on good terms with the agrarian and labour movement6. His 
revolutionary past and his young age — 36 years old when he assumed the presidency 
—  increased his electoral appeal among the younger generation that had little if 
anything in common with the old Sonoran dynasty of leaders. Moreover, his moderate 
position towards the Catholic Church was a prerequisite to heal the wounds left by The 
Cristero War7, especially among the middle and upper classes. In sum, Cardenas 
offered a combination of conciliation and balance between the dominant political forces, 
and his closeness to Calles was initially seen as an asset to soften the reactionary 
character of his political sponsor.
Despite Cardenas’ credentials and proven commitment on certain key policy issues, the 
power of the president and the nominated presidential candidate were still far from what 
they turned into during the following decades. Their influence was still heavily 
counterweighted by the political ambitions of some veterans of the revolution operating 
under Calles’ complacent eyes. Regardless of the progress in taming the political 
activism of the armed forces, the possibility of a military coup was not completely ruled 
out, in part because Calles maintained a high ascendancy over key personalities with
o
strong regional presence and close ties with the military
Still, if powerful and relatively well organised, Calles’ authority in the political system 
was fading away by the end of 1933. The strength of el Callismo responded to a 
particular period of history where the institutions of the nascent regime lacked the 
legitimacy and operational capability to handle disputes between the main political 
actors. Between 1928 and 1934, Calles represented the moral figure of The Revolution 
and the only individual in the system with enough political stature to define specific 
policy paths. However, as the regime evolved in the direction of clearer rules of the 
political game, institution-building, and mass labour and peasant political organisations 
aggregated in the PNR, Calles and his followers faced the urgent need to accommodate 
to the new political conditions if they still aspired to extend their domination beyond the 
informal and rapidly changing realm of personal relationships.
6 While governing Michoacan, Cardenas showed great commitment towards labour and agrarian causes, 
even when against Calles’ advice. (Krauze, 1997)
7 For a comprehensive work on the Cristero movement see D. Bailey (1974).
8 That was the case with General Joaquin Amaro in Mexico City, Abelardo Rodriguez in Baja California, 
Juan A. Almazan in Nuevo Leon, and Satumino Cedillo in San Luis.
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The chosen means to secure a convenient policy-path for him and his followers was 
known as El Plan Sexenal (six-year programme). In its simplest terms, this plan was 
intended to become the PNR’s general guideline on public policy that the presidential 
candidate would need to endorse if elected to the presidency. Not surprisingly, it did 
not lack the reactionary character that was common in Calles’ political positions 
towards labour and agrarian demands9. El Jefe Maximo was convinced that the 
subdivision of large estates was not conducive to a model of rational and efficient 
agriculture. He went on to saying that the Revolution had failed the peasants. 
Therefore, it was time to rethink the direction of land reform and start planning the best 
way to exploit the countryside. On labour affairs, the former president believed that 
strikes in strategic sectors of the economy should not be allowed as they represented a 
major threat to Mexico’s economic development (Dulles 1961:629-638).
If the idea of El Plan Sexenal was good in terms of promoting the institutionalisation of 
party procedures, its reactionary content did not recognise the broad interests and 
mobilization capacity of the organisations that were also represented in the PNR. In 
fact, Calles’ statement on land reform triggered a series of popular protests organised by 
labour and agrarian leagues. In time, such events forced the party leadership to appoint 
a special commission to revise it during its annual convention. Unfortunately for 
Calles, the revision process resulted in major changes. The new Plan called for greater 
state intervention in the economy and proposed the creation of a minimum salary for 
workers. In the final chapter, it also demanded a deep revision of the agrarian reform as 
it was considered insufficient and incomplete (Meyer, 1981:157). In a broader sense, 
the new document stressed nationalistic sentiments by making explicit that domestic 
natural resources should belong to and be exploited by Mexicans. This position alone 
was consistent with Article 27 of the Constitution, but entered in direct opposition to 
strong interests of international companies whose property rights on mining and oil 
exploitation had been widely respected since the onset of the Revolution in 1910 
(Knight 2001:256).
Failing to impose a defined policy course was not just a small defeat for a politician 
accustomed to dominate the political arena since 1924. It became clear that
9 In essence, Calles’ idea of stability and ideal conditions for economic development were not particularly 
different to Porfirio Diaz’s policies in this area. It emphasised protecting property rights, privileging 
public order and political stability to promote investment and economic growth.
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Personalism in the way Calles and others before him practiced it became non- 
operational as the ruling party lost no time to align with its main political clienteles. In 
the long run, Calles’ first political failure also marked the onset of a deeper 
rearrangement of the institutional framework of the country. In the new setup, the armed 
forces would be displaced by the PNR from the core of the political system. Instead, the 
military would turn into the constitutional ally and main political instrument of the 
President.
4.1.1 The presidential succession of 1934
Despite the antagonisms generated by the Plan Sexenal, the presidential campaign and 
handover of power in 1934 occurred without turmoil. The PNR acted to amalgamate the 
political forces around Cardenas, which helped to erase the ominous tradition of 
violence that had characterised earlier presidential elections. The PNR won the election 
by an overwhelming majority, 98 per cent of the vote. The electoral result clearly 
reflected the high degree of political control of the post-revolutionary regime. Under 
these conditions, Cardenas assumed the presidency in December 1934. Not 
surprisingly, his first cabinet included a high number of Callistas. The list started with 
Calles’ son, Rodolfo, who became the Secretary of Communications. It continued with 
the top ranks of the public service, the secretary of the interior included, and into the 
armed forces. For instance, General Joaquin Amaro was ratified as Director of the 
Military College in 1934 and Juan Andrew Almazan, another recognised callista, was 
appointed chief of the military zone in Monterrey.
However, the high number of concessions to Calles and his followers was not going to 
stop the collision between the two icons of the Mexican Revolution. It seems clear that 
by 1935, the dark figure of El Jefe Mkximo operating behind the curtains of the political 
system represented a handicap for Cardenas’ presidency for a variety of reasons. First, 
it limited the possibilities of the president to create his own basis of social support as 
any concession to workers or peasants would necessarily be identified as a challenge to 
Calles’ ideology and vested interests. Additionally, the long and bitter confrontation 
between Calles and the Catholic Church added an unnecessary source of distress. It was 
clear that Cardenas had no intention to intensify the conflict with los cristeros. Under 
such circumstances, the political struggle with Calles threatened almost every comer of
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the political system. Not surprisingly, the war was ignited by a dispute for the control 
of the organised social forces of the revolution, meaning labour and agrarian leagues.
Cardenas began by accelerating the agrarian reform and consolidating the collective or 
“ejido ” form of ownership, in the way he had done in Michoacan while serving as 
governor between 1928 and 1931. There was also the idea of rebuilding the relationship 
of the state with the labour movement as a way to weaken the prevailing alliances of the 
CROM and its leader, Luis Morones, with el callismo. In fact, Cardenas engaging in a 
perilous policy of encouraging unions to go on strike to pressure the owners of capital to 
improve labour conditions. In the short term, the president’s strategy to break the 
decaying monopoly of the CROM proved effective. By 1935, the unions that deserted 
Morones’ control were running at least 650 strikes in the country while in 1933 there 
were only 12 in total. Unofficial sources reported more than 1,000 strikes during 
Cardenas’ first year in office (Hodges and Gandy 2002:57). Under such circumstances, 
the CROM lost its capacity to unify the labour movement and represent it at the PNR’s 
council, and also, most importantly, it lost the capability to protect industrial groups 
linked to e/ callismo from labour disruption.
As expected, the apparently uncontrolled activism of unions in the country soon led to 
a confrontation between the President and Calles. The latter declared that the country 
had entered “a marathon of radicalism” 10(Cordova 1995). Calles went as far as to 
suggest that Cardenas’ rule could follow the tragic fate of Pascual Ortiz Rubio in 1932 
(Dulles 1961; Calvert 1969:516). If Calles’ remarks were certainly ignited by his 
discontent with Cardenas’ policies, it was also true that too much unrest could 
eventually force a more active participation of the military in the political arena. In fact, 
Calles foresaw this situation when he declared that “division into groups based on 
persons begins first with the deputies, then the senators, governors, cabinet ministers, 
and, finally, the Army takes sides” (Dulles 1961:213).
No doubt that manipulating the labour movement from the presidential office to achieve 
specific political objectives was a risky strategy for Cardenas. His tactic heightened the 
confrontation of economically accommodated classes with unions and organised 
peasants. The immediate result was the generation of an overheated political situation.
10 “Mexican trend towards right seems on rise.” The Democrat-Post. March 4, 1938.
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High levels of political instability could have triggered the return of the military to the 
political arena as the state’s ultimate response to restore order. Furthermore, there was 
always the possibility that some sections within the armed forces could take sides with 
the former president. However, this possibility was not favourable to Calles either. The 
military and its generals had proved loyal to the executive power before, and the mass 
organisations of the revolution had already turned their back to Morones’ and Calles’ 
leadership. In other words, Cardenas had broader sources of support, which made it 
good politics for the military to remain loyal. Additionally, most of the generals 
ideologically close to Calles for reasons of age and background had already been 
incorporated into the new commercial and financial bourgeoisie of the country (Pyneiro 
1985:46). It was clear that as the Revolution grew older, the choice of joining a military 
uprising became even more difficult for the first generation of revolutionary generals. 
They became increasingly reluctant to risk everything they owned (Hans-Wemer, 
1971:50-73).
If it were true for the generalship that joining a military uprising would have represented 
a serious threat to their privileged economic position, the situation was not strikingly 
different at lower levels within the armed forces. President Cardenas had consistently 
supported the professionalisation of the new generation of officers in a way that 
reinforced their allegiance to the regime. The corporate interest of the military was not 
being threatened in any way by the president’s polices (Cordova 1974:135-38). 
Moreover, the new educational system stressed a doctrine of full respect and obedience 
to the superior chain of command (Ackroyd 1991). Apart form the purely military 
sphere, a military coup against a president who was presenting labour and agrarian 
reforms as the keystone of his policy programme would have meant an attack against 
the myth of the Mexican Revolution and a serious problem for national unity. Under 
these conditions, Calles lost virtually every instrument, formal or informal, to oppose 
policies and, therefore, the aftermath of his political dispute with the president turned 
highly predictable. Cardenas exiled Calles to the United States on July 20, 1935. Soon 
after, the public administration and the top ranks of the armed forces were also cleared 
from callistas. Influential figures such as Joaquin Amaro were among the excluded and 
Cardenas’ die-hards filled the vacant positions. Regardless the good name Amaro 
enjoyed in the Armed Forces, no reaction came as a result of his dismissal (Loyo 
Camacho 2003:177). His attitude of submission and discipline towards the president’s
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decision served as example for future generations of recruits11. It also showed how 
much political influence the military had lost in political life, as no one dared to stand
19up against the president’s will .
At this point, President Cardenas’ success on the political arena may portray him as an 
intrepid politician who took high and risky bets that ended up paying off. However, it is 
also possible to argue that Cardenas understood, better than his predecessors, that given 
the origin and the authoritarian characteristics of the revolutionary regime, the 
legitimacy and strength of the presidential office as well as his capacity to carry out 
specific policy projects rested on ensuring the subordination of the armed forces to his 
will. According to Serrano (1995:428), Cardenas’ approach to civil-military relations 
during the early years of his administration resembled Huntington’s definition of 
subjective control (Huntington 1957). However, as discussed in the first chapter, 
Huntington’s concept only captures a single dimension of the Cardenista regime. This 
refers to the way the president exploited the operational capability of the armed forces
1 'Xto get rid of political enemies or deter them from conspiring against the regime . It 
seems that Serrano (1995) does not take into consideration the heavy ideological 
content that portrayed the use of the armed forces as a legitimate instrument of the state 
to convert the ideals of the Revolution into specific policy paths. In many ways, the 
role Cardenas gave to the armed forces comes closer to the pragmatic use of the military 
M. Janowitz (1960) discusses. That is a constabulary force, intertwined into civil 
society and conducting missions that are both agreeable to the government and socially 
accepted (Janowitz 1960). In fact, the military still relies heavily on the revolutionary 
mythology to obtain legitimacy (Wager 1984:88).
If uneasy, Cardenas’ resilience during this period rested on the assumption that the 
military would remain disciplined to civilian authority, regardless of the degree of 
political or economic instability in the country or even his lack of popularity among
11 Salvador Novo, one of the most influential poets of his time, wrote on Amaro as “always loyal and just, 
his name was never linked to a military coup or a conspiracy. He was the first military man that 
understood the role of the army within Mexico’s political institutions...’’(Novo, 1994)
12 The political casualties of these actions were not just those who lost their posts within the public 
administration, but also those whose interests benefited from military patronage and state’s financial 
support. For instance, former president Abelardo Rodriguez was forced to close down his gambling 
houses in the border cities of Tijuana and Ensenada and some others saw their estates fragmented as a 
result of the unprecedented land reform policy.
13 General Calles was definitely the most representative actor of this kind, but the list of political 
casualties during the late 1930s included General Satumino Cedillo in San Luis Potosi, General Tomas 
Garrido Canabal in Tabasco, General Adalberto Tejeda in Veracruz, and Fidencio Osomio in Queretaro
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dominant sectors of society. In fact, the absence of a serious threat of military revolt, 
not only during Cardenas’ term in office but in the decades that followed, suggests that 
the armed forces did not truly consider the possibility of a coup even in the event of 
extreme political or economic instability. While this condition has proved quite 
advantageous for the executive power, it also granted the military a status of autonomy 
that still precludes other government agencies, Congress and Judiciary included, from 
intervening or supervising the armed forces in any sensitive way.
The sharp differences between the Porfirian and the Post-Revolutionary armies can now 
be seen clearly. If disciplined and loyal, the Porfirian army lacked the legitimacy to act 
in the political arena because it could not get rid of the image of being the instrument of 
the ruling elite and international capital to suppress subordinate classes and political 
enemies (Knight 1986). In contrast, Cardenas turned this relationship upside down. He 
presented the armed forces as the unconditional allies of peasants and labourers against 
the owners of capital, and the army’s leadership immediately adopted the populist and 
nationalistic rhetoric of the executive. This new image provided the army with an 
immense amount of moral capital14 that was later reinforced by a consistent 
professionalisation programme15. Once more, the corporate interest of the armed forces 
was reinforced by both the policies the president implemented to protect it and through 
the construction of an image that portrayed the armed forces as the ultimate guardian of 
the revolution’s legacies16.
In sum, Cardenas’ contribution to the normalization of civil-military relations consisted 
on the institutionalisation of the military within the presidential system. The armed 
forces played a subordinate political role and had no voice on mainstream public policy 
definitions. Their approach to professionalisation was less focussed on a policy of
14 For a detailed discussion on moral capital see J. Kane (2001).
15 In terms of military professionalism, Cardenas succeeded in taking care of the corporate interest of the 
armed forces. The new president improved the standard of living of soldiers and their families by building 
schools and hospitals for officers and their dependants, increasing salaries, improving uniforms and 
pension schemes. Together, these policies started to raise the dignity of the common soldier by giving the 
military the appearance of being a more honourable profession. At the level o f organisation o f the armed 
forces, the War Ministry, later renamed to Secretary of National Defence, started to perform competitive 
technical examinations as a prerequisite for promotion. Along with these measures, the new system 
added or subtracted points from an officer’s score based on age, heath, physical condition, seniority and 
ability to command troops. (Grayson, 1999)
16 This idea is encapsulated in a speech by President Cardenas to cadets from the Military College in 
1940. On that occasion, Cardenas stressed the continuity of the New Army as the Popular Army of the 
Revolution. He insisted that by defending the gains of the revolution, the army still served the interests of 
subordinated classes against internal reaction and external threats. (Avila Camacho, 1942)
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deterrence and national defence (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003), 
than with filling the gaps where the executive power considered that state action was 
absent, insufficient or inadequate.
It appears that the ruling elite perceived the military as an effective tool to deliver 
policy results in those areas where civilian performance involved a high number of 
transaction costs, as well as in those that needed fast state response. The first area 
included sanitation campaigns, plague control, reforestation, literacy programs, 
infrastructure building, school construction and disaster relief operations. The vertical, 
hierarchical and highly disciplined behaviour of the institution, as it was encouraged 
and socialised through the educational system, favoured military intervention on those 
missions. D. Ronfeldt (1985) named these roles residual or complementary, specially 
those related to conflict management or “crisis management,” in Wager’s words (Wager 
1994). In contrast, the internal security component represented the other side of 
military missions. This included an active gathering of political information 
(intelligence) and selective enforcement of presidential orders against political enemies. 
This side of military missions accounted for the preservation of order on behalf of 
partisan elites (Ronfeldt 1984c:58-72). At local and regional level, zone commanders 
played and still play the role of gathering political intelligence through the compilation 
of first hand information concerning subversive or guerrilla activity in rural and remote 
areas. At the same time, senior military officers helped to shape interest articulation and 
representation when discontented peasants considered that appealing to the zone 
commander represented a straightforward way to attract the president’s attention.
The role zone commanders played during el porfiriato and after the revolution had a 
number of similarities in the sense that they continued being identified as the exclusive 
agent of the executive power. The main difference, particularly after 1940, was that 
senior military officials played more the role of a depoliticised and professional state 
bureaucracy than that of semi-independent individuals with some fairly defined regional 
interests or local political objectives. For this reason, increasing professionalism of the 
armed forces did not entirely limit the political role of the military in the years that 
followed the end of the armed phase of the revolution as Lieuwen and others argued 
(Lieuwen, 1968; Lozoya, 1970). Greater professionalism lessened the independent role
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of the military in the political arena insofar as it emphasised strict discipline17, and 
obedience towards superior command18 (Ackroyd 1991; Benitez 2000). However, the 
focus of military education maintained a high, if  relatively concealed, political content 
as it prepared the armed forces to address the changing political priorities of the 
executive power and the specific needs of survival of the political regime. Not 
surprisingly, Cardenas’ actions during the second half of his presidential term showed 
he had no fear for the old generalship linked to Calles, their powerful economic allies or 
their loyal camarilla of public servants. Additionally, he was not only determined to 
renovate the political elite with a new generation of civilian politicians but also to refine 
once more the rules of the political game.
4.1.2 The new rules of the political game and the foundation of the PRM
In December 1937, President Cardenas made the decision to integrate the armed forces 
within the formal structure of the ruling party and changed its name to Party of the 
Mexican Revolution (PRM) (Lozoya 1970:64). While in principle this political move 
suggested the return of the military into the political arena, some political analysts 
argued that Cardenas’ intention was to devise a scheme where all representative powers 
of the revolution kept each other closely balanced while giving the president the final 
decision-making authority on national policy (Weyl and Weyl 1939:344-349). For 
more contemporary authors, such as Aguilar and Meyer (1993) the intention of the 
president was to transform the PNR into a more active organisation, where the forces 
that supported his presidency were fully represented (Aguilar Camin and Meyer 
1993:148). Lieuwen (1968) and Brandnburg (1964) offer a different explanation. For 
them, Cardenas intended to dilute the political standing of the military by forcing the 
generalship to bargain directly with the other three organised social bases of the 
revolution19, meaning the peasantry —  organised in the National Confederation of 
Peasants (CNC) — the powerful labour movement assembled in the new National 
Confederation of Workers (CTM) under Vicente Lombardo’s leadership, and the
17 In the Mexican Context, discipline means unquestioning deference and personal obedience to superiors. 
(Avila Camacho, 1942)
18 W. Ackroyd’s research concluded that military education in Mexico restricted the political content of 
instruction to only a few people, specially at the highest ranks. This characteristic differed a great deal 
from its counterpart in Latin America, specially Peru and Brazil, where their four-tier military educational 
system stresses politically orientated subjects.
According to L.J. Garrido (1987), the idea o f turning 50,000 soldiers into party members (1% of the 
total PRM membership), strengthened the role of the PRM as a single political front, that in turned helped 
to reinforce a broad notion of civilian supremacy. (Garrido, 1987)
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bureaucracy that belonged to an incipient professional and urban sector, a “catch all”
9ftorganisation named El Sector Popular
While the two explanations presented above are not mutually exclusive, Cardenas’ 
attention on the institutional design of the new Party suggests he did not want the 
military to evolve into a special caste that, given the political circumstances of the 
country, would only look out for its own corporate interests, to the detriment of those 
of the revolution and Mexican society as a whole (Camp 1992:22). Cardenas saw in the 
party’s new institutional design the opportunity to reinforce orderly communication 
between the organised forces of the revolution. His intention was to socialise the 
priorities of the military as an institution as well as to impose political insurance against 
counter-revolutionary tendencies within the armed forces (Nunn 1984:34). Bearing 
these ideas in mind, each of these groups was provided with a similar number of 
representatives so their bargaining capacities could be kept in reasonable balance at the 
time of choosing candidates or establishing policy directions (Brandenburg, 1964:91). 
In real terms, the new institutional design forced the military to integrate its political 
agenda, or what was left of it, into the rejuvenated version of the ruling party. Not 
surprisingly, the new political arrangement also meant the elimination of the last traces 
of el callismo within the armed forces.
The inclusion of the military into the structure of the PRM had two benefits for the 
President. Being seen as one of several components, its weight lowered. Also, it 
supported an ambitious agenda that less than a year later put key natural resources and 
industries under state control. In that sense, Cardenas used the legitimacy of the armed 
forces to imprint the “revolutionary” twist to his policy programs — labour and agrarian 
reform—and to ensure their support on specific policy objectives affecting dominant 
economic groups21. By doing so, Cardenas created the precedent of the military backing 
up the president regardless who may be affected as a result of reforms. In the short run, 
the Mexican state reinforced its autonomy to design and carry out specific policy
20 To those who criticised the President’s decision, Cardenas responded: “we did not put the army in 
politics, it was already there. In fact, it had been dominating the situation, and we did well to reduce its 
influence to one out of four. (Lieuwen 1968:126)
21 According to El Nacional. General Castrejon, Military Chief in Pachuca, Hidalgo, declared that the 
National Army was naturally close to the labor movement so it supported the creation of Unions. 
Castrejon also said that all army chiefs see with joy that the ideals of the revolution are taking shape 
regardless the obstacles that its enemies have put in the way. “£ / Ejercito Mexicano y  el Proletariado”. 
El Nacional. September 5, 1936.
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projects. The technocracy started to gain ground as state missions expanded 
accordingly. In sum, Mexico started a long period of state-led economic growth that 
continued until the early 1970s.
The first real test of this new relationship came with the nationalization of the oil 
industry in March 18, 1938. Not entirely surprisingly, the strongest complaint Mexico 
received as a result of the expropriation decree did not come from the United States, but 
from the British Government, which had come to the support of one of the most 
affected companies, El Aguila Oil Company, owner of the highly promising oil fields of 
Poza Rica in the Gulf of Mexico. Retaliation came in the form of restrictions and 
partial closure of international oil markets where Mexican products were traditionally 
traded. Furthermore, the oil multinationals agreed to withdraw their cash from the 
banking system, which eventually worsened the economic situation of the country. In 
turn, the United States recognised the right of Mexico, as a sovereign nation, to 
nationalise the property of foreign companies, but pressured Cardenas to quickly make 
compensation to the original owners. To make things worse, the US cancelled the 
purchase of silver and its derivates that represented the main export commodity of the 
country. The effects of these measures were particularly threatening for a simple 
reason: Mexico was being pressured to comply with its financial obligations to foreign 
creditors while its main sources of income were reduced drastically due to the elements 
described above (Cronon 1960:209).
The discussion of the nationalization of the oil industry is important for civil-military 
relations, since the worsening of economic conditions rapidly turned into a deep 
political crisis. In fact, the intelligence unit of the American Embassy in Mexico 
acknowledged that a number of rumours were spread among the military elite, 
indicating that a military coup was being plotted to halt the radical and even communist 
character of the incumbent administration. In fact, Cardenas’ actions to ameliorate the 
threat of insurrection within the military show that some of these rumours had solid 
grounds. The President started with the inclusion of the rural guards aligned with the 
National Confederation of Peasants (CNC) within the national structure of the army. 
With this measure, it was expected that subversive officers, if  any, would think twice 
before planning a military coup as thousands of armed peasants would immediately rise 
to defend the achievements of the agrarian reform. In other words, Cardenas managed
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to enlist the support of his political clienteles against the possibility of a reaction of 
dominant classes through the participation of the armed forces. Additionally and within 
the wider context of the incoming war in Europe, Cardenas encouraged the membership 
of the CTM to engage in proper military training, apparently to assist the military in 
case of a national emergency.
Arming the two mass organisations that had benefited the most under Cardenas’ 
administration provided the regime key guarantees of continuity. However, it also had 
one serious and obvious drawback as it increased the tension with loyal groups of the 
armed forces. According the US State Department, the hierarchy of the army saw in the 
CTM, particularly in the actions of its leader, the emergence of a parallel military 
organisation that was acquiring strength under the complacent eye of the president. The 
U.S. ambassador considered that the majority of army generals looked upon the 
militarised workers with contempt22. The report went on by commenting that a trusted 
informant within the armed forces pointed out that there was almost “universal 
dissatisfaction found among Mexican Army officers towards President Cardenas’ 
policies [...] the army feels that the fact that Cardenas is training the agrarians and 
labourers indicates he does not trust the army”23.
Days later, the same source24 informed that there was a manifesto being circulated from 
division generals down to the rank of major that condemned Cardenas’ policies and 
indicated the Mexican Army was preparing to take revolutionary action25. While no 
major military uprising took place during this period, other than the failed cedillista 
uprising in 1938, rumours of “potential” military coups never disappeared entirely. In 
fact, the ominous defeat of General Cedillo’s revolt in San Luis Potosi under the 
command of General Miguel Henrriquez Guzman made even more explicit that 
Cardenas’ extreme and frequent measures to tame the political ambitions of some 
members of the army were fully justified. However, this time the president was
22 Pierre de L. Real, Charge d ’ Affaires. The US Embassy. General Records of the Department of State, 
RG 812.20/224 NARA
23 Josephus Daniels, American Ambassador to The State Department. July 18, 1838. General Records of 
the Department of State, RG 812.20/175 NARA
24 According to other documents of this period, it is possible to suggest that the “trusted informant” was in 
fact former President and army General Abelardo Rodriguez, whose differences with Cardenas were 
public. In fact, General Rodriguez had already offered to cooperate with the U.S. Embassy in Mexico 
City under the most rigorous secrecy. Josephus Daniels, American Ambassador to The State Department. 
August 11, 1942. General Records of the Department of State, RG 812.20/415 NARA
25 Josephus Daniels, American Ambassador to The State Department. July 30, 1938. General Records of 
the Department of State, RG 812.20/178 NARA
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probably pushing the loyalty of the armed forces too hard, given that the creation of a 
competitor was running against their corporate interest and moral capital. In fact, a few 
months before the presidential election, the Secretary of Defence, General Jesus Agustin 
Castro, declared that The National Army was the only institution in the country 
“entitled to provide military training, which, apart from the police, was also the only 
organisation that had the right to bear arms”26.
The echoes of the military’s disagreement were not unheard this time. The labour union 
leader, Lombardo Toledano, declared that the CTM and its workers had no intention of 
operating in a conflict to the military and its purposes. However, he clarified that the 
CTM was instructing workers as aids to the army officers, in case such aid were to be 
needed in a moment of national crisis. In fact, Toledano ended up asserting that the 
CTM was also defending the benefit of the workers’ health from military training. 
Despite his explanations, the Secretary of Defence demanded once more the immediate 
dissolution of the workers’ battalions and the absolute prohibition of similar forces 
disguised under the name of sport (Kirk 1940). It seems President Cardenas had no 
intention of opening new political conflict with the armed forces by defending the plans 
of his loyal ally. Soon after, the CTM suspended the creation of its military college and 
ended the militarisation program altogether27
Up to this point, it seems that Cardenas’ approach to civil-military relations moved 
freely between the extremes of a policy of give and take. The military got their voice 
back in the political system through their incorporation in the PRM. However, Cardenas 
had apparently no problems, if only briefly, with a military programme run by the CTM. 
It can be suggested that these swings in the way Cardenas managed his relationships 
with the armed forces made even more evident that the president had consolidated a 
complete command over the army’s hierarchy and the military had lost its ability to 
autonomously intervene in a political crisis or oppose a given presidential order. 
Having lost such capacity, the military reinforced its role as a loyal and unconditional 
ally of the executive power against any threat endangering the political stability of the 
country. It soon became a relationship of mutual convenience. The army bureaucracy
26 “Wo habra mas milicias que las del Ejercito, La Armada y  las Fuerzas de las Policla” Excelsior. May 
8, 1940.
27 Josephus Daniels, American Ambassador to The State Department. May 8, 1940. General Records of 
the Department of State, RG 812.20/216 NARA
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maintained a high level of autonomy and even despised other state agencies; but 
acknowledged that their missions could easily deviate from the realm of national 
defence to enter in the undefined terrain of safeguarding internal security. In turn, the 
ideological and symbolic weight of the revolution made such missions familiar rather 
than extraordinary to the Mexican Military. They were legitimate in a sense that the 
incumbent president could easily covert any issue into a matter of national security or 
securitize it28 to justify the intervention of the armed forces. While this characteristic 
was positive as it solved some basic problems of governance, it also legitimised the 
partisan use of the army, which still represents one of the most recognisable 
characteristics of the system of civil-military relations and a visible obstacle for the 
current process of democratic consolidation.
Having these simple rules of the game in action made the last year of Cardenas 
presidency far less complicated than Carranza’s, Obregon’s or Calles’ experiences. As 
expected, the political effervescence of the presidential election started to monopolise 
the political agenda as soon as 1938 ended. Despite the mass support of his policies, 
Cardenas apparently chose not to show his support for any of the presidential 
candidates. In real terms, his unwillingness to show open support for a candidate 
immediately destroyed the chances of General Francisco J. Mugica to seize the PRM’s 
presidential nomination (Kirk 1942:239-244). With Mugica out of the presidential race, 
the CNC and the CTM lost their most important political card. On the other hand, the 
political and economic casualties of el cardenismo, meaning the traditional oligarchy 
and senior members of the armed forces, saw in a more moderate candidate a chance to 
regain some of the ground lost against the labour and the agrarian confederations. 
Under these conditions, it did not come as a surprise to see General Manuel Avila 
Camacho, Cardenas’ Secretary of Defence, to advance confidently towards the 
nomination of the ruling party for the next presidential term. Months later, when the
28 The term securitization, developed by Buzan,Weaver and de Wilde (1998) and their collaborators in 
what has been named the Copenhagen School, subtracts the objective conditions to the term security to 
portray it as the outcome of a specific social process. This scholarship stresses the social construction of 
issues tagged with the label “national security”, which usually takes place through a series of 
“securitizing speech acts”, mostly from the president of the head of the state, through which threats 
become represented and recognised. See also M. Williams (2003:513). This concept is key for the 
discussion of civil-military relations after 1917, because it encapsulates the importance that the new 
political leadership of the country gave to the legacy of the Mexican revolution, in the sense that anything 
that could be taken by the executive power as an attack to this heritage could easily become into an issue 
of national security and so, “claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” O. 
Weaver (1995:55).
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odds clearly favoured him within the PRM, the CTM and the CNC put away their 
radicalism and rushed to support Avila Camacho’s candidacy.
Manuel Avila Camacho won the presidential election without major difficulties and by 
1940, the economic situation of the country was starting to clear up29. Largely 
promoted by the economic momentum created by the Second World War, Mexico 
started a steady process of economic growth. At the same time, Germany had completed 
the invasion of Poland and France and the participation of the United States in the 
conflict was seen as an imminent event. In such a convulsive international scenario and 
given a long history of German flirtations with the Mexican government (Katz 1981), 
the United States wanted to avoid any source of conflict with Mexico, needing a 
politically stable ally on its southern border.
No doubt, the war in Europe played an important role in the decision of the U.S. to 
gradually resume imports of Mexican oil. Behind such actions was also Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy, aiming at solidifying a great Inter-American alliance against 
fascism. Silver exports were recommenced a year earlier as the Silver Lobby in 
Washington feared that Cardenas could easily expand his expropriation policy to the 
silver mines (Townsend 1952:256-259). On military professionalism, World War II 
created a formidable force and political will that brought together the agendas of both 
countries on a number of issues. Reluctantly but steadily, the American military started 
to provide greater assistance to its Mexican counterpart and military expenditure rose 
from 15.8 per cent in 1938 to almost 20 per cent of the budget in 1940. At the same 
time, the Mexican government accepted a loan from the United States to purchase 
modem military equipment, and a significant number of Mexican soldiers received 
military training in US Army bases (Torres Ramirez 1984).
29 Electoral fraud allegations and demonstrations were seen in different cities of the country in support of 
the losing candidate. There was also the report that Almazan and his close group of supporters, most of 
them with a military background, were planning a military coup. Less than a month after the presidential 
election, General Almazan left the country with the promise of coming back to lead a military uprising 
against the regime. There is no doubt that his candidacy enjoyed considerable popularity in some urban 
centres, particularly in the northern part of the country. However, his electoral structure in the countryside 
was poor and could only do very little to counteract the strong affinity between el cardenismo, the PRM 
and the agrarian leagues. Despite the initial belligerent tone, none of the rumours proved to have solid 
ground. Almazan did come back in November 1940, but it was a quiet event. Soon after, his close 
collaborators, for example General Jose Mijares Palencia, were readmitted to the armed forces.
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Almost overnight, the United States ceased to be commonly regarded as the most 
important menace to the territorial integrity of the country, to become Mexico’s most 
powerful ally. In fact, the State Department helped the Mexican Foreign ministry to 
solve the disputes with the expropriated oil companies and assisted the Secretary of 
Treasury to negotiate the first international loan since the times of Victoriano Huerta 
(Aguilar Camm and Meyer 1993:164). In return, Cardenas condemned the Nazi 
occupation of Austria, Albania, Belgium, France, Norway and Poland as well as the 
Japanese invasion of China. At the same time, Cardenas actively supported the Spanish 
Republic and opened the country’s borders to hundreds of political refugees. The only 
point where cooperation came to a standstill was on the US request to set up military 
bases on Mexican soil. However, Cardenas and later Avila Camacho made sure to 
indicate that Mexico would welcome such bases if the war situation demanded it
4.3 Civil-military relations during the Presidency of Manuel Avila- 
Camacho
The first important move of President Manuel Avila Camacho in terms of civil-military 
relations was the reversal of Cardenas’ decision of including the military within the 
party structure. By the end of his tenure in office, the PRM had changed its name to 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)31. In his first speech as president of Mexico, 
Avila Camacho reassured the country that “the membership of the armed forces should 
not intervene directly or indirectly on political affairs while being on active service.” He 
explained that any sort of political activity within the army’s barracks could provoke 
division within the armed forces32. It was known that Avila-Camacho did not agree 
with Cardenas on the inclusion of the military while serving as Secretary of Defence 
back in 1937, but could not do much to convince the president to act otherwise. Under 
the new scheme, the military returned to its position of exclusive agent of the executive 
power and was deprived from any decisive say on political matters. Most important, it 
reaffirmed the relationship of the military with the state’s institutions as opposed to their 
connection with the ruling party. On strict civil-military relations, the war scenario 
naturally pushed a profound process of modernization that ended up refurbishing the
30 It is also possible to argue that Mexico’s unwillingness to accept a U.S. military mission responded to 
the president’s decision to prevent further foreign influence as well as to maintain the military attached to 
the goals and nationalistic sentiments of the Mexican Revolution.
31 Diario de Debates de la H. Camara de Diputados. Primero de Septiembre de 1941.
32 Diario de Debates de la H. Camara de Diputados. Primero de Diciembre de 1940.
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military’s capacity. The new Secretary of Defence, General Pablo Macias, announced 
in May 24,1941 that the armed forces were about to start a complete transformation that 
would provide the army with modem military equipment33. However, the events of 
Pearl Harbor later that year gave civil-military relations a new political dimension.
To start with, it made possible for ex- president Cardenas to return to active duty, this 
time as Military Commander of the Pacific Region (Ibarrola 2003:20). In an interview 
with Mary Saint Adams, a foreign newspaper reporter, Cardenas stated that Mexico was 
willing to cooperate with the United States and other Latin American Nations “to 
defend the Americas and the victory of democracy”34. Even when the international war 
scenario justified the new role of the former president in the military, documents 
produced by the US embassy suggested that the former president appeared to be 
devoting more time to political affairs than military issues. It is important to highlight 
that the Pacific Region, particularity the Baja California peninsula, was mainly under 
the political influence of Abelardo Rodriguez, who was not only a national political 
figure, but presumably the richest man in the country back then (Niblo 1999). His 
unsympathetic positions towards e/ cardenismo were a matter of public knowledge. 
The U.S. embassy indicated that Cardenas was using his moral capital in the region to 
undermine the political standing of his rivals. The attention the American Embassy 
paid to this issue was not coincidental. General Rodriguez was recognized as “a good 
friend” of the United States; a status that Cardenas definitely did not have. The same 
source revealed that Cardenas’ constant comments on regional and national politics 
made Avila Camacho ask the ex-president to stop doing so, because it was interfering 
with national unity35. Soon after, the president appointed Rodriguez as chief 
commander of the Gulf Region in July 1942 and reinstalled former president Calles in 
the armed forces by giving him a symbolic position.
Bringing Cardenas’ political enemies back to active military duty could have suggested 
that AvilaCamacho wanted to counteract his political stature in the system and the 
armed forces. However, Cardenas’ appointment as Secretary of National Defence in
33 “Modernization del Ejercito. Una transformation completa sera operada, segun proyecto en estudio”. 
May 21, 1941. Excelsior. Mexico
34 Raleigh A. Gibson. First Secretary of Embassy. December 16, 1941. General Records of the 
Department of State, 14595 NARA
35 Herald D. Finley. First Secretary of Embassy. July 3, 1942. General Records of the Department of 
State, 812.20/351
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November 1942 suggests that there were other motives too. First of all, his appointment 
reinforced Avila Camacho’s image as a leader capable of conciliating apparently 
divergent interests, who was in total control of the political situation. Not surprisingly, 
such actions boosted his popularity throughout his term and enabled him to escape from 
the greater shadow of his predecessor. In a far less radical manner in comparison to 
what Cardenas did to Calles, Avila-Camacho also started to shape the political forces of 
the revolution according to his more moderate policy preferences. Moreover, the 
presence of Cardenas as the Defence Minister contributed to keep his activities under 
close supervision. No doubt, the good general still enjoyed huge popularity among the 
public and members of the cabinet, three of whom were army generals. However, it was 
also clear that in his role as Secretary of National Defence, he would need to subsume
' j / r
his views to those of the president
For the armed forces, the constant inflow of retired generals into active military service 
was a clear signal of unity with the incumbent government and positively exhibited the 
loyal and professional values of the armed forces. Moreover, its natural role in the 
strategy of national defence provided a degree of legitimacy and media exposure that 
hardly any other agency within the public administration could possibly aspire to during 
the first half of the 1940s. This position was taken to an even higher level when the 
United States agreed to assist Mexico in its intention to send troops to the fighting front 
in Europe and the Far East in June 194437. For the United States, sending Mexican 
soldiers to the warfront during the final months of the war was not expected to be of any 
significant contribution. However, it allowed the President to obtain more recognition, 
militia training, and military equipment from the United States (Torres Ramirez 1984). 
Furthermore, it created a deep internal impact that improved the image of the regime38, 
and reinforced the already strong legitimacy of the armed forces among the
36 George S. Messersmith. American Ambassador to Admiral A.W. Johnson U.S.N. Chairman. United 
States Section. Joint Mexico-United States Defense Commission, Washington D.C. December 27,1942. 
General Records of the Department of State
37 George S. Messersmith. American Ambassador to Laurence Duggan, Advisor to the U.S. President. 
American Embassy. Mexico City February 17, 1944. General Records of the Department of State 
812.20/455
38 It can also be argued that the US state Department saw in the eventual inclusion of a Mexican Squadron 
in the war effort an opportunity to undermine the political standing of General Cardenas, who was openly 
against a direct intervention of Mexico in the war scenario. They knew that whatever objections General 
Cardenas may have, he would be necessarily overruled by the sentiments of the President and most o f the 
members of the government and the army (Mexico’s active participation in the war) and for even broader 
action. Laurence Dugan Secretary of State to George Messersmith, American Ambassador to Mexico. 
February 18, 1944. General Records of the Department of State 812.20/455
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population39. By the end of 1944, there was no doubt that Mexico had become the main 
ally of the United States in the Americas.
Internally, the Presidency and the armed forced emerged as the most cohesive and 
trustful institutions of the political system. When the war ended, Avila Camacho 
ordered the retirement of 1,100 high ranking military personnel between Generals and 
Colonels (Pineyro 1985:64). Despite the protests of those who lost their posts in the 
armed forces, the president explained that the military needed to open new space to 
officers who had graduated from the Military College and the Superior School of War. 
In many ways, this event ended the career of most military men who had had some 
experience in the revolution and paved the way for a peaceful government change in 
194640. One year later, the ruling party proposed the Secretary of Interior, Mr. Miguel 
Aleman, as presidential candidate. Once more the ruling party obtained an 
overwhelming electoral victory.
4.4 Conclusion
The Mexican Revolution and the Constitution of 1917 redefined the formal and 
informal rules governing civil-military relations, but maintained the core of the vertical 
and exclusive subordination of the armed forces to the executive power, which was 
inherited from el porfiriato. It also gave the armed forces the legitimacy and moral 
capital the Porfirian army lost at the onset of the 20th Century. In time, widespread 
recognition and legitimacy gave the armed forces the consistency and even the moral 
authority to act in the political sphere under the ultimate command of the executive 
power. This role became widely accepted, insofar that the executive could justify 
military intervention to achieve the goals of the Mexican Revolution.
If positive for the military as institution, this high quota of moral capital disseminated 
unevenly among its membership was frequently used by disgruntled generals to 
challenge central authority. The 1920s and early 30s tells a chronicle where the ruling 
elite, specially the holder of the executive power, were committed to the task of 
eliminating real and potential political rivals who attempted to use the military as a
39 Guy W. Ray. Second Secretary of Embassy. American Embassy in the Mexico City. March 13,1944. 
General Records of the Department of State 812.20/462
40 However, the leadership of the ruling party, by that time renamed as PRI (Institutional Revolutionary 
Party) remained in the hands of General Alfonso Corona del Rosal, arguably the most famous member of 
the first generation of professional military officers.
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political springboard. Apart from the draconian measures implemented to enforce 
soldiers’ discipline and loyalty to the president, the new political leadership also 
overhauled the system of military education under the leadership of General Joaquin 
Amaro. As observed in this chapter, the institutional relationship between the armed 
forces and the civilian leadership proved to be highly beneficial for both parties. The 
executive power ensured the protection of the armed forces’ corporate interest. It also 
favoured their autonomy and separation from other state agencies and representative 
powers. In turn the generalship turned very vigilant and jealously self-enforced a 
disciplined loyalty to the executive, and kept silent on political matters.
Calles’ political downfall in 1935 is important because it confirmed the concentration of 
authority and political power in the executive power. The consequences of this 
transformation were relevant for the system of civil-military relations in the following 
decades, since the presidency emerged from this dispute as the uncontested national 
political leader. In the late 1930s, this condition allowed Cardenas to rearticulate the 
social bases of the revolution in ways that supported an ambitious agenda of reform. 
Under this scheme, the armed forces became the moral and material support the 
president needed either to challenge powerful transnational economic interests or to 
favour the disadvantaged groups represented by the ruling party. The clearest example 
of these measures was the expropriation of the oil industry and the escalation of agrarian 
reform throughout his term in office. Subordinated to the executive power, the armed 
forces acquired a number of missions that suited the policy preferences of the 
incumbent president and the needs of political survival of the regime.
In the years that followed World War II, the ramifications of these missions reached 
almost every comer of the political system. Within the landscape of the Cold War and 
given the characteristics B. Buzan recognises in the North American Regional Security 
Complex, the Mexican armed forces did not focus on the external defence of the state 
but on the policy preferences and political priorities of the president (Buzan and Waever 
2003). The soft side of this mission was concentrated on the social policy role of the 
armed forces. This role was highly applauded by the population as it represented a 
valuable channel for the executive to deliver results. On the other had, internal security 
became the dark side of military missions as it exhibited both the authoritarian nature of
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the regime and the areas of the state machinery that were seriously underdeveloped 
(Sanchez Ruiz 1996:4).
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Chapter 5. Guarding Political Security and Growth: a New Era of Civil- 
Military Relations during Mexico 9s Economic Miracle: 1946-1970
Introduction
When Miguel Aleman arrived at the presidency in 1946, the social groups supporting 
the governing coalition had already undergone a process of accommodation to the 
institutions created by the Mexican Revolution. Peasants’ and workers’ organisations 
did play a key role in the construction and legitimization of the regime after 1929. Their 
representation in two of the three corporate bodies of the hegemonic party underlined 
their importance within the overall structure of governance. In real terms, this formal 
arrangement expanded the room of manoeuvre of the ruling elite to define and impose 
specific policy choices without being forced to build consensus with Trade Unions and 
Peasant Leagues. Undoubtedly, this political strategy facilitated decision making at the 
top of the structure of political power, but lessened the individual capacity of interest 
groups to influence policies.
This was particularly noticeable under the leadership of President Aleman. From the 
start, the promotion of a national-based industry occupied again the centre stage to 
achieve rapid economic growth. The evolution of the import substitution 
industrialization (ISI)1 approach to development, implemented since 1942, put too much 
stress on building a climate of labour stability to invigorate national and foreign 
investment appeal. However, tensions with the labour movement built up as the regime 
restricted the unions’ right to go on strike. Furthermore, tightened control over salaries 
did not help to ease the situation as workers’ living standards diminished steadily 
(Middlebrook 1995:107). Not surprisingly, these tensions crystallised in a series of 
union mobilizations during the first year of Aleman’s administration. The situation in 
the countryside was not particularly different. The subdivision of the large Haciendas
1 The strategy of ISI consisted on fostering national supply of manufactured consumer durable and 
intermediate goods instead of foreign imports. (Middlebrook 1991:209).
139
came almost to a standstill after 1947, leaving behind enormous grievances among 
peasant communities that were still waiting the Revolution’s promises of land 
redistribution.
Since this policy shift was centrally planned and conducted from the presidential office, 
peaceful and violent responses from labour organisations and agrarian leagues were 
expected and the ruling elite prepared itself to deal with both. As a first approach, the 
regime was willing to settle grievances with organised groups, either labour or peasant 
in origin, through consent, negotiation or co-optation. This mission was mainly 
performed by the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers), the CNC (National 
Confederation of Peasants), the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and tripartite 
conciliation and arbitrage boards. The core of this relationship represented one of the 
enduring sources of legitimacy and survival of the political system. It enabled 
disciplined social groups with real roots in society to achieve a limited amount of 
intervention in the definition of policies. It also portrayed the government as willing to 
provide legal, financial and political support to allied (state-subsidised) labour and 
peasant organisations in exchange for political loyalty and control over their 
membership.
When mediation failed or national unions wished to reclaim independence from the 
post-revolutionary agreement, the regime often opted to securitize union dissent. This 
task was entrusted to police agencies and the armed forces as their actions in this field 
were deemed necessary to guarantee the success of specific political and economic 
programmes. The present chapter is mainly concerned with that policy choice and the 
way it was implemented after 1946. In other words, it deals with the intervention of the 
military, intelligence agencies and police bodies in the resolution of political conflicts 
involving trade unions, peasant leagues, student demonstrations or incipient guerrilla 
movements.
According to the principle of exclusive subordination, I will argue that the armed forces 
and police agencies remained subjected to the will of the president, but not necessarily 
to the rule of law. In practice, this combination generated paradoxical consequences. 
On the one hand, it shaped the armed forces’ doctrine in a way that placed social peace 
and internal security as integral components of the national interest that needed to be 
maintained at all costs (Servin 2002:17). On the other hand, this anxiety for pacifying
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all political sources of public disorder created a myriad of perverse motives. First of all, 
it granted security agencies a wide room of manoeuvre and even tolerance to engage in 
illegal activities as long as the internal security mission, their raison d'etre, could be 
fulfilled according to the president’s orders.
For the overall system of civil-military relations, I will argue that the frequent 
utilization of the armed forces in the domestic arena under a clear political criterion 
eroded the margins of civilian control. It also created a situation where the military 
would need to risk its moral capital by implementing the regime’s will to restrain social 
representative groups with an independent political agenda. I suggest that President 
Miguel Aleman and his successors rewarded the armed forces for their internal security 
role by conceding greater levels of independence over corporate issues — salaries, 
retirement benefits, promotions, education system, socialization of officers and 
recruits— and autonomy on the use of allotted military funds and military intelligence.
In the first part of this chapter, I will look at the way civil-military relations evolved 
during the Presidency of Miguel Aleman and the way conflicts with the labour 
movement were addressed. For conflicts from the paralysis of the agrarian reform, I 
look at Ruben Jaramillo’s political and later guerrilla movement. In this section, I will 
also analyse the role played by the Federal Directorate of Security (DFS) to exemplify 
the civilian mechanisms President Miguel Aleman established to assist the armed forces 
on the internal security mission. The termination of the DFS in 1985 after a series of 
high profile corruption allegations is a useful example to demonstrate the paradoxical 
consequences for granting too much independence and autonomy to security agencies. 
In the second section, I will address the effects generated by the Henriquista Movement 
on the transformation of the political arena after 1952.1 will also look at the generation 
of new political rivalries that drew from the fragmentation of el henriquismo and were 
eventually addressed by the armed forces. Finally, I analyse the nature of military 
missions after 1960 by evaluating the capacity of the armed forces to adjust to the 
changing preferences of the executive power, while safeguarding their corporate 
interest.
5.1 Civil-military relations after 1946
From the start, President Aleman proved to be willing to promote young professional 
officers to the highest ranks and responsibilities. In less than three months, the President
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granted the rank of General to all new army zone chiefs, with similar action in the 
navy2. In fact, when Aleman left power in 1952, there were 716 army officers with the 
rank of the three categories of general, for a military force of nearly 50,000 soldiers 
(Ibarrola 2003:63). It was the highest ratio of general per troops of all armies in Latin 
America — one general for every 69 soldiers—  and probably one of the highest in the 
world3. In real terms, the political power of the military elite was impressively diluted. 
But still, the new appointees were naturally indebted to the new president4. At lower 
levels of the military structure, salaries were raised and labour conditions were 
significantly improved (Corona del Rosal 1995). The Bank of the Army was created and 
its junior and senior members managed to contract credits under advantageous 
conditions. The effects were similar when the president improved the Military Hospital 
and laid the first stones of El Campo Militar Numero Uno (CM1).
Regardless the improvements that were made in the army’s infrastructure, military 
expenditure markedly dropped as a proportion of the government’s budget. It went from 
18 percent of total expenditure in 1947 to 7.2 per cent in 1952 (Wilkie, 1970). In fact, it 
continued dropping until 1988, as can be appreciated in Table 5.1. President Aleman’s 
changes were visible in the yearly composition of the army’s budget and his 
discourteous treatment of high-ranking military officers, and in the configuration of the 
new ruling elite5. During his six years in office, not a single army officer occupied a 
non-military position in the cabinet and the number of governors with military 
background dropped to 13 percent while during the Administration of President Avila 
Camacho, this was around 40 percent. A similar trend can be seen regarding military 
Senators, who dropped from 20 percent between 1940 and 1946 to 5 percent in the
2 Other than a clear political logic aiming at tightening his control over the armed forces, it was known 
that Aleman heavily distrusted the old generals. His father was a military officer, killed in 1929 during 
one of the numerous military rebellions. Aleman himself saved his life two years before when he actively 
supported General Amulfo R. Gomez who was executed in 1927 with Francisco Serrano for mounting a 
failed military uprising against Alvaro Obregon.
3 There, was also the idea that Aleman’s hostile and interventionist position towards the military was the 
result of personal grievances and distrust since his younger years when his father was killed by the 
military during the Escobarista Rebellion in 1929. Interview granted by former president Miguel Aleman 
to Roderick Ai Camp in 1976. (Camp 2005:27)
4 The task also needed to get rid of the last remnants of the first generation of revolutionary officers who 
had little, if anything, in common with the new ruling elite. The masterstroke o f this strategy came with 
the creation of the Mexican Legion of Honour that effectively sent the old generals to retirement despite 
most of them being more than willing to serve and intervene in political affairs.
5 It is important to notice that the size of the military budget was already high in 1946 because 
extraordinary defence spending fostered by the Second World War. Therefore, this shift is not explained 
only by the executive’s decision to cut down military spending, but by the bigger size of the government 
budget in the years that followed.
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following period (Camp 2005:76). Certainly, this policy shift contributed to clean the 
political arena o f military presence and stressed the separation between the civilian and 
the military sphere o f influence. However, it also restricted the channels o f 
communication and socialisation between public servants and military officers, which is 
essential for effective civilian control.
Table 5.1
Military expenditures as a percentage of government expenditures 1935— 1994
Period P resident %  of G overnm ent 
E xpend itu re
1935— 1940 Gen. Lazaro Cardenas 22.03
1941— 1946 Gen. Avila Camacho 18.85
1947— 1952 Lie. Miguel Aleman 10.08
1953— 1958 C. Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 7.87
1959— 1964 Lie. Adolfo Lopez Mateos 6.92
1965— 1970 Lie. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 2.63
1971— 1976 Lie. Luis Echeverria A. 4.86
1977— 1982 Lie. Jose Lopez Portillo 2.55
1983— 1988 Lie. Miguel de la Madrid 2.33
1989— 1994 Lie. Carlos Salinas de Gortari 3.08
Source: Table elaborated with data from G. Boils (1975) and R Benitez (2002)
While changes indicated above were important in the new configuration o f civil- 
military relations, it was the political side o f Aleman’s policies that set a long lasting 
transformation. Under his leadership, the military turned into one, if  not the most, 
efficient agent o f the state to free the regime from groups opposing the political status 
quo and the new direction o f economic policies. In the eyes o f the ruling elite, the 
internal enemies6 were likely to be those who openly expressed their grievances towards 
the policy choices of the executive or the autocratic nature the political system (Leroy 
2004:107). In other words, fierce presidential control over the armed forces was 
regarded as a key element for the regime’s survival, not because the ruling elite feared a 
military coup, but as an instrument to confront organised political opposition.
6 In the introduction o f a draft version of Mexico's Special Prosecutor for Social and Political Movements 
o f  the Past {Fiscalia Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Politicos del Pasado —  FEMOSPP), it states 
that Mexican State prevented, criminalised, and combated different sectors o f  the population that 
organised themselves to push for greater levels o f participation in public policy decisions. ( . . . )  those 
groups o f  society were considered as enemies.
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Under this basic condition, the political role of the military was understood as an 
essential backup to the president on specific policy choices — as it was definitely the 
case during Cardenas’ Presidency—and as the president’s exclusive agent to control 
groups and individuals challenging the ruling party and its elite. The strategy consisted 
of criminalising political dissent. This was revealed through a series of speeches where 
the President, the Interior Minister and the Secretary of Defence portrayed the 
politically discontent as disenfranchised individuals and opposed to the true 
representatives of large social organisations7. They also labelled them as traitors to the 
revolution, thieves, murderers and professional agitators and often accused them of 
being funded by foreign or communist powers intending to halt the Revolutionary 
project (Servin 2001; Servin 2002)
Along with this rhetoric, the regime preserved in full working condition the Law of 
Social Dissolution, approved by Congress in September 1941 within the context of 
Mexico’s participation in World War II (Stevens 1970:62)8. This law had been 
originally planned to prevent the incursion of Nazi propaganda. In fact, the Mexican 
Academy of Penal Sciences expressed the hope that this law could be repealed as soon 
as the circumstances that promoted its creation disappeared (Rosales-Aguilar 1959). But 
the law was not revoked when the war ended. On the contrary, it gained an internal 
political dimension — some even named it the Anti Labour Law—  and it was used to 
justify state intervention with suspicious trade unions and peasant organisations.
This was clearly the case of actions against independent cells of the National Union of 
Railroad Workers, Oil Workers and Miners (Boils 1975). As will be explained later in 
this chapter, these groups lacked the strength and the organisational capability to 
challenge the regime on their own, but they were fiercely combated anyway. 
Apparently, the disproportionate use of force was in response to the fears of the elite
7 Labelling political dissent as the enemy of the revolution was entirely rhetorical. The goals of The 
Revolution seen in its briefest definition, as labour and agrarian reform, had slowed down since the 
presidency of Cardenas. In other words, the division of the haciendas was not longer an issue of national 
policy since Avila Camacho, and it stopped almost completely during the rule of Miguel Aleman. On the 
other hand, the regime had already strengthened its control over the trade unions, though the creation of 
the CTM and their compulsory affiliation to the ruling party (Schmidth, 1991).
8 The Article 145 (promulgated in 1941 and revised in 1950) and 145 bis (promulgated in 1950) of the 
Penal Code specified that a prison term of two and up to twelve years and a fine of one to ten thousand 
pesos “to any foreigner or Mexican national who in speech or in writing, or by any other means, carries 
on political propaganda among foreigners or Mexican Nationals, spreading ideas, programmes or forms 
of action of any foreign government, which disturb the public order or affect the sovereignty of the 
Mexican State.”
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regarding the possibility that discontented trade unions and peasant leagues could gain 
enough political momentum, and therefore provoke a real challenge to the status quo 
(Pineyro 1985). It seems also that intelligence agencies deliberately overestimated the 
risk that these organisations posed to the polity as a way of obtaining a higher portion of 
budget and political influence.
For the armed forces, Aleman’s drive for internal security countered a historical 
weakness by focusing on confronting radical expressions of political opposition, such as 
guerrilla movements (Vanderwood 1976)9. The Army reorganised its geographical 
deployment through the sub-aggregation of the 32 military zones into nine military 
regions. This transformation created a new command ring headed by newly appointed 
generals. At the same time, it diminished the interaction between the chiefs of military 
zones and state governors, as regional chiefs took control over dealings with local and 
state authorities. In addition, Aleman ordered the installation of a private phone 
network between the presidency and each military zone in the country (Servin 
2001:114). Finally, the central command began to shift military zone chiefs more 
frequently. As during el porfiriato, the objective was to disrupt political alliances 
between regional political leaders and army representatives.
The map presented below shows how the geographical deployment of the armed forces 
in Mexico followed an internal logic of defence, rather than conventional priorities 
associated with deterrence10. There was nothing new in this, it was created during el 
porfiriato and reaffirmed on many occasions by Obregon, Calles and Cardenas 
(Lieuwen 1968). It seems clear that the army distributed its battalions in expanding 
rings around Mexico City. In fact, around 65 per cent of the army’s capability was 
deployed within a radius of 300 kilometres from the country’s capital. It is also 
noticeable that while the northern region was still kept reasonably secure, military 
presence in the South East was almost nonexistent. Furthermore, the creation of the 
Presidential Guards Unit and its integration into the Presidential Chief of Staff -Estado
9 The downfall of el porfiriato occurred partly in response to the federal army’s inability to confront the 
simultaneous attack of poorly organised guerrillas in the north and south of the country. Likewise, 
Fracisco Madero’s legitimacy had also been seriously undermined by the inability of the federal army to 
deal with the widespread presence of movements in the north and the centre of Mexico. It seems that the 
executive power after 1930s paid considerably more attention than their predecessors to preventing 
revolutions.
10 Riding, A. “Mexican Army, Amid Rumors, Insists it Steers Clear of Politics”. The New York Times. 
February 5, 1974 p 4.
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Mayor Presidencial (EMP) reinforced the capacities o f the president to define the 
character o f military missions. The EMP grew in size and continued to be recognised as 
an elite body o f the armed forces. In general, it was better equipped than other military 
units and its personnel was carefully selected from the top classes o f the Military 
College (Ortega 1995:16).
Figure 5.1
Troop locations and military zones. Mexican Army 1941
T15
>1 f  «t4t
Source: Map retrieved from the General Records o f the Department o f  State. February 1, 1941, The 
National Archives. Declassified EO 11652 Sec 3(E) 5(D) OSD letter May 3, 1972.
5.2 The Federal Directorate of Security
The armed forces were assisted by specialised government agencies on the civilian side 
o f internal security. In this category, it is possible to identify the Judicial Police, the 
Secret Service under the command of the Mayor o f Mexico City, and state and local 
police bodies. Such assistance was considerably reinforced through the creation o f the 
Federal Directorate of Security (DFS) in 1947. According to President Aleman, the DFS 
was meant to become the Mexican version o f the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
(Gonzalez 1996). Not particularly different from other intelligence agencies on the
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continent, the DFS directed its energies to infiltrate trade unions, political parties and 
student organisations with undercover agents as a way to keep a close eye on every 
corner of the political activity in the country11. They also carried out analyses of open 
sources of information, such as newspapers and magazines. In many areas, their 
missions overlapped with those of the Estado Mayor as they were also included in the 
protection of the president and high profile visitors. However, its most important 
mission included the supervision of political groups, individuals and organisations that 
had presumably assumed a critical and even challenging stand towards the ruling elite.
Within the terrain of civil-military relations, the Federal Directorate of Security came to 
counterbalance and supervise the missions delegated to the armed forces on internal 
security. Yet, its assignment was never centred on preventing abuses committed against 
civilians, but ensuring that the armed forces performed the internal mission according to 
the executive’s orders. Having the DFS installed next to the presidential office 
automatically conferred the agency a high standing within the public administration. 
The DFS participated, along with the armed forces, in the intervention against the Oil 
Workers Union disturbances in Azcapotzalco as well as the occupation of oil facilities 
in Veracruz and Tamaulipas on December 19, 1946 . A few months later, the DFS 
destroyed a political movement organised by several national unions opposing their 
automatic affiliation to the ruling party13. In 1948, the DFS intervened to dissolve the 
strike in the Railroad Workers’ Union14. In sum, there were at least 8 major incidents
11 Marin, Carlos. “Los cargos en su contra en Estados Unidos aun vigentes. Resucitan a Nazar; no 
importaron las acusaciones de represor, de torturador, de informante de la C IA ..”. Proceso. December 
26, 1988
12 Right after some sections of the Oil Union agreed to suspend activities, the army occupied PEMEX 
(Mexico’s State ‘Oil Company) facilities and arrested the union leaders. The regime accused them of 
subversion, attacking vital communications infrastructure and sabotage. As a result, 40 members of the oil 
union who were allegedly linked with the disturbances were seized by direct presidential orders. 
Concurrently, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) cooperated with the president and 
completely abandoned the discontented cells of the Oil Union in Mexico City, Veracruz and Tamaulipas.
13 This decision generated widespread discontent of the most representative union organizations of the 
country. The oil workers, railroad, electrical power generation, telephone and mining unions opposed the 
CTM as it was clearly not in their best interest. These unions had a long tradition of independence from 
the ruling party that enabled them to increase their political and economic bargaining power, mainly on 
yearly salaries’ negotiations. Not surprisingly, the regime’s response followed the same pattern. It sent the 
military and the DFS to placate the dissidents, but this time the DFS stayed longer to oversee the 
appointment of a new leadership. The automatic affiliation of the oil workers membership was approved 
on November 16, 1947.
14 Jesus Diaz de Leon, its General Secretary, accused Jose Luis Gomez Z., by that time President of the 
Unitary Workers Confederation (CUT) —  the CTM’s independent competitor —  apparently of 
mishandling the workers’ fees to the trade union. When the accusation against Gomez Z. did not initially 
succeed, Diaz de Leon was accused by the Union board of fuelling internal division and dismissed him 
from the position of General Secretary. The problem with these actions was that Diaz de Leon was being 
protected by President Aleman himself. The next day, one hundred DFS agents dressed as railroad
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between 1946 and 1952 with national unions where the DFS and the armed forces were 
called to restore order. In all cases, the CTM and its national leader, Fidel Velazquez, in 
conjunction with the president, put an end to the problem by denying support to the 
dissidents and publicly condemning their actions. These episodes show how the regime 
mounted an effective, perhaps brutal, strategy to limit the potential o f unions and other 
organisations to cut their ties from the corporatist arms o f the PRI. It was clear that in 
the eyes o f the executive power, the emergence of independent trade unions was seen as 
a matter of internal security that needed military intervention. Under these conditions, 
the creation o f the DFS had a positive side for the armed forces as it allowed a 
rearrangement o f division o f labour within repression duties. In terms of control, the 
strategy proved adequate. Labour strikes during Aleman’s sexenio dropped dramatically 
in comparison to the lapse of General Avila Camacho’s mandate as it can be appreciated 
in Table 5.2. Ironically, the administration o f the first elected civilian president since 
1911 had shown even more intolerance, willingness to repress and authoritarianism than 
its military predecessors.
Table 5.2
Labour strikes 1938-1962
P residentia l Y ear F ederal Jurisd iction L ocal Jurisd iction
A dm inistration Strikes Strikes
L&zaro Cardenas 1938 32 287
1939 35 268
1940 15 342
Manuel Avila Camacho 1941 17 125
1942 19 79
1943 569 197
1944 734 153
1945 107 113
1946 24 183
Miguel Aleman 1947 13 117
1948 34 54
1949 35 55
1950 28 54
1951 17 127
1952 29 84
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 1953 20 142
1954 18 75
1955 13 122
1956 10 149
1957 10 183
1958 11 729
Adolfo Lopez Mateos 1959 18 361
r ......................................... | 1960 1 52 | 325
Source: This table was constructed by K. Middlebrook (1995:165)
workers, along with army soldiers, assisted Diaz de Leon to assume the Union’s leadership by force. The 
overwhelming use o f force succeeded and the undisciplined leaders went into hiding for months. The 
regime mounted a manhunt against them until the DFS found them. Valentin Campa and Jose Luis 
Gomez Z were incarcerated in the Federal Prison o f  Lekunberri.
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On the negative side, sending soldiers against representative sectors of Mexican society 
significantly affected the military’s corporate interest. On many occasions, trade unions 
and agrarian leagues demanded the dissolution of the armed forces as they considered 
them the regime’s instrument to repress the population and serve big transnational 
capital and land owners. This position was clearly stated in their manifestos and press 
releases (Jaramillo 1950). On the face of it, the presidency made every effort to protect 
the army’s corporate interest by praising their institutional loyalty in events and parades. 
It also prevented the publication of negative comments in newspapers through its 
control over the mass media15. In return, the military missed no opportunity to show 
their support for Aleman’s policies and leadership. On August 13, 1948, zone army 
chiefs and the Secretary of Defence met with the president to reiterate their loyalty and 
commitment. A similar encounter was repeated two months later with the presence of 
the entire generalship. These public displays became a ritual in which, every time the 
president confronted some degree of internal unrest, the military rushed to his office to 
show support. In the late 1940s, the main reason behind these acts was to reaffirm their 
allegiance vis-a-vis the trade unions. In the 1960s and 70s the approach changed by 
showing both their commitment to counteract massive student demonstrations, and by 
dealing with the upsurge of rural and urban guerrilla groups. Nowadays, it is a mixture 
of responding to wide public insecurity, guerrilla movements, and drug trafficking.
Among many other disadvantages of this form of interaction, missions delegated to DFS 
and the armed forces were used to put entire state agencies at the service of the private 
interests of key political officers16. For instance, the DFS was used by President Aleman 
to carry out personal vendettas like the persecution of the journalist Rafael Garcia 
Travesi (Taracena 1979:12). It also served its own members as a useful fa9ade to 
conceal their engagement in illicit activities17. According to the State Department 
Records on Mexico’s politics and military affairs, it was well known that the DFS was 
involved in the traffic of drugs. According to Col. Holden, Army Attache at the US 
Embassy in Mexico City, the second in command of the DFS, Mr. Juan Ramon Gurrola, 
used his subordinates and official vehicles to traffic illegal substances to the United
15 Up to the 1980s, it was well known in the country that freedom of press ended when journalists 
attempted to criticise the incumbent president, his wife or the armed forces (Batiz, 1999:72)
16 Maurice C . Holden, Assistant Military Attache “Misuse of power by National Security Police.” D.F. 
July 17, 1947. General records of the Department of State Rg 59, LM112m 1945-1949. Confidential 
Files, 812.00-812.34, roll 17, NACP
17 Tirado, E. (2000). “El Cisen: el salto del trapecio o cirisi de identidad\ Proceso. October 1, 2000
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States. Holden even described in detail how the Director of the DFS was sometimes in 
charge of overseeing such highly profitable activity. The military attache affirmed that 
Col. Serrano, one of the two founders of the DFS, tried to take advantage of his close 
friendship with President Aleman to convince him to centralise the anti narcotics 
campaign by assigning the entire task to the Federal Directorate of Security. In fact, 
Colonel Carlos Serrano was publicly accused in the United States for his alleged 
participation in the smuggling of heroin. Holden also believed that the profits of the
1 ftillicit business were being shared among high profile politicians
Despite the rumours and the evidence that the DFS was involved in illegal activities, the 
ruling elite did nothing. It was taken as a small price to pay for assisting the regime in 
maintaining economic growth and political stability (Aguayo 2001:93; Lupsha 1991:41; 
Toro 1995); Nadelmann 1993; Pimentel 2000). In time, such deviant behaviour created 
a competitive and highly profitable market of state protection (military and police 
officers) to individuals and organisations committed to the traffic of drugs and other 
illicit activities such as weapons trading, kidnapping and car theft. (Nadelmann 
1993:287-288). It was during this period when the concept of “La Plaza” was forged. It 
defined a franchise system by which drug traffickers paid police and military chiefs a 
fixed, usually monthly, amount of money for the monopoly of illegal activities in a 
defined region or city. The way this system works has been elegantly described by 
Terrence Poppa in his book about the life of the famous trafficker Pablo Acosta (Poppa 
1991). According to this scheme, the profits made in the underworld are passed on as 
percentages up through the system until they reach the office of the president. (Lupsha 
1991; Bailey and Godson 2000; Pimentel 2003; Willoughby 2003).
Following this logic, the appropriation of some high profit illegal activities by the 
regime, especially by police agencies, created a cash cow system where high profile 
politicians tolerated criminal organisations as far as they could safely profit from such 
illegal activities (Lupsha 1991). Tolerance from above was granted and maintained as 
long as it did not become a matter of friction with the United States and, most
18 Besides a number of cases cited by the US Embassy personnel, sinister stories of corruption in the DFS 
were never in short supply. According to the weekly magazine Proceso. two of the bodyguards of 
President Aleman, Hugo and Arturo Izquierdo Hebrard, were expelled from the DFS after being 
implicated in the assassination of Mario Angulo Hernandez, by that time Senator of Tlaxcala. The same 
brothers were later identified by the Attorney General’s Office as prominent players of the traffic of 
drugs. Another case was of Captain Rafael Chavarri, who was later linked to Jorge Moreno Chaubet, the 
kingpin of heroin traffic to the United States in the mid 1960s. (Astorga Almanza, 2003:242-243)
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importantly, as long as police and local political authorities continued performing the 
mission of checking political opposition.
At lower levels, the agreement between the political principal and the security agent 
acquired complex ramifications of corruption that cut across social and political 
structures. The income from illegal activities was often channelled to reinforce the 
corporatist instruments of the ruling party at local and state level. This situation 
enhanced the social capital of local public officials as well as allowing those 
participating in criminal activities to mingle freely with the rest of society without being 
stigmatized as members of the underworld. Since illegal activities were not only 
tolerated, but even assisted by security agencies, their participants, and specifically drug 
traffickers, were not particularly seen as a threat to society by the political elite. On the 
contrary, they were often regarded as magnanimous characters who contributed to 
minimize the gap of social welfare the state was unable to fulfil. Not surprisingly, 
political campaigns funded by criminal organizations were also regular (Curzio 2000).
No doubt, international pressure could have pushed the regime to reinforce the 
supervision of military and security agencies as well as to denounce the illegal dealings 
of the DFS. However, it seems that the U.S. State Department was not willing to voice 
its disapproval on these two issues, as long as its southern neighbour remained stable 
and free from communist influence (Willoughby, 2003.129, Schulz, 1985:6). With the 
external and internal variables affecting the continuation of the post-revolutionary 
regime under reasonable control, attempts to transform the nature of the status quo 
could only come from the fragmentation of the ruling elite. As it occurred to General 
Juan A. Almazan in 1940, the political casualties left by the electoral defeat of General 
Henriquez Guzman in 1952 diversified the enemies and so the regional scope of the 
policies of internal security. This part of the discussion leads us to the second element 
shaping the contradictions generated by involving the armed forces in political affairs.
5.3 The henriquismo and its casualties, 1952-1958
On the eve of 1952, the regime’s candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, confronted the 
candidacy of Efrain Gonzalez from the PAN (National Action Party), Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano from a coalition of the Popular and the Communist Parties, and 
General Miguel Henriquez Guzman supported by The Federation of People’s Parties
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(FPPM). Undoubtedly, the candidacy of General Henriquez represented the highest 
threat to the regime, as it attracted many of the groups discontented with the 
neoconservative character of Aleman’s policies. Within the armed forces, the 
resentment was still fresh for his arbitrary allocation of ranks.
Daniel Cosio Villegas’ work on the Mexican Presidential Succession (Cosio Villegas 
1975), argues that the regime feared that General Cardenas could offer his preferences 
for Lombardo or Henriquez in 1952. Both were aligned to Cardenas’ leftist policies, 
and the so-called revolution heritage, so their alliance to the former president was 
expected. There were also bitter resentments due to Aleman’s alleged intention to seek 
re-election (Taylor 1960; Medin 1990). In fact, Congressman Manuel Jimenez, 
President of the Chamber of Deputies, had already hinted at the possibility of amending 
the Constitution for such purposes19. Despite the rumours, Cardenas maintained an 
uncompromised position that was understood more as an endorsement to Adolfo Ruiz 
Cortines than to a veiled support to General Henriquez or Lombardo. Brandenburg 
(1964) argues that Ruiz Cortines turned out to be the choice of Cardenas over the 
preferences of Miguel Aleman who tried, but failed, to impose the candidacy of 
Fernando Casas Aleman, the appointed Mayor of Mexico City (Brandenburg 1964; 
Langston 2002).
In any case, the fragmentation of the large revolutionary family was of concern for the 
ruling elite. Even if Cardenas was not openly supporting Henriquez, there were a 
number of well-known cardenistas who were indeed working in his campaign. This 
was a situation that definitely infuriated PRI loyalists working in the first circle of 
Aleman (Servin 2001). The FPPM had already been endorsed by the Party of the 
Revolution, headed by General Candido Aguilar and The Constitutionalist Party that 
was controlled by another recognised cardenista and former governor of Veracruz, 
Heriberto Jara. Their allegiance to Henriquez was not only the result of twelve years of 
abandonment and lack of opportunities to intervene in the political arena, but also the 
chance to reshape the composition of the ruling elite. Not surprisingly, the FPPM was 
stronger in rural areas than in the great cities. Such affiliations resulted from the 
resentment to Aleman’s regressive agrarian policies. That was the case of the Agrarian
19 See Gruson, Sydney. “Aleman Declines 2nd Term in Mexico”. The New York Times. September 2, 
1950, page 6.
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and Labour Party of Morelos (PAOM)20, created and headed by Ruben Jaramillo in 
1945. Within the PAOM, there were also radical peasant groups that had received 
weapons and military training during the late 1930s as part of President Cardenas’ 
strategy to prevent the “Guardias Blancas”—small paramilitary units at the service of 
Hacendados—  to retaking the expropriated lands. Heading these groups were Cesar 
Martino, Wenceslao Labra and Graciano Sanchez, all being well known cardenistas 
(Story 1985:155).
Within the armed forces, there were also groups that openly sympathised with 
Henriquez’s candidacy. However, as under Almazan’s presidential campaign in 1940, 
the Defence Minister personally made sure that none of the Henriquistas had command 
positions prior and during the presidential election. In fact, missions delegated to the 
armed forces in the political arena increased as the presidential election approached. On 
election day, the military placed troops all around the state of Morelos; ballot points 
were also secured by army personnel. In fact, ballot boxes were burned or stolen in the 
strongholds of Jaramillo’s organisation and the PAOM was denied the chance to win in 
a single electoral district, not to mention the state governorship. Nationally, the results 
were not favourable to General Henriquez either. Despite the high expectations, The 
Federation of People’s Parties could not pass the barrier of 20 percent of the preferences 
(Estrada Correa 1988). Still, it was the largest vote for a non PRI candidate since the 
end of the revolution. The PRI won once more with a more than a 50 percent 
margin.
As with Almazan’s group after his electoral defeat in 1940, violence against the losing 
side after the election reached daunting levels in some regions of the country. According 
to T. Padilla (2008), the repression against the jaramillistas turned harsher when 
Governor Rodolfo Lopez Nava —  a well-known political enemy of Jaramillo—  
assumed the governorship and used his power to settle some debts with Jaramillo and 
his followers. The headquarters of PAOM were raided in Cuernavaca and Jojutla and a 
few peasant leaders linked to this party were killed, tortured or imprisoned. Working 
with the local state police, the military put in practice the “carreterazos” that consisted 
of dumping the dead bodies of jaramillistas along the roads with the intention of
20 The PAOM was a political party based on a regional peasant movement that saw itself as the 
continuation of Zapata’s revolution. It had a radical policy agenda that included the expropriation of all 
the sources of wealth in the country and extensive allocation of land to all landless peasants. After 1952, 
most of its operations went underground as a result of local and federal government repression.
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spreading fear and pushing for the termination of the organisation (Lopez -Limon 
2000).
Outside Morelos, the level of mobilization resulting from the election was considerably 
lower, but not negligible. Armed peasant groups allied to the PFFM rose up in 
Michoacan, Queretaro , Veracruz, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Chihuahua, Sonora and Oaxaca. 
Apparently, these groups were moved by the expectation that General Henriquez would 
ask his followers to join him in the quest of overturning the regime by force. However, 
Henriquez did not do this21. In fact, he managed to deactivate a violent response 
towards the regime even when a large number of his followers had been massacred in 
the Alameda Central by members of the DFS and the army during a peaceful 
demonstration. There were also rumours of a possible military uprising, but the military 
remained loyal to the executive power as everyone expected.
In sum, General Henriquez’ electoral defeat and resulting political surrender quickened 
the dissolution of the labour and urban ingredient of the PFFP, which in fact vanished in 
the months that followed. As with the moderate wing of the opposition headed by 
Lombardo’s Partido Popular, the urban leaderships of the FPPM were easily co-opted 
by the government. In contrast, the more radical wing of the henriquismo, the agrarian 
leagues linked to Jaramillo, Celestino Gasca and other peasant leaders, preserved a 
higher level of independence. In the following years, repression was considerably 
reduced and the realm of national security shifted actors and protagonists. The Labour 
movement lost steam throughout Ruiz Cortines’ presidency as a result of a policy of 
relatively constant raise of salaries. Moreover, high rates of economic growth helped the 
ruling elite to maintain a heavy corporate and clientelistic structure supporting a variety 
of benefits for labour and peasant organisations. Furthermore, it was also clear that 
President Aleman had already dismantled the most belligerent sections of the national 
trade unions.
It also appears that Ruiz Cortines was perhaps more inclined to tolerate, negotiate with, 
and consent to a certain degree of political dissent within labour, before sending the 
security agencies to take over the situation by force. In the light of his record on 
internal security, it seems he was not easily persuaded to choose violence over political
21 See Gruson, Sydney. “Defeated Mexican Hints at uprising” The New York Times. October 2, 1952. 
and Gruson, Sydney. “Henriquez fading in Mexico Politics” The New York Times. February 10,1954
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bargaining to solve grievances between the regime and the so-called political enemies. 
The contrast with his predecessor was very sharp. In fact, even when Jaramillo’s group 
turned into a 100 armed men guerrilla during his sexenio (FEMOSPP 2006 V:31), 
President Ruiz Cortines did not focus entirely on a military solution to the problem. 
Military occupation of Morelos continued and in fact it escalated in 1954. However, the 
president also looked for reconciliation. Ruiz Cortines personally met with Jaramillo in 
1956 and 1957 to negotiate an amnesty for his group and a viable solution to the 
agrarian discontent in the region. Because of these high profile meetings, Jaramillo also 
met with Mr. Adolfo Lopez Mateos during his presidential campaign and Gustavo Diaz 
Ordaz, who was going to become the Interior Minister in the upcoming presidential 
term (1958-1964).
Apart from these indications of tolerance, the Ruiz Cortines’ presidency slowed down 
the repression of political dissent by separating the newly created DFS from the 
presidential office in 1952. On many occasions, Ruiz Cortines declared he had no 
intention of being surrounded by “pistoleros,” in a clear allusion to the DFS. It seems 
clear that the new president adopted a more relaxed approach than his predecessor when 
dealing with political dissent. However, the separation of the DFS from his inner circle 
of influence also suggests a different explanation. It is possible to argue that given the 
nature of missions delegated to this agency and the illicit activities some of its members 
had allegedly engaged in, Ruiz Cortines wanted to prevent any visible link between the 
presidency and the poor image of the Federal Directorate of Security. In other words, 
the eviction of the DFS from the presidential palace may have been more of a public 
relations strategy than a genuine desire to dismantle a key instrument to ensure public 
order.
Perhaps unintentionally, the separation of the DFS from the presidential office made the 
supervision of the armed forces by the executive more subtle, indirect and harder to 
track down. From 1953 up to 1982, there is evidence suggesting that the executive 
handled some delicate points in the relationship with the armed forces through the 
director of the DFS. The extensive interviews that Jorge Castaneda carried out with four 
former presidents of Mexico reveal some characteristics of this relationship (Castaneda 
1999). In one of the fragments, J. Castaneda asked former president Jose Lopez Portillo
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(1976-1982), about the chances of Javier Garcia Paniagua22, by that time Director of the 
DFS, becoming his successor in the presidential office. Instead of giving a direct 
answer, Lopez Portillo replied that Garcia Paniagua had the mission of representing the 
voice of the president “underneath the military” (Castaneda 1999:107). Lopez Portillo 
did not specify what “underneath” meant. According to Enrique Aguilar Ortega, an 
acquaintance23 and collaborator of Garcia Paniagua in the late 1970s, the director of the 
DFS was in charge of conveying direct presidential orders to army zone chiefs on 
specific regional or local operations. (Interview: Mexico City, July 10th 2006).
In a different fragment of the same interview, Castaneda refers to an incident in which 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and future president of Mexico (1982-1988), Miguel de la 
Madrid, informed Lopez Portillo that Garcia Paniagua had requested some extra- 
budgetary resources that needed explicit presidential approval. According to Miguel de 
la Madrid, Lopez Portillo replied: “no need for consultation, whatever Javier says, is 
like if I were saying it” (Castaneda 1999:133). Even when the former president failed to 
remember this particular incident as vividly as Miguel de la Madrid did, Lopez Portillo 
said it could easily be possible because Garcia Paniagua was managing funds that were 
meant to “fix certain things” he was not ready to reveal in that interview (Castaneda 
1999:134). When Castaneda insisted and asked Lopez Portillo what he meant by “fix 
certain things,” he simply replied that those were “control expenses” of the armed forces 
(Castaneda 1999:134). General Miguel Angel Godinez Bravo, who served as 
President’s Chief of Staff during the administration of Jose Lopez Portillo, corroborated 
this version. General Godinez told this author that Lopez-Portillo had a way of 
governing that allowed close collaborators to exercise their judgment on critical 
decisions, without having to consult him beforehand. He also affirmed that Garcia 
Paniagua had plenty of economic resources to give away for a variety of issues. 
However, he did not want to delve on the nature of such issues. (Interview: Mexico 
City, May 8th 2005 and August 10th, 2008).
22 Garcia Paniagua was the son of General Marcelino Garcia Barragan who served as Defence Minister 
during the presidency of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. According to DFS files, one of Garcia Paniagua’s 
political assets was his close relationship with the army due to his father reputation and position. DFS 
009-096-070
23 It is important to note that there was a style of interpersonal communication among priistas that 
occupied important government positions in the 1970s to call each other “friends”, even if they had a 
distant or just merely a work relationship.
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It seems clear that neither Lopez Portillo nor his Interior Minister, Jesus Reyes Heroles, 
were particularly interested in getting involved with the dark alleys of the internal 
security policy. Lopez Portillo did not have relevant experience on issues associated 
with internal security. However, he was quite aware that such matters were related to 
the urban counter guerrilla campaign the DFS and the Armed Forces carried out in the 
1970s. “The system is the system” he replied to Castaneda as a veiled hint to stop 
talking about the subject. In the case of Reyes Heroles, it was common knowledge that 
he despised the DFS and most likely chose to put some distance between him and the 
agency (Aguayo 2001:93). Therefore, the internal security mission rested entirely on 
Javier Garcia Paniagua, who in fact has been mentioned many times as the mastermind 
behind the extermination of the last traces of the urban guerrilla movement in the late 
1970s24. Despite the alleged unwillingness to know the details of internal security 
operations, it seems clear Lopez Portillo understood well the role of the DFS in the 
political system as the civilian counterweight of the Military. In his memoirs, the former 
president wrote that he thought General Miguel Angel Godinez Bravo, by that time 
Chief of Staff to the President, was a good candidate to replace Javier Garcia Paniagua 
in the DFS in 1978. However, he soon vetoed this possibility because he knew that the 
inclusion of an Army General in the leadership of the DFS would automatically 
detonate unnecessary rivalry with the Secretary of Defence (Lopez Portillo 1988:1160). 
In an interview with the author, General Godinez said that the DFS was a black box of 
corruption and abuse and he and the army’s leadership would not have liked the idea of 
commanding the DFS.
Later in Castaneda’s’ book, Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico between 1982 
and 1988, explained that he had no intention of maintaining a direct relationship with 
the DFS, whose bad reputation had reached untenable levels. Manuel Bartlett, Interior 
Minister during the President’s De la Madrid administration, had the intention of 
gradually disengaging the DFS from the regime as a whole. In an interview to Andrea 
Becerril, Bartlett said he suggested President De la Madrid to shut down the DFS due to
24 The late 1970s was the time were the political influence of the DFS reached its peak. The agency had 
passed from a couple of hundred agents in 1965 to nearly 3,000 full time employees that controlled more 
that 10,000 informants in 1979. It is difficult to believe that the alleged threats to internal security in those 
years, meaning a diluted guerrilla movement, justified a security force o f such dimensions. According to 
S. Aguayo (2001), the DFS often manufactured information and built conspiracy theories to invent 
powerful internal enemies that justified increasing budget allocations.
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its links to drug lords and clear involvement in a variety of criminal activities25. The 
revelations made by Lopez Portillo and other high profile political actors may be 
insufficient evidence to argue that the DFS acted, since its separation from the 
Presidential office in 1953, as the main channel for civilian supervision of the armed 
forces on sensitive security issues. Moreover, direct statements of former presidents of 
Mexico concerning the role of the DFS and its relation to the armed forces are 
extremely scarce. Given the nature of missions delegated to the DFS, further revelations 
may also lead to criminal charges. Still, the close and rigid characteristics of the 
Mexican Armed forces suggest this relationship could not have been radically different 
during the presidencies of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976), Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964- 
1970) or Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-1964). Fernando Gutierrez Barrios, who served 
as Director of the DFS during the sexenio of Diaz-Ordaz, is mentioned in different parts 
of Castaneda’s book and numerous journalistic and academic accounts, as the trusted 
broker who was able to communicate civilian preferences to military agencies. In fact, 
key actors of the security arena, such as Gutierrez Barrios, developed a measure of 
political power of their own. Jorge Moreno Collado, former Federal Deputy and 
General Director of Government when Fernando Gutierrez Barrios served as Interior 
Minister (1988-1992), explained to this author that student leaders in the mid 1960s 
were trying to gain the confidence of the DFS’s Director as he had the power to allocate 
some seats in the Federal Congress. (Interview: Mexico City, February 12th 2005 and 
August 15th, 2008).
In retrospect, it seems that the success of the DFS at imposing some sort of civilian 
supervision on military missions was directly related to the need of President Miguel 
Aleman to reshape the relationship with the armed forces according to his policy 
preferences. After him, this informal agreement became an accepted mechanism of 
indirect communication between the executive and the armed forces. Therefore, even 
when the DFS was relocated in the Interior Ministry in 1953, its role did not change 
much. On civil-military relations, the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines did not 
interfere as much as Aleman did with the internal life of the armed forces. He even 
managed to restore some order concerning the anarchic system of promotions imposed 
by his predecessor.
25 Becerril, Andrea “Fox prometid una comision de la verdad sobre desaparecidos politicos y  debe 
cumplir: Bartlett” La Jornada. November 28,2001
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5.4 Violence returns: the 1960s
Unfortunately for the regime, the honeymoon between labour and the president was not 
meant to last as it started to show signs of exhaustion by the end of 1957. The economy 
maintained sustained growth, but inflation was high too, and tight state control over 
salaries often resulted in real loss of earnings for workers. (Philip 1992:28). The good 
relationship with the trade unions broke down again in 1957, when the Railway Union 
complained about working conditions, hours and discrepancies between agreed salary 
raises and inflation rates (Stevens 1970:69). Having 70,000 affiliates, the strike of the 
Railroad workers posed a real problem to the newly elected president. Apart from this 
conflict, the regime was facing the strike of seven thousand telegraphers, fifteen 
thousand rural teachers of the Section 9 of SNTE, Oil workers from the Section 34 and 
35, miners of Fresnillo, Electricians belonging to the National Union of Electricistas 
(SME), the strike by Mexicana de Aviation and an undetermined number of armed 
peasants’ organisations that invaded almost 1,000,000.00 hectares in different parts of 
the country26 (Moguel 1981; Ortega Aguirre 1982). In addition to the political activism 
of unions, the regime was also confronted by a revival of opposition parties, such as the 
PAN in Jalisco27.
The internal situation of security was also complicated by the success of the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959. The second half of the 1950s opened some room for political 
dissent in the country. No doubt, Presidents Ruiz Cortines and Adolfo Lopez Mateos 
wanted to be seen as progressive politicians who were willing to tolerate some degree of 
political opposition. Nevertheless, this room for manoeuvre became significantly 
reduced, especially towards the more moderate left, after Castro’s clear alignment with 
the Soviet Union and the embracement of a Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1962. As a
26 That was the case o f peasant organizations that invaded the Hacienda of Cananea belonging to the 
Cananea Cattle Company and accounted for 500,000 hectares of land. A similar event took place in 
Culiacan and Guasave in Sinaloa and Manzanillo in Colima, just to mention some of the incidents. In all 
cases, the military intervened by violently expelling the invaders.
27 Methods o f addressing the institutionalised opposition were not radically different from their 
counterparts in the agrarian leagues or the trade unions. For instance, on January 30, the State leader of 
the PAN, Mr. Martin del Campo, demanded a full investigation of the death of Manuel Hernandez 
Padilla, vice-president of the PAN in the town of Union de San Antonio, Jalisco. Apparently, Mr. 
Hernandez was shot dead by a municipal police officer for threatening the peace. The source of this 
information was the American Consul in Guadalajara who commented that this sort o f incident 
represented a common occurrence and hardly attracted the interest of the press. However, the difference 
this time was that Mr. del Campo was accusing a local PRI congressman, Aurelio Perez Munoz, of being 
the mastermind behind the assassination. According to the report, local PRI officials were concerned by 
the popularity the PAN had acquired in the region, so police bodies and army officers joined in the task of 
intimidating opposition party leaders. This occasionally ended up in fatalities.
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result, the ruling elite grew increasingly anxious, in part fuelled by increasing pressures 
from the United States, and turned more repressive and distrustful. This sense of 
national urgency was accurately reflected in intelligence appraisals released by the 
Secretary of National Defence. They underlined the existence of conflicting signs in 
international and domestic politics that were a matter of deep concern for the country on 
the eve of the 1960s (Pineyro 1986:84). The Secretary of Defence reported a number of 
politically motivated conflicts in Guerrero, San Luis, Oaxaca, Chihuahua, Michoacan, 
Veracruz, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Queretaro and Yucatan. 
Furthermore, frequent upsurges of violence in universities were also placed on the 
agenda of internal security.
Not surprisingly, the DFS returned to the first row of politics. In September 1961, the 
military and the Federal Directorate of Security acted against retired General Celestino 
Gasca and 200 members of his private army. Apparently, the old revolutionary general 
was planning to join forces with other agrarian leaders in the country to launch a multi- 
regional guerrilla uprising . If Gasca’s participation in the revolt was frustrated by the 
regime, other cells of his organisation did carry out guerrilla operations in Puebla, 
Veracruz, Yucatan and Chiapas. In all cases, the armed forces managed to contain and 
destroy the rebel organisation . One year later, in 1962, the government started to 
change its approach by adopting a more pragmatic view to contain the spread of 
guerrilla actions. The strategy consisted of the elimination of its leadership, often 
through assassination, while maintaining high levels of harassment of their regional 
bases of support. This was the fate that confronted Ruben Jaramillo and his family when 
they were murdered by the elite body of Presidential Guards in spite of the fact that they 
had been given amnesty in 1960. According to the files of the DFS, the death squad had 
responded to direct orders of the president30 in a military operation known as the 
“Operation Xochicalco”(Montemayor 2002; Castellanos 2007:83).
Jaramillo’s assassination was a clear sign that the regime had decided to tighten the 
control of the countryside through a more extensive use of the armed forces. Purchases 
of light armament, machine guns and transportation vehicles from the United States 
were resumed by 1961. The newly acquired equipment was enough to provide at least
28 “Alborotadores detenidos ayer". El Universal. Sep 11, 1961
29 “Incidentes en cuatro puntos del pais”. El Universal. Sep 17,1961.
30 DFS 36-62-62,L-1,H-1
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50 per cent of the troops with new automatic and assault weapons. Further investments 
where made in armoured all-terrain vehicles —  2,113 were bought from the United 
States, as well as 2,000 trucks that were converted into troop transportation.
In addition to these measures, the corporate interest of the military was not neglected. 
President Lopez Mateos fostered the enactment of the Law of Social Welfare of the 
Armed Forces. All levels of the military structure received a 10 per cent salary increase. 
At the same time, housing compounds were built and specialised hospital facilities were 
added to the Army’s health system. The regime also started to encourage graduates of 
the military college to attend military training and education in Europe and the United 
States. For instance, between 1950 and 1963, 18 Mexican soldiers on average received 
foreign military training every year. This number jumped to 76 between 1964 and 1968. 
According to the U.S. Army Attache, many of the Military Zone Chiefs had attended 
U.S. Military schools and more than half had been in that country on official orientation 
visits31.
By mid-1963, the official instrument of communication of the army, “La Revista del 
Ejercito,” explained that the armed forces needed to improve their internal strategy and 
capabilities to address pressing issues on internal security. On this topic, General Angel 
Lopez Padilla, Chief of the Plans Section of the Ministry of Defence, informed the U.S. 
Military Attache in Mexico City that the main reason behind military modernisation 
was the anticipation of social, and perhaps insurgent, upheaval in the country. General 
Padilla stated that the Army was not going to be able to contain it, unless it were 
modernised along the lines proposed by the Secretary of Defence32. Not surprisingly, 
particular emphasis was placed on internal disturbances, internal control to avoid 
rebellion within military units, and greater supervision over independent unions and 
agrarian leagues.
To address those issues, the Secretary of Defence proposed the reorganisation of the 
Rural Defence Body to increase the capacity of the military to gather intelligence in the 
countryside. It also contemplated the improvement of weaponry for all units and the 
modernization of communication equipment to enable easier and faster contact between
31 AIRGRAM Secret- From the American Embassy in Mexico City to The State August 19, 1968. 
General Records of the Department of State, A-576 NARA
32 AIRGRAM Secret- From the American Embassy in Mexico City to The State Department. June 14, 
1963. General Records of the Department of State, A -1645 NARA
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troops and commanders. The strategy also included a more active rotation of personnel 
so that more officers could gain troop-command experience in conflictive military 
zones . It also pushed for the preparation of manuals to train soldiers to deal with 
insurgency and intensify the training and graduate education of officers in the United 
States under the Military Assistance Programme34. (SEDENA 1958-1974:45).
With respect to public security, the military maintained its influence over the 
appointment of police chiefs in different states of the country. The link between state 
governors and the armed forces was General Jose Gomez Huerta, Chief of Staff of 
President Lopez Mateos. Gomez Huerta was in charge of appointing army officials to 
state government positions. For instance, in the State of Nuevo Leon, the positions of 
Chief of the State police and Chief of the Judicial Police were held by Colonel Miguel 
Bravo Carpinteyro and Colonel Alfonso Echanove del Castillo respectively. According 
to a confidential Airgram sent by the American Consul in Monterrey to the US State 
Department, Governor Eduardo Livas Villarreal was considering the replacement of 
both officers to put his own men in charge, but he feared that such a decision would 
fracture the relationship with the centre35
The army’s leadership of the main police bodies ensured that all security areas in the 
region, civilian and military, were controlled and addressed by army officers taking 
orders form Mexico City, presumably from the presidential office. According to internal 
sources consulted by the Legal Attache at the American Consulate, Colonels Bravo and 
Echanove were in charge of gathering information on the political and security situation 
of the region and forwarded it to the Chief of Staff at the Presidential Office. 
Concurrently, the Zone Army Chief, General Trinidad Rodriguez, forwarded his side of 
the story to the Secretary of Defence. Given the security agenda in the early 1960s, it 
seems the issues of concern were subversive movements with communist inclinations, 
trade unions and student groups .
33 AIRGRAM Secret- From the American Embassy in Mexico City to The State August 19, 1968. 
General Records o f the Department of State, A-576 NARA
34 AIRGRAM Secret- From the American Embassy in Mexico City to The State August 19, 1968. 
General Records o f the Department of State, A-576 NARA
35 AIRGRAM Confidential- From the American Consul in Monterrey to The State Department. April 15, 
1963. General Records of the Department of State, A-131 NARA
36 More than 40 years later, the appointment of State Police Chiefs has not changed its core procedures. In 
an interview with Governor Fidel Herrera of Veracruz on the way he selected his Secretary of Public 
Security, he responded that he consulted this decision first with Natividad Gonzalez Paras, Governor of
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It seems clear that expanding responsibilities on the field of internal security forced the 
military to develop even more policing and intelligence capacities — both the proper 
task of civilian police agencies—  to comply with the policy preferences of the executive 
power. Under this logic, the Secretary of Defence inaugurated the school of Infantry, 
Artillery and “Zapadores” and the College of Motorised Cavalry that were mainly 
specialised in counter-guerrilla operations. The US Embassy in Mexico indicated that 
there was a growing interest of the Mexican Army to send individual officers to schools 
in the U.S. or those located in Panama to learn the skills and techniques of special 
forces engaged in anti-guerrilla warfare37. The Airgram indicated that the US Embassy 
Service Attaches were openly promoting Mexican interest in Special Forces activities. 
As a result, counterinsurgency courses were instituted and emphasised at the Mexican 
War College, while the Ministry of Defence provided such instruction directly to troop 
units38
The new approach to military professionalism and modernization prepared the armed 
forces to confront rural guerrilla movements. It also improved their capacity to assist the 
DFS and local police bodies in combating urban guerrillas as well as tumultuous student 
demonstrations during the late 1960s. The way the armed forces intervened in both 
situations shows its enormous capacity to adjust to the roles and responsibilities ordered 
by the executive power. It also portrayed a differentiated structure of costs accepted by 
the military as a result of the nature of their missions. It seemed clear that the 
containment of the rural guerrilla had limited political costs as military actions were 
circumscribed to relatively small regions. Even when their operations were highly 
questionable from a Human Rights perspective, information filtered to the written press 
was scarce and centrally controlled. In fact, this part of Mexico’s history remained 
basically unknown until President Vicente Fox ordered the opening of intelligence and 
military archives of this period in 2001. In contrast, military actions against the student 
movement, specially the episode of Tlaltelolco, resulted in much more damage to the
Nuevo Leon. In turn, Governor Paras advised him to follow his experience on the matter and leave the 
decision to the Secretary of Defence. Nowadays, both states have a retired or on-leave Army General as 
Chief of the system of public security. It is clear that the agenda of security and even the nature of the 
political system have changed a lot since 1963. However, the way the military interacts with local and 
state political power remains almost unchanged.
37 Telegram Confidential. From Mexico City to Secretary of State. No 34, July 24, 1963. NARA
38 AIRGRAM Confidential, From the American Consul in Monterrey to The State Department. December 
18, 1963. General Records of the Department of State, A-709 NARA
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image, and therefore corporate interest, of the armed forces. I shall return to this issue in 
the final part of the chapter.
5.5 The rural guerrilla movement, 1965-1970
After the practical annihilation of Jaramillo’s organisation, a new peasant movement 
appeared in the small town of Madera, Chihuahua, in 1965. It had a regional base of 
social support and the informal backup of the General Union of Peasants and Workers 
of Mexico (UGOCM). Their demands were no different from those that had inspired the 
Jaramillista, meaning the unfulfilled promises of the regime to carry out the agrarian 
reform (Valero Flores 2005), but the composition of its leadership was more 
heterogeneous, in the sense that it incorporated university students, rural teachers and 
individuals of different professions, such as physicians and engineers. Like Jaramillo, 
the leadership of this movement also met with President Adolfo Lopez Mateos in 1963 
to present their demands, which basically concerned the standstill of the agrarian reform 
in Chihuahua and the abuses committed by Governor Praxedes Giner Duran, — who 
was also a retired general of the army—  to landless peasants in the region. Not 
particularly different to Jaramillo’s experience, Arturo Gamiz, the leader of the group, 
was incarcerated, and his movement fiercely persecuted by the regime and the state 
government.
No doubt, high levels of state repression fuelled the radicalization of this group. By 
1965, its name changed to Grupo Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary 
Group GPR). Their manifesto proposed a radical reorganisation and conceptualization 
of Mexico’s left through the a National or Mexican version of Marxism (Gamiz -Garcia 
1965). By looking at Gamiz’s documents, it is clear he portrayed the GPR as the peasant 
response to a political and economic reality they found terribly unequal and unable to 
provide them with fair opportunities for development. The GPR also despised the 
“institutionalised left” represented by the Mexican Communist Party and the Socialist 
Party. It accused them of becoming accustomed to survive under the complacent eye of 
the hegemonic party, knowing that they had no chance of modifying the socioeconomic 
conditions of the country. In many ways, the GPR inaugurated a new generation of 
social movements that were not willing to negotiate with the regime, but as Gamiz 
Garcia expressed clearly in the movement’s manifesto: “our mission is to talk to the 
powerful in the only language they understand; that is why our fearless people hold the
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rifle because such is the only language they (the regime) respect...’’(Gamiz -Garcia 
1965). The group also made it clear that it would only abandon the armed struggle once 
the regime agreed to allocate land and fulfil the promises of social justice proclaimed by 
the ideals of Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa.
The provocative rhetoric of Gamiz coincided with the arrival of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, 
former Secretary of the Interior, to the presidency. His short temper and reputation as 
head the Interior Ministry was not an omen of peace. From the start, the new president 
appeared to be unwilling to reopen the channels of communication to discontented 
peasants. Despite the efforts that former president Lazaro Cardenas made to persuade 
Diaz Ordaz to attend to the demands of these groups through a more open and lenient 
approach, the regime moved in the opposite direction. The policy of military 
modernization continued during his administration in a way that prepared them to 
confront the challenges posed by the guerrillas. In many ways, the regime’s approach to 
the GPR set the norm for future interventions. It started by denying them the label of 
and status of guerrillas, or of anything that could be interpreted as true representative of 
a social cause. In fact, the analyses developed by the DFS would not address the social 
or political demands of the GPR, but instead, were centred on deciphering their 
strategies, zones of influence and the identity of its personnel39
The first action of the GPR consisted of burning down a small timber bridge on the 
property of the Ibarra Family, who owned most of the lands of the municipality of 
Madera, in February 1964. As has been the case with other guerrillas, their first 
intervention took the regime by surprise, but the DFS and the Army learnt fast. 
According to confidential documents released by the Army and the DFS, the 
government knew beforehand that Gamiz and his group were going to attack the nearby 
military post of Madera. Apparently, the army had infiltrated the structure of the GPR 
down to the level that even its main instructor on warfare, former army captain Lorenzo 
Cardenas Barajas, was an agent working for the regime (Lugo Hernandez 2003:71; 
Contreras Orozco 2007:146). Based on such information, the army waited for the day 
they knew the GPR planned to attack its garrison. The battle ground was set up, they 
even cut down the nearby trees and planned to perfection the best way to end the
39 Their leaders, Arturo Gamiz-Garcia, Salomon Garcia, Antonio Escobel, Margarito Gonzalez and others 
were considered as delinquents who had fled from the police because they had killed or stolen cattle. DFS 
100-5-3-65, H403,L2
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guerrilla group right at the first encounter (FEMOSPP 2006 V:52). On September 23, 
1965, the military’s calculations worked as expected. Arturo Gamiz and thirty other 
members of the GRP were killed in a matter of hours40. The survivors were 
incarcerated in military jails, tortured and then released. The overwhelming force the 
army put in place to confront a small pocket of resistance did not go unnoticed by local 
and national newspapers that reported the crudeness of the confrontation41. The 
regime’s response in this particular case sent a clear message to other guerrilla groups in 
the country concerning the kind of treatment they would receive from the armed forces.
However, the fact that at least 23 guerrilla movements declared themselves after the 
Madera Bloodshed (Table 5.3) in the following five years suggests that the regime’s 
strategy to deter the upsurge of armed peasant movements did not work as expected. In 
fact, the excessive use of force exerted against the GRP provided a powerful tool for 
other organisations to recruit combatants. The first repercussion was a guerrilla group 
that took its name from the massacre of Madera: the 23rd of September Movement. This 
guerrilla group was headed by Oscar Gonzalez Eguiarte, co-founder of the GRP. 
Concurrently, other small guerrilla cells continued operating in the state on behalf of the 
Gamiz group. For instance, on July 20, 1967, the press reported that an army unit was 
searching for 12 men belonging to Gamiz’s group, who had dynamited a sawmill in 
Tomochi, 200 Km NW of Chihuahua City. The newspapers stated that guerrilla 
members were spreading the rumour that Arturo Gamiz was not dead and was still 
gathering people in the highlands to assemble a full sized rebellion against the regime42.
40 Exp 100-5-3-65, H239,L2
41 DFS 21-26-66, H60,L,L1; DFS 100-5-3-65,H-1,L3; Exp 100-5-3-65, H 7,L3
42 Telegram. Confidential- Mexico 6154. American Embassy to State Department. Jul 68. General 
Records of the Department of State, NARA
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Table 5.3
Armed movements in Mexico 1963-1970
Organisation Regional
Influence
Start End Particip­
ants (a)
Particip­
ants (b)
Outcome
1. Grupo Popular Gucrrillcro (GPR) CHIH 1963 1965 12 14 Annihilation
2. M ovimiento 23 dc mayo MOR, MICH, 
CHIS, DF
1963 1967 Dissolution
3. M ovimiento Rcvolucionario del Pueblo ZAC, DF 1965 1966 2 Annihilation
4. M ovim iento 23 de Septiembre CHIH 1966 1973 6 Joined the 
LC23Sept.
5. M ovim iento de A ccion Revolucionaria 11 States 1966 1972 89 100 Imprisonment
(M AR)
6. Partido de los Pobrcs GRO 1967 1974 347 350 Annihilation
7. A sociacion CIvica Nacional Revolucionaria GRO, DF 1968 1972 70 70 Annihilation
8. Union del Pueblo OAX, DF, JAL 1968 Joined
PROCUP
9. Ejcrcito Insurgcnte M exicano CHIS, DF 1968 1971 EZLN
10. Comando Urbano Lacandones Patria DF 1968 1973 95 107 Joined
Nueva LC23Sept.
11. Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario JAL 1969 1973 154 154 F/LCZ3Sept.
12. Fuerzas Rcvolucionarias Armadas del JAL, N A Y 1969 1977 31 31 Annihilation
Pueblo
13. Fuerzas dc Liberacion Nacional NL, CHIS, VER, 
TAB, PUE, 
EDOMEX
1969 1981 129 130 EZLN
14. Comite dc Lucha Revolucionaria DF 1968 1969 17
15. Frente Urbano Zapatista DF 1969 1972 17 17 Annihilation
16. Grupo Comunista de Chihuahua CHIH 1970 1972 94 Imprisonment
17. Liga Leninista Espartaco DF, TAM PS, NL 1970 1973 15 Annihilation
18. M ovimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria DF 1970 Annihilation
19. Frente Campcsino del Norte DF 1970
20. Liga de Comunistas Armados COAH, NL 1970
21. Fuerzas Armadas dc la Nueva Revolucion SON 1970 1973 9 28 Joined
LC23Scpt.
22. Fuerzas Armadas Rcvolucionarias AGS 1970 Unknown
Socialistas
23. Comando Urbano dc Expropiacioncs DF 1970 17 unknown
(a) According to General Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro, Movimiento Subversivo en Mexico, Enero de 1990, Secretaria de la 
Defensa Nacional. (b) Centro de Investigaciones Historicas de Los Movimientos Armados. Source: (Sierra Guzman 
2003:108); (Aguayo 2001:312). (FEMOSPP 2006). An original version o f this table can be found in Jose Luis Sierra (Sierra 
Guzman 2003)
On August 9, 1968, another guerrilla attack stormed the army zone in Chihuahua. An 
army helicopter was shot down by members o f an unknown guerrilla group near the 
town o f  Tomochi. Once more, the army denied any connection with a guerrilla 
encounter and blamed the accident on a technical fault. However, Jaime Cavero, Chief 
o f the Economic Department o f Chihuahua Government confirmed that the helicopter 
had been shot down43. He also stated that various fire fights had taken place in recent 
months, leaving an indeterminate number o f fatalities o f military men and guerrilla 
combatants. It was clear that the military was trying to conceal the existence of one or 
more guerrilla groups in Chihuahua. In fact, the deployment o f soldiers in La Sierra was 
in small numbers with the intention o f not alerting small villages that were presumably 
assisting the guerrillas with food and supplies. Furthermore, given the size o f the state 
— similar to the area o f France—  and the relatively small number o f guerrilla hardcore
43 AIRGRAM From the American Consulate in Ciudad Juarez to the State Department. August 13, 1968. 
General Records o f  the Department o f  State, A -l 1 NARA
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combatants, estimated between 15 and 20, a massive deployment of soldiers was not 
even feasible. So the approach adopted by the army had to be somehow flexible as the 
Consulate Principal Officer, A. F. Thoms, described: “General Trinidad Rodriguez, 
Chief of the Fifth Military Zone, had delivered a short list with names of men who were 
to be shot and killed when found, with no questions asked44”
Still, the army’s strategy to combat the guerrillas in Chihuahua remained uncertain. For 
instance, General Trinidad Rodriguez visited the Sierra several times with the idea of 
meeting personally with the guerrilla leaders in an attempt to find a negotiated end to 
the conflict, but none of his efforts succeeded. Frustrated by his failure to contact his 
enemies, Rodriguez claimed he would welcome an increase in the size of the guerrilla 
corps, so his men could wipe out a larger force, i.e. 200 men, in a set battle. With a 
touch of irony, the American Consul in Ciudad Juarez indicated that it seemed the good 
General was not too familiar with guerrilla hit and run tactics45. In any case, the search 
continued in Chihuahua until the leaders of the guerrillas were killed by the end of 
1968. The Fifth Military Zone informed to the local press that a group of armed men 
had been killed in combat with the army. It also explained that one of the bodies was 
identified as Oscar Gonzalez Eguiarte, the alleged leader of the Guerrilla movement, 
who had participated along with Arturo Gamiz in the assault to Madera on September 
2 3 ,196546.
Down in the state of Guerrero, the guerrilla movement increased its intensity. The Party 
of the Poor declared itself in 1967. It was headed by Lucio Cabanas, a rural school 
teacher and former member of the Communist Party who had already confronted state 
and federal authorities for abuses against peasant communities47. This group had 
extensive social support in the highlands of Guerrero and was probably influenced by 
the success of the Cuban Revolution (Campos Gomez, Cabanas et al. 1987). Two years 
later, another group emerged in Guerrero under the leadership of Genaro Vazquez, 
another primary school teacher. It was known as the National Revolutionary Civic 
Association (ACNR). Both organisations represented the radicalization of peasant 
demands for land reform.
44 Ibidem
45 AIRGRAM From the American Consulate in Ciudad Juarez to the State Department. August 30, 1968. 
General Records o f the Department of State, A-12 NARA
46 AIRGRAM From the American Consulate in Ciudad Juarez to the State Department. October 7, 1968. 
General Records of the Department of State, A-25 NARA.
47 DFS 100-10-3 L25
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5.6 Student disturbances
If the handling of the rural guerrilla was mainly in the hands of the armed forces, the 
repression against student movements was a function assigned to the DFS and local 
police bodies. Early in the 1960s the US Embassy in Mexico reported the existence of a 
number of university student organisations with an ambiguous communist agenda. The 
over-riding issue of Cuba provided a pretext for turning almost any student protest into 
an anti-American demonstration. However, the anti-American feeling faded away after 
1963, to focus on local issues that were easily distinguished by the internal and external 
drive of the demonstrations. On the one hand, the internal matters included the 
imposition of university officials, complaints about the precarious conditions of 
university facilities and low faculty wages, competition among student groups for 
power, rivalry among universities or colleges, alleged violations to university autonomy 
by local or federal government agencies. On the other hand, the external drive of 
demonstrations was often centred on hostility against state authorities. It included 
broader political issues such as the character of economic policies, objections 
concerning investment in education and, ultimately, a severe criticism and rejection of 
the authoritarian nature of the political system. As the student agenda expanded, their 
demonstrations were often joined by local trade unions, peasant leagues and 
occasionally, the communist and the socialist party. Not surprisingly, every time student 
demonstrations were endorsed by other social groups, the likelihood of military 
intervention to restore public order increased48
For instance, prior to the bloody incident of Tlatelolco in October 2, 1968, the army had 
intervened in small scale repressions of the student movement on a number of 
occasions. According to the report of the American Embassy on student movements, 
there were 43 student revolts since 1942. The army intervened to impose order on eight 
occasions. In all cases, repression took place when the students widened their agenda of 
pleas to include broader national issues, or harshly criticised the non-democratic nature 
of the political system. Another aspect of military intervention on student disturbances 
was that they became costly for local authorities. On four occasions, the use of the 
armed forces to contain student revolts was followed by serious adjustments in regional 
politics (FEMOSPP 2006 1:4). These included the dismissal of state governors. Such
48 AIRGRAM Secret- From the American Embassy in Mexico City to The State August 19, 1968. 
General Records of the Department of State, A-576 NARA
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was the case of Governor Caballero Aburto, who was also a retired General from the 
Army, in Guerrero in 1960. A similar situation occurred in Puebla in 1968.
However, the army’s intervention during the student disturbances of 1968 in Mexico 
City was a different story. The analysis of causes that triggered the student movement is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Still, it seems that the student demonstrations during 
the summer of 1968 captured the social imagination of the young urban middle class 
that felt increasingly detached from the revolutionary heritage as well as ideologically 
unable to fit into the scheme of hegemonic domination by the ruling party. It was 
perhaps their harsh criticism of the political status quo that triggered the regime’s 
violent response in 1968 and again in 1971. Furthermore, the imminence of the 
inauguration of the Olympic Games, scheduled to open in Mexico on October 12, 
placed additional pressure on the government to find a quick end to the student 
movement. Not entirely surprising and according to President Diaz Ordaz’s past 
performance on repression, the regime opted for a violent solution and the army played 
a definite role in the strategy.
Intelligence reports provided by the DFS indicated that students were well armed, and 
were likely driven by foreign interests, almost certainly of communist origin, with the 
sole objective of creating chaos and instability in the country. The ultimate goal, as 
General Luis Gutierrez Oropeza,-Chief of the President’s Staff, put it, was to establish a 
communist-like regime in the country (Gutierrez -Oropeza 1986). According to Sergio 
Aguayo, who has extensively researched the 1968 Student Movement, there was not a 
single document in the archives of the DFS that clearly assessed the context, political 
demands, or real mobilization capacity of the students prior to the events in Tlatelolco 
(Aguayo 2001:134). Once more, there was the impression that the DFS had consciously 
exaggerated the capabilities of the student movement and presented it as a real risk to 
political stability. According to R. Camp (2005), General Marcelino Garcia Barragan’s 
memoirs indicate that the request of the Interior Ministry to intervene was based on 
false and exaggerated information that suggested the Preventive Police of Mexico City 
was unable to control the demonstration and, therefore, unable to maintain order in the 
Capital. (Camp 2005:28). R. Camp also noted that Garcia Barragan’s subtle criticism of 
civilian performance on intelligence gathering and analysis provides a strong antecedent 
of the kind of arguments the armed forces have frequently used to justify their 
intervention in crime fighting and anti-drug missions. In any case, it seems that based
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on such defective intelligence, President Diaz Ordaz was indeed convinced the students 
had an arsenal and were ready to take over the regime by force49 (Krauze 1997:232).
On October 2, 1968, such fears resulted in direct orders passed to the Secretary of 
Defence, General Marcelino Garcia Barragan, to take direct measures against the 
student movement. The infamous Olympia Battalion ended the student movement in 
less than 18 hours. The encounter left an estimated 350 students and military men dead, 
and around 1,100 imprisoned students50 in different jails around Mexico City, including 
Military Camps, and hundreds wounded (Zermeno 1978:13).
President Diaz Ordaz assumed full responsibility for the events and the loyal political 
allies of the regime applauded the president’s decision. For instance, Fidel Velazquez 
affirmed that any measure adopted by the federal government was justified and would 
be approved by the people. His declaration was as follows: “I think the time to adopt 
such a decision [meaning the repression of students] has arrived.. .It is my belief that the 
Mexican People will fully endorse such a decision”51. A similar situation occurred with 
the speaker of the Lower Chamber of congress, Mr. Luis M. Farias, who justified the 
occupation of the National University by tanks and troops. The leader of the Senate 
stressed that the military was acting to protect the rule of law.52
Despite the attempts of the ruling elite to relieve the military of the full responsibility 
for the many fatalities of Tlatelolco, it was impossible to exculpate the armed forces and 
save them from social opprobrium. Not surprisingly, the armed forces demanded 
compensation from the president that acquired qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics. It all started with the creation of a new military zone command and three 
new battalions as well as a new company of combat engineers in the body of 
presidential guards. Half of the troops received new weapons and the air force 
purchased 37 new planes from the United States. (Camp 2005:33). Concurrently, the 
military became increasingly reluctant to disrupt large civilian demonstrations, 
especially in urban areas. This attitude did not end their mission of looking out for
49 This vision is also partially shared by former president Luis Echeverria, who served as Interior Minister 
of Diaz Ordaz. Echeverria argues that if President Diaz Ordaz had not taken direct measures to repress 
the demonstration in October 2, 1968, the students could have invaded Palacio Nacional and killed the 
president (Cardenas Estandia 2008:81)
50 DFS 11-4/L.44/F.250-254
51 Dominguez, Horacio. “Cualquier medida que se tome para reprimir la actual situacion, esta 
justificada”. CTM. El Universal pl-12 29-08-68
52 El Sol de Mexico. Oct 5, Page 249
171
political enemies of the regime, but it served the Generalship to impose limits and 
conditions to this sort of assignment (Wager 1994:20). The armed forces reinforced 
their capacities to carry out intelligence. In general, their relationship with Diaz Ordaz’s 
successor turned occasionally worrying and confrontational. It also promoted the 
creation of Special Forces and paramilitary units to take on the dirty work of repression. 
The most infamous group of this kind was known as Los Halcones — The hawks—  
which managed to end the last attempts of re-launching the student movement in the 
early 1970s.
5.7 Conclusion
A large number of military missions was used to control different expressions of 
political dissent during the administrations of Miguel Aleman (1946-1952), Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) and Luis Echeverria (1970-1976). Their previous experience in 
the Interior Ministry or Gobernacion suggests that this set of presidents really knew in 
detail the regime’s policy of dealing with political enemies. Some of them, as it was 
presumably the case of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, developed a strange “fascination with 
security issues,”53 with some apparent paranoid twists (Pineyro 1985; Scherer Garcia 
1986; Aguilar Camin 1989). In contrast, missions delegated to the armed forces on 
internal security during the administration of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) were 
considerably less violent. Ruiz Cortines even made public his distrust regarding the way 
security agencies functioned, specially the Federal Directorate of Security. The sexenio 
of Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-1964) is somehow trapped in the transition from a 
relatively soft approach to internal security embraced by his predecessor, to the 
implementation of a more violent and preventive strategy to counteract student 
demonstrations and guerrilla movements in the second half of the 1960s. In turn, Jose 
Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) simply over-delegated the mission of internal security to 
military and civilian agencies that eventually led to the biggest state-sponsored 
bloodshed of the 20th Century in Mexico, which is also known as the dirty war. In all 
cases, the Executive power took care of protecting the corporate interest of the armed 
forces by concealing their internal security missions as much as possible. When things 
went out of control, as in 1968, the military were handsomely compensated, either by 
protecting their moral capital at all cost or through approving bigger yearly budgets.
53 Central Intelligence Agency (CLA)”SINE 81-67: Security Conditions in Mexico”, October 12, 1967. 
National Security File (NSF), Country File Mexico LB Johnson Library (Austin) Box 62
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Two main conclusions come to light on this chapter. It seems that this process of change 
in civil-military relations did not lead automatically to the penetration and subordination 
of civilian police agencies to military authorities as it visibly occurred after 1989. Quite 
the opposite, the creation of the Federal Directorate of Security in 1946 provided an 
effective instrument the executive power utilized to decentralise some of its control over 
the armed forces. Therefore, the DFS managed to contain the advancement of the armed 
forces in other areas of the system of public security. However, its dissolution during 
the administration of Miguel de la Madrid in 1985 ended up reinforcing even more the 
military’s autonomy and independence from other civilian agencies. In other words, the 
closer the military gets to the president, the larger the room of manoeuvre for officer 
corps to carry out its internal security missions. It seems clear that after the 
disappearance of the DFS, the executive power in Mexico has failed to impose a 
subsidiary civilian channel of interlocution and intermediation with the armed forces.
This lack of interaction between civilians and military officials remains in place and it is 
delaying the process of democratic consolidation in Mexico. In other words, the 
termination of the DFS in 1985 ended up reinforcing another deeply embedded 
authoritarian characteristic of the political system: the exclusive subordination of the 
armed forces to the executive power. In the following chapter, I will explain how the 
armed forces managed to comply with the difficult task of protecting the regime from 
its alleged enemies while safeguarding its moral capital and corporate interest.
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Chapter 6. Armed Forces and Guerrilla Activity: the Primacy of Partisan 
Politics in the Definition of Mexico’s Policy of National Security 1970- 
1982
Introduction
As explained in the last chapter, the students and the political regime collided violently 
on the night of October 2nd, 1968. The characteristics of the aggressive government 
response to suppress social discontent were an alarming sign of exhaustion of the post­
revolutionary political agreement and marked the onset of a gloomy political mood not 
seen in Mexico since the downfall of Porfirio Diaz’s presidency in 1911. It seemed 
obvious that the regime had run out of ideas and resources to peacefully control urban 
demonstrations of a considerable size. Not surprisingly, the state-promoted bloodbath 
that followed deeply shaped the tone of international public opinion1. It exposed the 
inability of the presidency and the political system to deal peacefully with popular 
demands (Shapira 1977:558).
On top of that, the proximity of presidential elections and the designation of the 
regime’s presidential candidate made things more difficult for President Diaz Ordaz in 
his final year in office. As the political apparatus was under severe pressure, the 
economy was also under strain. Growing unemployment and weak agricultural 
production were particularly acute in rural areas surrounding Mexico City and nearby 
states, such as Oaxaca and Guerrero. Both would soon turn into the main locations of 
rural guerrilla activity. In the urban arena, continuing inflationary pressure battered 
wages in the industrial sector. Scarce access to public services in a society that was
1 The scale of repression against the students gave the international media a chance to enrich their reports 
on the inauguration of the Olympic Games Mexico City was hosting that year, with acute political 
conflict surrounding the presidency of Mexico. For instance, the New York Times reported a few days 
before October the 2nd how thousands of students marched in the streets of Mexico City chanting: “We 
want Revolution, not Olympic Games.” Ginigers, Henry “Mexico keeps up a calm exterior; Regime 
Seeks to Avert Open Clashes With Students. The New York Times. August 15, 1968
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rapidly becoming more urban was an unfavourable signal for political stability in the 
long term (Middlebrook 1981:58).
Despite the scale of repression and the resulting political setback this meant to the 
president and his legitimacy, the regime did not run out of internal allies. The corporate 
branches of the ruling party, still representative of the primary political faction in 
Mexico, proved resilient and managed to unite behind the executive power. The CTM, 
CNC, the organised federal bureaucracy, the Federal Congress as well as every state 
governor supported and even applauded Diaz Ordaz’ “hard hand” in addressing the 
student riots. However, restraint measures carried out by major political 
“representatives” did not prove very useful in containing the emergence and 
radicalization of a multitude of groups and organisations that, even before 1968, were 
no longer contemplating state institutions as legitimate means for political participation. 
Radicalised armed rural and urban organisations, some of them inspired by communist 
ideas, were undoubtedly fostered by the events of 1968.
I will argue in this chapter that the incapacity, and often, the unwillingness of the 
regime to reach these belligerent groups by peaceful means, led to a partial transfer of 
responsibility for internal political affairs to the armed forces and other civilian based 
intelligence and police agencies. This policy embraced an underground and cautious 
scheme where the military and the federal directorate of security (DFS) gained entire 
freedom of manoeuvre to halt any group that challenged or disputed the regime’s 
legitimacy. On the public side of the strategy, the regime tried to work out some kind of 
agreement to temper the relationship with the students. A discourse of reconciliation 
and democratisation was put forward on every occasion president Diaz Ordaz and his 
successor talked about the student movement. President Echeverria went as far as 
promoting a “democratic opening” as a key element to achieve reconciliation2. Yet, 
there was no connection between words and actions3. The repression against student 
demonstrations continued, and a silent but ruthless approach to implacably annihilate 
remnants of urban and rural guerrillas was put in motion. Not surprisingly, such a
2 Rincon Gallardo, Gilberto. “La estrategia de la muerte”. Reforma. December 01,2001
3 US Department of State. Bureau of Research and Intelligence. “Mexico: Government Repression of 
Students Causes Crisis. June 18, 1971. NARA
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policy of internal security reinforced budget allocations and personnel growth for both 
civilian security agencies and the armed forces4.
A second issue I will address in this chapter is the evolution of the political role of the 
military during this period and its impact on the overall system of civil-military 
relations. To illustrate this process, I will examine the role of the armed forces during 
three mayor internal security events that took place in the 1970s under the presidency of 
Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillo. First, I will address the creation of a 
paramilitary group known as “Los Halcones” and the massacre of June 10th, 1971, 
known as Corpus Thursday. Second, I will look at the counterinsurgency policy 
employed by the armed forces in Guerrero to crush the armed groups of Genaro 
Vazquez and Lucio Cabanas. And third, I will look at the participation of the armed 
forces in the campaign against urban guerrillas’ especially the role they had in the 
persecution of the Communist League 23 of September.
The analysis of these three events suggests that the army turned more cautious when 
dealing with the so-called “enemies of the state,” especially in urban areas. It seems the 
military evolved in the direction of improving their capacity to comply with the 
commands of the Executive power while protecting their interests and moral capital 
from the kind of episodes that had damaged their public image. This was particularly 
clear in the attitude of the army after the bitter experience of 1968.
6.1 The policy of national security in the 1970s
When Luis Echeverria came to power, Mexico enjoyed a fairly stable economy, 
although it was clear the so-called Mexican Economic Miracle that had maintained high 
rates of sustained economic growth for decades was showing signs of exhaustion. The 
political arena was difficult for the reasons explained above; and his personal 
relationship with the armed forces had gone through hard times since the years as 
Interior Minister and Presidential Candidate. It is well known that the Secretary of 
Defence, General Marcelino Garcia Barragan, had differences of opinion with 
Echeverria while he had acted as Secretary of the Interior, particularly during the peak
4 After 1968, the number of enlisted soldiers grew by 60 per cent. The army created two new battalions of 
parachutists, 15 of infantry and one more of military police, three regiments o f cavalry and one of heavy 
transport. Cf. Reveles, Jose. “A1 Ejercito lo han alejado del pueblo: Ramiro Bautista. “De sosten de la 
Constitucidn apunta ldelsistem d\ Proceso. No. Oil 1-05. December 18, 1978.
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of the student crisis in 1968. It was also known that President Diaz Ordaz disciplined 
Echeverria5, on the request of General Garcia Barragan, for his remarks against the 
armed forces during a campaign rally in the Universidad Nicolaita of Michoacan6.
With those antecedents, during the first year of his administration, Echeverria had to 
cope with a possible revival of the student movement and the increasing guerrilla 
activity in the highlands of Guerrero. The armed forces had gained experience in 
counterinsurgency, but no doubt the Lucio Cabanas and Genaro Vazquez’s guerrillas 
represented a bigger challenge than their predecessors in Chihuahua or Morelos. To 
begin with, they were more numerous, had strong bases of social support and 
confronted the regime in a less naive way than Arturo Gamiz or Jaramillo’s 
organisations. At the same time, radicalized student organisations, disenchanted with 
the authoritarian character of the political system and encouraged by socialist precepts, 
became part or evolved into armed organisations in different parts of the country, and 
eventually attacked police and military posts.
As mentioned in the last chapter, many of these groups were Marxist-Leninist in 
ideology. In fact, some of their members got university education in the Soviet Union. 
There were even a handful of students who had received specialised military training in 
North Korea (Oikion Solano 2006). The general context of the Cold War and the 
Doctrine of National Security cultivated by US foreign policy since the 1950s cannot be 
removed from the general picture of Mexico’s counterinsurgency strategy in the 1970s 
(Pineyro 2007:73). This is also reflected in the language used to describe the nature of 
the discontented groups by intelligence officers of the DFS. Labels such as communists, 
Trotskyites, Marxists often accompanied the descriptions of these groups, which were 
also portrayed in derogatory terms. In fact, the expression “the enemies of the regime” 
was often used to refer to them7. However, internal factors seem to have played a 
greater role. According to intelligence dossiers of the armed forces and the DFS, the 
appeal of guerrillas was embedded in objective conditions of poverty, bitter disputes for
5 To consult Luis Echeverria’s own recollection of this incident see Cardenas Estandia (2008:95)
6 Cano, Arturo. “Crimenes de estado: La verdad sospechosa”. Reforma. April 17, 2004.
7 “The frictions among groups of Tecpan de Galeana and the existence of Communists in Atoyac de 
Alvarez, has been used advantageously by the enemies of the regime to create a situation of unrest prior 
to the visit of the PRI presidential candidate. It has been assured that these groups are preparing a 
“surprise” during the visit of Mr. Luis Echeverria Alvarez to the region.” This confidential memorandum 
is signed by the Director of the DFS, Mr. Fernando Gutierrez Barrios. Dated March 4, 1970 DFS 10-26 
L.17
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ownership of land, and government abandonment in rural areas; whereas in the urban 
centres, they documented the unwillingness of the ruling class to open up the system 
towards more tolerant, democratic and participatory practices, while encouraging harsh, 
violent repression to opposition groups or individuals, specially among disenfranchised 
groups of society. In other words, the regime acknowledged that the causes behind the 
proliferation of guerrilla cells in the country were multivariate and mostly related to the 
incapability of federal and regional ruling elites to address specific economic and 
political demands of poorer and less developed groups of society.
Still, President Luis Echeverria and his successor, Jose Lopez Portillo, chose to address 
a possible revival of the student movement in 1971 and the emergence of rural and 
urban guerrillas from the viewpoint of a policy of national security. In that sense, 
political conditions set off by the cold war were important as they helped both 
presidents justify the repression against those displaying open opposition to the political 
status quo. This was a point implicitly accepted by General Ramon Mota Sanchez, chief 
of staff of the Secretary of Defence during the Presidency of Jose Lopez Portillo and 
President of the Defence Commission of the Senate (2000-2006). Mota Sanchez told 
this author that guerrillas in Mexico, specially the urban kind, were determined to take 
over political power. He added that it was urgently required to put the State in charge of 
stopping the progress of these radical groups and making them pay for their criminal 
behaviour. He also regretted the fact that this period of Mexican history had been named 
as the dirty war. For General Mota Sanchez, this term was incorrect, since Mexico had 
never experienced a military regime, and those who attacked legitimate political 
institutions should not be called freedom fighters, but ordinary criminals. (Mexico City, 
August 23rd 2005)
No doubt, the spread of guerrilla movements in the 1970s produced uncertainty and 
ambiguity towards the legitimacy of the regime, the legacy of the revolution, and the 
stable but undemocratic political order constructed by the ruling party after 40 years in 
office. Members of the PRI were the first to publicly label those involved in guerrilla 
actions as “traitors to the motherland”. They did so by spreading around a set of 
billboards that revealed the image of a woman dressed in national colours (red, white 
and green), apparently being threatened with death by a group of guerrilla men who 
were carrying knives and rifles (Castaneda 1992:57-59). This characterisation was
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symptomatic of how uncomfortable the ruling elite felt with the emergence of 
subversion. It is also interesting to observe how this mood among the civilian ruling 
elite was rapidly absorbed by the high ranks of the armed forces, at least in their public 
discourse. Up to 1974, the secretary of defence, General Cuenca Diaz, kept denying the
o
existence of armed movements in the country . For him, guerrillas were in reality a 
group of bandits terrorizing the population for economic gain. In March, 1972, General 
Cuenca affirmed: “Lucio Cabanas does not have 75 guerrrilleros under his command, as 
some rumours have stated. He is alone, and he is just a common delinquent running 
away from police forces. We don’t know where he actually is, but we are certain that 
some political group is trying to make him a hero. If he really had 75 men supporting 
him, he wouldn’t be free. I repeat, he is just running away"9. His statements to the 
press were rapidly reproduced by a multitude of regional and local newspapers and 
incorporated into the content of articles and editorials that bought the official story at 
face value (Mendoza-Garcia 2006:150).
However, it is at this point when the inconsistencies between the public discourse of the 
president and the secretary of defence and their policy to address the issue of guerrillas 
started to show sharp contrasts. In spite of the fact that the army denied the existence of 
guerrillas in the country, it launched an ambitious program of modernization meant to 
develop counterinsurgency capabilities. From December 1970, the army renewed part 
of its light weaponry through the purchase of 7,150 machineguns from Belgium. The 
Air Force acquired 100 new aeroplanes and 34 helicopters armed with anti insurgency 
capability. It also refurbished 30 aeroplanes. According to the magazine of the Army 
and the Air Force, edited by the Ministry of Defence, this purchase of armament and 
equipment represented the highest investment of its kind since WWII10. Furthermore, 
soldiers’ salaries were raised by 15 percent at all levels of the army hierarchy and 
retirement plans for high rank officers were also promoted. More funding was poured 
in the army, especially into housing. New military hospitals and sports facilities were 
built and the infrastructure of the army was considerably improved11. Special emphasis 
was placed on specialised training through cooperation with the US armed forces: 29
8 AIRGRAM Confidential Mexico 2882. US Embassy in Mexico City. “Defense Secretary Denies 
Existence of Guerillas in Mexico”. May, 1971. NARA
9 Excelsior March 24, 1972
10 Revista del Ejercito y la Fuerza Aerea, Septiembre, 1974. Page 88.
11 Revista del Ejercito y la Fuerza Aerea, Septiembre, 1973. Page 43-44.
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officers were sent to the School of the Americas in 1971, where they received
10counterinsurgency training (Castellanos 2007:125).
Judging by the character of the equipment acquired by the armed forces and despite
President Echeverria’s rhetoric of democratic openness and dialogue or General Cuenca
Diaz’ denial on the existence of guerrillas, there are indications that his regime was
preparing to wage a war against political dissidents, and that the planned response of the
Mexican state to the incipient proliferation of rural and urban guerrilla groups was out
of proportion to their strength or real threat to national security. According to
estimations made by one of the masterminds of the counterinsurgency policy in Mexico
in the 1970s, General Arturo Acosta Chaparro (once in a military prison accused of
engaging in drug trafficking and genocide), at its peak in the 1970s, the membership of
guerrilla groups in Mexico reached nearly 2,000 combatants. The largest group was the
Communist League 23 of September with 392, followed by the Party of The Poor
1 ^(PDLP) with 347 members . If we compare this number with other guerrilla 
organisations in South America, like the Tupamaros in Uruguay (estimations vary from 
4 to 6 thousand members), or Los Montoneros in Argentina (about 8,000 members), it is 
possible to see that the Mexican guerrilla was relatively small. This observation is also 
reinforced by the size of Mexico’s population during this period, nearly 60 million in 
197514, while Argentina was 26 million15 and Uruguay 2.8 million16. We also have to 
recognise that the PDLP and the LC23SEPT rarely worked together and an alliance 
between the two groups, even when they tried, was never achieved17. Furthermore, 
their radius of action as well as social basis of support were different (Ramirez Salas 
2006). In fact, urban guerrillas were never able to construct a solid base of popular 
support. They also had deep ideological differences18 and their short term goals did not 
allow them to merge into a single national organisation. The remaining combatants,
12 Reveles, Jose. “Al Ejercito lo han alejado del pueblo: Ramiro Bautista. De sosten de la Constitucion a 
puntal del sistema ” Proceso. December 18, 1978
13 According to the files extracted from the archives of the Federal Directorate of Security, it seems the 
relationships between Lucio Cabanas’ group and urban guerrilla groups were often conflictive, specially 
with the Communist League 23 of September (LC23S) DFS 11-235-73 H-10 LI; DFS 11-235-74 H-237 
L-7
14 CELADE, Boletin Demografico, Ano 26, N° 51, Santiago de Chile, 1993
15 CELADE, Boletin Demografico, Ano 23, N° 46, Santiago de Chile, 1990
16 CELADE, Boletin Demografico, Ano 23, N° 45, Santiago de Chile, 1990
17 DFS 11-235-73 H-277 L-2
18 DFS- 100-10-15-4 L8
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that is nearly 1,200, were disseminated in 27 organisations that hardly knew each other 
or had worked together.
In any case and despite its weak numbers, the Mexican state directed the full strength of 
the armed forces and the DFS to combat the guerrillas. As his predecessors, President 
Echeverria opted to maintain the stability of the regime by force. This attitude suggests 
that the policy of security was basically defined by the civilian ruling elite on partisan 
grounds rather than through a professional appraisal of the possible danger dissident 
groups represented to the country’s security.
The system assigned certain advantages to local and federal civilian agencies of security 
that justified their existence and budgets in relation to their efficiency in identifying and 
defusing political opposition. However, for the armed forces, the situation was not as 
clear as it was for their civilian counterparts. After 1968, the military remained 
reluctant to repress public demonstrations, especially in urban centres; as such actions 
deeply affected their corporate interest and moral capital. No doubt, this internal 
decision of the armed forces entered in conflict with the President’s internal security 
policy. In the following section, it will be observed how the army solved this problem 
and the way it redefined its political role within the prevailing system of civil-military 
relations.
6.2 Los Halcones and the Corpus Thursday massacre
The primacy of partisan politics over the policy of internal security turned the DFS and 
the armed forces into the building blocks of an authoritarian dike against popular 
demonstrations and subversive movements. The military maintained the task of 
controlling rural guerrillas but it certainly lost some leverage on the urban arena. The 
urban centres were the natural field of civilian agencies of security, and this place was 
occupied by the Federal Directorate of Security. Still, the armed forces engaged in a 
considerable level of intervention through the formation of paramilitary organisations19. 
That was the idea that gave birth to los halcones, a paramilitary group whose mission
19 U.S. State Department. Intelligence Note. “Mexico: an emerging internal security problem?” 23 
September, 1971. NARA
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consisted of confronting by force left wing groups and demonstrations led by leaders 
linked to the 1968 movement20.
91In essence, this group was formed after 1968 by deserters from the armed forces , 
federal police officers and general employees of the government of Mexico City. They 
were all formally enrolled in the Department for the Preservation of Parks, Gardens and 
Green Areas of the city council22. Not surprisingly, the architect of its formation was a 
member of the armed forces, Colonel Manuel Diaz Escobar, known as “El Maestro” 
(The Master), who was also the under-director of this local and apparently harmless 
government agency23. According to released documents of the U.S. State Department, 
Diaz Escobar travelled to the U.S. to arrange its cooperation to instruct police officers 
on counterinsurgency tactics, criminal investigation, security, traffic control, 
communications, weapons and intelligence. Many of those who travelled abroad later 
became the chief instructors of los halcones24. According to Tirado (1997), Rogelio 
Flores Berrones, Javier Castellanos, Moises Cuauhtemoc, Jose Lamberto Ponce Lara 
Francisco Villasenor and Francisco Peres Moreles, all army officers, were among those
25in charge of supplying specialized training to the group (Tirado 1997:104-105) . In 
fact, there was a concern of the State Department that the US government would not 
like to be publicly implicated in the training of death squads the Mexican government
9 f twas using to control dissidents .
In many ways, the creation of Los halcones mimicked the early years of the Federal 
Directorate of Security as it soon turned into a parallel agency in charge of monitoring
• 27and, if needed, repressing those considered as enemies to the regime . Even when the 
leadership of this group was headed by a public servant occupying a junior position in 
the local government of Mexico City, it was well known that his orders came directly
20 DFS 15-1-71 H-274L-11
21 DFS 35-24-72 H-l L-l
22 DFS 21-438-71 H-l L-l; DFS 21-438-71 H-2 L-l
23 DFS 10-1-72 35-24 L-l and DFS 13-1-72 35-24
24 “Diaz Escobar met with DCM this afternoon and once again expressed appreciation for consideration 
shown him and his group during their visit to Washington last week. He said he was most impressed with 
the program arranged for him and with police training facilities available through cooperation with USG. 
Airgram. Police Training, January 1971. NARA
25 Tirado’s information coincides with that found in intelligence dossiers retrieved from the files of the 
extinct Federal Directorate of Security. DFS 11-4-71 H-236 L.143
26 Exdis. Us Training of Mexican Police as related to disturbances. Mexico 40B Mexico 232 Ci Mexico 
227. NARA, June 23,1971.
27 DFS 11-4-71 H-234 L-143
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from the Presidential Office. In fact, when President Luis Echeverria appointed Alfonso 
Martinez Dominguez as mayor of Mexico City, Colonel Diaz Escobar kept his job. This 
was confirmed in recent years when Gonzalez Aleu (Director of General Services 
during the 1970's) explicitly revealed Echeverrias’ instruction to keep Diaz Escobar in 
charge of that department.
According to archives of the General Direction of Political and Social Investigations of 
the Interior Ministry (IPyS), the first mission given to los halcones took place in 1969 
when they were sent to confront and disband a student demonstration headed to the 
Zocalo of Mexico City. The closeness between the student movement and some urban 
guerrillas helped the regime to define their mission. According to General Felix Galvan 
Lopez, who was Secretary of Defence under the presidency of Jose Lopez Portillo, los 
halcones were a paramilitary group, trained by army officers, specially created to 
combat the urban guerrilla, specifically the League 23 of September (Scherer Garcia 
1986:62). However, their span of operations went beyond such a mission. Following 
the archives compiled by the FEMOSPP, los halcones intervened violently on at least 
11 occasions before the famous massacre of June 10th, 1971, also known as the 
Thursday of Corpus. Based on the testimony of Efrain Ponce Sibaja, a former member 
of los halcones, Colonel Diaz Escobar clearly indicated that the student demonstration 
scheduled on June 10th, 1971, should be disbanded at any cost28. The central concern in 
regard to this demonstration was that it represented, in the eyes of the DFS, the most 
important attempt of the student leadership to revive its former strength.
The importance of this demonstration is also evidenced by the communication of the
thSecretary of Defense to Mexico’s Highway Police Director on June 9 , 1971, 
requesting information on a possible arrival of students from different cities of the 
country in order to participate in the demonstration29. The same day, General Cuenca 
Diaz requested the presence of extra medical personnel at the Hospital Militar as they 
were expecting wounded soldiers and police officers as a result of the student 
demonstration scheduled for the following day.
28 DFS 13-1-72 35-24
29 Sedena Box 54. DFS 170/ 57.
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On June the 10th, los halcones set up a strategy to disperse the demonstration. The plan 
consisted on infiltrating numerous troop members into the protest to try to start brawls 
among the students to disrupt the cohesion of the group. Intending to ignite a 5,000 
person march implied a bigger challenge and required a high level of coordination. But 
the paramilitary group did not excel that day. To begin with, the number of halcones 
participating in this event was so high that it became difficult, even for themselves, to 
distinguish each other from the students30. The narratives of this event describe how at 
different points during the demonstration, brutal fights took place between halcones 
themselves. As the level of violence escalated, it forced the intervention of other police 
agencies, such as the secret service and agents from the DFS that were meant to play a 
secondary role. The cost of the commotion reached more that 100 casualties, 25 
fatalities31 and more that 160 arrests. (Doyle 2004:2).
Based on the book of Julio Scherer— Los Patriotas— President Echeverria gave crucial 
orders during the operation, which suggests he was the one making the big decisions 
during the confrontation (Scherer Garcia and Monsivais 2004). For instance, 
Echeverria ordered the transfer of captured students to military facilities for medical 
treatment and further interrogation. He also maintained control over the inflows of 
information to the press. Still, the high number of casualties and fatalities triggered a 
political scandal of national dimensions, forcing President Echeverria to take direct 
action. His first move to address the ensuing political crisis included the dismissal of 
Alfonso Martinez Dominguez, Mayor of Mexico City32. Echeverria also asked the 
Attorney General to carry out a special investigation of groups involved in the 
aggression. At all times, the regime affirmed that the mayhem was the result of brawls 
between students of different colleges and universities that were fighting for the 
leadership of the student movement33.
The Governor of Mexico City stoically accepted his fate and kept in secret the details of 
his dismissal up until 1984, when Heberto Castillo, a journalist and historical leader of 
the Mexican Left, made public a conversation he had with Martinez Dominguez after
30 DFS 11-4 L 132 271
31 US Department of State. Bureau of Research and Intelligence. “Mexico: Government Repression of 
Students Causes Crisis. June 18, 1971. NARA. According to the DFS, there were at least 30 fatalities. 
DFS 11-4-71 H-236L-143
32 TELEGRAM AMCONSUL Chihuahua. Confidential 086. “June 10 and the resignation o f Martinez 
Dominguez”. Ref A) Mexico 3306 B1 Mexico 3371. June, 1971 NARA
33 DFS 44-21 L-l 90
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the violent events of June 10, 197134. According to Martinez Dominguez, Luis
thEcheverria was in fact the mastermind behind the massacre of June 10 , 1971. He 
explained how Echeverria had asked him to resign in order to defuse the political 
scandal and to save the image of the presidency. According to Martinez Dominguez, 
President Echeverria wanted to emphatically prove to left-wing students and groups that 
his government was not willing to play games with dissidents. Even when some 
sections of the armed forces were involved and certainly many of the halcones were 
former or on-leave army officers, the scandal of repression did not have an impact on 
the military as an institution. In fact, the idea of training paramilitary squads to repress 
the discontent in urban areas did work as expected. This time the corporate interest of 
the armed forces was not damaged and the President succeeded in preventing the 
student movement to have any further effect.
The group of los halcones was dissolved after the incidents of June, 1971. Some of its 
members joined the Federal Directorate of Security and the Federal Police, and those 
with a military background were reinstalled in the armed forces. Colonel Diaz Escobar 
remained on the payroll of Mexico City’s local government until he was appointed 
Military Attache in the Embassy in Chile in 1973, right before General Augusto 
Pionochet’s coup to unseat President Salvador Allende. Six years later, President Lopez 
Portillo approved his promotion to Brigade General and his successor, Miguel de la 
Madrid, made Diaz Escobar Division General, the highest rank in the Mexican Army.
6.3 Guerrero’s rural guerrilla
During the 1970s, the armed forces had a clear presence in rural regions as they fought 
against local guerrillas, primarily in the highlands of Guerrero. As mentioned above, 
rural guerrillas were far less ideologically known in comparison to the urban counterpart 
or the student movement. Their demands were more pragmatic and remained deeply 
rooted in the resentment of peasant and indigenous groups due to unresolved land 
disputes, endemic poverty and abandonment by local, state and federal institutions. 
There was also the idea that the corporatist peasant organisation, (The National Peasant 
Confederations) was an illegitimate channel for conveying their demands due to its 
allegiance to the ruling party and the president (Canabal Cristiani 1983:249). That was
34 Castillo, Heberto. “La Matanza fue preparada por Luis Echeverria”. Proceso Febrary 18, 1984. This 
article was retrieved from DFS 21-100 009
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the general position of the groups headed by Genaro Vazquez and Lucio Cabanas. 
Both had become a headache to President Echeverria since the years he had served as 
the interior minister of President Diaz Ordaz.
The guerrilla of Genaro Vasquez was located in the south east part of the state of 
Guerrero and its bases of support were in the towns of Atoyac de Alvarez, San 
Jeronimo, Tecpan, Coyuca de Benitez, Ilatenco and Tierra Colorada. Their political 
structure was known as the National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR). This 
organisation had three armed squads (CAL) named after Mexican heroes of the 
Independence War and the Mexican Revolution, such as Juan Alvarez, Vicente 
Guerrero and Emiliano Zapata. Their mission consisted of defending the movement 
from the armed forces, who represented an imminent threat; acquiring armament and 
economic resources for the guerrilla’s survival as well as to punish (kill, rob or kidnap) 
those considered responsible for oppressing the peasants in the region under their 
control.
On the other hand, Lucio Cabanas created the Party of the Poor (PDLP)35, whose armed 
branch was the Peasant Brigade of Justice, created in 196736. The party of the poor had 
a vast network of clandestine committees with direct links to peasant communities in 
the high lands of Guerrero. Cabanas and his followers took advantage of this 
organisation to teach and inform their social base of support about their values, ideals, 
and political objectives . According to documents of the DFS, the Peasant Committees 
of Fight (PCF) aligned with Lucio Cabanas became very popular as there was at least 
one PCF in every town of Guerrero39. The proliferation of guerrilla committees, even 
in small communities, reinstates the idea that Lucio’s and Genaro's movements enjoyed 
a considerable amount of local support40. They became the main source of food supply, 
information, and human resources to the guerrilla.
35 DFS 180-10-16 4
36 Exp- 11-235-73 H-10 L-l; DFS 13-XI-68 189 L-32
37 Ramirez, Ignacio “Cuando el gobiemo se inclino por la represiony el autoritarismo surgio la lucha 
armada, dice Fierro Loza” Proceso. January 16, 1984
38 DFS 10-16-4 L-5 313; DFS 100-10-10/4 L-8
39 DFS 100-10-16-4-72 6H  189
40 DFS L38 233 30/Enero/71
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The leaders of the two guerrillas had a similar background. Genaro Vazquez and Lucio 
Cabanas were elementary school teachers who had been involved for years in the 
representation of peasant interests in Guerrero at a grass roots level. Both leaders had 
been close to the Communist Party (PCM)41 and benefited from the formal and 
semiformal organisational structures created by this party in the rural areas of 
Guerrero42 (Trevizo 2002:286-287). The case of Vazquez was somehow different 
because the early years of his political life took place within the PRI, a situation that 
was often used by the regime and even the Mexican Left wing to undermine his 
authority as a guerrilla leader. Even when both groups evolved in the state of Guerrero, 
their organisations kept a high degree of independence from each other, at least 
organisationally speaking.
The way the armed forces addressed both movements similarly. It was clear that the 
military knew they had little room to manoeuvre as most of the local population shared 
their resentment of the regime with the guerrilla gunmen. It was natural for these 
communities to identify the armed forces as being the long arm of the executive power 
to impose its will in the country, even at the expense of the legitimate demands of 
peasants. According to Carlos Montemayor (1991; 1997), widespread poverty and 
inequality as well as the abandonment of the federal and local governments of rural 
communities in Guerrero had caused a deep resentment over the years against the 
regime (Montemayor 1991; Montemayor 1997). This feeling was often manifested 
through local support of guerrilla movements. Montemayor concludes that as long as 
these conditions remain, the emergence of new guerrillas will be a common occurrence 
in Mexico’s political life. This idea has points of coincidence with the way the armed 
forces understood the social dimension of the guerrilla.
According to a secret dossier written by Lieutenant Colonel Luis Mario Vargas 
Amezcua, the army identified two main elements harbouring the guerrilla movement in 
Guerrero. First, the Military acknowledged that the civil population was in great 
discontent with the federal government, due to poor living conditions and the 
abandonment by local and federal authorities. Second, the army was aware that the 
groups attacking military posts and kidnapping large land owners and businessmen in 
the region were being supported by the local population. Consequently, it was difficult
41 DFS 10-XI-67 100-10-1 379 L-28
42 DFS 8-XIII-67 100-10-1 L29 233
187
to acquire information on their whereabouts. In the face of this problem, Lieutenant 
Colonel Vargas proposed that the federal government should promote and assist local 
economic development as a way of diminishing the high levels of discontent and above 
all, to undermine the social base of the local guerrillas43. Lieutenant Colonel Amezcua 
went so far as to propose that the Secretary of Defence should “talk to the President 
about the convenience of engaging into a far-reaching program of economic 
development in the region, with the idea of diminishing the discontent of the local 
population and, above all, the assistance of villagers to those that oppose the regime by 
illicit means”44. This was definitely an unusual document, given that most of the 
material generated by the regime during this period was strictly concerned with finding 
the best way to combat these social movements as opposed to understanding their 
causes or demands.
Despite the professional opinion of the armed forces concerning the social and 
economic fundamentals and the possibility of a political solution to the conflict, the 
ruling elite ordered a military solution. Under such circumstances, the first two years of 
the 1970s presented a difficult scenario for the armed forces. First, they had to adapt 
their operation and infrastructure, as well as human resources, to combat the guerrillas 
on their own ground. This process of learning took time and numerous lives of soldiers 
with poor counterinsurgency training45. In fact, the soldiers’ death toll went up sharply 
between 1970 and 197246. According to the FEMOSPP, army squads were easily 
ambushed by the guerrillas in hit and run confrontations. A. Bartra argues that between 
June, 1971 and September, 1974, the guerrilla killed 150 soldiers in combat (Bartra 
1996:140). Former Lieutenant Roberto Ruiz Illescas, an airborne pilot whose mission 
consisted of flying the wounded out of Guerrero to military hospitals, explained to this 
author how the army was stunned by the number of soldiers killed and hurt as a result of 
hit and run confrontations with the guerrillas. He acknowledged that his chief 
commander explained that the Mexican army was not fighting against a handful of 
armed men hidden in the jungle. Instead, the war was against every small and medium
43 Sedena Box 98 Exp 0292. August 24, 1972.
44 Sedena Box 98 Exp 0292. August 24,1972. Page 3
45 In a confidential report signed by Lieutenant Colonel Luis Vargas Amezcua, to the Secretary of 
Defence, the Army recognised that is was necessary to reorganise its structure and deployment of troops 
in Guerrero, given the fighting capabilities of the guerrilla of Lucio Cabanas and Genaro Vasquez and the 
high number of soldiers and officers killed by the guerrillas. Sedena Box 98 Exp 0292. August 21, 1972. 
EMND S-3 OPS
46 DFS 100-10-16/4 L-5 233
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sized community that appeared to be offering food and shelter to the insurgents. 
(Xalapa, Ver. April 4th 2007)
Taking these elements into consideration, it seems the military realized that 
implementing a low intensity conflict strategy aimed at winning the hearts and minds of 
the population as a way to undermine the basis of social guerrilla support was not a 
feasible option given the urgency of the ruling elite to see concrete results of the 
counterinsurgency campaign. An intelligence report made by the US Embassy in 
Mexico City indicates that President Echeverria had privately expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the army’s efforts to track down Genaro Vazquez and his group. 
The report even suggest that General Cuenca Diaz’s days as Secretary of Defence were 
perhaps about to end47. Under these conditions, the military implemented a full 
occupation of the state of Guerrero. In real terms, the military transferred one third of 
its total force, nearly 24,000 soldiers, to the region in conflict. With such a military 
power, it quickly overwhelmed entire communities and towns in search of guerrilla 
gunmen, and terrorised villagers while searching for suspects. The violation of rights 
that took place during this period is still a matter of research, and former president 
Echeverria has been indicted for genocide charges.
In many ways, the instrumentation of operation Telaraha, as it was named by the army, 
affected the two guerrilla groups differently. On the one hand, it pushed Genaro 
Vazquez's guerrilla away from areas where he enjoyed popular support. Vazquez’s 
group moved to Tianguistango, Hidalgo and later to Mexico City, where they carried 
out some kidnappings and robberies to secure funds, and chances to negotiate with the 
regime. At the onset of the 1970s, Genaro Vazquez kidnapped Donaciano Luna Radilla, 
who was the president of the Bank of the South48. The ransom for his release was set at 
half million pesos, which the family paid. On April 11, 1971, the Emiliano Zapata 
squad kidnapped Agustin Bautista, who was the son of a wealthy businessman of El 
Paraiso, Guerrero. The ransom requested by Vazquez was considered too high for the 
Bautista Family. Days later the guerrilla squad killed the victim. After this attempt, the 
urban cell of Vazquez’s guerrilla moved towards bank robberies with little success. In 
fact, in July 1971, Mexico City police captured seven members of Vazquez’s 
organisation during a failed attempt to assault the Distribuidora Comercial Azteca's
47 Confidential Intelligence Report. Pol 22.8 Mex U.S. State Department. NARA
48 DFS L38-236
vaults. Despite the setback, Genaro Vazquez kidnapped Jaime Castrejon Diez, who was 
not only a prosperous businessman, but also the Dean of the University of Guerrero.
The disappearance of an important member of Guerrero’s society did not go unnoticed. 
It rapidly attracted the interest of the mass media that, quite successfully conveyed the 
idea that a well grown insurgency group was developing in the highlands of Guerrero 
and presented a difficult challenge to the armed forces and the political project of Luis 
Echeverria. At first, the guerrilla found this type of publicity quite helpful, as it allowed 
them to insert their social movement into the political agenda. However, it was soon 
exploited by the regime to portray Vazquez’s guerrilla as a vulgar group of bandits 
using social and revolutionary banners to engage in criminal activities. In exchange for 
Castrejon Diez, Vazquez requested a sum of money and the release of a handful of 
guerrilla prisoners as well as a guarantee of their transfer to Cuba. President Echeverria 
agreed to Vasquez’s demands and some days later Castrejon Diez was freed49
It is also interesting to note that despite the obvious confrontation between the guerrilla 
and the Federal Government, the secretary of Defense, General Hermenegildo Cuenca 
Diaz, denied at all times the existence of belligerent armed groups in the country. His 
statement came at a moment when thousands of soldiers were engaged in the task of 
torturing and killing peasants who were possibly linked to guerrilla activity in the 
region. In the light of the character of the military occupation in Guerrero, it seems 
possible to argue that President Echeverria’s discourse of justice, economic 
development and democratisation was a tremendous contradiction with reality50 (Cox 
1985; Handelman 1997). In fact, it is possible to suggest that his discourse of 
reconciliation was more of a smoke curtain to conceal the brutal policy of national 
security he had put in motion.
By the end of 1972, the military strategy started to pay off. The setbacks already 
suffered by Genaro Vazquez’ organisation in a number of frustrated kidnapping
49 According to a reports generated by the DFS and the Armed Forces, President Luis Echeverria was 
kept informed about the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign in Guerrero. For instance, on May 8, 
1971, General Cuenca Diaz informed the president that they had captured Sixto Flores, who was a close 
associate of Genaro Vazquez (DFS 100-10 16L 3H 133). Having stayed in different military prisons for 
months, Sixto Flores was freed as a part of the bargain Genaro Vazquez obtained for the liberation of 
Jaime Castrejon Diez.
50 This policy included the release of student prisoners from the 1968 movement; lowering the voting age 
to eighteen; the recognition of non-official trade unions and even a moderate electoral reform that 
guaranteed a limited representation to leftist organisations in Congress.
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attempts and bank robberies left them in disarray. Away from the centres of rural 
support, his organisation had little possibility of success. Vazquez died in car accident 
near the port of Acapulco, while trying to escape from a police and military chase51. 
After his death, the leftovers of the ACNR disbanded. Some of its members joined 
Cabanas’ guerrilla and other militant organisations (Bellingeri 2003:158). In fact, it 
was after the death of Vazquez that the Cabanas’ movement reached the headlines of 
regional and national newspapers, although his guerrilla had been present since 1967. 
Not surprisingly, Cabanas became the most wanted man in the country and the Federal 
Directorate of Security joined the armed forces in the manhunt.
Different from Vazquez’s guerrilla organisation, the group of Lucio Cabanas decided to 
maintain their locus of operations within the highlands of Guerrero. Their survival 
remained depended on their local knowledge and the willingness of the local peasants to 
provide food to his group and to hide their whereabouts from the armed forces. His 
long experience and detailed knowledge of the region helped him elude the armed 
forces for a while, but his movement turned defensive and centred on survival. 
According to Cabanas’ own recollection, the military had changed its strategy by 
centring its actions on harassing the population and building military positions along the 
paths and roads of the highlands of Guerrero, expecting that some day, the guerrilla 
would need to go through those paths . According to Castellanos (2007), the army 
opened seventy paths that allowed the penetration of troops to the highlands of Guerrero 
(Castellanos 2007:124). They reinforced the policy of terror, and forced 
disappearances became a normal procedure of the army to undermine the guerrilla’s 
base of social support53. Such actions included incarceration and even random 
assassination of villagers, even entire families that had nothing to do with the guerrilla 
movement. For instance, the father of Genaro Vazquez, a well-known priista (member 
of the ruling party), was made prisoner along with 50 peasants in the region of Atoyac. 
They were all taken to a military camp in Mexico City for interrogation. Another case
51 DFS 100-10-16/4 L-4
52 This observation coincides with information from confidential dossiers of the Secretary of Defense, 
which it clearly explains to the Interior Minister, Mr, Mario Moya Palencia, the army’s policy of 
surveillance of routes and paths that connect Atoyac and nearby regions in order to speed up the capture 
of Lucio Cabanas. Sedena Exp a/041/27 -1/041/27 On Novemeber 30, 1974. There is another official 
communication, this time to President Echeverria, from General Cuenca Diaz, where the Secretary of 
Defense informs the president on the hunt for Lucio, and the militarization policy in Guerrero. Sedena 
Exp A/041/27 November 30, 1974.
53 Turati, Marcela. “Las rutas de la muerte”. Reforma. December 10,2001.
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was the continuous harassment to all those with the family name Cabanas or Vazquez 
54. Tita Radilla told this author that even those who were not necessarily related or even 
knew about Lucio and Genaro but bore the last name Cabanas or Vazquez were 
incarcerated London, March 30th, 2005). This information is consistent with the 
documentation found in the DFS files55
It was during this phase of military occupation that the military accompanied the 
strategy of terror with humanitarian actions. In fact, a few months before the final days 
of Lucio Cabanas, he recognized that the armed forces had once more adapted the 
counterinsurgency strategy. Knowing that the guerrilla was weak and surrounded, the 
army enhanced social action in towns and villages under occupation. They often 
delivered food and provided medical attention to villagers in exchange for information. 
(Suarez 1976:3, Pineyro 1978: Montemayor 1991). Conasupo56 stores were also 
installed in the region of conflict as a way of providing cheap and subsidised products to 
communities. The regime was now aiming at winning the hearts and minds of the local 
villagers. In other words, by the end of 1973, the military had completed the mission of 
weakening the social support of the guerrilla, but this achievement did not make the 
counterinsurgency strategy less violent. Those detained by the armed forces under the 
suspicion of insurgency where not longer handed to civilian authorities, but imprisoned 
in army bases and later executed. (FEMOSPP 2006: V 70). In cases where the civilian 
authority detained some people presumably linked to the guerrilla, they were handed 
over to the armed forces after a day of interrogation57. A former colleague of Lucio 
Cabanas, Simon Hipolito, described how he witnessed an army commander jokingly 
explain that those who had been detained were about to become sailors, which meant 
they would be drowned alive in the ocean. Others would become miners, meaning that 
they would be buried alive. According to Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez, who was chief 
assistant to General Renato Vega in the 1970s, he witnessed the execution of 180 people 
under the suspicion of belonging to Lucio's Guerrilla58. Airplane pilot Captain Ruiz 
Illescas confirmed that such actions were a common occurrence during the 
counterinsurgency in Guerrero during the 1970s. The idea was to discourage others 
from joining the guerrilla. (Xalapa, Ver. April 4th 2007).
54 Gerrero, Jesus. “Exigen castigo contra Acosta Chaparro”. Reforma. October 2,2000
55 Exp- 1000-10-1 L32
56 Company for Popular Subsistence (Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares)
57 DFS 100-10-16 L 9 H 26 y 44
58 Ramirez, Ignacio. “No voy a Huir del pais, dice Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez. Proceso. January 21, 1984.
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The end of Lucio's guerrilla came with the kidnap of Senator Ruben Figueroa, 
candidate to the governorship of Guerrero, in May 30, 197459. The manhunt the military 
unleashed to rescue Figueroa did not match Lucio's calculations or capacity to replace 
those who died in confrontations with the armed forces. In fact, the temporary military 
withdrawal Lucio was expecting from the region as a way to negotiate the release of 
Figueroa never took place. On the contrary, the regime increased its military presence 
even more 60 and reinforced the civic actions of the armed forces in the nearby regions 
where guerrilla activity was not apparent (Pineyro 1985:107). In the end, a military 
force of nearly 25,000 soldiers confronting a guerrilla movement of 40 men61 looked 
amazingly unequal. Figueroa escaped from his captors in the last days of October, 1974 
during a confrontation between them and a special military squad . Few days later,
63Lucio was finally ambushed by the armed forces and killed on December 2, 1974 . 
The death of Cabanas only temporarily ended, the guerrilla in Guerrero.
In the following months, the military reduced their numbers, but their presence became 
permanent by the creation of new military posts and regiments in the region. In the eyes 
of the regime, the operation was a complete success and the army chief of the region 
during the campaign, General Eliseo Jimenez Morales Ruiz, was made Senator of the 
Republic by direct intervention of President Echeverria. The campaign to hunt down the 
remnants of Lucio’s group continued until the end of the presidency of Jose Lopez 
Portillo, this time under the command of General Jorge Grajales. Large numbers of 
military personnel remained in the region as way to prevent other guerrilla movements 
from emerging64. The army also gained some leverage in local agencies of security 
through the inclusion of its personnel in key positions at local police bodies. For 
instance, once Ruben Figueroa won the governorship, he appointed Major Arturo 
Acosta Chaparro, who had participated in his liberation, as chief of all police 
corporations. One year later, the weekly magazine Proceso published an article
59 DFS 80-85 L-l
60 DFS 80-85-77 L-l
61 DFS 100-10-16 4 L-9
62 Ramirez, Ignacio. “No ofreci fmanciar la guerrilla; preferi subsidiar al Partido de los Pobres" Ahorita 
hay detonantes en la sierra guerrerense. Proceso. January 23,1984
63 DFS 100-10-16/4 L-10 213
64 Guerrero lEstado de Guerra? Proceso 0005-03. December 6,1976.
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explaining how 400 people apparently related to Cabanas’ organisation had been 
captured and never seen again in the region65
6.4 The urban guerrilla
In any case, the federal government failed to reach the kind of peace it expected after 
the final stand of Lucio Cabanas. As had occurred previous occasions, the excessive 
display of force against the rural guerrilla in Guerrero inspired the activities of other 
armed groups in the country. Still, the urban expression of guerrillas had different 
fundamentals from their rural counterpart. At the urban level, it seems the high degree 
of violence practiced by the military and the Federal Directorate of Security during the 
Student revolt of 1968 represented the breaking point in the way the urban guerrilla 
evolved in the following years. Most of the intelligence reports produced by the Federal 
Directorate of Security in the early 1970s highlighted how the discourse of student 
leaders had turned more radical and violent after the massacre of 196866. D. Treviso 
(2002:289) found that while repression discouraged collective action of the student 
movement and other radical groups in Mexico in the short term, it also stimulated 
contentious collective action by other social actors attuned with the student demands. 
These findings coincide with Goldstein’s observations (1983), who explained in his 
comparative study on repression in nineteenth-century Europe that the use of excessive 
state-sponsored violence multiplied the number of clandestine groups of resistance. He 
showed that most repressive states appeared to have bred opposition that was just as 
rigid, brutal and obstinate (Goldstein 1983:340). This scholarship is also consistent 
with the findings of M. Loveman (1998) study on the emergence of human rights 
organizations in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina during the 1970s and 80s. Loveman 
argues that repression may induce certain types of collective action. (Loveman 
1998:485)
In Mexico’s case, the violent means President Diaz Ordaz employed to handle the 
conflict with the students was easily portrayed by the surviving leadership as the 
ultimate proof that political change could only be achieved through an armed 
revolution. This was also the vision of Sergio Hilares, one of the founders of the most 
important urban guerrilla group in the 1970s, known as The Communist League
65 Moreno, Daniel. “Acosta Chaparro: un historial de impunidad’ Reforma. September 25, 2000.
66 Exp- 11-235-73-H-266 L21; DFS 11-235-73 H-3 L-2
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September 23rd. Hilares explained in an interview published in 1977 that it was the 
harsh government repression against the students and other social organisations that
f k lpushed many young people to abandon a civilised way to confront the regime
(Reveles 1978). By 1972, the inflammatory discourse of student organisations and
• 68peasant leaders in Guerrero acquired clear dimensions of violence . These groups 
began to execute bank robberies, kidnappings of politicians and business people, 
especially in Guadalajara, Monterrey and Mexico City69. These “expropriations”, as
70urban and rural guerrillas called them, represented their principal source of funding . 
The DFS always kept a tight control over these organisations. Even a superficial reading 
of its archives would clearly reveal the intention of its intelligence agents to accentuate 
the challenging discourse of the guerrilleros towards the political status quo, perhaps in 
order to overrate the DFS own capacity and scope.
Urban guerrillas mainly consisted of university students who were no longer trying to 
revive a movement of national dimensions, but confronting the regime in the streets 
through armed violence. That was the case of the Revolutionary Actions Movement
71 72(MAR) , the League 23 of September, Los Guajiros, Los Enfermos de Sinaloa , The 
Student revolutionary Front of Guadalajara, Los Procesos, Los Lacandones, the Red 
Brigade of Mexico City, The Arturo Gamiz Political and Military Committee, The 
Genaro Vazquez Brigade73, among others that came together in 1973 to form the 
Communist League, 23 of September (LC23S)74.
The LC23S became the most important urban guerrilla organisation in the country in the 
1970s. It was particularly active in Guadalajara, Mexico City, Morelia and some parts 
of Veracruz. This group was organised in cells or squads with few links between each 
other to avoid being discovered by the regime’s forces. Their objective consisted of 
increasing the levels of political instability through direct confrontation with security 
forces and kidnapping of high profile politicians and businessmen. Among those
67 Reveles, J. “La historia de la Liga. La Guerrilla, en la derrotay la descom posicioriProceso. 
December 2, 1978
68 DFS 11-235-74 H-l 34 L-l 1; 11-235-74 H-76L-19
69 DFS 11-235-73 H-2L-2
70 DFS 11-235-74 H-195 L-6; DFS 11-235-74 H-265 L-l 1; DFS 11-235-74 H-274L-11
71 DFS 80-80-74 H-10 LI; DFS 11-201-73 L -ll
72 DFS 11-235-74 H-51 L-6
73 DFS 11-235-74 H-168 L-20
74 DFS 11-235-74 H66L19; DFS 11-235-74 H-257 L -ll;
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kidnapped were the businessmen Eugenio Garza Sada and Fernando Aranguren75, and 
The British Consul in Guadalajara, Anthony Duncan Williams76; in 197377, the father- 
in-law of President Echeverria, Jose Guadalupe Zuno in 1975. In the same year they 
failed to kidnap Margarita Lopez Portillo, the sister of the PRI Presidential Candidate. 
These incidents generated extensive media coverage and elevated the level of concern 
of the federal government concerning these groups. As expected, concerns of the ruling 
elite were directly translated into more funds and power to the intelligence apparatus, 
the armed forces included.
The central government tackled the urban guerrilla according to pretty much the same 
recipe as previous interventions. However, this time the disproportionate use of force 
was combined with a careful management of intelligence. Their operations were better 
planned, but equally violent and merciless against the LC23S. Specialised military 
squads and the remnants of Mexico’s City Secret Service joined the DFS with the 
objective of infiltrating the guerrilla movement. The sophistication of the intelligence 
apparatus contrasted sharply with the operative capabilities of the guerrilla. In fact, the 
regime’s strategy was so effective that they even managed to infiltrate the highest 
echelons of the League.78 Some of them were even involved in the selection of
7Qprominent citizens or business men susceptible of being kidnapped . According to 
Samuel Raza and Francisco Tejeda {elpaco), both former agents of the DFS imprisoned 
in the Penitentiary of Santa Martha Acatitla, the level of infiltration the DFS reached 
into these movements was so high that detailed reports on plans and strategies of the 
LC23S were known by the agency in matter of days (Mexico City, November 10th, 
2006).
No doubt, the Federal Directorate of Security represented the main government agency 
to address the urban guerrilla, while the army occupied a supporting position. 
According to Stephen Wager, former US military Attache in Mexico City, the Mexican 
Army was indirectly involved in the hunting of urban guerrilla movements, such as the 
MAR, the Zapatista Urban Front and the LC23S (Wager 1992). They mainly helped 
through the exchange of intelligence with civilian police agencies.
75 DFS 11-235-74 H-301 L-7
76 DFS 11-235-73 H-91 L-4
77 DFS 11-235-73 H78 L-2
78 DFS file from 74/02/02
79 Exp 11-235-74, H-36, L-6
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As it occurred with the rural guerrilla, the security apparatus of the state succeeded in 
crushing the urban kind. By 1977, many of their members had been killed or 
incarcerated. The regime celebrated its great success against this kind of movement. As 
the urban guerrilla was clearly hit by the DFS, the regime’s usual secrecy started to lose 
ground. For instance, the newly appointed secretary of Defence, Felix Galvan Lopez, 
described the LC23S as a group of ordinary delinquents. He added that the armed forces 
were expecting a call from their civilian counterparts in order to exterminate the last 
traces of this criminal organisation. “For that purpose, the armed forces have specialised 
personnel. It won’t take long for them to end this (the LC23S) extremist force”80. One 
year later, Felix Galvan confirmed during the launching of a major antidrug trafficking 
operation in Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua (Condor I) that the LC23S was a “thing 
of the past,” it no longer exists81.
Despite the regime’s success in the combat against the urban guerrilla, it maintained the 
schizophrenic character of its policies. The newly elected president, Jose Lopez Portillo, 
proposed to grant amnesty to those with a guerrilla record. The bill passed in congress 
and 244 former guerrilla members sought the protection of the law according to the 
President’s offer between 1978 and 1982 (Esteve 1996:81). However, it is also true that 
civilian agencies of security took advantage of this initiative to locate those guerrilla 
leaders the regime had not been able to find82. In fact, 20 out of 244 were later 
assassinated by the intelligence apparatus. (Esteve 1996:82). This version has also 
been confirmed by Sergio Espino Verdin, an inmate in the federal penitentiary of Santa 
Martha, in Mexico City. Sergio Espino had been chief commander of the DFS during 
the 1970s and now faces charges for participating in the assassination and torture of 
Enrique Camarena Salazar. Espino told this author that he got the verbal order to 
identify all those requesting amnesty and then to have them killed. He regretted that the 
order came a bit late, in the sense that many had already returned to their homes, wich 
made the elimination much more complicated. (Mexico City, November 10th, 2006)
By the time the structure and organisation of the urban guerrilla was coming to an end, 
the regime created another security agency, whose mission consisted of erasing all
80 “ElEjhrcito contra la 23”. La Prensa. April 23, 1977.
81 “ Veinte Mujeres y  un GeneraF. Proceso. February 14, 1977.
82 Reveles, Jose. “Doble sentido de una amnistia, El gobiemo olvida los delitos, el pueblo olvida los 
atropellos”. Proceso. August 28,1978
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traces of subversive movements in urban areas. This agency is known as the White 
Brigade. Different from other secret agencies, the White Brigade had its headquarters 
within military premises in El Campo Militar No 183, and their operations were no less 
brutal and illegal than those practiced by El Batallon Olimpia or Los Halcones. 
President Luis Echeverria created the White Brigade during his last year in office. His 
successor, Jose Lopez Portillo, maintained the character of the agency and appointed 
Javier Garcia Paniagua, the son of General and Former Secretary of Defence, Marcelino 
Garcia Barragan, as Director of the Federal Directorate of Security and one of the 
visible heads of the organisation.
The White Brigade was made up of the “best” agents from the DFS and the armed 
forces; however it was headed by two senior army officers: Luis Montiel Lopez and 
Guillermo Alvarez Nahara. Additionally, its “board of directors” included the top
oa
leaders of civilian and military agencies of the country: Miguel Nazar Haro , second in 
command in the DFS, was appointed chief of ground operations; Lieutenant Colonel 
Francisco Quiroz Hermosillo, Chief of the Federal Military Police; Florentino Ventura, 
Chief of the Federal Judicial Police; Jesus Miyazawa, Chief of the Judicial Police of 
Mexico City; General Arturo Durazo Moreno, Transit Police Chief of Mexico City85; 
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Sahagun Baca, Chief of the Division of Investigations for 
crime prevention of Mexico City86.
Despite the number of agencies involved and the mixture of civilian and military 
membership, the level of coordination they kept was noteworthy. To begin with, they 
all maintained the thesis in the press that the LC23S was not a guerrilla movement, but a 
bunch of delinquents taking advantage of respectable social banners to commit their 
crimes87. Some of them went as far as declaring they would follow the guerrilleros as 
dogs follow prey88 The carelessness in the use of language of some of the visible
83 “La Brigada Blanca contra una familia” Proceso 055-28, November 21, 1977
84 DFS 009-0LL-014. 10-08-1979
85 All of these men, except for Florentino Ventura who committed suicide in 1984, ended up being 
prosecuted by federal and military courts for felonies connected to drug trafficking (General Francisco 
Quiroz Hermosillo), illegal enrichment (Arturo Durazo Moreno), genocide (Miguel Nassar Haro) and 
kidnapping (Jesus Miyazawa).
86 See Ramirez, Ignacio. ‘Wo voy a Huir del pais, dice Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez. Proceso. January 21, 
1984.
87 Arturo Durazo Moreno, the Chief of Mexico City Transit Police, declared the LC23S was a group of 
delinquents that called themselves guerrilleros to rob banks and businesses as well as to kidnap wealthy 
and respectable citizens. “8 millones en 4 asaltos” Proceso. February 21, 1977.
88 “Durazo seguira como perros a los Guerrilleros”. Proceso. April, 25 1977.
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leaders of the White Brigade indicates the level of freedom and impunity it enjoyed to 
comply with its mission. It was clear the agency had no limits in their range of 
operations and it was known that those captured by the White Brigade were likely not to 
be seen alive again. According to a study made by the CNDH and released in 2001, 
there was enough information to indicate that the White Brigade was responsible of 24
OQ
forced disappearances during the second half of the 1970s and early 80s . It was 
common to find the dead bodies lying in the streets in some of the neighbourhoods were 
the regime suspected the presence of guerrilla activity (Sierra Guzman 2003). On many 
occasions, the police announced that they had found the bodies of alleged members of 
the LC23S, who had apparently committed collective suicide. Still, the press announced 
that they all had “e/ tiro de g ra tia ” (shot in the forehead)90. In Mexico City, local police 
kept declaring they’d found dead the presumed leader of the urban Guerrilla, known as 
El Piojo Blanco. However, the security agencies never showed pictures of the body and 
often requested those who could have witnessed the shootings, neighbours or 
bystanders, to keep silent on the issue91. It was a macabre tactic from the White 
Brigade to prevent others to continue or join the urban guerrilla (Sierra Guzman 2003: 
105).
By 1978, when the LC23S was in complete disarray, two of its former members, Jose 
Dominguez and Hector Torres, declared that their movement had disappeared 
completely. Still, the regime, and Miguel Nazar Haro, also known as “the master of 
torture”92 and by that time Director of the DFS, kept fuelling the myth of the 
Communist League as a way to combat other social organisations93. Despite the high 
number of abuses committed by the White Brigade and the armed forces in their crusade 
against the guerrilla, there were few international voices that denounced the blatant 
violation of human rights in Mexico. One of these voices that managed to put some 
pressure over the Mexican government was Amnesty International. Through its 
interventions, it achieved the release of some prisoners from the Military Camp. Still, 
the US Government proved to be an accessory by keeping silent about the operations of
89 Turati, Marcela; Taniguchi, Hanaco and Jimenez, Gerardo. “Acaparan DFS y  Ejercito casos de 
desapariciones”. Reforma. November 29, 2001.
90 “Descabezan otra vez a la liga”. Proceso 0036-20. July 11,1977
91 “Guerrilleros mueren varias veces”. Proceso 0035-16 July 4,1977
92 Marin, Carlos “Un maestro de la tortura, dueno y  senor de la Brigada Blanca, al amparo del 
gobiemo”. Proceso. April 10, 1982
3 Reveles, Jose. “Dos profugos acosados afirman: La liga espantajo para la rebelion” Proceso.
November 27, 1978.
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the White Brigade and other security agencies throughout this period. This position was 
particularly contradictory given President Carter’s foreign policy in terms of the 
promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights. Years later it became 
known that Miguel Nazar Haro, the civilian leader of the White Brigade and Director of 
the DFS, was also a key informant of the CIA and the FBI94. In fact, he was protected 
by both intelligence agencies when a US federal prosecutor, James Kennedy, tried to 
bring Nazar Haro to trial for his suspected participation in a criminal organisation 
involved in car theft in California95.
6.5 Conclusion
President Echeverria, as well as President Lopez Portillo, opted to deal with some 
extreme forms of political dissent by treating them as matters of national security. 
Echeverria did it deliberately, knowing that neither the urban nor the rural guerrilla had 
the capacity to overturn the regime by force. There is not enough evidence to say that 
those groups represented a real threat to national security. In contrast, Lopez Portillo 
just let the inherited policy of internal security continue under the command of the 
experts, meaning the Director of the DFS and the Secretary of Defence. It seems he did 
not have the nerve to go into the details of the counterinsurgency policy. This is not to 
say that he was unaware of the kind of operations the DFS and the armed forces were 
performing. In his memories, Lopez Portillo wrote “the LC23S is losing blood. Almost 
everyday some of its members fall. The brigade created to address them and Durazo are 
doing a good job” (Lopez Portillo 1988:594). I suggest both Echeverria and Lopez 
Portillo managed to make political dissent a national security issue, because Mexico had 
an authoritarian regime and the system of civil-military relations, as it was designed 
after the revolution, allowed the president to send the armed groups to combat those he 
considered as enemies. This power of the executive led to a policy of national security 
that did not need to be explained to the population or be endorsed by it. On the contrary, 
most of its operations, such as the entire military occupation of the state of Guerrero in 
the 1970s to crush Lucio Cabanas’ and Genaro Vazquez’s guerrillas and their social
94 “Nassar, Protegido por una ley de EU, como agente encubierto de la CIA; Kennedy, su acusador, 
saldra” Proceso No. 0283-06. April 15, 1982 and Marin, Carlos. “Los cargos en su contra en Estados 
Unidos, aun vigentes”. Proceso. December 24, 1988
95 Marin, Carlos. “Los cargos en su contra en Estados Unidos, aun vigentes”. Proceso. December 24, 
1988
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bases of support, were explained by the regime to the population in terms of combating 
criminals, drug traffickers and kidnappers.
Therefore, military operations in rural and urban areas were not aimed at containing or 
controlling the guerrilla. Rather, they were sent with the mission of annihilation or 
erasing any trace of such a social movement, using whatever means available, without 
any respect for constitutional guarantees. Merciless as this process was, the armed 
forces proved loyal to the president, following orders even at the expense of risking 
their corporate interest and moral capital. They also proved to be an institution capable 
of adjusting to the circumstances and able to understand the political needs of the 
president. In that sense, the violent episodes of the 1970s also show the capacity of the 
armed forces to adapt to new political conditions. This sensibility gave a key to the 
executive power, as it allowed the incumbent president to keep on delegating governing 
responsibilities to the armed forces without having to confront great internal opposition 
from political parties, the public opinion or the civil society as it still occurs now.
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Chapter 7. From Insurgency to Terrorism: Chiapas, the EPR and the 
Shortcomings of Mexico’s new Democracy.
Introduction
The decade that followed the annihilation of the urban and rural guerrilla movements 
witnessed a drastic change in the agenda of national security. General Mario Acosta- 
Chaparro, one of the masterminds of the extermination, wrote in 1990: “Up to 1981, 
intelligence and security agencies in charge of maintaining control over insurgency 
performed an effective neutralization. Their results were noteworthy and admirable, as 
nearly all guerrilla groups that represented a serious problem since 1973 up to 1977 
were exterminated...’’(Acosta-Chaparro 1990:3). Thus, the risk of insurgency had been 
erased, but organised crime, particularly in the form of drug trafficking, replaced it with 
vigour in the following years. For the armed forces, their counterinsurgency mission 
remained uneventful for nearly two decades, until the Chiapas uprising in 1994 and the 
appearance of the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) in 1996 stormed once more into 
the political realm.
Concurrently, the political institutions of the country experienced serious 
transformations as a result of a slow but consistent process of democratic transition. 
Along with this process came the deinstitutionalisation of many of the authoritarian 
practices that had characterised the PRI regime for decades, especially in the field of 
intelligence and public security. Since the onset of the Presidency of Miguel de la 
Madrid in 1982, it was clear that the ruling class no longer trusted civilian police bodies 
to contain the growth of organised crime, while the task of combating political enemies 
was no longer seen as a priority. Therefore, as the process of democratic transition 
dismantled the civilian apparatus of political repression, the military took over, 
gradually but consistently, the mission of policing the new menace: drug trafficking.
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In that sense, the national and international urgency given to the war on drugs rendered 
the armed forces resistant to the changing force of democratisation. This was basically 
the rule until a political party different to the PRI won the presidency in July 2000. The 
arrival of Vicente Fox to the presidential office set up, arguably, the biggest challenge to 
the military’s corporate interest since the expropriation of the oil industry in 1938. It 
revived the clamour of individuals, human rights organisations and intellectuals to dig 
deep into the record of abuses and harsh violations of human rights that different 
agencies of security, including the armed forces, committed against those that once were 
considered enemies of the regime and its institutions, particularly during the 1970s or 
the so-called dirty war.
This chapter tackles two different but connected issues that shape the system of civil- 
military relations in Mexico and are of great help in understanding the 
counterinsurgency policy and the current political role of the armed forces. First, I will 
address the way the army in Mexico modified its internal structure of promotions, 
deployment and training of troops as a way to improve the containment of insurgency, 
particularly in the south east region. After 1994, it was clear that the strategy of 
annihilation to control incipient guerrilla organisations could no longer be applied. This 
change of mentality seems to be the result of democratisation, increasing activism of 
human rights organisations and the intense international media coverage of Mexico’s 
politics.
Second, I will look at the informal mechanisms the army has at its disposal to defuse 
any institutional attempt to review its past record of abuses and violations to human 
rights that could represent a direct damage to their corporate interest. On this issue, I 
analyse the dossiers presented by the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) 
in 2001 and the Special Prosecutor of Social and Political Movements of the Past 
(FEMOSPP) in 2006 concerning the violations of human rights perpetrated by state 
agencies during the dirty war.
In the light of the results of both studies and the fact that they have had little impact, I 
will argue that the Mexican military is an institution with the capability to protect its 
corporate interest, even in the midst of adverse or changing political conditions. It does 
so by adding to its current tasks new policy responsibilities assigned by the ruling elite, 
assuring to itself the support and protection of the executive power in return for these
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services. In consequence, I suggest democratisation in Mexico strengthened the 
political leverage of the armed forces at different levels of the structure of political 
power. Evidence indicating this is the way the military managed to force the ruling elite, 
the executive power included, to keep their record on human rights away from public 
scrutiny. This situation is consistent with the type of exclusive subordination of the 
armed forces, and poses serious questions regarding the possibilities of Mexico’s 
democracy to consolidate in the upcoming years.
7.1 The new era of guerrilla activity in Mexico
With the annihilation of the rural and urban guerrilla, the armed forces entered a period 
of relative calm during the 1980s. This situation was reflected in terms of minimum 
personnel growth and modernization of equipment. Furthermore, the military shifted 
gradually their counterinsurgency role to concentrate on combating drug trafficking 
organisations as requested by President De la Madrid and later reinforced by his 
successors. In fact, the declaration of war on drug trafficking in 1980, by US President 
Ronald Reagan , in what is known as the “War on drugs,” dominated the dynamics of 
the bilateral relationship between the two countries until the global war on terror took 
the limelight away from drug trafficking.
At the same time, the majority of survivors of insurgency groups of the 1970s were 
either absorbed by the regime or by opposition parties. That was the case of many of the 
members of the Party of The Poor (PDLP),who joined the PRI or the PRD (Ramirez 
Sevilla 2006). Tita Radilla, a Human Rights activist, told this author that some of those 
who had accompanied Lucio and Genaro in their social struggles were currently 
engaged in party politics, particularly within the PRD. The few guerrilla cells that 
remained active entered into a period of latency and preparation throughout the 1980s. 
That was the case of the National Liberation Forces (FLN), an armed militia founded in 
Monterrey by students of the University of Nuevo Leon. This was the group that years 
later became the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN).
Like many other contemporary guerrillas, the FLN sought to command a revolutionary 
struggle that, in their own words, was meant to finish off the reign of the bourgeoisie; 
unchain the nation from “foreign” domination; set up the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and start the construction of socialism in Mexico (La Grange and Rico 1998:226). The
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FLN was inspired by two key political events of the 1960s: the triumph of Castro’s 
Cuban Revolution and the repression unleashed by President Diaz Ordaz against the 
students in 1968. Not surprisingly, it faced the fierce repression of the regime 
commanded by the DFS and the armed forces in the 1970s. In fact, the FLN came to the 
verge of extinction in 1974, when the army captured Napoleon Glockner, who was one 
of its founders. Once in captivity and under torture, Glockner revealed FLN positions in 
Chiapas and Oaxaca that were later raided by the armed forces, killing many of its 
members, including the leader and founder of the movement, Cesar Yanez.
Those who were not discovered or managed to escape moved to Veracruz and Tabasco, 
where they found refuge and the chance to regroup. The remnants of this organisation 
eventually returned to Chiapas in the early 1980s. This time, the FLN established 
alliances with indigenous communities and some sectors of the Catholic Church that 
sympathised with Liberation Theology (Wager 1994; Tello Diaz 1995:55-97). It seems 
the combination of covert guerrilla activity, a receptive community and the protection of 
the Church made the FLN less likely to become the target of the security apparatus.
For the FLN in Chiapas, the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s represented a period 
of preparation, where they effectively managed to gain a solid base of social support 
among the poor and forgotten indigenous communities of Chiapas. Throughout those 
years, the FLN constituted the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and 
January 1994 they broke into the national scene by taking under control four 
municipalities, including the city of San Cristobal de las Casas, the third largest of the 
state. In their initial press release, the EZLN denounced the illegitimate and 
authoritarian character of the political system. It also declared war to the Mexican 
government and the armed forces.
The military response to the EZLN was fast and effective. By putting into practice the 
DN2 Plan, the army rapidly retook the region under control of the Zapatistas and forced 
them to retreat to deep regions of the tropical rainforest in Chiapas. The initial 
mobilization included 12,000 soldiers. It was the largest of its kind since the times of 
Lucio Cabanas and Genaro Vazquez. Still, the country and its institutions had changed 
a lot since the last stand of Lucio Cabanas in 1974 and it was clear the guerrilla and the 
political elite were well aware of this transformation. The political system had started 
to democratize, if slowly. The ruling party had accepted electoral defeats in two
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governorships and an increasing number of seats in congress were being occupied by 
opposition parties. A similar trend occurred at local level. Key municipalities, especially 
in the northern part of the country, fell under the control of the right-wing National 
Action Party. That was the case in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Piedras Negras. In other 
words, the country was no longer dominated by a single political voice. Concurrently, 
the regime had also dissociated itself from the organisation of elections, leaving this 
responsibility to a citizen led electoral institution. The security apparatus of the state 
had also suffered drastic transformations. The Federal Directorate of Security was not 
longer in place, having been dissolved by President De la Madrid in 1985 after a series 
of corruption scandals and international pressure.
The former strength of the intelligence apparatus and its close coordination with the 
armed forces were also a thing of the past. The faulty Mexican record in the war on 
drugs had exhibited the shortcomings of national police corporations as well as their 
close links with the criminal organisations they were supposed to combat. The literature 
on the link of the criminal underworld and the Mexican public sector is quite extensive 
(Kitchens 1967; Nacif Mina 1986; Vanderwood 1986; Toro 1995; Builta 1997; Rochlin 
1997; Schulz 1997; IMECO 1998; McRae 1998; Chepesiuk 1999; Jordan 1999; 
Montana 1999; Rochlin 1999; Eskridge 2001; Piccato 2001; Shelley 2001; Marin Marin 
2002; Willoughby 2003). They appeared in the eyes of the population as very efficient 
in repression, torture and intimidation of political dissidents, but unable to counteract 
the growing power of drug cartels. It seems clear that by the time the Zapatistas entered 
the national stage, the regime was undergoing a process of deinstitutionalization of its 
authoritarian political structures that affected electoral institutions, the informal powers 
of the executive power, and the efficiency of civilian agencies of security.
On a different front, the regime had also lost its hegemony over the mass media. The 
privatization of Imevision, the national TV network during the first years of Carlos 
Salinas’ Administration left the regime without its former channels of propaganda, 
control and censorship. Even if some local and national media were still compliant, the 
international mass media remained impartial towards certain issues, such as those 
related to the Zapatistas. In fact, CNN was one of the first networks that managed to 
reveal the excess use of force practiced by the armed forces during the initial days of 
their confrontation with the EZLN. In addition to the independent media, the violence
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was vigorously denounced by national and international NGOs. Mexico’s civil society 
had emerged vigorously since the earthquakes that devastated Mexico City in 
September 1985. (Fox 1994:165; Hallin2000).
Not surprisingly, the impact of the news and the press narratives that showed the 
carnage in Chiapas deeply affected public opinion. The image of a modem and 
economically vigorous Mexico that Carlos Salinas had meticulously and patiently 
constructed during five years in the presidency broke down abruptly with the emergence 
of the EZLN. For the corporate interest and moral capital of the armed forces, this 
scenario set some key questions to their role in an era of global communications, and 
the transition to democracy. The immediate result was obvious. The popularity and 
acceptance of the cause and objectives of the EZLN went up in the public opinion, 
while the image of the armed forces significantly dropped1. In the face of international 
pressure and the positive image of the EZLN in the public eye, President Salinas 
ordered the army to cease fire and retreat as a sign of good faith to the Zapatistas. 
According to Sierra-Guzman (2004), the presidential order to stop the attack to the 
EZLN was seen by the citizenry and by a large sector of the armed forces as the 
acceptance that the Mexican government had gone too far in the use of violence against 
defenceless indigenous people, most of them armed with fake guns and rifles made of 
wood and plastic.
It has also been suggested that the military understood the unilateral decision of the 
president to cease fire as a clear political intention to divert some of the damage caused 
to his image towards the armed forces. This was not the first time that institutions or 
individuals had to admit their fault for manifest policy failures to save the executive 
power from opprobrium. Within the armed forces, there was the idea that they were 
being used by President Salinas as scapegoats for the mistakes and incapacity of the 
civilian ruling elite to address the abandonment and endemic poverty Chiapas had 
suffered for generations. This was the impression of General Ramon Mota Sanchez, 
former federal deputy and senator. He explained that politicians are usually unable to 
address situations of crisis. In those circumstances, they often call the armed forces to 
solve a particular problem and when things do not run as they expected, they blame the 
military for such mistakes. Congressman and on-leave army general Jesus Esquinca
1 Sanjuana, Martinez. '’’'Antes que preocupamos por la imagen de Mexico, hay que hacer correcciones de 
fondo: Embajador Pichardo. Proceso. February 21, 1994
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went yet further. He accepted during a session at congress that sending the military to 
solve the conflict in Chiapas was a political error of former president Salinas. He added 
that in the past, the army had been irresponsibly used to counteract the insurgency, 
when political solutions should have come first.2
It is documented that the military was aware of the incipient guerrilla action in Chiapas 
and had informed President Salinas of this issue in time (Wager 1994; Doyle 2004). In 
fact, less than nine months before the seizure of San Cristobal by the Zapatistas, the 
army discovered a training camp of the guerrilla in a place called Las Calabazas where 
there was even an exchange of fire with the EZLN (Tello Diaz 1995:221-235). This 
information was corroborated by Minister David Paredes, who actually talked with 
General Miguel Leyva, who at the time served as Chief of the Military Zone of Rancho 
Nuevo, located just a few miles away from one of the strongholds of El Zapatismo. 
According to Minister Paredes, General Leyva explained to him how he was amazed 
and in deep disbelief when he got the order from the Secretary of Defence to retreat 
from the zone when it was clear a well armed and organised guerrilla was active. 
(Xalapa Ver, May 14th, 2008). General Leyva was not an ordinary officer; he was one 
of the 15 high ranked army officers who had received specialised counterinsurgency 
training at the US-managed “School of the Americas” in Panama3. On top of that, it was 
known that the Armed Forces of Guatemala sent President Salinas an intelligence 
dossier of the EZLN that included a detailed analysis of its structure, social bases of 
support and objectives (Sierra Guzman 2003:123-124).
Despite the evidence, the government chose not to address the guerrilla in Chiapas with 
the old recipe of overwhelming military force. It seems plausible to argue that President 
Salinas was trying not to contaminate the political environment with the issue of 
guerrillas prior to the inclusion of Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). He also did not want to take the limelight away from the presidential 
campaign of Luis Donaldo Colosio, who was actually experiencing a slow start. On 
President Salinas’ own admission, he was aware of the existence of a guerrilla-like 
organisation that could have been involved in training peasants and indigenous people
2 Sierra, Jose Luis. “Fuerzas Armadas “La critica lealtad’. Reforma. December 17, 1995.
3 Mexico is now the country which sends the greatest number of forces to United States military schools. 
La Jornada. August 16, 2008. (Newspaper note translated by NUEVO AMANECER PRESS and 
available at http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/usa/greatest num aug98.html
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in the region. However, he did not know the size of the movement, its intentions, or its 
supporters (Salinas 2000:809-822). Still, making full use of the available information, 
he reinforced the investment in infrastructure as well as the provision of public services 
in the region. The idea behind the presidential strategy was to undermine the appeal of 
the guerrilla by gaining the hearts and minds of the population. Therefore, addressing 
the social and economic needs became a must for Carlos Salinas.
In many ways, President Salinas’ decision to address the guerrilla in Chiapas through 
peaceful means was an indication that the armed forces in Mexico would once more 
need to upgrade their capability to comply with the orders of the executive power. 
Under such conditions, the transformation experienced by the armed forces in the 1990s 
regarding counterinsurgency can be traced by looking at two different spheres. First, the 
armed forces, and specially the army, increased the size of its force as well as the 
manner it has been deployed throughout the Mexican territory. This reorganisation has 
had repercussions on their record on human rights and their political stance towards this 
issue. Second, the army shifted its internal structure of promotions and specialised 
training to privilege their counterinsurgency role. In other words, it made it easier for 
officers with experience in counter-guerrilla activities to move up the ranks of the army 
hierarchy.
7.2 Human rights and the national distribution of army force
Since 1994, the army chose to concentrate its force in states where they believe the 
emergence of guerrilla movements were more likely. For instance, six years before the 
emergence of the EZLN, there were 1,055 soldiers stationed in the entire state of 
Chiapas. By 1994, this number climbed to 4,000 regular troops in that state and nearly 
15,000 more in special operations, nearly 20 percent of the army’s operative force 
(Pineyro 2002). A similar case occurred in the state of Guerrero. The army had 3,000 
soldiers deployed in that state in 1998, but by 2006 that number trebled. The next case 
that confirms this trend is Oaxaca, where the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) has 
one of its main centres of activity. In 1997, Oaxaca had nearly 1,500 soldiers deployed 
in the state. By 2006 the number reached 5,700. Furthermore, as the army increased its 
size throughout the 1990s (Table 7.1), it also increased its infrastructure in the regions 
where guerrilla activity was present.
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Army personnel 1990 -2006
2 1 0 0 0 0  -i
170000
130000
90000
50000
^  ^  ^  J  j  ^  ✓
Source: Secretary o f  Defence. IFAI, petition 0000700021805
For purposes o f territorial organisation, the army has divided the Mexican Territory into 
Military Zones and Military Regions. Until the early 1990s, most o f the states o f the 
Mexican Federation had a single military zone. However, as the agenda o f risks on 
national security acquired more relevance, the army decided to create more zones to 
improve its control over Mexican territory. By 1991, there were 34 army zones; that 
number increased to 44 in 2004. At the next level o f territorial organisation, the army 
split up into twelve Military regions, which basically consist o f 2 to 7 military zones 
under a single command. The following map shows how the concentration o f army 
regions and zones is quite noticeable around Mexico City and the surrounding states. 
Between the Estado de Mexico and Mexico City, the military has more than one 
hundred thousand troops under the direct supervision o f the Secretary o f Defense and 
the army general responsible for Region number 1. This region also concentrates the 
administrative structure, the intelligence apparatus and the largest part of their 
educational system. However, it is also noticeable that in Guerrero, Chiapas and 
Oaxaca, the concentration o f military personnel is higher than in other states. For 
instance, the 7th Military Region includes the states o f Chiapas and Tabasco. Both states 
together contain five military zones, three in Chiapas and two in Tabasco. This is the
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military region with the highest number o f military zones; two of them were created 
after the Zapatista uprising in 19944.
Taking into consideration the way the armed forces allocate their force throughout the 
territory, it is possible to identify three focal points o f concern. According to the arm y’s 
own statement, the states that contain the highest guerrilla activity are: Chiapas, Estado 
de Mexico, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Puebla. Altogether, they hold 25 percent o f the 
army’s manpower. The second priority is given to states that host the headquarters, so 
to speak, o f the so called drug cartels. These states are Baja California, Baja California 
Sur, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa and Michoacan. Altogether, 
they account for 19 percent o f the arm y’s total force.
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Figure 7.2
Map of the distribution of army regions and zones in Mexico 2008
Source: Map constructed using information retrieved from the website o f the Secretary of Defense 
(www.sedena.gob.mx) and The National Drug Control Plan from the Attorney-General’s Office (PGR 2002).
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4 Furthermore, in 1997 the army substituted the Task Force Arcoiris with a new group named Task Force 
Rapid Intervention, consisting o f  10,000 soldiers highly trained in counterinsurgency operations. Aranda, 
Jesus. “Se intensified en el Ejercito la creacion degrupos de elite” La Jornada. October 16, 2000
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The third priority corresponds to states where the production and processing of illegal 
drugs is concentrated. On this issue, the army identifies six states: Chihuahua, Sonora, 
Sinaloa, Jalisco, Nayarit, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Colima. Nearly 15 percent 
of the army’s manpower has a permanent post in this set of states. By looking at the 
numbers, it seems clear that the strategy of the armed forces to contain the expansion 
and progress of the guerrilla consists in increasing its physical presence. The idea is to 
erect a military fence to stop any possible advance of such organisations to other parts 
of the country. This strategy is also useful for maintaining close supervision of the 
activities of these groups. For instance, it is known that the army occasionally enters 
territories with high Zapatista ascendancy under the argument of searching for illegal 
crops, such as Marihuana or Amapola, to destroy them. The most recent episode of this 
nature occurred in May 2005, when the army declared it had destroyed marihuana crops 
near villages under the control of the EZLN. According to Montemayor (2006), this sort 
of military operation is part of a wider strategy of counterinsurgency based on 
intimidation. About this subject, General Juan Morales Fuentes, former army chief in 
Rancho Nuevo, declared that high military presence in Chiapas responds to the need of 
controlling illegal immigration, combating drug trafficking and protecting the natural 
resources of the region from “talamontes” (people who cut trees illegally). However, it 
seems clear that the 111 military positions that keep both the army and the navy in 
Chiapas is due to forecasts of possible activities of the EZLN within this region5. In 
spite of the fact that the EZLN has not fired a single bullet since 1995, every year the 
army devotes more personnel to the state of Chiapas. According to CAPISE6 (Center of 
Political Analisis and Economic and Social Research), high army density in Chiapas 
responds to a strategy of encircling the positions of the EZLN in the same way a 
professional army would surround an enemy in a regular war. The EZLN’s gradual 
diminution of importance in national politics in the last decade is partly the result of this 
aggressive strategy of containment implemented by the armed forces in Chiapas.
5 These bases have very adverse effects, especially in indigenous communities, particularly for women. It 
is widely known in Mexico and Central America that army settlements generate in the surrounding area 
an industry of prostitution and unregulated businesses where alcohol is sold to soldiers. These activities 
often disrupt the local communities and bring abuses and degradation to local women. It can also be 
argued that these operations are highly valuable for the regime to weaken the bases of support of 
guerrillas.
For for information on CAPISE research and aims, see www.enliea.capise.org.mx
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In pragmatic terms, the counterinsurgency strategy in Chiapas has been effective, as it 
contained the growth of the EZLN without having to use massive violations of human 
rights as it certainly occurred in the 1970s. However, by no means have violations of 
human rights disappeared or even diminished. On the contrary, the armed forces, and in 
particular the army, remain as the state agency with the highest number of complaints 
for presumed cases of torture, as well as the second in ordinary violations to human 
rights in the country7. It seems that low scale and selective violations to human rights 
represent a valuable asset for the military to maintain a certain degree of control over 
the regions they occupy.
Here it is possible to find the case of Emestina Ascencio, an elderly indigenous woman
of a community named Tetlalcinga in the highlands of Zongolica, Veracruz, who died,
presumably as a result of a sexual assault committed by soldiers on 26 February 2007.
According to INEGI’s statistics, Zongolica is one of the poorest and least developed
regions of the country and has been for decades a focal point of concern to the army due
• • 8to the presence of guerrillas as well as drug trafficking related activities . In fact, the 
army reinforced its presence in the region in 1999, when government intelligence 
sources considered the EZLN was intending to expand its radius of influence to 
Veracruz9. The case of Mrs. Ascencio is not an isolated event. It is one of at least four 
documented cases of sexual assaults committed by soldiers against indigenous women 
in different regions of the country, three in Guerrero and one more in Coahuila where 13 
women were sexually assaulted and raped by 20 soldiers10. However, this case deserves 
special attention because it detonated a quick response of rage in the local community 
that rapidly attracted the interest of local and national newspapers. Concurrently, human 
rights organisations lost no time to portray Mrs. Ascensio’s case as the typical kind of 
abuse the army performs in rural zones, mostly indigenous communities, while 
combating drug trafficking or searching for guerrilla activity.
7 “Encabeza IMSS y Sedena quejas ante Derechos Humanos. El Informador. July 28, 2008. 
http://www2.mformador.com.mx/mexico/2008/28199/1/encabezan-imss-v-sedena-queias-ante-derechos- 
humanos.htm
8 “Demandan una nueva necroscopia”. Reforma. April 5, 2007
9 Polemicaporpresencia militar en V era c ru zEl Universal. December 28. 1999
10 “MEXICO : Family of Emestina Ascencio Rosario and inhabitants of Tetlazinga community and 
Soledad Atzompa municipality. Amnesty International . March 6, 2007. 
http://www.amnestvintemational.be/doc/article 10195 .html
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The way the investigations of Mrs. Ascensio’s death evolved in the course of the 
following months, is a clear proof of the constant contradictions and mistakes in which 
local and federal agencies tend to fall. The army initially admitted in a press release the 
possibility of misbehaviour of some of the soldiers deployed in the highlands of 
Zongolica. However, as the case acquired a national dimension, the defence secretary 
denied the involvement of any soldiers in the incident. At the state level, the Governor 
of Veracruz, Mr. Fidel Herrera, ordered a full investigation. The first official study 
conducted by Veracruz’s Attorney General, Mr. Emeterio Lopez-Marquez, indicated 
that according to forensic studies performed on Mrs. Ascencio’s body, she had died as a 
result of injuries caused during rape. The report also said that there were a number of 
eye witnesses who had identified the presence of soldiers near her home at the time she 
was found lying on the floor, bleeding and barely conscious.
Two weeks later, the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) took over the 
case given that this independent but state-funded agency has jurisdiction over presumed 
violations of Human Rights by members or agencies of the Federal Government. 
Contrary to the results delivered by Mr. Lopez-Marquez, the CNDH found no evidence 
of rape and determined that Mrs. Ascencio had died due to anaemia and a chronic 
condition of gastritis11. As a result of the conflicting conclusions of Veracruz’s 
Attorney-General’s Office and the CNDH, Mr. Lopez-Marquez and Governor Herrera 
had to accept that there was no crime to prosecute in the case Mrs. Ascensio’s death and 
accepted the veracity of the investigation by the CNDH. A high officer working in 
Veracruz’s state government said to this author -under the condition of anonymity- that 
Mr. Lopez-Marquez was asked to retreat and accept that he made a mistake as a result 
of the confrontation his report had caused between Governor Fidel Herrera and the 
armed forces (Xalapa Ver, January 27, 2009).
In support of this version, it is interesting to observe how President Felipe Calderon 
rushed to mitigate any responsibility of the armed forces on this case, days before the 
conclusion of the CNDH investigations. On 13th March, 2006, President Calderon 
affirmed that Mrs. Ascencio had died due to a chronic case of gastritis. His statement 
came six days before de CNDH completed the report and naturally raised profound 
suspicions concerning the supposed autonomy of the CNDH in the case. Leftist
11 “Lamentan fallo sobre Ascencio”. Reforma. Septiembre 04, 2007.
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congressmen, among them the leader of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) 
in congress, Javier Gonzalez Garza, affirmed that the CNDH had lost credibility and 
implied this agency was joining forces with the president to protect the army from
1 ‘Jcriticism . His view was similar to that of Ana Luisa Nerio, Principal of the Centre of
1 ^Human Rights Fray Francisco de Victoria . Mrs. Nerio declared that it was likely the 
CNDH was acting in complicity with the Federal Government to protect the armed 
forces. She added that President Carderon is particularly protective of the army due to 
their responsibly in the war on drugs14. The other major opposition party represented in 
congress, the PRI, did not want to enter into the discussion because it considered “harsh 
remarks had been made by the PRD to the Army” 15. Furthermore, the President’s 
statement to the press was widely criticised by national and international NGOs as well 
as the public opinion16.
President Calderon’s attitude in this case is coherent with the way the armed forces have 
been defended by the executive power when they come under attack from civil society. 
This attitude has been historically shared by the executive power and probably reached 
its highest expression during the administration of President Vicente Fox when there 
was the will, formal but hardly political, to clarify the participation and the possible 
responsibilities of the armed forces, the DFS, and other agencies of security that were 
involved in the dirty war. The first professional assessment based on information from 
the archives of the DFS and the armed forces was presented by Mexico’s Ombudsman, 
Jose Luis Soberanes. The CNDH studied 532 cases of alleged forced disappearances 
that took place during the dirty war, that is, the 1970s and early 80s (See Table 7.1). 
After almost 12 years of research, the CNDH found evidence of torture practices in 
almost all cases under study. It also reveals that four out of ten victims of torture were 
taken out of their homes by force during the night, most of them being peasants from 
Guerrero. Moreover, it made clear that the Army had actively participated by providing
12 “Exigen a CNDH aclarar reporte”. Reforma. April 05, 2007.
13 http://www.derechoshumanos.org.mx/index.php
14 “Dudan de CNDH en caso de anciana”. Reforma. March 31, 2007
15 This remark was made by Emilio Gamboa Patron, who is the leader o f the PRI in Congress.
16 There was even a formal request for information made by a citizen and channelled through the Federal 
Institute of Information Access (IFAI), concerning the source President Calderon utilised to declare that 
Mrs. Ascencio had died as a result of gastritis. Since the presidential office could not provide a positive 
answer to the information request, the IFAI concluded that President Calderon had no evidence to support 
his statement. See: “Critica IFAIpremura de Calderon". Reforma. July 05,2007)
215
its prem ises to perform  the interrogations and torture the detainees17. The report also 
stated that the arm y was directly responsible for 1 in every 4 cases investigated 
regarding forced disappearances .
Table 7.1
Institution responsible for the forced disappearance during the dirty war 
according to the CNDH
Institution Responsible Number of 
documented forced 
disappearances
M exican Arm y 132
Federal D irection o f  Security (DFS) 106
Federal Judicial Police (PGR) 56
Judicial Police o f  Guerrero 30
The W hite Brigade 19
Total 532
Source: (CNDH 2001)
In sum, the Om budsm an confirmed during a press conference the S tate’s guilt for such 
crim es and violations o f  individual guarantees,19 which, ultimately, obliged President 
Fox to proceed in an official and proper m anner and, therefore, to legally condem n 
those who participated in the dirty w ar20. Am ong those with possible responsibilities 
were Luis de la Barreda M oreno(f), Javier Garcia Paniagua (f), M iguel N azar Haro, 
Jose A ntonio Zorrilla Perez, Jesus M iyazawa, Arturo Durazo M oreno (f) , Francisco 
Sahagun B aca(|) , Fernando Gutierrez Barrios ( |) ,  Pedro Ojeda Paullada and O scar 
Flores Sanchez, who at some point occupied directive positions in the civilian and 
judiciary  apparatus o f  security during the 1970s. W ithin the jurisdiction o f  the arm ed 
forces, the names o f  General Arturo Acosta Chaparro and Humberto Quiroz Herm osillo 
( t )  came up frequently21.
As expected, the same day the Om budsm an presented the outcome o f  his investigation, 
President Fox im m ediately declared that sentencing wrongdoers in the dirty w ar case 
by no m eans discredited the Army, as this institution belongs to the people and works 
for the people22. He also admitted that it was necessary to clarify w hat occurred during
17 Turati, Marcela, “La deception de los Cabanas”. Reforma. November 21, 2001
18 Turati, Marcela; Taniguchi, Hanako and Jimenez, Gerardo. “Acaparan DFS y Ejercito casos de 
desapariciones”. Reforma. November 29, 2001
19 “Las Denuncias” Reforma. November 26, 2001
20 “Daran ‘lista negra ’ sobre desapariciones”. Reforma. October 02, 2001
21 DFS 100-10.16 L9
22 Torre, Wilbert. “Piden evitar juicios contra instituciones”. Reforma. November 28, 2001
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the 1970s as a way to heal a ‘historic wound” of Mexican society. Having said that, the 
president authorised open access to the archives of the DFS and intelligence dossiers of 
the Secretary of Defence containing information of this period. Also approved was the 
creation of the position of a special prosecutor within the domain of the Attorney- 
General’s Office, to investigate the demands of those who had lost a relative or suffered 
abuses during this period, and convict those who were guilty of such crimes.
There is no doubt that this action taken during the Presidency of Vicente Fox posed a 
set of difficult questions to the armed forces concerning their role during the long rule 
of the PRI, particularly for the harsh violations to human rights committed by this 
institution during the 1970s. It seems that by seeking reconciliation with society and 
restitution to the victims, President Fox pushed the political system, at least in this 
aspect, in the direction of democratic consolidation.
The obscure side of this process was the way the investigation was in fact carried out in 
the following years and the defiant position the military kept towards the possibility of 
digging too much into the past due to the harm this could cause to the status of the 
armed forces. Former President Echeverria joined the discussion during a press 
conference in Ciudad Victoria, when he affirmed that he had no responsibility for any 
forced disappearance carried out during the 1970s. He alleged that the armed forces 
were not to be blamed either, as they were simply fulfilling their obligation. The former 
president explained that the “dirty war” was one of the maladies of the Cold War, as it
O'Xinduced many young people to defy the state and the army . However, he conceded 
the possibility that some police agencies could have indeed committed excesses against 
peasants and students24. Not particularly different from Echeverria’s position, Jose 
Lopez Portillo defended the performance of the armed forces during his administration. 
However, he said he was unaware of the meaning of the dirty war and the violations of
23 Klerigan, Efrain. “Justified Echeverria: Jue por la Guerra Fria” Reforma November 30,2001
24 Klerigan, Efrain. “Rechaza Echeverria tener culpa” Reforma November 29, 2001
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human rights during his administration25 as he was the President of Mexico, not a 
policeman26.
On the same topic, the Attorney General, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, who was in fact 
an on-leave army general, declared that it was painful for him to know that some leads 
suggested misbehaviour of some army officers during the dirty war, but he asserted that 
his responsibility and commitment was with the rule of law27. On the side of the armed 
forces, particularly the army, the reactions were more hostile concerning the possibility 
of bringing army officers to trial for their actions during the dirty war. Miguel Angel 
Godinez, a retired general who acted as Chief of Military Staff of President Lopez 
Portillo, said the “dirty war was an illusion, as it never took place.” According to 
General Godinez, the army confronted in the 1970s a set of armed groups endangering 
the security and survival of the State. He also added that the army, as an institution, 
does not violate human rights, on the contrary, it is the institution that respects them the 
most28. Another top general, Enrique Salgado Cordero, affirmed the information that 
suggested some wrongdoing of the army during the 1970s was false, as the armed forces 
do not act autonomously but always follow orders29. The unusual activism of generals 
in the press continued in the days that followed and it finally ended when President Fox 
declared, during the celebration of the Day of the Army on February 19, 2002, that the 
armed forces have always been respectful of legality and have also been supportive of 
decisions taken by civilian authorities, so it was unfair to adopt unilateral interpretations 
of history where the army has been involved30. It was clear President Fox had come out 
in defence of the army as a response to the results of the CNDH dossier on the dirty 
war.
In the following months, the topic vanished from the political agenda. It returned in 
March 2004, when some of the findings of the newly created agency to prosecute the 
crimes of the past were leaked to the press. This time, it was known that the army had
25 This vision is at odds with a document of the General Direction of Social and Political Research (IPyS)
that specifies that a group of women demanded General Miguel Angel Godinez Bravo, to attend the 
verbal order o f President Lopez Portillo to investigate the whereabouts of a number of people (their sons 
and daughters) that were missing in the state of Sinaloa during 1976,1977 and 1978, presumably for their 
political ideas. June 15, 1979. Direction General de Investigations Politicos y  Sociales 76/26839 
Irizar, Guadalupe. “No reprimi, afirma LEA... y y o  no supe, dice JL F ’ Reforma. November 30, 2001
27 Torre, Wilbert. “Causan 'dolor’ al ejercito hechospasados.- Macedo” Reforma. November 30, 2001.
28 Irizar, Guadalupe. “Fue guerra, no sucia, asegura Godinez". Reforma. November 30, 2001
29 Barajas, Abel. “Investiga justicia militar casos de desapariciones”. Reforma. December 20,2001.
30 Lopez, Fernando Mayolo. “Deslinda Fox al Ejercito de “episodios histdricos". Reforma. February 20, 
2002
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cooperated with the White Brigade by offering its main premises to conduct 
interrogations and eventually, to torture detainees presumably linked to guerrilla 
organisations in the 1970s. Since this information came from an official source, it 
forced the Secretary of Defence, General Ricardo Clemente Vega Garcia, to declare that 
such leaks were false and denied that the Military camp No. 1 served as a torture centre 
of the White Brigade during the dirty war 31. Such remarks are at odds with the final 
version of the dossier presented in December 2006 by the Special Prosecutor of Social 
and Political Movements of the Past that documented several cases of torture practiced 
in military premises (FEMOSPP 2006:VIII). It is also contradicted by the information 
provided by Commander Sergio Espino, who along to Miguel Nazar Haro, was allowed 
to enter freely to the Military Camp no 1 to interrogate the detainees belonging to the 
LC23S and a number of intelligence dossiers made by the extinct Federal Directorate of 
Security that are available to the public at Mexico’s National Archives32. (Mexico City, 
November 10th, 2006).
There is no doubt that the avalanche of testimonies, intelligence files and official 
documents gathered by the special prosecutor, Mr. Carillo Prieto, set the alarm once 
more in the highest echelons of the army due to the potential damage that such findings 
could cause to their reputation. The political timing of such leaks was particularly 
difficult for the Presidency of Vicente Fox. It coincided with the resignation of his 
private secretary, Alfonso Durazo, who revealed in an extensive letter the presumed 
plan of the first lady, Martha Sahagun de Fox, to succeed his husband as President33. 
Concurrently, the political agenda was dominated by the alleged intention of the 
executive power to impeach the mayor of Mexico City and most likely presidential 
candidate of the PRD, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. It was within this realm of 
political turbulence that General Vega Garcia made an unusual statement. The Secretary 
of Defence said the armed forces were all over the country and were perfectly aware of 
what was going on. However, it was not its responsibility to intervene in politics. “I 
affirmed that the armed forces have the weapons that are needed to defend the 
motherland and should never be used to protect the political power, “never to protect the
31 “Rechaza Sedena base de detention en campo militar”. Reforma. February 25,2004
32 Exp-11-235-74 H-300 L-7
33 Vargas, Rosa Elvira “Renuncia Durazo, inconforme con pretensiones dinasticas de Los Pinos”. La 
Jornada. July 6, 2004
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political power!” To conclude, General Vega Garcia recalled that the obedience of the 
military was to the President and the time had come to forgive34.
The cryptic speech of General Vega was not deciphered or clarified by him in further 
declarations or interviews, but key political figures and political analysts rushed to offer 
their interpretations. According to Lorenzo Meyer, General Vega responded with this 
speech on behalf of the numerous voices within the armed forces asking to stop the 
investigations or, at least, to ease the tone of accusations made against the army
^ c
regarding the dirty war . For the Deputy Attorney General, Jose Luis Santiago 
Vasconcelos, the words of General Vega suggested the need of the nation to close and 
forgive what occurred during the painful chapter of the dirty war36. On the same topic, 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador affirmed that he agreed with General Vega on the issue 
that the military should not be used to compensate for the inefficiencies of civilian 
authorities. However, he also concluded that the crimes committed during the dirty war
' I 'T
should not go unpunished . On the more conservative side of the equation, the former 
national leader of the PRI, Maria no Palacios Alcocer, considered that it was inadequate 
to mess with the armed forces as it was certainly inconvenient for President Fox to 
confront a “real factor of power,” in direct allusion to the armed forces. Roberto 
Madrazo, the principal figure within the PRI at the time, pointed out that the President 
should not hurt an institution as important as the armed forces38.
Judging for what occurred in the months that followed General Vega’s famous 
statement, it is possible to argue that president Fox listened and attended carefully to his 
demands as the topic of the army’s responsibility in the case of the dirty war did not 
return to the public agenda during the remainder of his administration. In fact, in June 
2006, General Arturo Acosta Chaparro, one of the names that came up more frequently 
in the investigations made by the CNDH and the FEMOSPP, was found innocent by a 
military court for his alleged participation in the killing of 22 peasants of Guerrero in
IQ
1974 . The absolution of General Acosta came as a precursor of what occurred a few
34 Ballinas, Victor and Garduno, Roberto. “Llama Vega Garcia a conciliar para que la nacion no se nos 
vaya de las manos" La Jornada. July 01,2004
35 Meyer, Lorenzo. “£V general en nuestro laberinto”. Reforma. July 08, 2004.
36 “Propuso Vega punto final sobre la guerra sucia: Santiago Vasconcelos”. La Jornada. July 02, 2004
37 Bolanos Sanchez Angel “Condena Lopez Obrador crimenes de la guerra sucia ". La Jornada. July 02, 
2004
38 Appendini, Manuel “Madrazo defiende a E ch everr ia Reforma. July 09, 2004
39 Barajas, Abel. “Dejan en libertad a Acosta Chaparro” Reforma. June 30,2007
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months later when the FEMOSPP presented the final results of its investigation. Not 
particularly different to CNDH’s seminal work on the dirty war, Mr. Carrillo Prieto 
concluded that the Mexican Army participated in at least 12 massacres, 120 
extrajudicial executions, 800 forced disappearances and more than 2,000 acts of torture 
along with an unquantifiable number of violations of human rights between 1965 and 
1982. The special prosecutor found the armed forces and the federal government 
responsible for crimes against humanity, terrorism and genocide. Despite the strength of 
the accusations, the Secretary of Defence did not offer a statement to counteract the 
findings of the special prosecutor and the impact of such findings were soon lost by the 
upcoming handover of presidential power from Vicente Fox to Felipe Calderon in 
December 1, 2006.
It seems the military successfully managed the formal and informal consequences of the 
investigations concerning their role and responsibility for the violations of human rights 
committed by their members in the 1970s. The critical juncture within this process was 
the speech of General Vega Garcia on July 1, 2004. It is clear that after that day, the 
initial presidential determination to dig deep into the role of the armed forces during the 
rule of the PRI was deactivated. There was a clear contradiction between the initial 
intention of the president to uncover this period of Mexico’s history and the 
authoritarian character of the system of civil-military relations. With his speech, 
General Vega reminded the president that the armed forces are extremely sensitive to 
issues or actions of civilian authorities that may affect their corporate interest. 
Consequently, they were expecting for the executive power to come to their rescue, and 
they were successful in this.
7.3 The army structure of promotions
The second element that explains the capacity of the army to adapt to new political 
circumstances is the way it changed its structure of promotions to train and eventually 
reward officers with direct experience in regions that face guerrilla activity. According 
to the revision of the resume of all army officers that were promoted to the rank of 
Brigade General since 1976 up to 2004, it is interesting to note the significant ways in 
which the structure of promotion has varied. In order to show the way this 
transformation works, I divided the 27-year period from 1976 to 2003 into two sections. 
I took as criteria for this division the beginning of the presidential term of Carlos
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Salinas, since it was during his administration that the military started to perform a wide 
variety o f missions beyond those traditionally identified with internal security and 
disaster relief. The information on the resume o f army generals was delivered to this 
author by the Secretary o f Defence, in response to are quest for information though the 
IFAI (Petition 0000700043003). The first list included the names o f those officers who 
commanded each of the 12 military regions in the country since 1976 to 2004. A similar 
list was delivered for the case o f each o f the 44 military zones. Having both lists, I was 
able to calculate the number o f months each officer remained in charge o f each military 
zone and region for the two periods under study. Once I had this comparison ready, I 
requested the Secretary o f Defence to name those military zones that are known to be 
characterised by guerrilla activities and illegal traffic or cultivation o f drugs.
For the guerrilla case, it was interesting to note that after the eradication o f the rural 
guerrilla in Guerrero in 1975, the permanence o f military chiefs in zones historically 
identified with the emergence o f insurgency was considerably longer than in the second 
period under analysis. In other words, army chiefs were rotated more often after 1989. 
This information suggests that the strategy o f the armed forces to train and give more 
officers the chance to acquire experience in regions under the strain o f guerrillas 
became quite significant after 1989. This was particularly clear in Guerrero and 
Oaxaca, where the presence o f the EPR is considered as a problem of national security.
Table 7.2
Average of months in post of chiefs of military zones between 1976-1989 and 1989- 
2003
Guerrilla 1976-1989 1989-2003
Oaxaca 19 13
Guerrero 27 15
Chiapas 16 14
Puebla 20 14
Estado de Mexico 26 9
Average 21.6 13
Source: own elaboration with date provided by the Secretary o f  Defence IFAI petition number 
0000700043003 and 0000700039604.
A further indication o f this variation is the importance the army is increasingly giving to 
officers with experience in military zones with guerrilla activity. According to the 
revision o f their resumes, it can be concluded that up to 1989, Brigadier Generals with 
experience in army zones with guerrilla activity had 16 percent more chance to be
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promoted to the next level (Brigade General). After 1989, this percentage climbed to 
27.5. This information is consistent with the way the military enlarged the size o f its 
first tier o f leadership as it can be clearly appreciated in Graph 7.3. It shows how the 
army raised the number o f promotions to the ranks o f Colonel, Brigadier General and 
Brigade General. These promotions are proposed by the Secretary o f defence to the 
President and then turned to the Senate to its final approval. Once this procedure is 
fulfilled, the promotions are announced by the army after the commemoration o f the 
Mexican Revolution, on the 20th o f November. According to the records, there is only 
one case o f refusal o f a proposed promotion by the Senate.
Another case that proves yet again the type o f parameters taken into consideration in the 
armed forces is the figure o f the Secretary o f Defence. For instance, former minister of 
defence in the administration o f Emesto Zedillo, Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, was 
trained in South America on counterinsurgency tactics. He was also active during the 
counterinsurgent campaign in Guerrero that ended up annihilating Lucio Cabanas’ 
guerrilla. A further analysis o f the background of the first three positions in the 
secretary o f defence (Secretary, Undersecretary and the First Officer) shows that after 
1989, these positions have had privileged officers with direct experience in 
counterinsurgency and the control o f drug trafficking.
Figure 7.3
Number of officers promoted to the ranks of division general, brigade general, 
brigadier general and colonel for the period 1976-1988 and 1989-2002
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It seems clear that the army understood that the strategy of containment needed both a 
bigger military presence, and a more professional and experienced one. It is also 
noticeable that the means the army found to foster the specialization of its personnel on 
counterinsurgency was to facilitate the promotion of officers with experience in those 
areas. This trend is even clearer when it comes to army zones known to contain the so- 
called drug cartels or on the border with the United States. I will return to this issue in 
the final chapter.
Special Forces
Since 1990, an increasing number of Mexican recruits have been trained on American 
soil under the International Military Education and Training Programme of the United 
States (IMET). According to The Centre for Public Integrity, the US Army trained in 
Mexico and abroad more that 4,000 Mexican soldiers from 1996 to 2003, an average of 
800 a year40. Concurrently, two new schools of Special Forces were added to the 
educational system to address issues like counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics tactics, 
kidnapping rescue or guerrilla combat. Such missions are mainly carried out by elite 
units called GAFES (Air-Mobile Special Forces Groups) and GANFES (Amphibious 
Special Forces Groups). These groups combine intelligence gathering and analysis with 
operational actions41. In fact, these groups were responsible for the highly publicised 
arrests of renowned leaders of drug trafficking organisations during the administrations 
of Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox42. In 1996, there was one GAFE group in each of 
the 12 military regions in the country, each group comprising between 100 and 150 
men, with functions similar to commando units in the United States Army (Camp 1999). 
By 1997, GAFE units were added to each army zone, with Chiapas having 4, Guerrero 
3, Oaxaca, Puebla, Tabasco and Veracruz with 2 each (SEDENA 1997:19-24).
These groups also perform direct public security functions, as they represent the 
operative arm of the Specialised Unit Against Organised Crime (UEDO),43 which was 
later incorporated to the Deputy Attorney General's Office for Special Investigation into
40 The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Special Report: U.S.-Trained Forces Linked 
to Human Rights Abuses. May 14,2003. www.public-i.ord
41 Medellin, Jorge Alejandro. “Usan Fuerzas de elite en lucha anticrimen” El Universal. February 254, 
2003
42 Benjamin Arrellano Felix, Oziel Cardenas Guillen, Adan Amezcua and Gilberto Garcia Mena whose 
pictures were also present in the FBI most wanted list, side by side to figures as Osama Bin Laden.
43 Medellin, Jorge Alejandro. “Usan Fuerzas de elite en lucha anticrimen” El Universal. February 254, 
2003
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Organised Crime (SIEDO). The growth of these elite units within the army is a clear 
example of the irreversible process of modernization and it aims directly at improving 
their capacity to address organised crime and insurgency. It also points out the 
changing nature of the institution, since presently 1 in 8 soldiers involved in operations 
of any sort belong to a GAFE of GANFE group.
7.4 New guerrilla tactics and the new politics of the EPR
The growth and the increasing specialization of the army does not necessarily mean that 
it is better prepared to contain all expressions of guerrilla activity. In this area, their 
performance tends to be varied. It is clear the armed forces in general have successfully 
contained the advance of the guerrilla and in some cases, have managed to eradicate its 
presence. As we observed in the case of the EZLN, the army succeeded on confining 
this social movement to a number of communities within the state of Chiapas where 
both the EZLN and the Army seem to be content with each other’s positions. However, 
there is one version of the Mexican guerrilla that has mutated towards a more terrorist­
like organisation, assaulting positions of the Mexican army and performing acts of 
sabotage against PEMEX’s infrastructure. The Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) 
enters into this category.
The EPR appeared on the Mexican scene on the 1st of July, 1996. This is one year after 
the infamous killing of peasants in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero. This guerrilla movement 
recognises itself as the continuation of the Party of the Poor (PDLP) and vindicates the 
social struggles of Lucio Cabanas and Genaro Vazquez. In fact, many of the regions 
where the army believes the EPR has a strong presence are the highlands of Atoyac and 
Coyuca de Benitez, two communities dominated by Lucio Cabanas’ guerrilla in the 
1970s (Wrighte 2002). Additionally, the EPR has managed to build urban cells of 
operation by making alliances with strong popular movements such as the Popular Front 
Francisco Villa in Mexico City and the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca 
(APPO). According to the magazine Proceso, one month after its public emergence in 
Guerrero, the EPR had already killed 13 solders and wounded 46 more. By 1999, the 
death toll reached 68 between army soldiers (53) and police agents (15)44.
44 “Suman 68 las bajas castrenses”. E l Universal. October 29, 1999
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Based on information released by the army in 1999, the EPR,45 along with other 16 
armed-groups, had plans to perform a series of sabotage attacks against primary 
infrastructure of the country with the purpose of igniting political instability during the 
presidential election of July 200046. The army alleged the possible formation of a wide 
national alliance of guerrillas, named Treble Alliance of National Indigenous Guerrilla 
(TAGIN), integrated by the EZLN, the EPR and ERPI. This report recommended the 
reinforcement of surveillance to key PEMEX infrastructure as well as 
telecommunications and electricity. Although none of the army’s predictions occurred 
that year, it was a clear sign of the level of tension and alert the armed forces maintained 
when it came to potential actions of guerrillas in the country. In another classified 
document, the army recognised that the multiplication of guerrilla movements in the 
country is partly explained by the acute economic crisis and the galloping poverty that 
persists in many regions, particularly in the south east. “Poor people in the countryside 
have nothing or too little to lose, so they are easily attracted by guerrilla’s ideals of 
economic progress, political and social vindication”47. It recognises that given such 
conditions of poverty, the armed forces have been pushed to increase their presence in 
Oaxaca and Guerrero as a way of deterring the expansion of subversion to nearby states.
From these intelligence documents, often leaked to the press, it is easier to understand 
why the Mexican government maintained and even increased the budget of the military 
during years of great financial restraint, such as 1995, when President Ernesto Zedillo 
cut government expenditure in virtually all areas, except for national defence. It is also 
evident that the strategy of counterinsurgency follows fairly pragmatic objectives. 
Room for protection of human rights remains scarce and terror is a key part of the 
strategy of containment and deterrence. This vision has also been assimilated by the 
civilian counterpart. In a talk, Maria de la Luz Lima Malvido, Deputy Attorney 
General from January 2001 to October 2004, affirmed that when national security is at 
stake, the State should have no limits to its action, particularly when there is a chance to 
bring criminals to justice (London UK. November 17th, 2004). At the level of public 
opinion, a series of polls performed by the top intelligence agency of the Mexican State,
45 It is important to notice that since its foundation in 1996, the EPR has experienced several 
fragmentations due to internal disagreements concerning the way the guerrilla should be conducted. Such 
divisions resulted in the creation of other guerrilla groups, with the ERPI (People’s Insurgent 
Revolutionary Army) and the FARP (People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces) being the most important.
46 “Reforzara SDN zonas estrategicas” El Universal. Novemeber 29, 1999.
47 ‘Credo gasto militar despues de 1994’ El Universal. August 19, 2001
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The Centre of Investigation and National Security (CISEN), between June 1996 and 
October 2000, found that the population generally maintains a low opinion concerning 
the federal policy of containing the advance of guerrillas as it can be clearly appreciated 
in Graph 7.3. However, every time the army or the PGR (The Attorney-General’s 
Office) captures an insurgent leader or the guerrilla performs an act of sabotage, public 
opinion is inclined to pay much more attention than usual.
For instance, two months after the emergence of the EPR, 53 per cent of the population 
had a negative view concerning the way the Mexican government and President Ernesto 
Zedillo were dealing with guerrillas in the country. In the following December, the 
approval rate improved 10 points, presumably as the result of the detention of Benigno 
Guzman, one of the top leaders of this guerrilla. After that point, the acceptance of the 
counterinsurgency strategy fell steadily until the armed forces struck the EPR again, 
with the detention of a handful of its members in Mexico City in June 1997. Three 
months later, the affirmative opinion of the population increased again with the 
imprisonment of Alvaro Sebastian Ramirez, who, according to the armed forces, was in 
charge of managing the finances of the EPR. At this point, the acceptance of President 
Zedillo reached 45 percent, the highest of his administration. By December 1997, the 
popularity of the counterinsurgency campaign went down to 33 percent. Curiously, it 
increased again in February 1998 as a result of a successful operation of the EPR 
against a police facility in Guerrero during the last days of January, which enjoyed wide 
media coverage.
227
Figure 7.4
Citizen’s approval rate of the counterinsurgency strategy 1996-2000
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Source. Own construction with information taken from the article: Ineficaz, el combate de Zedillo al 
EPR: opinion publica” El Universal September 4, 2001
From this brief account, it seems clear that citizens’ opinions are strongly influenced by 
spectacular apprehensions o f EPR leaders. In the next chapter, we will see that this 
tendency is also noticeable when it comes to the capture o f top drug traffickers. 
However, popularity also increases when the guerrilla makes an extraordinary display o f 
strength, such as an assault against police facilities or the execution o f terrorist acts. 
This movement suggests an underlying fear of the population concerning the capability 
o f insurgents to create chaos in the country. It is also clear that when there is limited or 
no information on a particular subject, people tend to assume a negative view regarding 
the government’s performance. As can be observed in the graph, between February 
1999 and November 2000 the negative perception concerning the performance of the 
counterinsurgency strategy remained stable at 38 percent48. However, this is likely to 
apply to other areas of public security and not just the containment of guerrilla activity.
These fluctuations in public opinion suggest the armed forces have little room to 
manoeuvre regarding the effects o f its missions on people’s perception. On the one 
hand, they have to control the advance o f the guerrilla and confine it to certain regions 
or try to breakdown its organisation, as seems to be happening with the EPR. One the 
other hand, they also have to inform the media of the progress achieved on this area,
48 “Ineficaz, e l combate de Zedillo al EPR: opinion publica''’ El Universal September 4, 2001.
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either by capturing guerrilla leaders or by destroying its structure, because such results 
improve the President’s image and their own corporate interest.
The problem with this logic is that these actions are often incompatible with a basic 
criterion of democracy. As we observed in the case of Mrs. Ascencio, the methods the 
army employs to maintain regions under guerrilla threat preserve many similarities with 
those of the past. Differences may be more a matter of the level of intensity and scale. 
Massive violations of human rights or genocide are no longer an option, but constant 
and selective action against leaders or vulnerable members of communities where the 
guerrilla has presence still occur. For instance, within one year of the first public 
appearance of the EPR in Guerreo, the Centre of Human Rights, Montana 
Tlachinollan49, documented 45 complaints of human rights violations against 
indigenous communities in “La Montand’ region of Guerrero. The complaints mainly 
accused members of the armed forces and the local police50. In the same vein, Miguel 
Alvarez, representative of the Human Rights Centre Miguel Agustin Pro51, stated that 
they had documented 38 forced disappearances executed in Guerrero between 1996 and 
199852.
On 7th June, 1998 occurred the alleged mass murder of peasants by the army in the 
community of Ayutla de los Libres. This event is also known as the massacre of El 
Charco. According to Erika Zamora, an eye witness of the killing, the army carefully 
surrounded the community and then opened fire against a group of peasants who were 
presumably linked to the EPR53. However, the army portrayed the event as a 
confrontation between guerrilla cells and soldiers of the 27th Military zone. Two 
months after this event, Senator Felix Salgado Macedonio of the leftist party PRD for 
the state of Guerrero, accused the army of killing three PRD followers because of an 
assumption of their presumed links to the EPR. Such accusations rapidly activated one 
of the mechanisms of defence the armed forces have in Congress. To begin with, the 
parliamentary groups of the PRI, the ruling party at that time, issued a statement 
defending the armed forces and accusing Senador Salgado of trying to degrade its 
image. Later, on-leave Generals who held a seat in congress as members of the PRI,
49 http://www.tlachinollan.org/inicio.htni
50 Guerrero, Jesus. “Destacan Violaciones a Derechos Humanos” Reforma. December 29, 1997
51 http://www.centroprodh.org.mx/2008/
52 Reyes, Carlos. “Asesinato y  tortura, crimenes de Acosta” Reforma. September 4th, 2000
53 “Exigen esclarecer la matanza de El Charco” El Universal. May 26,2002
229
General Alvaro Vallarta and Jose Antonio Valdivia, declared that the army was a clean 
institution and it was about time for some people to stop trying to defame the armed 
forces54.
Denunciations of this kind kept coming. In November 1999, 21 community leaders of 
the municipality of Ayutla de los Libres sent a letter to the governor of Guerrero, Rene 
Juarez Cisneros, requesting his assistance to end a multitude of practices of intimidation 
performed by the army while searching for EPR and ERPI members. Complaints 
included, specifically, sexual harassment of indigenous women, theft and destruction of 
property as well as random shootings from helicopters of towns and indigenous people 
for no particular reason55. In August 2001, eight months after Vicente Fox assumed the 
presidency of the country, the EPR accused him of re-editing the worst days of the dirty 
war in Guerrero. They accused the armed forces of hunting relatives of those who 
joined their organisation and torturing them56.
Still, the EPR and other guerrilla movements in the country entered into a period of 
relative inaction during the first half of the presidency of Vicente Fox. Miguel Angel 
Torre, leader of the task force on terrorism and counterinsurgency of the Federal 
Preventive Police, known as the Alamo Group, stated that the apparent tranquillity of 
the EPR could have been the result of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, or just 
the decision of this organisation to regroup , but Jose Luis Sierra, a well known scholar 
on the issue of armed forces in Mexico, has a different view. He affirms that Adolfo 
Aguilar Zinser, former chief of staff of the Presidency on National Security issues, 
managed to establish communication with the leaders of the EPR and offered a truce on 
behalf of the federal government. According to Sierra Guzman, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser 
convinced the EPR to stop their activities due to the risk of having the United States 
more involved in Mexico under the umbrella of the global war on terror58. That was a 
possibility that neither the EPR nor the Mexican government were willing to accept. 
This truce was partially broken in 2004, when the EPR set off a bag of explosives in a 
branch of the largest bank in Mexico, Banamex, in Jiutepec, Morelos, causing
54 Teheran Jorge, Claudia Ramo and Jesus Guerrero. Acusan a Ejercito de asesinatos. Reforma. 
November 19, 1997
55 “Cerco Policiaco-militar en las zonas eperristas” El Universal. February 6, 2000
56 “Miente grupo armadd,'> El Universal. August 21, 2001
57 Jorge Ramos. “En calma, los grupos guerrilleros”. El Universal. March 13,2003
58 Jose Luis Sierra. “Fallas de la inteligencia militar”. El Universal. July 20, 2007
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considerable damage to the building, but causing no casualties or human fatalities. The 
detonation of this bomb by the EPR was an alarming sign of alert to the intelligence 
bodies of the State, including the armed forces, as it took them all by surprise.
Even though this was an isolated incident in the midst of an apparent truce, it showed 
how poorly prepared the intelligence agencies were, the military included, to deal with 
this sort of enemy. For the army, it became clear that the old strategy of intimidation, 
militarisation and social assistance to communities under the threat of subversion was 
an effective way to weaken the guerrilla’s bases of support and keep them confined to a 
certain area. However, it was not going to prevent the sort of attacks terrorist 
organisations often carry out. In any case, there is no information concerning a 
confrontation between the army or a police agency and the EPR in the second half of 
Vicente Fox’s administration. In fact, the mood of previous years continued. The EPR 
kept denouncing the growing militarisation of the country under the argument of going 
after organised crime. For instance, in November 2006, the EPR released an official 
communication condemning the growing militarisation of the state of Michoacan. The 
guerrilla group claimed that militarisation was not an answer the growth of criminality. 
It argued that is has been continuously seen that security agencies always end up being 
bought by the drug cartels. For the EPR, this policy of militarisation was part of a 
fascist strategy of President Vicente Fox and now Felipe Calderon, used to impose the 
objectives of the far right in Mexico59.
Up to that point, the war between the Mexican state and the EPR was not a matter of 
main concern to the public opinion. After the 10th of June, 2007 the story became 
different. The EPR denounced the detention of two of their members: Gabriel Alberto 
Cruz Sanchez and Edmundo Reyes Amaya. According to the EPR, both had been 
captured by the federal government in Oaxaca and were being victims of torture in a 
detention centre in the City of Oaxaca. The press release argued that the Mexican 
government was once more putting in motion the dirty war and made clear that 
retaliations would occur if those individuals were not presented alive to the press. 
Local and federal police agencies denied the version of the EPR and claimed that there 
were no records of any detention of those named by the guerrilla. This was not the first 
time the EPR denounced the forced disappearance of one of its combatants. Back in
59 Jaime Marquez, “Michoacan: EPR critica petition  de ayuda militar. E l Universal. N ovember 30,2006
231
October 1997, they accused the Federal Government of apprehending and torturing 
commander “Gustavo”. In fact, the EPR was forced to release Gustavo’s real name 
— Rogelio Cuevas Fuentes—  to facilitate the mission of a human rights organisation 
that offered assistance to find his whereabouts60. The EPR also accused the federal 
judicial police of the disappearances of Fabian, Andres Tzompaxtle, Rafael, Jorge Salas, 
Domingo Ayala and Elsa. Despite the efforts, none of the above was found and the 
claims of the EPR were narrowed down to a simple condemnation of Ernesto Zedillo’s 
presidency for running a dirty war against their organisation.
However, this way of acting changed completely in 2007. Two months after the EPR 
denounced the army for the disappearance of Gabriel Alberto Cruz Sanchez and 
Edmundo Reyes Amaya, members of this organisation set eight explosive bags along 
different points of the Pemex gas pipelines in Guanajuato and five days later another 
round of explosives in Queretaro . The explosion disrupted gas supply in the region and 
caused serious damage to the pipes with an estimated economic cost of 100 million 
dollars. It is important to mention that the industrial activity of Guanajuato and 
Queretaro were paralysed due to the lack of gas supply. This region, known as El Bajio, 
holds a large proportion of Mexico’s industrial base. Industries like GM, Honda, and 
Nissan in the automobile industry, and Kellogg’s and Hershey, have huge industrial 
compounds in that area.
These kinds of attacks are relatively common in countries that host radical guerrilla 
groups, such as Nigeria or Colombia, but this was the first time a Mexican insurgent 
group acted against the country’s essential infrastructure. According to experts, the 
explosives had a level of sophistication not seen in previous incidents. The level of 
coordination and knowledge the guerrilla had over the Pemex infrastructure was also 
worth noticing. The worst scenario for the armed forces and the intelligence agencies 
had come true. The EPR lost no time in accepting its role in the explosions. It said it 
would continue attacking the interest of the illegitimate government and oligarchic 
economic interest, until their comrades were presented alive to the press61. Two 
months later, on the 10th of September, 2007, the EPR set off another load of 
explosives at different points of Pemex gas pipelines in Veracruz and Tlaxcala . This
60 Roman, Gerardo. “Exige el EPR la presentation de combatiente. Reforma. Oct 27, 1996
61 “Firma EPR explosiones” Reforma. July 11, 2007
62 “Reivindica EPR las explosiones” Reforma. September 12, 2007
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time the estimated economic cost, including lost gas, the costs for repairing the 
pipelines and the economic paralysis that followed the attacks, reached 110 million 
dollars in just one week . Together, the two attacks account for one fifth of the entire 
annual budget of the military in Mexico, which is an organisation with nearly 300,000 
members.
There was no previous event that could match the magnitude of the economic damage 
caused by the EPR to the local economy. It was clear that the armed forces or local and 
federal police agencies lacked the capacity to survey or guarantee the safety of nearly 
54,000 kilometres of pipelines that Pemex has within Mexican territory (Greenpeace 
2005). This new strategy of the EPR showed to the armed forces that the usual ways of 
counteracting the power of the guerrillas are useless in the face of this sort of activity. It 
also showed that under such circumstances, the Mexican government would need to 
invest more resources in civilian agencies of security, especially intelligence to 
counteract the shifting strategy of the ERP. On the political side, it shows the EPR is 
willing to perform such attacks as a valuable resource against the traditional State’s 
methods to combat the guerrillas. From now on, forced disappearances, torture or 
extrajudicial execution of members of the EPR may become too costly for the Mexican 
government to perform on the face of its retaliatory power.
7.5 Conclusions
The surprising emergence of the EZLN in 1994 made the Mexican armed forces 
redefine its mission in the era of globalization, mass media communications and 
democratisation. The violent and illegal recipes of the past for confronting the guerrilla 
could no longer be applied with the Zapatistas. The military, and especially the 
civilian elite understood, appropriately, I believe, that the EZLN could not be defeated 
militarily as their strength was not rooted in weapons, but on a progressive sector of the 
local Catholic Church, strong local appeal and consistent sympathy of national and 
international audiences with the Zapatista cause. In this case, containing the EZLN 
within certain areas of Chiapas is a success for the armed forces and the civilian elite. 
In the light of this experience, the army has consistently adjusted its allocation of 
soldiers within the territory and created incentives that promote the specialization of 
officers on counterinsurgency.
63 Emiliano Ruiz. iA  quienes reclama el EPR?. Reforma. N ovember 4,2007
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However, the success in dealing with the Zapatistas has not lessened the insurgency 
issue in the country. The EPR’s successful attacks on the Pemex infrastructure in June 
and September 2007 in four different states of the Republic suggest the strategy of 
containment is of little use in confronting a guerrilla group whose operations are quickly 
transiting towards terrorist-like activities. It is obvious that the institutional weakness of 
the Mexican state directly translates in the impossibility of the military or civilian 
agencies of intelligence to confront such a challenge. On the political side of the 
equation, the process of democratic transition has pushed the issue on human rights and 
the past record of the armed forces back into the public agenda. It is clear that this 
situation has made the armed forces profoundly uncomfortable. However, their 
reaction reveals one of the main characteristics of the system of civil-military relations 
and the enormous political leverage this agency has accumulated since 1989. The 
evidence shows that the executive power has consistently defended the reputation of 
the army. The failed attempt to bring army officers to trial under the umbrella of the 
FEMOSPP represents clear evidence of this trend. The final outcome was a de facto 
amnesty for those involved in the abuses perpetrated during the dirty war. Furthermore, 
the submissive attitude of the Governor of Veracruz towards the army in the case of 
Emestina Ascencio is further evidence of the scope of political leverage of the military 
at different levels of the public administration.
This overprotective attitude of the ruling elite towards the military reveals the level of 
attachment and reliance the federal government has on the armed forces to perform 
basic tasks of governance, such as public security, counterinsurgency and disaster relief. 
It seems clear that given the extended role of the military in the political system, the 
president simply cannot afford to endanger the legitimacy of its main policy instrument. 
Therefore, this chapter showed that the current system of civil-military relations in 
Mexico relies on tradition and the way loyalty towards the executive power has been 
constructed since the Mexican Revolution. Yet, the weakening capacity of the executive 
power to carry out its policy goals has turned this tradition into an obstacle for 
democratic consolidation.
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Chapter 8. Civil-Military Relations and the Militarisation o f Public 
Security in Mexico (1989-2007)
Introduction
Since 1989, the armed forces in Mexico have increasingly expanded their participation 
in the system of public security, mainly by replacing or assisting civilian agencies of 
security at federal and state level. This new set of responsibilities has been delegated by 
the executive power due to the incapacity of civilians to address rampant levels of 
violence in the country, mostly related to drug trafficking. International pressures have 
played an important role. The Mexican government has been historically constrained by 
the US continental approach on the combat of drug trafficking, which prescribes the 
utilization of the military to disrupt the supply of illegal drugs to the American market. 
On this issue, General Mario Palmerin Cordero, former undersecretary of defence 
during the first two years of Vicente Fox’s administration, explained the situation to 
this author in a very straightforward way: “the Americans tell you, if you fight drugs 
you are our friend, if you don’t, you are in problems. If you can’t contain drug 
trafficking as we expect you to do it, we can either do it for you or help you to do it.” 
(London, July 13, 2003). The part of “do it for you or help you to do it” has clear 
sovereignty-threat connotations the Mexican Government has historically opposed to 
consider in the relationship with the United States. It clearly contravenes Mexican 
foreign policy principles and international conventions, leaving “to show that you can 
fight it appropriately ” as the main path to follow. The literature on this issue is again 
quite prolific and has been at the centre of acute disputes and accusations between both 
countries (Barona Lobato 1976; Craig 1978; Margain 1990; Dombierer 1991; Chabat 
1996; Dunn 1996; Benitez 1997; Gonzalez 1997; Salgado 1997; Tello Peon 1997; 
Santamaria Gomez 1999; Velez Quero 1999; Van Wert 2001; Chabat. 2001; Chabat 
2002; Recio 2002; Serrano and Toro 2002; Sheptycki 2003; Youngers and Rosin 2004; 
Astorga 2007).
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I will argue in this chapter that the delegation of policy missions to the armed forces and 
away from civilian agencies transformed the balance of power that pervaded for decades 
in the system of civil-military relations. As will be observed in this chapter, the initial 
decision of president Carlos Salinas to use the military to counteract the power of the 
drug cartels, instead of the Attorney-General’s Office , created a momentum of 
militarisation that has virtually reached every comer of the system of public security at 
federal, state and municipal level. This momentum is partly supported by the moral 
capital and good image of the military in the eyes of the population. This condition 
permits the president to increase military roles without confronting important resistance 
from civil society and opposition parties. Still, the consequences of this shift of 
responsibilities from civilians to soldiers reinforce the authoritarian nature of the system 
and represent a visible obstacle to the process of democratic consolidation in the 
country. It is clear, as we observed in the previous chapter, that the new policy missions 
delegated to the military have not been accompanied by an adequate mechanism of 
supervision. According to the principle of exclusive subordination, the armed forces 
only remain accountable to the president, while progressively more other police 
corporations are now under the formal or informal control of the army.
In order to address these issues, this chapter is divided into three sections. First I address 
the historical background of the participation of the military in counteracting drug 
trafficking. In this section I deal with the long-standing pressure the United States has 
put on the Mexican government to improve its capacity to combat the power of the 
drug cartels. In the second section, I look at the possible motivations that perhaps 
pushed President Salinas to make the crucial decision to delegate this load to the armed 
forces. I analyse the impact these measures had in terms of the institutionalisation of 
military roles during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo. I particularly delve into the 
transformation this new roles generated in the organisation of the armed forces, 
especially in what concerns its yearly budget allocations, geographical distribution of 
personnel and internal structure of promotions.
Finally, I look at the presidency of Vicente Fox. Here I address the great expectations of 
social change embraced by the people because of his electoral triumph, especially in 
terms of democratising the system of civil-military relations. However, his policies 
turned out to promote the opposite. In fact, it was during his sexenio when the
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militarisation of public security reached its zenith with the appointment of an on-leave 
army general as the Nation’s Attorney General. This policy of militarisation does not 
appear to be changing, but is in fact deepening, during the fist third of the presidency of 
Felipe Calderon (2006-2012). I suggest in this section that democratisation in Mexico 
has not meant a change in the basic rule of the system of civil-military relations, as it 
was defined by President Porfirio Diaz in the 1880s. This feature represents one of the 
major problems of the current process of democratic consolidation.
8.1 Armed forces and the origins of the drug war
Military involvement against drug trafficking was active long before the US 
Government tagged the issue as “relevant” to its internal security in 19461. Back in 
1938, under the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, a battalion of the 4th Military Zone 
destroyed marihuana fields in Sonora. This operation was run in cooperation with the 
Attorney-General’s Office (PGR) and Agent Scharff from the US Secretary of Treasury 
(Astorga 2007:57). These early efforts by the Mexican government were followed by a 
permanent campaign of eradication of illicit drugs under the leadership of the PGR 
(Wager 1994; Bertram 1996). However, this policy was suspended during the Second 
World War, presumably as a result of the US intention to ensure the supply of opiates to 
produce morphine.
In the years that followed, mild international pressure was placed on the Mexican 
government, for example when the Director of the Antidrug Unit of the US 
Government, Harry J. Anslinger, declared in 1955 that 90 percent of the marihuana 
consumed in the US came from Mexico (Senate 1955). Yet, it was until the 1960s, in 
the midst of the hippie revolution, that the rampant consumption of illicit drugs in the 
United States attracted the eye of national policy makers, particularly that of President 
Nixon. According to the President’s Commission on Organised Crime, Mexico 
supplied almost the entire demand of marihuana in the United States in 1965 (GPO 
1986). In fact, it was in the late 1960s when Mexico and the United States experienced
1 Based upon its record in the early 1930s, the government in Mexico City appeared willing to act with 
the United States to stop smuggling. In 1930 the two countries concluded an informal agreement for the 
exchange of information on drugs. The following year, officials sent a special agent to coordinate 
antidrug activity with Consul William Blocker in the Juarez-£7 Paso region. Mexico next requested that 
agents of both countries be permitted unrestricted border crossings, pursuant to their duties. The State 
Department and the Bureau of Narcotics turned down the request, although United States agents did 
continue to cross into Mexico with Anslinger’s express approval. By mid-1932 all the Mexicans had 
achieved was another informal arrangement for the exchange of information. (Walker, 1989)
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the first mayor diplomatic confrontation over the issue of illegal drug trafficking. In 
1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the closure of all crossing points in the border 
with Mexico, so agents of the newly created Task Force One, integrated by the Justice 
Department’s Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Treasury Department’s 
customs bureau, could search for illegal drugs in every car and person who intended to 
cross the border (Andreas 1998). The search created an enormous chaos. According to 
Carpenter (2003), thousands of Mexican workers lost their jobs in the United States 
because of customs delays. Lastly, more than 5 million citizens of the United States and 
Mexico were caught up in that nightmarish dragnet before it finally ended.
Despite the extent of the operation, only small quantities of drugs were seized. It is to 
be remembered that President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was not upset by the closure of the 
border itself. This unilateral action damaged Mexico’s international reputation and the 
economic welfare of cities along the border (Toro 1995). Allegedly, Nixon’s drastic 
actions were the response to Mexico’s refusal to allow U.S. directed aerial inspection 
over Mexican territory. Diaz Ordaz’s negative got in the way of a U.S. continental 
policy that used spraying chemical herbicides over illegal crop fields to disrupt supply. 
Gordon Liddy, special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and member of the 
diplomatic team that negotiated with Mexico during the end of the operation explains: 
“Operation Intercept, with its massive economic and social disruption, could be 
sustained far longer by the United States than by Mexico. It was an exercise in 
international extortion, pure, and simple and effective, designed to bend Mexico to our 
will. We figured Mexico would hold out for about a month; in fact they caved in after 
about two weeks and we got what we wanted”2.
There is evidence that since 1969, Mexico’s ruling elite has not disregarded the U.S. 
concern on drug trafficking. After Operation Intercept, a wider cooperation was 
instituted between the two countries with the objective of eradicating illegal crops and 
running shared interdiction programs. Still, the frenzy of the war on drugs lost some 
steam under Presidents Ford and Carter’s tenures. Both presidents adopted a slightly 
different approach towards the issue of drugs and the bilateral relationship with the 
United States strongly improved. Carter shifted the policy focus towards preventing
2 Quoted in Epstein (1990: 84)
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consumption rather than concentrating exclusively on supply (Carpenter 2003). 
Paradoxically, under a period of low American pressure, the Mexican government 
launched the strongest ever known campaign against drug trafficking in the country to 
eradicate illicit drug crops and dismember domestic drug trafficking organisations. 
Under the so-called Operation Condor, the Mexican state brought together the efforts 
of the military, federal and local police agencies and the Federal Directorate of Security 
(DFS) towards a single objective: the combat of international drug trade.
The launch of Operation Condor exposes an interesting paradox that helps to exemplify 
the different dimensions and aims of Mexico’s drug war as well as the role of the armed 
forces in the strategy. Up to that year, 1976, Mexico had often taken measures against 
drug trafficking only as a direct response to pressures from the US government. 
However, Operation Condor was launched in a period where the “Nixonean” drug 
politics was absent. S. Aguayo (2001) argues that in the late 1970s the regime began to 
use the fa?ade of combating drug trafficking to conceal a disproportionate response to 
incipient and badly organised guerrilla movements. By using information of the state 
intelligence apparatus, S. Aguayo concludes that there are indications that the relentless 
campaign to combat drug trafficking in the late 1970s, particularly in Jalisco, Sinaloa, 
Nuevo Leon and Michoacan, was put in motion to prevent a hypothetical merger 
between drug traffickers and guerrilla groups. This view is consistent with the findings 
presented in chapter 6 of this research. Beyond the possible political motivations of this 
policy, the results of the Condor Operation were stunning. The share of the Mexican 
marihuana in the U.S. market passed from levels of 40% in 1977 to 3% in 1981 (Graph
8.1).
This result of Operation Condor were not only applauded by US officials, but even 
influential scholars in the filed of organised crime, such as Peter Lupsha, affirmed that 
the results achieved during those years represented probably the only resolute attempt to 
fight drug trafficking successfully in Latin America in 1970s. In fact, the US presented 
the Mexican achievements in the war on drugs as the model to follow by other countries 
(Lupsha 1986) as marijuana and poppy fields were practically eradicated during the five 
years the operations lasted. For a different set of authors, the success of the Mexican 
efforts to combat drug trafficking derived from the bad reputation of the Mexican
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marihuana among American consumers, due to the intensive use of paraquat, a highly 
toxic substance used to exterminate the plant by the local authorities3. (Anderson 1981; 
Baum 1996).
Figure 8.1
Estimated sources and percentage of imports of marijuana available in the United 
States 1977-1987
 Colombia
U.S.
Data taken from the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee complied for 
various years (1981,1985,1987,1994 and 1998).
Despite the success o f the Condor Operation, the total amount o f drugs available in the 
United States was hardly reduced, as Colombian traffickers and other external and 
internal suppliers managed to fulfil the market share left by Mexican drug cartels 
(Chepesiuk 1999). Still, Condor showed, for the first time, that the Mexican 
government was eager to act against drug trafficking both in response to international 
pressure and for their own reasons, in other words, to conceal the open combat the state 
was undergoing against urban and rural guerrillas. Not surprisingly, once the political 
power o f the regime was reinstated and the guerrilla movement annihilated in the early 
1980s, the production o f illegal drugs bounced back and recovered its normal levels, but 
with some important variations. First, the number of state resources employed during 
the Condor Operation brought into play almost all the security bodies available in the 
county. This massive eradication effort pushed less daring and smaller traffickers out o f 
the market, thus benefiting the most powerful and organised, particularly those who 
could afford the high cost o f corruption and the increasing use o f violence (Toro 1995). 
It also greatly expanded the corruption potential o f a burgeoning illegal drug market4
3 According to Baun and Anderson, American users stopped buying the Mexican marihuana as they 
considered it too risky due to the harmful effects that paraquat could represent to human health.
4 For an interesting explanation o f the hippie culture and the American drug market see (Estrada 1996)
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that was about to experience its best performance ever in the first half of the 1980s. To 
put it in numbers, based on US Health Ministry statistics, by 1979 almost 29% of the 
population above 12 years old was addicted to marijuana, 3% to heroin and 10% to 
cocaine (Bertram 1996). There is no doubt that such a massive demand made the 
business of illegal drugs very appealing, particularly for an increasingly impoverished 
Mexican peasantry.
A further element that enhanced the role of Mexico in the international map of drug 
trafficking was the widely celebrated triumph of the Reagan administration on the 
subject of the Caribbean corridor and its closure to Colombian cocaine shipments that 
entered the US through Florida (Camp 2005:110). After such “success,” Mexico was 
left as the preferred substitute route for Colombian cocaine exporters. This shift 
dramatically elevated Mexico’s position in the international drug trade and vastly 
increased the power and influence of country’s major trafficking organisations. 
(Andreas 1998; Andreas 2000a). Under these conditions, the 1980s represented an 
extremely difficult period for the Mexican Government. It coincided with the onset of 
Miguel de la Madrid’s sexenio (1982-1988) and the Republican administration of 
President Ronald Reagan. Internally, President de la Madrid needed to introduce urgent 
measures to readjust the country’s economic performance after the disastrous 
functioning of his predecessor. Externally, the revival of Nixon’s rhetoric by President 
Reagan implied that the return of a bilateral relationship that could easily be poisoned 
by the topic of drugs. In fact, the Reagan administration labelled De la Madrid's 
sexenio as poorly committed to the war on drugs and highly penetrated by corruption. 
The State Department’s long list of alleged Mexican corrupt public servants included 
names such as Sergio Garcia Ramirez who served as the Nation’s Attorney-General, 
Manuel Bartlet, Secretary of Interior; General. Juan Arevalo-Gardoqui, Secretary of 
Defence; Miguel Aldana, Chief of Interpol Mexico; and the chief of the State’s 
Intelligence Agency, Jose Antonio Zorilla Perez, who was later convicted for the 
assassination of Manuel Buendia, a well-known journalist specialising in national 
security issues, particularly drug trafficking. Even though many of these allegations 
were never fully proved, the confiscation of 7,000 tons of marijuana (the largest ever in 
world’s history) at El Bufalo Ranch in Chihuahua in 1984 and Jose Antonio Zorrilla’s 
imprisonment in 1989 showed that some of the rumours were certainly true and the
241
presence of drug traffickers in the political system was not merely a suspicion (Chabat 
1996).
Not surprisingly, after each political scandal of corruption, a political statement was 
issued by President De la Madrid exposing his firm commitment to combat drug 
trafficking, to clean law enforcement from corruption and to strengthen interagency 
cooperation with the United States. However, the presidential political discourse and 
the policies adopted in this area were not at all related. From 1969 to 1988, no president 
in Mexico tried to reform the police agencies as a way of boosting the ability of the state 
to counteract the power of the drug mafias. In other words, law enforcement reform did 
not figure in the agendas of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970), Luis 
Echeverria (1970-1976), Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) or Miguel de la Madrid 
(1982-1988). The Attorney-General’s office (PGR) remained the main actor in the 
antidrug strategy of the Mexican state as it had been since 1938.
8.2 The militarisation of the PGR and the presidencies of Carlos 
Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo.
The Attorney-General’s office had been the traditional agency for combating drugs. 
This changed drastically during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988- 
1994). Since the year of Operation Intercept, failure and corruption scandals had already 
caused great damage to the reputation of the Federal Judicial Police. Furthermore, 
achieving the inclusion of Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) — arguably the primary objective of President Salinas’s administration in his 
relationship with the United States—  needed to ease the negative impact of drug matters 
on the bilateral agenda to gain the support of the US Congress in this endeavour. 
Therefore, the President’s strategy focused on conveying the idea that Mexican 
authorities were working hard against corruption, and were willing to cooperate fully 
with the United States.
Still, it was clear that more than good intentions and joint press releases were going to 
be required this time. The government of Mexico wanted to prevent the generation of 
the type of corruption scandals that had damaged the past reputation of the Federal 
Judicial Police and the regime’s apparatus as a whole. In other words, President Salinas 
had to ensure that drug trafficking affairs would not become recurrent front-page
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material for newspapers, particularly as a result of corruption of Mexican officials. 
Furthermore, Mexico would also require compliance with the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s recommendations on the war on drugs. In practice, this meant bringing the 
military into counter-narcotics operations to assist or replace inefficient and corrupt 
police bodies. Under this set of conditions, President Carlos Salinas chose to delegate 
important responsibilities related to the war against drug trafficking to the armed forces 
instead of the Office of the Attorney-General5. This policy shift was framed within the 
National Development Plan (PND) 1988-19946. In the PND, President Salinas 
recognised that drug trafficking was a growing public health concern, which was also a 
damaging force affecting the performance of public security institutions. Therefore, it 
was the executive’s responsibility to direct as many resources as needed to counteract 
such a “destructive” effect. An important element underlying the situation was the 
public acknowledgment within the incoming administration that federal civilian police 
had failed to counteract the power of organised criminality. This was allegedly because 
they were corrupt and allied to the groups they were supposed to combat
The PND also made it clear that the participation of the armed forces was meant to 
exclusively assist the Attorney-General’s Office in the combat of organised crime, 
particularly drug trafficking. However, the activities the military performed during the 
Salinas Administration demonstrates that the word “assistance” was an euphemism for 
replacement. From 1989 to 1992, a series of joint programs between the Mexican 
Attorney-General’s office and the Defense Secretariat began to bring the efforts of the 
two institutions together in the fight against drug trafficking. The cooperation included 
training programs of civilian personnel in military facilities as well as the constant
Q
replacement of “dirty” or corrupt police officers with “on-leave” military personnel . It
5 The eroded electoral legitimacy of the government of Carlos Salinas after allegations of electoral fraud 
in the presidential election o f 1988 meant that the President could not afford the political cost of major 
corruption scandals that became endemic during the incumbency of his predecessor. In this sense, Artz 
(2000) argues that the lack of civilian alternatives to control the expanding problem of the drug money 
and common crime, given the total absence of professional security forces, left the military as the only 
resource available to the government of Carlos Salinas.
6 The NDP is a document that contains the main policy guidelines that each elected President is obliged to 
present to Congress within the first year of functions.
“The situation is very clear, the police bodies fell apart due to corruption and the army is intervening 
more every time because is the institution less penetrated by drug trafficking” said Sergio Aguayo, 
professor and specialist on national security issues and U.S.- Mexico relationship of El Colegio de Mexico 
during a conference in Veracruz in December 2002. (Ortiz, 2002)
8 “The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) purged some 737 agents from PJF organizations in 
August 1996.20 The mass firings —  which had been preceded by the dismissal of hundreds of other PJF
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was thanks to this policy that the first wave of army officers arrived to the PGR in 1990 
and the police department of Mexico City to occupy key positions. That was the case of 
General Jorge Carillo Olea, who took control of the fight against drug trafficking and 
the reorganisation of the intelligence apparatus of the PGR and General Jose Domingo 
Ramirez Garrido, current secretary of Public Security in Nuevo Leon, who became the 
Secretary of Transit and Security of Mexico City9.
Cooperation between the two institutions has never been free of conflict. On several 
occasions, the Army expressed its contempt for the lack of professionalism of the 
Federal Judicial Police or los judiciales. It claimed that training or educating already 
corrupt police personnel couldn’t do much to prevent them from protecting and assisting 
the operations of narcotraffickers (Avalos-Pedroza 2001:4). This kind of statements has 
been common in the discourse of the armed forces, especially when they achieved the 
apprehension of a notable drug lord. For instance, after the army detained Hector el 
Giiero Palma in 1995, who at the time was one of most hunted drug trafficker in the 
country, General Luis Garfias declared that the military had carried out the incarceration 
of Palma under strict conditions of secrecy as the Federal Judicial Police or the local 
police could not be trusted10. A similar argument was used by the Defence Minister 
when Benjamin Arellano Felix, the leader of El Cartel de Tijuana, was captured in 2002 
by a specialized unit of the army11. According to General Clemente Vega Garcia, there 
were only three senior public servants who knew about the operation: President Fox, the 
Attorney General (who was also an army general), and Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, 
who acted as the general director of the Special Unit Against Organised Crime (UEDO). 
Once more, General Luis Garfias declared, this time from his chair at the Centre for the 
Study of the Armed Forces, that the apprehension of Benjamin Arellano Felix was 
possible due to the close cooperation that exist between the DEA and the Mexican 
government as well as the efficient work of the army’s intelligence apparatus. “It could 
not be otherwise, because the Mexican police has not changed, these people remain 
corrupt.” Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos (JLSV) told this author that the intelligence 
unit that followed the leads concerning Arellano Felix was a very closed and select 
agency, made up of fine army officers and civilians. JLSV affirmed that the UEDO was
personnel —  had been planned for over a year and undertaken because of the failure of many officers to 
meet the requisite "ethical profile."(Turbiville, 1997;Maldonado, 1996)
9 Sierra, Jorge Luis. Fuerzas Armadas: la critica lealtad. Reforma. December 17, 1995
10 Sierra, Jose Luis. “Lor critica lealtad>\  Reforma. December 17, 2005
11 Castilla, Gustavo. “la captura”. La Jornada. March 10,2002
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the only civilian office enjoying the trust of the military, partly because he (JLSV) and 
his men also had the trust of the DEA (London UK. February 8th, 2006). In this case, it 
was also curious to observe how General Clemente Garcia allowed the mass media to 
film the specialized squad that had captured Arellano Felix12. For Oscar Rocha 
Dabrowsky, Director of the Foundation Joaquin Amaro of Strategic Studies, the 
message General Clemente was indenting to send with this video was clear: “the army is
• 13the only institution capable to delivering results in the war against drug trafficking” .
A similar message was repeated by the Defence Minister when the army captured Osiel 
Cardenas Guillen, the leader of El Golfo Cartel, in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas in March 
16, 2003 (Leroy 2004:117). On this occasion, General Clemente declared that only 
President Fox knew about the operation and the whole task of intelligence had been 
operated by the army alone14. According to General Clemente, not even the Governor 
of Tamaulipas, Mr. Tomas Yarrington, knew about the operation. Later that day, in an 
interview for a news radio show, Mr. Yarrington said he was happy about not knowing 
anything about the operation that ended in the incarceration of Cardenas Guillen, as 
issues related to drug trafficking were very delicate and, for that reason, more 
convenient to be carried out in strict secrecy15.
There is no doubt that the army has taken its mission to counteract drug trafficking very 
seriously; and the secrecy surrounding their operation may well be further evidence of 
such an attitude. However, clearly, the public relations side of the equation, that is, the 
success story of the army in the drug war, is also aimed at reinforcing the idea among 
the population that organised criminal rings have penetrated civilian agencies of 
security and, perhaps, key political figures. Therefore, the army is the only alternative 
to deal with the problem.
Under this logic, it is easy to understand the sharp resistance of military personnel to 
cooperate with, or even to receive orders from what they consider “inept and corrupt”
12 Giddis Smith, David, “Mexico’s military Coming Out of Shadows and Onto TV”. San Diego Union 
Tribune. March 17,2002
13 Najar, Alberto.” Los exitos contra el narco: de EU o de herenciapriista” La Jornada. April 21, 2002.
14 This declaration of General Clemente Vega was given to Joaquin Lopez-Doriga in his daily news show 
in Radioformula. March 14, 2003.
http://www.radioformula.com.mx/rf5000.asp?page=2&anio=2003&mes=3
15 This declaration of Tomas Yarrington was given to Joaquin Lopez-Doriga in his daily news show in 
Radioformula. March 14, 2003.
http://www.radioformula.com. mx/rf5000.asp?page=2&anio=2003&mes=3
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civilian authorities. These internal disputes reached a first point of crisis during the last 
year of the administration of Carlos Salinas. In April 1994, the president ordered the 
creation of the National Coordinating Council of Public Security (NCPS) (Arzt 1998). 
This interagency institution contained the Secretaries of Defence, the Navy Interior, the 
Attorney General, and the State Governors (including the Mayor of Mexico City). All of 
them were under the supervision of Arsenio Farell Cubillas, by that time Secretary of 
the Department of the Comptroller General and Administrative Development16. It is 
known they were told that President Salinas’s Minister of Defence, General Antonio 
Riviello Bazan, declared publicly that the army would not receive orders from a civilian 
other than the President. Because of this refusal to go along with civilians, the NCPS 
did not last long and later became, after being reformed, the National Council of Public 
Security, where the military assumed a primary leading role.
Jeffrey Davidow, former ambassador of the US to Mexico, revealed a second incident 
of this nature. According to Ambassador Davidow, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, who was 
appointed as senior advisor of President Vicente Fox on National Security, intended to 
establish better channels of communications between the Mexican government and the 
United States Embassy regarding security matters. As chairman of the National 
Security Council, Aguilar Zinser set up a meeting of top public servants of the incoming 
administration with some senior officers of the US Embassy, the Ambassador included. 
Among the attendants were the Minister of Navy, Defence, Interior, CISEN and the 
Attorney General. Davidow remembers that General Clemente Vega refused to 
participate during the meeting. He simply remained silent and other colleagues adopted 
the same attitude. (Davidow 2004:263-264). Once more, it was clear the Secretary of
• 17Defence refused to receive directions from a civilian other than the President . This
attitude rendered Zinser’s presence in Fox’s team irrelevant and forced his resignation
in the following months (Leroy 2004:114). Thereafter, Vicente Fox took personal care
18of the coordination of the National Security Council .
16 Criticism to this new interagency council came from well-known law professors who considered 
abominable the subordination of the military to a civilian other than the president, in this case Arsenio 
Farell. See Vera, Rodrigo. “Con el Ejercito sometido a Farell Cubillas, todo se vale y  se vulnera como 
nunca el estado de derecho: Burgoa y  Arteaga" Proceso May 2, 1994.
17 Benavides, Carlos and Garcia, Adriana “Habla divergencias, acepta Aguilar Zinser, El Universal. 
January 10, 2002.
18 Benavides, Carlos and Garcia, Adriana “Coordinara Fox seguridad nacionaF El Universal. January 9, 
2002
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The last major incident of this nature took place during the first year of the presidency 
of Felipe Calderon with the creation of the Federal Forces Task of Support. Initially, 
this agency, made up entirely of elite members of the armed forces, was meant to be 
commanded by the Secretary of Public Security, Genaro Garcia Luna, to address a 
sudden upsurge in the levels of criminality and violence in the country19. However, the 
resistance of the armed forces to receive orders from a member of the cabinet forced the 
transformation of the newly created security agency. In the end, the new task force 
remained within the structure of the Defence Ministry and is expected to act only to
90direct command by the executive power, and by the prior request of a state governor . 
In the light of these three cases, it seems clear that differences of opinion between the 
armed forces and the civilian leadership have always been resolved in the military’s 
favour. It shows that the Secretary of Defence fiercely defends the system of civil- 
military relations in terms of the exclusive subordination of the military to the executive 
power, even when different presidents appeared to be willing to accept some 
modifications.
While the military has been capable of keeping its sphere of influence intact and even 
expanding it, the fate experienced by its civilian counterpart tells a completely different 
story. Since 1990, the has PGR entered into a process of fragmentation, gradual loss of 
responsibilities, constant change of leadership and purges of allegedly corrupt 
personnel. For instance, between 1988 and 2000, the PGR had seven Attorneys 
General, the same number this institution had had in the previous 30 years (see table
8.1).
19 Jimenez, Benito. “Muestra Presidente a su grupo de elite” Reforma. September 17, 2007
20 Guerrero, Claudia and Salazar, Claudia. “Divide grupo elite a los legisladores”. Reforma. May 11, 
2007.
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Table 8.1
Mexico Attorney’s General 1988-2000
Attorney General Period
a
Enrique Alvares del Castillo 1988-1991
Ignacio Morales Lechuga 1991-1993
Jorge Carpizo Mcgregor 1993-1994
Diego Valades del Rio 1994
Humberto Benitez Trevino 1994
Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia 1994-1996
Jorge Madrazo Cuellar 1996-2000
Source: Own construction
Within the same period, the department responsible o f implementing the 
countemarcotics policy suffered five major transformations. From 1988 to 1990 it was 
named Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Investigation and Combat o f Drug 
Trafficking. In 1990 it was renamed to Division Anti Narcotics. From 1990 to 1993 it 
became the General Coordination o f Crimes Against Health. From 1993 to 1997 this 
agency acquired the name of National Institute for the Combat o f Drugs (INDC). 
During this period, the INCD had seven general directors and one o f them is in a federal 
prison for serious corruption allegations. In June 1997, the INDC was renamed to 
Special Prosecutor's Office o f Drug Crimes (FEADS). This office stayed in place until 
2002, when another case o f corruption triggered its transformation to the Deputy 
Attorney General's Office for Special Investigation into Organised Crime, SIEDO. 
(Sierra-Guzman 2003; ResaNestares 2006:935)
In addition to this continuous transformation, the PGR also experienced several purges 
o f personnel, since every new Attorney General ordered one. For instance, as soon as 
Ignacio Morales Lechuga arrived to the Department, he ordered the firing o f 600 agents 
o f the Federal Judicial Police. In 1993, Jorge Carpizo applied the same recipe and got 
rid o f 237 agents who did not enjoy his trust. Later, in 1994, when Congress approved 
the Federal Law o f Responsibilities o f Public Servants, 1,205 agents were fired or 
voluntarily left their job at the PGR. (Carpizo 1994:30). Under the Presidency o f 
Ernesto Zedillo, the new Attorney General, Antonio Lozano Gracia, fired 1,250 agents
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of the Federal Judicial Police21. One year later, when a major corruption scandal 
exploded at the INDC, another 1,100 agents left the Department. By the onset o f 
Vicente Fox’s presidency (2000-2006), the PGR had about 1,300 agents. This was one 
fourth o f those that had been contemplated by the annual budget and by January 2003, 
the new Attorney General, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, fired another 200 agents 
(Davidow 2004:266).
8.2.1 Budgets, performance and personnel growth of the armed forces as a result 
of their participation in drug trafficking.
While the PGR has been virtually dismantled since 1989, the armed forces experienced 
a completely different fate. While most state agencies have been characterised by deep 
cuts in government spending, the military is one o f the few that massively increased its 
size during the 1990s (Andreas 1998). In other words, military budget allocations 
resisted the uneasiness o f the Mexican economy in the second half o f the 1990s. With 
the exception o f 1995, military spending has consistently increased.
Figure 8.2
Variations in percentage of government and military expenditure, 1991-2002
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Source: Statistical appendix o f the fourth address to the nation o f  President Vicente Fox Quezada (Fox 
2004) and S1PR1 Military Expenditure Database http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4
21 Unfortunately, within two years, 500 o f  them had to be rehired, because even if  they were corrupt, they 
still had labour rights. See Labardini, Rodrigo. “M exico’s Federal Organised Crime Act” United States- 
Mexico Law Journal. Vol 11, The University o f  New Mexico. School o f  Law Albuquerque. Spring 2003
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A correlation analysis between the total government budget and the budgets of other 
government ministries since 1990 gives further evidence of the relevance the armed 
forces acquired in the years that followed. Military allocations increased at the same 
pace as total government spending, which marks a sharp contrast to what occurred in 
other ministries, whose budgets experienced serious cuts as a result of the economic 
crisis of 1995. (Table 8.2). The Military budget increased even more than budgets of 
key areas of the public administration, such as the Interior Ministry, Inland Revenue, the 
Foreign Affairs Secretary and Education, all considered Type “A” Secretariats.
Table 8.2
Correlation between government expenditure and selected ministries budgets
1990-2001
Militar
y
Budget
Inland
Revenue
Ministry
Budget
Ministry
of
Energy
Budget
Commun
ications
Ministry
Budget
Foreign
affairs
ministry
Budget
Ministry 
of the 
Interior 
Budget
Secretary
of
economy
Budget
Secretary of
Education
Budget
Govern­
ment
budget
Pearson
Correlation .988(*
*)
,841(**) .230 .350 .955(**) .948(**) -.419 .678(*)
Sig. (2- 
tailed) .000 .001 .497 .291 .000 .000 .200 .022
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Calculations made with data taken from the statistical appendix of the fourth address to the nation 
of President Vicente Fox Quezada
The consistent increase in military budget allocations also positively affected the 
capacities of the armed forces, particularly the army, in the campaign against drug 
trafficking. Drug interdiction and eradication increased almost at the same rate as 
budget allocation, shown by the correlations detailed in Table 8.2. It also improved 
their capabilities to ensure vigilance on highways and at airports, disaster relief and 
health assistance campaigns to the civilian population (army only), and apprehensions 
of drug related suspects (army only). The growth of the military membership also 
became possible. Still, it is necessary to point out that most of the statistics of 
eradication and interdiction of drugs are provided by the armed forces themselves, 
without any sort of external supervision or verification. Therefore, it is important at 
least to consider the possibility that such estimations could be manufactured to justify 
the constant increase of their budget.
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Table 8.3
Correlation between military budget allocation and military functions 1990-2001
Military
Cocaine
Seizures
Military
Marijuana
Seizures
Military 
Marijuana 
Eradications in 
HC
Military 
eradication 
opium poppy 
fields in HC
Military
vigilance
operations
Military
Budget
Pearson
Correlation .608(*) .726(*) -716(*) .535 .69 I f )
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .011 .013 .090 .019
N 11 11 11 11 11
Professional 
isation of 
the armed 
forces
Military
Personnel
Disaster
relief
operations
Military 
detentions 
related to 
Drug
Trafficking
Military
health
provision to 
civil
population
Schools 
repaired by 
military 
personnel
Military
Budget
Pearson
Correlation .818(**) .686(*) .483 .200 -.638(*) .534
Sig. (2- 
tailed) .002 .020 .133 .555 .035 .091
N 11 11 11 11 11 11
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Calculations made with data taken from the statistical appendix of the fourth address to the nation 
of President Vicente Fox Quezada.
8.2.2 Changes in the scale and criteria for moving across the ranks in the army
In addition to increasing budget allocations, the 1990s were also marked by an increase 
of promotions to the highest ranks within the army. This can be seen by comparing the 
promotions of army officers to the rank of colonel from 1976 to 1988 with those 
promotions that took place between 1989 and 2002. Here it is possible to appreciate a 
60 per cent increase, 49 percent more in Brigadier Generals, 56 per cent increase in 
Brigade Generals and only 5 percent more on Division Generals. In sum, by 2002, the 
Mexican army had one general for every 348 soldiers, while the US army had one for 
every 1,46722.
It is important to mention that the Secretary of Defence presents the promotions from 
colonel to division general to President’s approval every year during the Anniversary of 
the Mexican Revolution. Once the president approves the promotions, the Senate 
makes the final ratification. During the 1990s, the number of promotions to the highest 
echelons of the army considerably increased in number and the president and the Senate 
approved them immediately (see figure 8.3). This attitude also exhibits the willingness
22 Fuentes, Victor “Empareja Mexico a EU en generales” Reforma. November 24, 2002
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of both powers to comply with military demands.
Figure 8.3
Number of officers promoted to the ranks of division general, brigade general, 
brigadier general and colonel for the period 1976-1988 and 1989-2002
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If a higher number o f promotions o f army officers to top military ranks indicate the 
growing influence o f the army in the political system as well as a more extensive 
package o f rewards to its membership, it is important to point out that this 
transformation has also a clear qualitative nature. Since 1989, it seems that army began 
to increase the rewards to officers with direct participation in counterinsurgency and 
drug trafficking operations. Nowadays, reaching the top o f the army hierarchy requires 
a concise record o f service in military zones identified with the production of illicit 
drugs or the presence o f guerrilla activity (See Table 8.4).
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Table 8.4
States identified by the army to be highly active in drug trafficking (DT) or face 
presence of guerrilla movements (G)
National Ranking 
of Violent 
homicides 200723
National ranking on 
positive opinion of the 
armed forces at sub­
national level 200824
National ranking on 
reported violations to 
human rights of the 
armed forces 200725
Baja California (DT) 4th 2nd 15th
Chiapas (DT) 24th 5th 10th
Chihuahua (DT) 5th 6,fl 8th
Guerrero (DT and G) 2nd 6th 13th
Michoacan (DT and G) 3rd 8th 1st
Sinaloa (DT) 1st 6th 4""
Sonora (DT) 7th 6th 9 th
Tamaulipas (DT) 12th 3rd 3rd
Source: Constructed by the author
Through an analysis o f the databases sent to this author by the Secretary o f Defence, it 
is possible to identify that from 1976 to 1988, 30 percent o f those officers who reached 
the rank o f Division General had command experience in zones where the army itself 
recognises the high presence of insurgency (See table 8.5) . For the following period, 
1989-2002, that proportion increased to 47 percent. For the case of direct command 
experience in military zones identified with the presence o f drug traffic activities, the 
percentage passed from 34 between 1976 and 1988, to 43 percent in the following 
period under study. This transformation is also noticeable at lower levels o f the 
hierarchy. In the case o f Brigade General, the second highest rank within army files, the 
results are as follows:
"3 Data retrieved from the daily report o f the nacional newspaper Reforma on violent executions in the 
country, www.reforma.com
24 (GCE, 2008)
25 Garduno, Silvia, “llueven quejas a la sedena”. Reforma. May 19, 2008
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Table 8.5
Command experience of army officers promoted to the rank of division and 
brigade general 1976-2002
Command experience of army officers promoted to 
the rank of Division General
Command experience of army officers 
promoted to the rank of Brigade General
Guerrilla Drug Trafficking 
Activity
Guerrilla Drug Trafficking 
Activity
1976-1988 39% 16% 1976-1988 10% 34%
1989-2002 48% 27% 1989-2002 16% 43%
Source: own construction with date provided by the Secretary o f  Defence IFAI petition number 
0000700043003 and 0000700039604. On the states identified by the Secretary o f  Defence to host the largest 
number o f  guerrillas IFAI 0410000023405.
A third indication o f the transformation of the army as a result o f its increasing 
participation in the system of public security is the willingness of the institution to 
provide more opportunities o f direct command experience to high ranking officers. In 
this area, we found that chiefs of army zones are being rotated more often after 1989 
than in the previous period under analysis. Rotations seem to be more acute in Sinaloa, 
Chihuahua and Michoacan, where chiefs o f military zones last barely a year in their 
posts when in the previous period under study they stayed considerably longer.
Table 8.6
Average of months in post of chief army military zones
Drug Trafficking 1976-1989 1989-2003 Guerrilla 1976-1989 1989-2003
Sonora 18 14 Oaxaca 19 13
Chihuahua 25 12 Guerrero 27 15
Durango 22 19 Chiapas 16 14
Sinaloa 19 13 Puebla 20 14
Nayarit 13 12 Estado de Mexico 26 9
Michoacan 24 14 21.6 13
20 14
Source: own constrution with date provided by the Secretary o f  Defence IFAI petition number 
0000700043003 and 0000700039604.
In sum, it seems clear the army has taken the mission of guarding public security and 
combating drugs very seriously. As we can appreciate by this data, the army has not 
only increased the number o f officers promoted to the highest ranks within the 
institution, but also favoured their specialization in the areas that represent the driving 
force o f its recent expansive role in the political system, meaning the fight against drug 
dealing and counterinsurgency. This may show their willingness to take over key policy
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areas in the system of public security with a long-term perspective . The conclusions 
drawn from this data present a sharp contrast with the army’s alleged reluctance to take 
over the mission of combating drug trafficking from civilian agencies. This 
contradiction between their apparent reluctance to fight drug cartels and their patent 
proclivity to gain more political influence and economic power through this task may be 
difficult to comprehend. Admiral Rafael Galvez Ibarra, who participated in the creation 
of the Federal Preventive Police in 1997, explained to the author that the army clearly 
uses a double discourse. According to Galvez Ibarra, their intention is to occupy as 
many positions in the system of public security as possible, because this means an 
expansion of their influence in the political system. However, they need to publicly 
acknowledge that police agencies are very difficult to handle because of the endemic 
phenomenon of corruption they suffer. In that way, they can protect the good name of 
the institution in case a scandal brakes out (Veracruz, Ver. July 23, 2003).
Besides the increase in size and budget allocations, the military, especially the army, 
continued gaining space in areas of public security that had been traditionally occupied 
by civilians. However, their missions were not limited to fighting drug trafficking or 
the reorganisation of the PRG. President Salinas called the armed forces to maintain the 
public order during local elections in Baja California Sur, Hidalgo, Guerrero, Quintana 
Roo, San Luis Potosi, Estado de Mexico, Nayarit and Yucatan,27 and sent soldiers to 
replace bus drivers during the strike of the Ruta 100, the state owned public 
transportation company of the government of Mexico City in 1989.
Salinas also used the army to apprehend Joaquin Hernandez Galicia (“La Quin a”), 
leader of the Oil Workers’ Union, for illegal accumulation of weapons intended for the 
exclusive use of the armed forces, as well as for assassination and corruption. In his 
memoirs, former President Salinas affirms that he got the indication from his Secretary 
of Defense that La Quina and his personnel had firearms without the proper 
documentation and permits (Salinas de Gortari 2000:502). It is important to notice that 
in Mexico, civilians who wish to carry a firearm need to request a special permit from 
the Secretary of Defense. This was the argument President Salinas employed to justify
26 In fact, Vice Admiral Wilffido Robledo, Director of the Federal Preventive Police, affirmed that the 
presence of the armed forces in the system of public security would last at least 15 years. Martinez 
Mcnaught, Hugo. “Quedara lista la PFP en 15 ahos: Robledo” Reforma. November 19, 1999.
27 Trejo, Armando “Entre los desastresyla guerrilla” Reforma. February 16, 1994
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the intervention of the army against Hernandez Galicia on the morning of 10th January, 
1989. It was, however, a controversial argument. Article 129 of the Mexican 
Constitution prohibits the use of the army on missions that do not correspond strictly to 
“military discipline,” unless the Mexican Congress declares the suspension of 
constitutional guarantees. That was certainly not the case during the apprehension of La 
Quina. In fact, the partisan utilization of the army to hunt down a well-known political 
enemy of President Salinas was seen by academics and political commentator of the 
time as a powerful message to other trade union leaders or members of the PRI who
90wished to oppose his policies (Reding 1989). This view was recently corroborated by 
a released intelligence document of the United States and published by the National 
Security Archive. According to this file, Fidel Velazquez, the emblematic leader of the 
CTM, informed the US Embassy, that Hernandez Galicia was incarcerated because he 
had several times challenged the policies of the PRI and the President. Fidel Velazquez 
stated that La Quina had gone too far in his attacks on the PRI, the Governor of El 
Estado de Mexico, former president Miguel de la Madrid and President Salinas, 
“ ...things were out of control and it was clear that the government, in this case the 
President, was forced to act”30
8.2.3 Formalising the role of the armed forces in the system of public security
Militarisation of public security continued during the Presidency of Emesto Zedillo. 
However, it was during his sexenio when such participation acquired an important 
qualitative shift. The participation of the military in missions of public security, as it 
was portrayed in President Zedillo’s National Development Plan, represented the chief 
asset of the Mexican state to combat the power of the drug cartels. In 1996, the Mexican
28 The animosity between La Quina and Carlos Salinas was not new. Back in 1984, Carlos Salinas, 
Minister of Budget and Planning under the Administration of Miguel de la Madrid, prohibited the 
participation of trade unions as Pemex’s contractors or outsourcers. This decision was then considered as 
a challenge from the young Minister to one of the principal sources of power and illicit enrichment of 
Pemex’s trade union leaders. See Hinojosa, Oscar. “La malquerencia entre Salinas y  la Quina surgid a la 
luz publica en 1984 y  fue creciendo”. Proceso January 16, 1989. Ever since, Hernandez Galicia did not 
conceal his discontent with the proponents of neoliberalism and De la Madrid’s economic policy. Not 
surprisingly, it was in the public domain that Hernandez Galicia was unhappy with PRI’s nomination of 
Salinas as presidential candidate. Even when the Pemex’s trade union formally supported the PRI, it has 
been argued that La Quina threw part of his support behind Salinas’ main electoral contender, 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, in the presidential elections of 1988. See Enrique, Maza. “Tres Presidentes le 
rindieron pleitesia. El de la Quina, un imperio construido a golpes de corruption”. Proceso. 16 January, 
1989.
29 See Lopez, Narvaez, Froylan. “La subversion de La Quina”. Proceso. January 16, 1989; Castaneda, 
Jorge. “£7 ocaso de un sistema”. Proceso. January 16, 1989.
30 Lizarraga, Daniel. “£7 Quinazo, una venganza politico”. Proceso August 10, 2008
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Congress formalised this role in the law that created the National System of Public 
Security (SNSP). According to the new strategy, the army assumed a central role in 
backing federal, state and local police bodies in their effort to confront organised crime 
(Moloeznik 2001:100). This cooperation included direct intervention of the military in 
anticrime operations, designing and implementation of training programs for police 
bodies. With the creation of the SNSP, the participation of the military ceased to be an 
arbitrary choice of the executive power to deal with the problem of public security. 
Instead, their roles became institutionalised in the best-funded policy of President 
Zedillo’s administration. Under this scheme, the armed forces were allowed to arrest 
drug related criminals, interrogate them, carry out investigations and use their 
intelligence apparatus to support their tasks against criminal organisations (Arzt 2001).
In fact, the intervention of the military in the system of public security was taken even 
further in the second half of Zedillo’s term of office under the name of the National 
Crusade Against Crime (NCAC). Highly advertised on radio and TV, the NCAC 
focused strongly on reducing criminality levels in the country through modernization of 
police bodies and the participation of the armed forces. Not surprisingly, it was also 
meant to strengthen the position of Francisco Labastida — the Interior Minister who 
later became the presidential candidate of the ruling party—  in preparation for the 
upcoming presidential election. In the same year, President Zedillo created the Federal 
Preventive Police, a new security agency whose human resources, nearly 5,500, came 
directly from Army and Navy battalions (Sierra-Guzman 2003:31)31.
As in the past, President Zedillo’s strategy started with the assumption that military- 
educated personnel were more resistant to the corrupting power of the drug cartels and 
other forms of organised criminality. Furthermore, their rigorous instruction and civic 
education were thought to be helpful to boost the efficiency of police agencies (Mares 
2003:63). No doubt, this vision was widely accepted among the political elite, 
regardless of party affiliation, until General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, Mexico’s Drug
31 When President Zedillo created the PFP in 1999, about half of the original agents were on loan from 
the military police. Under Fox, the number of soldiers within the PFP increased by twenty-five percent, 
thanks to the addition of 1,700 newly hired agents and the incorporation of 826 new recruits from the 
Federal Support Forces (Fuerzas Federates de Apoyo, FFA), which are composed entirely of military 
police and members of the navy. Based on information from the Second State of the Government Report, 
compete army units were transferred to the FFA to make a current total of eight, including the Third 
Military Police Brigade and the Tenth Military Police Battalion. 1,600 members of several navy 
battalions were also added to the PFP. Top positions in the PFP are also held by military officers: The 
FFA is led by a general, and the PFP as a whole is led by a retired brigadier general.
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Czar, was removed from his position in February 1997 for his alleged links to the 
criminal underworld. It was alleged that Gutierrez Rebollo maintained close ties with 
Amado Carrillo Fuentes, leader of the Juarez Cartel (Chabat 2002:140). It was also 
found that General Gutierrez lived in the same building as Carrillo; that he was 
particularly aggressive towards the Arellano Felix Cartel, while remaining rather 
ineffective against Carrillo’s organisation32
This was not the first time that a high-ranked military officer was presumably involved 
with drug trafficking. President Salinas removed Admiral Mauricio Schleske from the 
position of Secretary of the Navy in 1990, presumably for his alleged links with drug 
traffickers33. However, the official story was that Schleske left his post due to health 
problems34. The other case was the corruption scandal of General Juan Arevalo 
Gardoqui, the Secretary of Defence under President De la Madrid. Still no formal 
accusations were made in that case, even when the DEA had a number of testimonies 
supporting the General Arevalo Gardoqui’s guilt (Wager 1994:15). However, the case 
of Gutierrez Rebollo was different. For the Mexican government, the international 
community and the military itself, it became clear that one of the major powers of the 
State against drug trafficking was being used to serve the interests of a criminal 
organisation. The magnitude of the scandal led to the disappearance of the INDC and 
the creation of the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes Against Health (FEADS), but 
the military participation in the war against drugs was not affected, nor was the 
perception of the population towards the military, which remained as high as it had been 
for decades. Furthermore, the US government continued portraying Mexico’s decision 
to involve its armed forces in the war against drug trafficking as the best possible 
solution to the problem. The director of the DEA, Barry McCaffrey, recognised that the 
Mexican army represented an adequate instrument to counteract drug trafficking, 
because their values, discipline, honour, and self-sacrifice made them less vulnerable to 
corruption35. It seems this is an institutional position of the US Government. Silvestre 
Reyes, who is the President of the Intelligence Committee of the US Congress, affirmed
32 Riva Palacio, Raymundo. “Sin asombros" Reforma. February 24, 1997
33 Ortiz Pinchetti, Francisco. “Actividades de narcos de las que Schleske debio estar enterado” Proceso. 
July 23, 1900
34 Gomez Leyva, Ciro. “El escenario del caos” Reforma. February 23, 1997
35 Gonzalez Maribel and Romero, Cesar. “Democracia es vital en lucha antinarco” Reforma. May 13, 
1999
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that the decision of President Calderon to involve the army in the war against drug 
trafficking is not only respected but highly valued by the United States
All the same, the incarceration of Gutierrez Rebollo did multiply the voices of 
opposition politicians, retired army officers, and leaders of national and international 
organisations of Human Rights challenging the idea that the militarisation of public 
security represented a sensible policy to counteract criminality. For instance, Francisco 
Molina, former Director of the INCD in 1996 and PAN Senator in 1997, declared that 
involving the military in the war against drug trafficking was a serious mistake made by 
President Zedillo. Molina argued that there were no evidence to assure that the military 
had been more effective or less corrupt than the civilian police in such tasks37. In fact, 
Molina argued that 150 officers from the armed forces had been found to be linked to 
criminal organisations38. A secret dossier leaked to the press in July 1997 clearly 
showed the great concern of the army concerning the links of high ranked officers to the 
drug mafias. The files included the names of 10 generals who had been investigated on 
that matter since 1990. General Gutierrez Rebollo was not on that list39.
For the leading academic expert on the Mexican Military, Roderic Ai Camp, the 
incarceration of General Gutierrez meant further evidence of the impossibility of 
guaranteeing the immunity of military officers from the corruptive power of the drug 
cartels40. In fact, many studies deal with the proclivity of the Mexican Military to 
become corrupt (Schulz 1997; Shelley 2001). General Luis Garflas, former president of 
the Commission of Defence of the Federal Congress, affirmed that it was urgent to keep 
good care of the army and retire it as soon as possible from the war on drugs as well as 
to limit its role and involvement to missions of eradication of marihuana or opium 
poppy fields41
36 Guerrero Claudia. “Pide Mexico a EU su Plan Colombia”. Reforma. June 9, 2007
37 Carlos Resa Nestares argues that there is a direct relationship between high military presence and high 
production of illegal drugs, because the military centralises the cost of corruption in a single agency, 
facilitating the activities of growers of illegal crops. Resa Nestares, Carlos. “£7 ejercito mexicano y  el 
comercio ilegal de drogas”. Nota de Investigacidn. Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. 2002
38 Ravelo, Ricardo. “£7 Narcotrafico invencible. En la PGR, los enemigos en casa”. Proceso. May 14, 
2000.
39 “Archivos secretos del Ejercito senalan a jefes y  oficiales involucrados con capos de la droga” 
Reforma. July 27, 1997.
40 Martinez McNaught, Hugo. “Necesaria una politico antinarco altemativa” Reforma. March 21,1997
41 Martinez McNaught, Hugo. ilObligados Sedena y  Zedillo a revisar estructura militar”. Reforma. 
January 28, 1998.
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From all these voices against the participation of the military in counter-narcotics 
operations, it is interesting to read the declarations and even articles written by Felipe 
Calderon, current President of Mexico, while he served as the national leader of PAN. 
In February 1997, Calderon stated that the armed forces were being excessively used by 
President Zedillo. He argued that the military had been unnecessarily exposed to 
situations like the case of General Gutierrez Rebollo42. Calderon also said that the 
disproportionate use and abuse of the armed forces in missions that correspond to 
civilian agencies, meaning public security, could only set the military on a path of 
institutional debacle43. Despite the strong position of Felipe Calderon concerning the 
missions that should not be carried out by the armed forces, his record as President of 
Mexico tells a different story. I will return to this issue in the final section of the 
chapter.
No doubt the avalanche of criticisms of the armed forces, particularly the army, after 
the incarceration of Gutierrez Rebollo, forced President Emesto Zedillo to appear on 
National Television to defend the reputation of the military and their participation in the 
war against drug trafficking. Zedillo pointed out that the Mexican Army, as an 
institution, supports legality and represents the great ally of Mexicans to defend the 
country’s security as well as to counteract, without hesitation, organised criminality44. 
The behaviour of President Zedillo on this issue was consistent with the system of civil- 
military relations and honoured one of the basic rules of the agreement between the 
executive power and the armed forces; that is, to secure their corporate interest and 
moral capital whenever it may be threatened.
8.3 Democratisation and militarisation of public security.
Despite the rhetoric of president Zedillo on the topic of public security and an 
acceptable performance of the country’s economy during the last two years of his 
mandate, the ruling party lost the presidential election in July 2000 after 70 years in 
office. Great expectations were formed on the arrival of Vicente Fox to the presidency 
in terms of democratisation of the system of civil-military relations and the redefinition
42 Caballero, Alejandro and Roman, Gerardo. “Se recurre en exceso al Ejercito” Reforma. February 20, 
1997
43 Garcia, Adan. “Exige PAN evitar abuso de funciones". Reforma. July 31, 1997. Also see, Calderon
Hinojosa, Felipe “Cambios en el Necaxa” Reforma. May 18, 1998.
44 “Es e l E jercito e l gran aliado: Zedillo  .Reforma. March 20, 1997
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of the missions of the armed forces. In fact, one of Fox’s campaign proposals was to 
take the military out of the war against drug trafficking (Camp 2005:116). His position 
towards the issue was to consider drug trafficking as a problem of public health, not 
national security. There was even a presumed intention of the team commanding the 
transition to find ways of selecting a civilian defence minister. Apparently, the idea was 
to appoint a retired general as the secretary of defence, so he could prepare the arrival, 
within a period of two years, of a civilian successor45. The idea was not new; it had 
been implemented in Uruguay, Paraguay and El Salvador in the 1980s and 90s46
However, none of the above plans or ideas was carried to fruition. One day after the 
arrival of Vicente Fox to the Presidency, the Minister of Defence, General Vega Garcia, 
declared that he had been instructed to fully concentrate on the war against drug 
trafficking47. This was the first sign that the arrival of a president from a political party 
different to the PRI did not meant a shift of direction in terms of public security and the
A O
inherited trend of militarisation . On the contrary, it was during the Presidency of 
Vicente Fox that the PGR seemed for the first time in history as a mere extension of the 
Secretary of Defense. By 2002, Mexico's Attorney General was an on-leave army 
general and 16 out of the 20 most important positions within The Attorney-General’s 
office (PGR) and the Federal Secretariat of Public Security had military backgrounds49 
(See table 8.7)
45 Tirado, Erubiel. “Fox: del azul al verde olivo”. Proceso August 26, 2000
46 Barajas, Abel: Interview to Luis Garfias Magana, “Yo mejor que Godinez” Reforma. July 21, 2000
47 Alegre, Luis. “Ratifica Sedena lucha antinarco” Reforma. December 2, 2000
48 Tirado, Erubiel. “Ahi vienen” Proceso. January 15, 2005
49 Gen. Rafael Macedo de la Concha, Attorney General, brought a number of military officers with him 
into the PGR. They were given top positions in counter-narcotics and intelligence divisions. Brig. Gen. 
Demetrio Gaytan Ochoa was named anti-drug operations coordinator, responsible for detecting and 
destroying marijuana and poppy plants. Gaytan was later replaced by Div. Gen. Jose Ruben Rivas Pena, 
whose previous record included counterinsurgency campaigns in Chiapas and training at the U.S. Army’s 
School of the Americas. Gen. Carlos Fernando Luque Luna, former director of military intelligence, was 
named CENDRO’s director. In addition, Div. Gen. Alfonso Mancera Segura was named director of the 
PGR’s training institute.
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Table 8.7
Top positions occupied by high-ranking military officers in the PRG and the 
Secretariat of Public Security in 2002.
Position N am e M ilitary R ank
Nation's General Attorney. PGR Rafael Macedo de la Concha General
Attorney General Chief o f Staff
Alejandro Ramos Lieutenant
Colonel
Coordination o f  Operations Against Drug Trafficking Oliver Cen Genera
Drug Control Planning Centre CENDRO Carlos Fernando Luque General
Federal Judicial Police PJF Genaro Luna Civilian
*Assistant Director o f the PJF Pedro Huerta General
Federal Preventive Police Coordinator. Guillermo Alvarez General
Operations coordinator o f the PGR Carlos Demetrio Gaytan General
General Direction o f  Eradication PGR
Amoldo Rios Lieutenant
Colonel
General Direction o f Search and Interception SSP Carlos Mendivil General
Director o f  the Federal Police Academy SSP Luis Angeles Fuentes General
Internal affairs SSP Alfonso Hernandez Morales General
Direction o f  interagency coordination SSP
Eduardo Gomez Garcia Lieutenant
Colonel
Direction o f  maritime interception SSP Carlos Humberto Lanz Admiral
Direction o f land interception SSP
Eufebio Ibarra Flores Lieutenant
Colonel
Direction o f  air Operations SSP Joel Guzman Molina Captain
General Direction o f  Interception SSP Agustin Becerra Colonel
General coordinator o f operations SSP Demetrio Gaytan General
Direction o f  IT and telecommunications SSP
Carlos Villa Lieutenant
Colonel
General Direction o f Air Services SSP Roberto Noble General
Direction o f  appropriations SSP
Hilario Mejia Lieutenant
Colonel
Source: Alegre, Luis and Barajas, Abel. “Monopolizan Militares el combate Antinarco”. Reforma. March 
18, 2001. Information sent to the author by the army. Petition number: 0000700034603 and 
0000700039703
Furthermore, the presence of the armed forces is not limited to agencies o f the federal 
administration. They have also begun to dominate state and local agencies of security. 
Based on information obtained through the Freedom of Government Information Law, 
the army is known to have 241 officers, retired or on-leave, working in public security 
institutions in 2003 (Table 8.8).
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Table 8.8
Army personnel working in public security positions at federal and state level in 
2003
Generals Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenant Sergeants
54 46 32 43 40 48
Source: Constructed by the author, based o information from the army. IFAI Petition number: 
0000700034603 and 0000700039703
Even if  the number does not look significant, the positions they occupied in local and 
state police corporations made a notable difference. High-ranking army officers 
commanded 16 out o f the 32 state police departments in the country and nine were 
secretaries of public security at state level (Table 8.9). In 2004, only in Aguascalientes 
and Tlaxcala, the smallest states o f the country, did the army have no public security 
functions.
Table 8.9
Army personnel occupying high positions in state public security systems
Status P osition R ank
Colima Secretary o f  Public Security Captain (2004)
Guerrero Secretary o f  Public Security Mayor (2008)
Nayarit
Executive Secretary o f the State 
Council o f  Public Security General (2004)
Nuevo Leon Secretary o f  Public Security General (2008)
Puebla Secretary o f Public Security General (2004)
Quintana Roo Secretary o f Public Security General (2004)
Tamaulipas Secretary o f  Public Security General (2004)
Tlaxcala Secretary o f  Public Security General (2005)
Veracruz Secretary o f  Public Security Captain (2004)
Baja California Sur Chief o f  State Police Captain
Colima Chief o f  State Police General
Distrito Federal Chief o f  State Industrial Police Mayor
Estado de Mexico Chief o f  State Police General
Guerrero Chief o f  State Police Lieutenant
Hidalgo Chief o f  State Police Captain
Jalisco Chief o f  State Police General
Michoacan Chief o f  State Police Colonel
Morelos Chief o f  State Police Colonel
Nayarit Chief o f  State Police Captain
Nuevo Leon Chief o f  State Police General
Oaxaca Chief o f  State Police Mayor
Puebla Chief o f  State Police General
Quintana Roo Chief o f  State Police General
Tabasco Chief o f  State Police Mayor
Information sent to the author by the army. IFAI Petition number: 0000700034603 and 0000700039703
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The method followed by elected officials to select those in charge of local and state 
police agencies is also symptomatic of the enormous influence of the armed forces in 
this field. Governor Fidel Herrera stated that he made the decision to appoint General 
Orozco as his Secretary of Public Security by direct recommendation of the Secretary of 
Defence, General Clemente Vega Garcia. The governor told the author that this method 
was a common practice among PRI governors, as he got the advice to call General 
Clemente from Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras, the governor of Nuevo Leon. (London 
UK, February 20th, 2006). This practice of consulting the Secretary of Defence or the 
Regional Military chief seems to be common among elected officials, regardless their 
political affiliation, when it comes to selecting a chief of police. In an interview dated 
13th May 2008, the PAN Governor of Baja California, Francisco Osuna Milan, affirmed 
that the appointments of the head of the police agencies of Tijuana, Ensenada and 
Tecate were made by direct recommendation of General Aponte Polito, the Military 
Chief of the northern region50.
Moreover, the information provided by the military on the allocation of on-leave or 
retired officers in local and state institutions of public security revealed that up to 2004, 
the army tried to avoid direct participation in local police agencies in states with a high 
density of illegal crop cultivation (Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, Sonora and Nayarit) or 
that share the northern border with the United States (Baja California, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila and Tamaulipas). It is quite possible to think that this trend had 
everything to do with their intention to prevent possible corruption links that have 
traditionally emerged among civilian law enforcement institutions in this particular set 
of states. Quite the opposite occurs near the southern border, where high participation 
of army officers in state and local public security agencies is noticeable.
It terms of presumed violations of human rights by the military, it is interesting to note 
that the highest number of reported violations to human rights in 2007 occurred in states 
where the federal government put in motion the emergency security plan known as 
“Mexico Seguro”51: Baja California, Chihuhua, Guerrero, Tamaulipas, Michoacan,
50 Such statement was made by Governor Osuna during an interview within the radio news show of 
Joaquin Lopez Doriga. The interview can be listened at: 
http://www.radioformula.com.mx/multimedia/ild/130508 j ld l .ram
51 The Mexico Seguro plan is an interagency policy that includes the armed forces, federal and local 
police forces in joint operations of stop and search as well as provide constant surveillance of highways, 
ports and airports.
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Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa and Sonora. This plan, originally implemented by President 
Vicente Fox in 2005 and maintained by Felipe Calderon, is meant to stop sudden 
upsurges of violence in states identified by the armed forces and intelligence bodies as 
hosting the main criminal organisations, mostly connected to drug trafficking52. 
According to information of the CNDH, five out the six states with more presumed 
violations of human rights committed by the military were included in the first part of 
this programme (See table 8.10). In other words, high physical presence and activity of 
the armed forces seems to be related to a high index of alleged human rights violations 
(Freeman 2002). Still, this phenomenon does not affect the military’s good image 
among the population in this small but significant number of states. A recent public 
opinion study, the first of its kind that has been made available to the public, indicates 
that the highest evaluation achieved by the military among the population (on a scale 
from 1 to 10) was reached in Colima, a tiny state located on the pacific coast, with 8.4 
(GCE 2008). After Colima, we find Baja California second, Tamaulipas third, Chiapas 
fifth, Sinaloa sixth, Sonora seventh and Michoacan eighth. The rating obtained 
throughout these states was above the National average of 7.5 and all were recipients of 
the “Mexico Seguro” Plan. Furthermore, all these states are also identified by the 
military as either high in the presence of drug trafficking (Baja California, Sinaloa, 
Tamaulipas and Sonora), or suffering guerrilla activity (Chiapas and Guerrero); and 
even in a couple of cases, a combination of both (Michoacan and Guerrero). If we look 
at the number of violent assassinations connected with drug trafficking, the list of states 
that rank at the top is not particularly different. Sinaloa comes first with 346 violent 
executions in 2007, 253 in Guerrero, 238 in Michoacan 154 in Baja California and 125 
in Sonora53 A complete radiography of this data can be consulted in Table 8.10
The analysis of this data suggests that the image of the armed forces is not affected by 
their presumed violations of human rights, the implementation of highly invasive 
security operations such as Mexico Seguro, or even their high, permanent and visible 
deployment of troops. On the contrary, whenever the presence of the military is high, 
either as a result of guerrilla or drug trafficking activities, they register a noticeable 
appreciation from the population. In fact, according to a Bimsa poll made in 2000, 66 
per cent of the Mexican citizens believed that the armed forces should participate more
52 Melgar, Ivonne. “Solicita Fox a EU apoyo anticrimen. Reforma. June 14, 2005
53 Data retrieved from the daily report of the national newspaper Reforma on executions in the country. 
www.reforma.com
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in tasks of public security54. It seems that this fact has made elected politicians, the 
president included, to rely increasingly on the armed forces not only to contain the 
advance of criminality, but also to convey the idea of commitment to attend the problem 
of public insecurity. This attitude was recently taken to the extreme by President Felipe 
Calderon, who, on his first day in office, appeared on TV dressed in an army uniform 
while commanding military operations against drug trafficking in Apatzingan, 
Michoacan. During the same event, Calderon announced a policy of austerity and 
restricted government expenditure, but he made clear that such cuts would not affect the 
military. On the contrary, soldiers’ salaries would be raised. Calderon’s speech was also 
accompanied by a strong campaign on TV and radio, where the president says “it is an 
honour to command a military organisation whose origin are the people of Mexico, that 
is identified with the people and works for the people.” It has been suggested by many 
political analysts that the President’s extreme reliance to the armed forces and his 
public adulation of them is the result of his weakened legitimacy and political authority, 
deriving from the challenging attitude of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his refusal 
to accept defeat in the presidential election of July 200655. Therefore, Calderon has been 
obliged to rely too much on the political institution that enjoys the highest regard of the
# # .  C*7
population, meaning the armed forces , as a way to enhance his public image .
It is fair to say that this general attitude is not exclusive of the executive power, but 
shared among politicians and members of congress. In an interview, Jose Alberto 
Aguilar Inarritu, former federal representative and member of the congressional 
commission of National Defence, affirmed that we should not disregard the military as 
they are the experts on national security and enjoy the full confidence of the population 
(Mexico City. September 20th 2007). Similarly, former senator and assistant chairman 
of the Mexican Senate, Ernesto Gil Elordoy, said to this author: “It is possible to 
exchange views and even challenge the opinion of the army’s leadership, the big 
generals, but we have to do it behind shut doors and within a climate of respect and
BIMSA. Propuesta de Reforma Judicial de Vicente Fox-ags 00. 
www.bimsa.com.mx/bimsaon2000/lasencu/foxrefiudgs00.htm
55 During his presidential campaign, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador offered to enact a constitutional 
reform to provide the armed forces greater powers in terms of research and operations against organised 
crime. Aguirre, Alberto. “ VeAMLO caduco a Mexico Seguro” Reforma. January 30, 2006.
56 Aristegui, Carmen. “Comandante Supremo”. Reforma. January 5, 2000. Meyer, Lorenzo. “Cada quien 
su Guerra” Reforma. January 18, 2007. Braco Padilla, Tonatiuh. “Estrategia perdida” Reforma. May 19, 
2007.
57 Meyer, Lorenzo, “68-07”. Reforma. June 14,2007.
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deference.” On the question, “Given the amount of responsibilities delegated to the 
armed forces by President Fox, wouldn’t it be reasonable to increase congressional 
supervision on their responsibilities and performance?” Senator Gil Elorduy answered 
that the military is very sensitive and “there is no need to look for problems where there 
are none” (London UK. November 8th, 2005). Finally, Congressman Cesar Camacho 
and Jose Manuel del Rio, both members of the National Security commissions of the 
Federal Congress, affirmed that the Mexican state should give as many resources as 
possible to the armed forces to correspond the size of their responsibilities in the 
crusade against organised crime. Both deputies stressed the need to fund the
r o
modernisation of the military and the purchase of new equipment .
58 “Diputados: al Ejercito, todo el dinero posible” Milenio. June 16,2008
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N a tio n a l d is t r ib u tio n  o f  th e  a rm e d  fo rces  a c c o rd in g  to  local ag e n c ies  o f  p u b lic  sec u rity , g u e r r i l la  a c tiv ity  a n d  d ru g  t ra f f ic k in g  in c id en c e  
2002
State
Army personnel 
working in public 
security agencies 
(2004) (a)
Rank on size 
of deployed 
military 
personnel (b)
Permanent army 
personnel 
deployed (2005) 
\
Rank in marijuana 
and opium 
eradication (2005)
Rank on
guerrilla activity 
(2005) (e)
Executions in 
2007 (f)
Reported Human Rights 
Violations by the Army. 
CNDH (2008) (g)
Citizen’s 
appraisal of the 
army’s image. 
June 2008 (h)
San Luis Potosi 4 29 1900 0 0 13 8 7.0
Chiapas 15 3 9187 0 3 12 21 8.0
Durango 1 8 5317 2 0 124 11 8.0
Zacatecas 3 21 3000 0 0 13 2 8.0
Coahuila 1 27 2407 0 3 29 31 8.0
Yucatan 3 20 3000 0 0 1 5 8.1
Estado de Mexico 13 2 19000 0 4 111 8 7.3
Oaxaca 12 7 5673 8 2 33 28 7.3
Tamaulipas 2 14 3200 0 0 88 68 8.2
Nayarit 2 18 3000 3 0 2 1 8.3
Baja California 2 26 2463 0 0 154 11 8.3
Morelos 14 17 3000 0 0 17 1 7.5
Nuevo Leon 6 24 2800 0 0 107 29 7.5
Colima 3 32 1000 0 0 0 1 8.4
Tlaxcala 0 25 2536 0 0 1 0 7.6
Distrito Federal 14 1 52000 0 0 145 106 6.8
Jalisco 23 10 5000 5 0 92 13 7.7
Guanajuato 3 15 3097 0 0 40 4 7.7
Michoacdn 10 22 2873 6 6 238 139 7.7
Hidalgo 7 28 1947 0 7 37 2 7.7
Aguascalientes 0 31 1120 0 0 27 0 7.7
Tabasco 4 11 4997 0 0 24 15 7.8
Sonora 3 13 3864 0 0 125 22 7.8
Veracruz 16 4 8100 0 0 48 10 7.9
Guerrero 17 5 7198 7 1 253 13 7.9
Chihuahua 2 6 6346 1 0 147 33 7.9
Baja California Sur 2 9 5230 0 0 1 3 7.9
Puebla 17 12 4466 0 5 2 1 7.9
Quintana Roo 6 19 3000 0 0 34 4 7.9
Campeche 5 16 3000 0 0 2 1 7.9
Sinaloa 1 23 2828 4 0 346 38“ 7.9
Queretaro 4 30 1387 0 0 4 4 7.9
Source: (a) Information sent to the author by the army. 0000700034603 and 0000700039703. (b) . IFAI Petition number: 0000700011807. (c) IFAI Petition number: 
0000700011807. (d) Information consulted by this author in the public information section o f the Secretary o f Defence website, (e) IFAI petition number 0410000017305. 
(f) Data retrieved from the daily report o f the national newspaper Reforma on violent executions in the country, www.reforma.com. (e). Gardufio. Silvia, “llueven queias a 
la sedena”. Reforma. Mav 19, 2008. (h) (GCE 2008)
Guerrilla
I Drug 
I Trafficking
8.4 Conclusions
It appears that by delegating direct policing functions to the armed forces, President 
Salinas opened a window of opportunity for military participation in anti drug 
trafficking operations, and eventually in the entire system of public security. In fact, 
since 1989, the military has come to intervene and even command the functions of the 
Attorney-General’s Office; control the reform of federal police bodies; dominate the 
intelligence apparatus of the state and displace civilian authorities from state and 
municipal police departments. There is evidence that this set of new responsibilities 
has been taken very seriously by the military, to the point of pushing an internal 
reorganisation aimed at creating incentives for their membership to specialize in the 
areas of counterinsurgency and anti drug trafficking.
As the military gained power and autonomy from civilian law enforcement bodies and 
other representative institutions, the executive power is the only institution they 
remain accountable to. However, the nature of such “accountability” operates more in 
the sense of tacit obedience to presidential orders rather than a real accountability 
exercise. This situation has isolated the military from practically any formal form of 
supervision, reinforcing their autonomy and their internal mechanisms to ensure 
discipline. In the end, this condition has been greatly enhanced by the necessity of 
the executive to convey internally and externally the message that there is a clear will 
to combat corruption in police agencies and drug trafficking activities in the country.
It seems that this new set of responsibilities delegated to the military has heightened 
the principle of exclusive subordination that has ruled the system of civil-military 
relations in Mexico for more than one century. As we observed in this and the 
previous chapter, the military has been successfully able to oppose, stop and even 
reverse attempts to make them accountable for abuses committed during the 1970s or 
be subjected to parallel ways of civilian supervision. This clearly authoritarian 
attitude is not only defended by the military, but also by members of congress. 
Regardless of political affiliation, the leadership that led the process of 
democratisation in Mexico deliberately left untouched one of the most emblematic 
institutions of the authoritarian regime. None of the political actors have attempted to 
deprive the president from full control over his most effective policy instrument. 
Only then it is possible to understand the weak political will to strengthen supervision
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over the armed forces, in spite of their enormous role in the political system. In the 
end, this loss of authority by civilians vis-a-vis the military poses serious questions 
about civilian supremacy and represents one of the faulty lines that hinders the 
process of democratic consolidation in Mexico.
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Thesis9 Conclusions
I started this thesis with the idea of explaining the driving forces behind the increasing 
intervention of the military in the system of public security during the sexenio of 
Vicente Fox (2000-2006). I particularly noted Fox’s initial decision to appoint a top 
army officer to head the Attorney-General’s Office in December 2000 and the 
invasion of high ranking army and navy personnel to leading positions in the entire 
system of public security that followed. My first thought on this matter was that the 
great expectations of democratisation built upon the triumph of a non-PRI candidate 
in the presidential election after 71 years in office, were somehow in conflict with the 
responsibilities and duties this new and undisputed democratically elected elite were 
entrusting to the armed forces. I wondered why the use of the military had become 
the preferred choice of the executive power, governors and even city mayors when 
addressing rising levels of public insecurity. I saw in this increasing role a serious 
obstacle to democratic consolidation, given the autonomous and unsupervised nature 
of the military in Mexico.
The conventional explanation to this puzzle, long defended by the President and the 
Secretary of Defence, is intended to portray the use of the military against organised 
crime as an urgent and temporary measure. There was an explicit understanding that 
given the inefficiency and corruption affecting civilian agencies of security, the 
military represented the last line of defence for the Mexican State to reinstate the rule 
of law. This justification was not only shared and promoted by domestic and 
international government agencies, the US State Department included, but also by 
numerous scholars who have closely documented the scandals of corruption in the 
Mexican police. From the beginning, I found these explanations somehow 
incomplete. They often overlooked the public policy process by which the executive 
power has historically delegated an increasing number of domestic responsibilities 
beyond their traditional expertise to the military. They did not take into consideration 
the ample support these “urgent” measures found among left or right wing politicians, 
the Catholic Church or public opinion. I argued throughout this thesis that the 
proclivity of the executive power to militarise police agencies is closely related to the 
historical character of civilian supremacy in Mexico, the unique nature of the system 
of civil-military relations and the interest the military, especially the army, may have
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as an institution to intervene in the system of public security. In order to address these 
issues, I disentangled the origins of the undisputed civilian control over the armed 
forces in Mexico. There I found a clear path-dependent trajectory of civilian 
supremacy that has consistently encouraged the executive power to delegate to the 
military a variety of missions. This was either because of poor civilian performance or 
just to add a quota of legitimacy to key and often controversial policy decisions. It is 
clear that the executive power depends on the moral capital of the military to make 
credible its policy commitments to domestic and international audiences. Despite 
official statistics, which inexorably reveal the inefficiency of the policy on abating the 
illegal traffic of drugs, federal and local ruling elites appear to be reluctant to adjust 
the current policy route.
Although popular and accepted, there is little doubt about the pernicious effects of 
militarisation in the overall process of democratic consolidation. First, increasing 
participation of the armed forces in the system of public security has become the 
official excuse to delay, postpone, even disregard, a true renovation of law 
enforcement institutions based on civilian leadership. Second, the recent militarisation 
of the system of public security tipped the balance of power in favour of military 
institutions to the detriment of a long-standing tradition of civilian supremacy in 
Mexico. Nowadays, this phenomenon is particularly noticeable when considering the 
constant conflict between military personnel, local political authorities and federal 
police bodies that collide in anti-drug trafficking operations; or in the capacity of the 
military to stop and even reverse attempts to dig deep into their past and current 
record of violations of human rights; or in the struggle to bring the armed forces under 
reasonable conditions of civilian control. Third, the lack of institutional watchdogs to 
supervise military functions has left large segments of the population unprotected 
from the violence and excesses that military operations often generate in regions 
where drug trafficking or guerrilla activities are more prevalent. I devoted the last 
two chapters to addressing these issues and the way they affect the prospects of 
democratic consolidation in the mid and long term.
In this concluding chapter, I will present the empirical findings of this research, the 
theoretical conclusions and contributions, some methodological considerations and 
new horizons for research. Extended and particular conclusions for the experiences
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on militarisation presented in Chapter 7 and 8 can be found at the end of each chapter. 
In this section, I will provide my general conclusions to the whole thesis.
I. Empirical findings
I found evidence of a clear path-dependent trajectory of the way civilian supremacy 
was constructed during El porfiriato and the route it followed after the Mexican 
Revolution. This feature is particularly noticeable in the exclusive and rather 
undisputed authority of the president over the military elite as well as in the autonomy 
and independence the military enjoys from the judicial and legislative power. As I 
tracked the way this relationship has evolved since the late 1880s up to the onset of 
the 21st Century, I found that it provided an extraordinary room of manoeuvre to 
ruling elites to define the scope and reach of military missions according to their 
policy preferences. This characteristic became even clearer after 1934, when the 
executive power emerged as the undisputed national and political leader of the 
country. Since the 1930s, there has been no conclusive evidence suggesting that a 
president of Mexico has seriously considered the possibility of a military coup 
regardless of the increasing number of missions in the hands of military officers or the 
intensity of economic and political problems.
I also observed that it was during the 1930s and mid 40s when the military acquired 
the core of its moral capital. Their decisive intervention during the expropriation of 
the oil industry in 1938 and their intervention in the Second World War portrayed the 
armed forces as the great asset of the Mexican Nation to achieve wide social and 
economic transformations. Ever since, it is clear that the conservation of the military’s 
moral capital represents a priority for officers and politicians as it allows a free and 
even celebrated intervention in a wide variety of issues such as disaster relief, 
sanitation campaigns, reforestation, etc. Both characteristics, their high moral capital 
and the exclusive subordination to the executive power, allowed the creation of a 
profound internal dimension of intervention where the armed forces have been 
employed to address mostly, but not exclusively, internal security missions.
It was clear that threats to internal security were often defined under partisan criteria, 
as opposed to the impartial and professional expertise of civilian and military agencies 
responsible for looking after the security of the Mexican state. After 1946, several
273
manifestations of political dissent that explicitly challenged the nature of the political 
system or opposed the policies promoted by the ruling elite became a matter of 
national security for the executive power. The regime showed no patience in dealing 
with opposition, so they were often identified as “those who want to curtail the 
objectives or the heritage of the Mexican Revolution.” President Miguel Aleman used 
the military against different movements and labour demonstrations during his term in 
office. He also created the Federal Directorate of Security. It was shown through this 
work that the DFS served for nearly 40 years as the only civilian agency that managed 
to counterbalance the autonomy of the armed forces. Therefore, its cancellation in 
1985 ended up intensifying the unchecked role of the military in the political system.
As the regime failed to include other groups of society within the corporatist branches 
of the ruling party, the use of the armed forces and the DFS for political ends 
increased accordingly. In fact, the extensive partisan use of the military reached its 
zenith in the late 1960s and 70s with the emergence of the student movement, the 
urban and rural guerrilla. However, it was also detected that the military started to 
display some reticence to obey orders to repress politically dissenting social groups, 
particularly in urban centres. Their intervention against the student movement in 
1968 caused long enduring damage to their moral capital. However, this attitude did 
not lead to the cancellation of their partisan role, but the adjustment of its plans and 
operations. The creation of Los Halcones in the late 1960s and the White Brigade in 
the mid-70s responded to the need to conceal their direct political intervention in 
urban centres. The strategy worked as expected, and the military remained obedient 
to the president while protecting its public image and moral capital.
In the last two chapters of the research, I presented evidence that democratisation of 
the political system in Mexico strengthened rather than diminished the authoritarian 
nature of the system of civil-military relations. In terms of counterinsurgency 
operations, it was clear the military adjusted its operations and low intensity conflict 
strategies to contain the advance of the EZLN to neighbouring states as opposed to 
going after the rebels and annihilating them as had occurred with Lucio Cabanas’ and 
Genaro Vazquez’ guerrillas. The new strategy succeeded in terms of restricting the 
EZLN within a small region of Chiapas; however it seemed to be unable to contain 
the terrorist attacks the EPR made against PEMEX infrastructure in 2007. In other
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words, this proves that the military may be able to contain the advance of the EZLN, 
but unable to prevent the activities of the EPR. These deficiencies may well be the 
result of a policy of internal security that relies too much on the armed forces and the 
way it has prevented the professionalisation of civilian agencies of intelligence.
In terms of politics, it is clear that democratisation put the issue of human rights, and 
their past violations by the armed forces at the centre of the political debate, at least 
during the first half of the presidency of Vicente Fox. As we observed in chapters 7 
and 8, the military has been successfully able to oppose, stop and even reverse 
attempts to make them accountable for abuses committed during the 1970s, or to be 
subjected to civilian supervision. This clearly authoritarian attitude is defended by 
both the military itself, and also by members of congress.
The second arena of intervention of the military is given by the recent militarisation of 
the system of public security. It was observed that the decision of President Salinas to 
open the Attorney-General’s Office to the direct participation of the armed forces 
facilitated an apparently unstoppable intervention in the entire system of public 
security. As a result, military budgets have considerably increased since 1989. It was 
also noticed that the army took its new responsibilities very seriously, to the point of 
promoting the transformation of its educational system, training programmes and 
internal structure of incentives, which promoted the specialization of its personnel in 
tasks of public security, specially drug trafficking and counterinsurgency. The 
increasing participation of the armed forces in the federal system of public security 
after 1989 exposed a clear difference between old and new military responsibilities. 
After 1989, policing public insecurity became the hub of military professionalisation 
and development. Furthermore, their participation in public security reached local 
and state police bodies, as governors and even city mayors opted to regularly involve 
the armed forces to contain criminality and maintain public order. No doubt, the 
expansion of military roles into the system of public security has placed the army 
above civilian agencies of security. In that sense, the military is not only autonomous 
from other civilian agencies in terms of accountability and supervision, but it also has 
direct control over agencies of security which have become subordinated to the 
military itself. This is particularly noticeable in state and local police agencies.
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II. Theoretical considerations and contributions
After reviewing the literature on civil-military relations in Latin America, I proposed 
in chapter one a model to address the inner workings of the system of civil-military 
relations in Mexico. The model is arranged as three levels of a pyramid, each with 
unequal distributions of power between civilians and military officers in what I called 
the dual nature of civilian control over the military. I argued that in the first level, this 
is at the top of civilian control, the relationship between the president and the military 
remains unequal, favouring the authority of the executive power. However, at lower 
levels of the pyramid, where the military interacts with other agencies of the 
government, the relationship changes significantly as civilians become the agents of 
the military. This was particularly clear after the takeover of the Attorney-General’s 
Office and the system of public security by military personnel. In the third level of 
the structure, at the bottom of the pyramid, the relationship between the armed forces 
and the judicial and legislative power remains unchanged, as it has been since el 
porflriato. The interactions of the three levels of the pyramid depict a system of civil- 
military relations characterized by presidential control over the armed forces, rather 
than civilian control. It is a system where the military will take orders from the 
president, but from nobody else.
In order to address the interactions in between different levels of the model, I 
proposed a synthesis of two theoretical concepts: rational choice and historical 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalism explained how the initial configuration of 
civil-military relations established during el porflriato, and later institutionalized in 
the country’s constitution and organic laws of the military, created path-dependent 
tendencies ensuring military subordination to the executive’s authority. My initial 
expectation was that this form of subordination would remain unchanged even when 
military missions reinforce, duplicate or absorb responsibilities of other state 
agencies. However, the empirical evidence gathered in this research indicates that 
some variations are possible at the top level of the model. The military has been able 
to contain and even reverse decisions of the executive power that could either affect 
their corporate interest or transform the balance of power at lower levels of the 
pyramid. This was clear after the failure of the CNDH and the FEMOSPP to assess 
the criminal responsibilities of military officers who had commanded operations
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during the dirty war. It was also capable of reversing attempts by a President to 
decentralize his authority to supervise the armed forces.
At the second level of the model, I argued that the horizontal expansion of military 
responsibilities was intrinsically related to the impact that such a changing political 
environment can make to the objectives and preferences of the ruling elite. In other 
words, the political preferences of the President represent the key factor determining 
the character and scope of military missions. The empirical evidence I gathered 
during this research clearly supports this expectation. Thus, while subordination of 
the armed forces to the executive is formal and generally undisputed, the definition of 
their missions if more flexible and leaves room for agency manoeuvring. I called this 
part of the model the politics of military missions. I also found an interesting variation 
that was not foreseen at the onset of this research. It was observed that once a mission 
is delegated to the armed forces, it is very difficult to take it back. As an institution, 
the military creates entrenched interests and expects to collect rewards from such new 
missions, either in the from of moral capital or by the greater role these new tasks 
grant them in terms of access to top decision making, definition, and instrumentation 
of policies, particularly on anti-drug matters.
Therefore, I consider that the main contribution of my thesis is the identification of a 
path-dependent character of the exclusive subordination of the armed forces to the 
executive power and the politics of military missions. These represent the two 
interacting realms that define contemporary civil-military relations in Mexico. For 
analytic purposes, this initial analysis may prove useful for understanding the impact 
of formal institutions over the formation of preferences and choices of ruling elites 
concerning the scope of military missions. In the end, Mexico’s record on civil- 
military relations shows that exclusive subordination remained constant, while the 
politics of military missions have been highly dependent on the preferences that 
incumbents may have concerning the convenience of delegating more responsibilities 
to the armed forces. In the case of Mexico, the politics of military missions made 
little impact on the preferences of the president while the regime was dominated by 
authoritarian politics, but they became paramount as the political system began the 
transit to democracy. In other words, under authoritarian conditions of electoral 
competition, it was possible to expect a low interest of the ruling elite concerning the
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potential impact that military missions could generate on its public image. However, 
under more democratic conditions, missions delegated to the armed forces have 
become an important referent shaping the president’s reputation, specially when such 
missions are pictured and advertised by the regime as an indication of commitment to 
combat pressing policy issues.
A fundamental question of this research is not directly addressed by the nature of the 
exclusive subordination or the scope of military responsibilities, but still determines 
contemporary civil-military relations in Mexico: why would the civilian elite be 
interested on delegating functions to the armed forces? What makes the armed forces 
so appealing, to the point that different holders of the executive power in Mexico have 
opted to assign them a variety of missions in preference to other state agencies? The 
answer to this question may lie on the loyalty, organisational capacity, strict discipline 
and most important, high citizen appreciation and moral capital of the armed forces. It 
appears that the current ruling elite rapidly envisaged in the military an effective tool 
to deliver policy results both in those areas where civilian performance involves a 
high number of transaction costs, and where Mexico is under constant international 
pressure, as in the case of border control, weapons traffic, international terrorism and 
the war against drug trafficking.
Military missions became more prominent under democratisation because the ruling 
elite found in the armed forces an effective instrument to convey their commitment to 
tackle a widely accepted perception of public insecurity. This kind of decision has 
been repeatedly made and reinforced even when it was clearly at odds with the 
process of democratic consolidation.
III. Further research horizons
Relevant research is still to be done on the attitudes of civilians, either in elected 
positions or the general public, to tolerate and even promote the expansion of military 
roles beyond their conventional expertise. It would be also interesting to research 
what the officers think about their new missions in the political system and the way 
they think these changes may affect their institution and the prospects for democratic 
consolidation. So far, we only know the official positions of the Defence Secretary on 
these issues as well some testimonies of retired officers to the press. Still, based on
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my interviews, it is clear that military officers do not all think alike. I agree with S. 
Fitch (2003), who argues that theoretical progress in the study of civil-military 
relations requires giving up the implicit model of the armed forces as a unitary actor 
with a single mentality, a single sent of interests, and a consistent political agenda 
(Fitch 2003).
Another string of research is the remarkable transformation experienced by the 
presidential power as a result of democratisation. It has been argued, and even 
recognised by former President Vicente Fox, that democratisation shifted power from 
the executive to the federal congress1. Democratisation devolved political power to 
the legislative branch by weakening the presence of the ruling party and empowering 
those in the opposition. In practice, critics of Presidentialism suggest that this has 
been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, multipartyism brought the benefits of 
greater political competition and extended representation such as transparency in 
decision-making and accountability for the actions of elected leaders. On the other 
hand, given the presidential nature of the constitution, multipartyism involves a 
serious threat: recurrent policy deadlock or government paralyses. (Nacif 2003:21) 
Because of this new reality, it seems the military remains as one of the most effective 
assets of the President to deliver results on pressing policy issues, especially when a 
divided congress prevents the approval of more far-reaching policy programmes.
The relationship between congress and the military is another branch of the system of 
civil-military relations that remains widely understudied. I observed during the course 
of this research that federal deputies from states that are highly dependent on the 
action of the armed forces to maintain minimum levels of stability, such as those that 
have high density of illegal crops or suffer from guerrilla movements, may be 
consistently willing to approve increasing budgetary allocations to the armed forces 
irrespective of their party label. They may also exert influence over their 
representatives in congress to support measures that directly or indirectly favour the 
armed forces. This situation may provide an alterative explanation for the resilience 
of military budgets to economic crisis and cuts on government expenditures as it has 
occurred since the Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo. This may also exhibit an
1 At his inauguration speech, President Fox recognised that the years of exaggerated power of the 
president had ended. “From now on the Executive will propose and the Legislative will decide.” 
(Reforma Dec 2,2000. Internet Edition)
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independent capacity of the armed forces to secure generous budgets using their own 
means of political bargaining.
IV. Final remarks
Greater military participation in areas that do not belong to their natural expertise does 
not by itself pose a challenge to democratic consolidation. In fact, military 
institutions in well-established democracies have shifted their functions towards 
policy areas that are not strictly related to national defence (Fitch 1998; Moskos, 
Williams et al. 2000). However, in the Mexican case, greater military participation is 
problematic because alternative forms of supervision and accountability have not 
accompanied the new military responsibilities. Formal supervision of military 
missions remains highly dependent on the capacity and willingness of the executive 
power to carry out this function. In other words, expanding military prerogatives 
poses a challenge to democratic consolidation in the country, because it seriously 
undermines the prospects that the state apparatus can be held accountable to, and 
become habituated to, the rule of law (Linz and Stepan 1996a). It also prevents the 
imposition of civilian control over law enforcement, which is necessarily a condition 
for polyarchy.
In sum, the process of democratic transition created political conditions favouring the 
militarisation of the system of public security. However, democratically elected 
politicians do not seem to have enough incentives to change the nature of civilian- 
military control, as the armed forces are an important resource to deliver policy results 
where civilian agencies cannot. If authoritarian, there seems to be no intention to 
change a status quo where both elected officials and armed forces are successful.
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Appendix 1
The Civil-Military Game
Following the methodology employed by P. Feaver (2003:96-117) to describe the 
American civil-military game, the next exercise depicts a minimal matrix of strategic 
interactions that provides a rational explanation of choices and outcomes, given the 
nature of the missions delegated by the executive to the armed forces in Mexico. I go 
around the description of this phenomenon through reverse engineering. That is, I 
take an observed civil-military outcome to identify the values of certain key variables. 
The basic assumption of this model is that players, in this case the President and the 
armed forces, are aware of the costs and benefits arising from their actions, so they 
can rank and order outcomes according to some subjective estimate of the benefits 
minus the cost (Feaver 2003:96-97). In any case, I assume that the armed forces will 
try to make decisions bearing in mind that the benefits derived from sticking to the 
orders of the President will be higher than the costs incurred in resistance or 
avoidance of the President’s will. Second, I assume that the interaction between the 
principal and the agent is clearly defined by means of the Constitution, secondary 
laws and tradition. I also assume that friction may arise because of conflict of interest 
between the principal and the agent. Even so, the principal-agent framework does not 
presuppose agent obedience; on the contrary, it expects a certain amount of conflict 
that could even reach the point of a military coup.
Due to the longstanding subordination of the armed forces to the executive in Mexico, 
the game begins when the military, especially the army, has the choice of following or 
ignoring an explicit order or a policy lead from the executive. That is, the military 
can Work (W) or Shirk (S). Work means to do exactly what the president wants and 
Shirk means to do whatever is better for the armed forces in terms of protecting its 
corporate interest and moral capital. It may involve a partial or total rejection to the 
President’s orders. Given the historical nature of civilian control over the military, 
there is no record of open shirking, since this attitude could trigger a military coup or 
the introduction of intrusive monitoring by the executive power to oversee the armed 
forces in general. Both outcomes are very costly for the armed forces.
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In contrast, by working with the president, the military has been historically 
compensated with greater margins of autonomy and independence at the time of 
procuring the military with a government led strategy of public relations that 
minimizes the negative impact of its potential partisan missions.
The formal game:
Once the military has received an order from the executive, its available choices 
appear evident. They can either accept the orders of the executive (W) or evade the 
responsibility (S). Having in mind that the executive knows that the military could be 
hurting its corporate interest by taking part in a mission with an obvious partisan 
character, the military usually expects a reward for its obedience. This often comes in 
the way of cancelling any kind of intrusive monitoring over military missions, or a 
generous increase in their yearly budgetary allocations, which in turn increases their 
independence and autonomy. This research shows that both characteristics are highly 
treasured by the Mexican armed forces. Conversely, shirking can be punished by 
imposing intrusive forms of monitoring. The closest example to this form of intrusive 
monitoring was the creation of the Federal Directorate of Security in 1947. In the 
Mexican case, intrusive monitoring implies a diversification of civilian principals at 
the top of the structure of political power, which ultimately means involvement of 
congress and independent agencies in the supervision and accountability of the armed 
forces. This hasn’t occurred in the last 80 years.
This was basically the core of the relationship between civilians and officer corps 
until 1989. However, democratisation slightly changed the equilibrium, making the 
executive more reliant on the armed forces to achieve specific policy objectives or to 
convey to the public the idea of commitment to address organised crime and impose 
the rule of law. After 1989, the military not only obeyed the commands of the 
executive power, but also took over areas that were traditionally undertaken by 
civilian agencies. This expanding role gives the armed forces more elements to 
negotiate with the executive power, being able to improve the conditions of their 
intervention on missions of internal security. As was observed in chapters 7 and 8, the 
armed forces have effectively contained and even reversed civilian attempts, the 
executive’s included, to impose parallel means of monitoring over their functions.
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Game sequence
1. The military is given an order to intervene
2. The military decides to work or to shirk
3. Given the outcome, civilians choose to punish or reward the military 
according to their allegiance to the executive power and their willingness to 
support the executive power in such mission.
Lexicon:
W: Work done as the civilian principal wanted.
S: Work done as the military agent wanted.
CPw: Corporate interest of the military when working with the President.
CPs: Corporate interest of the military when shirking the President’s orders.
M l: Military payoff of working with the President without intrusive monitoring.
M2: Military payoff of working with the President with intrusive monitoring.
p: Cost to military of punishment (makes shirking less valuable for the military).
r: President’s reward to military for working. Autonomy and Independence.
Cl: Military payoff of shirking the President’s orders with intrusive monitoring. 
C2: Military payoff of shirking the President’s orders without intrusive 
monitoring.
Outcomes:
01: Military works and the President rewards by expanding the room for 
autonomy and independence. [W-CPw, M l (r)]
02: Military works and the President imposes a civilian form of supervision. [W- 
CPw, M2 (r -  p)]
03: Military shirks and the President imposes a strict form of supervision. 
[S+CPs, Cl (p)]
04: Military shirks and the President does not impose a strict civilian form of 
supervision. [S+CPs, C2 (p)]
□
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Mexico’s chll-military game
Rank of 
Preferences
CPw President
Wor 
k
Military
CPs President
Not
monitor
Intrusively
Independence
Autonomy
O l
Monitor DFS (1946- 0 2
Intrusively 1984)
Monitor
Intrusively
Diversification of 
principals (Congress 
and specialised 
agencies of  
supervision)
0 3
Not monitor
Intrusively
Defiance and 
Insubordination. 
Victoriano 
Huerta’s rule 
1914-1916
0 4
Over these four outcomes, it is quite clear that the military would rank its 
preferences according to the following structure. It seems the military would try 
to sacrifice its corporate interest to some degree in exchange for maintaining a 
system of civil-military relations that ensures the preservation of the principle of 
exclusive subordination. It is the preferred outcome because the military would 
also be expecting that the executive could use its informal power over the mass 
media to minimize the negative impact on the roles delegated to the armed forces. 
Therefore, the military would be able to operate with a minimum level of 
supervision, which would automatically improve its degree of autonomy and 
independence. The second best choice of the military would be 02. This option is 
similar to 01 but the President decides to include civilian supervision that is not 
meant to interfere directly with military missions but to assist their functions 
through the incorporation of a civilian agency. 03 and 04  derive from the 
decision of the military to shirk in the face of a mission with a high potential to 
damage their corporate interest. Within the landscape of authoritarian politics, a 
lack of trust of the armed forces in the political elite would trigger a serious 
political crisis. In the case of 03, it means the introduction of more principals in
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the equation of civil-military control; it could be in the form of grating a greater 
role to the Mexican congress in terms of supervision and accountability or through 
the creation of a civilian minister of National Defence. In turn, 0 4  would 
represent a serious fracture in the chain of command with a President unable to 
impose his will or to punish the military for shirking. The closest example to this 
scenario took place before the assassination of Francisco Madero in 1913, and the 
brief reign of Victoriano Huerta.
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Mexico: Gobiemo de Mexico.
1.5 Documents of restricted ciruculation provided by Mexican military personnel 
for consultation
Angeles Dauahare, Tomas . Concepto, organization y metodo de la Seguridad 
Nacional en el Marco de la Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. Sedena 1991
Carnal Santos, Mario. Las escencia de la seguridad nacional. Centro de Estudios 
Superiores Navales. Edicion especial para el personal de la Armada de Mexico. 1995
Cintra, Thiago Jose. Seguridad Nacional, Poder Nacional y Desarrollo. Sedena. 1991
Secretaria de Marina. Doctrina de la Armada de Mexico para enfrentar Conflictos de 
Baja Intensidad. Reservado EMG-CEE-R-013-2003
Sedena. La historia de Mexico, fundamento de la seguridad nacional. Conferencias. 
Colegio de la Defensa Nacional. Mexico. 1999
Sedena. Libro bianco. 2005
Sedena. Manual de Operaciones en Campana. Tomo I. 1991
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1.6 Public Information obtained through the freedom of information act:
Request Date of Date of
number request answer
0000600066805 13/05/2005 27/05/2005
0000600066905 13/05/2005
Topic
Budget 
committed to state 
agencies of public 
security
30/05/2005 Salanesofa™ y personnel
0000700004806 12/01/2006 28/01/2006
0000700010005 09/02/2005 02/03/2005
0000700012505 22/02/2005 09/03/2005
0000700012605 22/02/2005 16/03/2005
CIAM,
Intelligence
Agencies
Mixed bases of 
operation
Class of the 
Generalship
General’s CVs
0000700016105 11/03/2005
Division General 
15/03/2005 year of graduation 
of military collage
0000700018205 28/03/2005 01/04/2005 Mllltary BudSet
0000700021805 08/04/2005 30/04/2005 S izeofa™ y personnel
0000700026906 14/03/2006 24/03/2006 Denied
0000700028105 13/05/2005
Army personnel 
01/06/2005 penalised for
misbehaviour
0000700032704 06/05/2004 17/05/2004
0000700034603 27/10/2003 10/11/2003
0000700038203 06/11/2003 14/11/2003
0000700038504 14/05/2004 20/05/2004
0000700039604 18/05/2004 14/06/2004
0000700039703 11/11/2003 14/11/2003
Senate approval 
of promotions
Military 
personnel 
working in 
agencies of public 
security
War tribunal
Non existent
Promotions
Military 
personnel 
working in 
agencies of public 
security
Government Agency
SECRETARIA DE HACIENDA Y 
CREDITO PUBLICO
SECRETARIA DE HACIENDA Y  
CREDITO PUBLICO
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
NACIONAL
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0000700041103 17/11/2003 20/11/2003
0000700043003 21/11/2003 25/11/2003
0000700045805 25/07/2005 12/08/2005 
0000700055505 29/08/2005 21/09/2005 
0000700083005 06/12/2005 22/12/2005 
0000700139307 11/09/2007 02/10/2007
0000700139407 11/09/2007 02/10/2007 
0001300014103 27/10/2003 28/10/2003 
0001700042603 03/11/2003 25/11/2003 
0001700124305 09/02/2005 22/02/2005
1.7 Dissertations
• Ackroyd, William S.
Relations in Mexico.” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Arizona, 1988.
• Arteaga Conde, Jose Antonio. El levantamiento armado del Ejercito Zapatista 
de Liberation Nacional en la prensa extranjera: politica e information a 
finales del siglo XX Mexico. Bsc Thesis UNAM, Facultad de Filosofia y 
Letras. 2005.
• Avendano Franco, Eduardo Enrique. La profesionalizacion del Ejercito 
Mexicano: 1917-1946. Bsc Thesis. UNAM, Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y 
Sociales UNAM. Mexico. 2008
• Dziedzic, Michael J. “The Essence of Decision in a Hegemonic Regime: The 
Case of Mexico’s Acquisition of a Supersonic Fighter.” Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Texas, 1986.
• Gallardo Rodriguez, Jose Francisco. Ejercito y sociedad en Mexico: reforma 
de las fuerzas armadas. Mexico, PhD Thesis UNAM, Facultad de Ciencias 
Politicas y Sociales. Mexico. 2007
• Galvan Gonzalez, Guillermo. Analisis juridico de la actividad que desarrollan 
las fuerzas armadas en el combate al narcotrafico. Bsc Thesis Universidad 
Lasallista Benavente, Facultad de Derecho. Mexico. 2004
Deployed army 
personnel by SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
military zone and NACIONAL
region
Military chiefs by SECRETARjA DE LA DEFENSA 
zoneandm.htary NACIONAL
region 1972-2004
White book SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA
NACIONAL
Addresses of SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
army attaches NACIONAL
Mixed bases of SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
operation NACIONAL
Chief of military SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
zones 1060-1976 NACIONAL
Military zones of SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA 
new creation NACIONAL
Denied SECRETARIA DE MARINA
Suspended public PROCURADURIA GENERAL 
servants DE LA REPUBLICA
Salaries of police PROCURADURIA GENERAL 
agents DE LA REPUBLICA
)escendants of the Revolution: Civil-Military
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• Guzman Mora, Humberto Luciano. Presencia del Ejercito Mexicano en la 
agenda nacional. Bsc Thesis UNAM, Facultad de Estudios Superiores 
Acatlan. Mexico. 2007
• Hidalgo Rivera, Francisco. Fundamento constitucional de las fuerzas armadas 
mexicanas. Bsc Thesis UNAM, Facultad de Derecho. Mexico. 2005
• Martinez Romero, Olga Margarita. Analisis juridico de las facultades del 
Presidente de la Republica para nombrar al personal de las fuerzas armadas 
mexicanas. Mexico. 2006
• Montano Rodriguez, Alejandro. La problematica de la participacion de los 
elementos del ejercito mexicano en la policia federal preventiva, llamados a 
ser fuerzas federates de apoyo de 1999 al 2000. Bsc Thesis UNAM, Escuela 
Nacional de Estudios Profesionales Aragon. Mexico. 2001
• Oliva Posada, Javier Ulises. Las fuerzas armadas de Mexico en la trayectoria 
y ajuste de las politicas de seguridad nacional en el contexto de los EU. PhD 
Thesis. UNAM. Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales Mexico. Mexico. 
2007
• Orduna Cano, Araceli. El Estado, la seguridad nacional y las fuerzas armadas. 
Bsc Thesis. Universidad del Valle de Mexico, Escuela de Derecho. Mexico. 
1993
• Paz del Campo, Rafael. “La Seguridad Nacional de Mexico en el Siglo XXI. 
Debilidades y Oportunidades. Universidad Anahuac. Msc Thesis. 2007
• Robledo Sanchez, Lizbeth. Analisis juridico de la participacion del Ejercito 
Mexicano en el combate a la production y trafico de drogas. Bsc Thesis 
UNAM, Escuela Nacional de Estudios Profesionales Aragon. Mexico. 1998
• Rodriguez Herrera, Ivan. La contrainsurgencia, una politica publica: el caso 
del Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation Nacional. Bsc Thesis. UNAM, Facultad 
de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales Mexico. 2004
• Rosa Aguilar, Maria Manuela de la. La imagen del Ejercito Mexicano. Bsc 
Thesis UNAM, Escuela Nacional de Estudios Profesionales Acatlan Mexico. 
UNAM 1991
• Rosario Juarez, Maria de la Luz. La seguridad publica en Mexico y las 
Fuerzas Armadas. Bsc Thesis UNAM, Facultad de Derecho. Mexico. Msc 
Thesis. UNAM, Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlan. Mexico. 2006.
• Torres Camacho, Roberto. La intervention de las fuerzas armadas en apoyo 
de la poblacion civil y a sus autoridades. Bsc Thesis UNAM, Facultad de 
Derecho. Mexico. 2003
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• Wager, Stephen J. “The Mexican Army, 1940-1982: The Country Comes 
First” (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1992.
• Zavaleta, Jose Alfredo. “La militarizacion de la seguridad publica en Mexico, 
1994-1998. Un piso estatal de la baja intensidad democratica”. Benemerita 
Universidad Autonoma de Puebla. Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y 
Humanidades. Tesis Doctoral. 2003
1.8 Laws and by-laws:
• Diario Oficial de la Federation
• Constitution Politica de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
• Ley Organica del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos
• Ley de Disciplina del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanosley de Ascensos y 
Recompensas del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexica
• Ley Federal de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos
1.9 Statistics
• Presidencia de la Republica (1995). Primer Informe de Gobiemo: Anexo 
Estadistico. Mexico City.
• Presidencia de la Republica (1998). Cuarto Informe de Gobiemo: Anexo 
Estadistico. Mexico City.
• Presidencia de la Republica (2000). Sexto Informe de Gobiemo: Anexo 
Estadistico. Mexico City.
• Presidencia de la Republica (2004). Cuarto Informe de Gobiemo: Anexo 
Estadistico. Mexico City.
• Presidencia de la Republica (2008). Primer Informe de Gobiemo: Anexo 
Estadistico. Mexico City.
• National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. 1981. Report 1980:
The supply o f  illicit drugs to the United States. Washington: Drug
Enforcement Administration.
• National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. 1985. Narcotics 
intelligence estimate 1984: the supply o f illicit drugs to the United States from  
foreign and domestic sources in 1984. Washington: Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
• National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. 1987. Report 1985- 
1986: The supply o f  illicit drugs to the United States. Washington: Drug 
Enforcement Administration.
• National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. 1994. Report 1993:
The supply o f  illicit drugs to the United States. Washington: Drug
Enforcement Administration.
• National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. 1998. Report 1997: 
the supply o f illicit drugs to the United States. Washington: Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
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1.10 Press Articles:
As explained in the introduction, I did an extensive use of online search engines of five of 
the main newspapers of Mexico and the United States to construct and illustrate the 
narratives of chapter 6, 7 and 8. Such articles appeared in the following Mexican 
newspapers and magazines:
- Reforma www.reforma.com
- La Jornada www.laiomada.com.mx
- El Universal www. el-universal, com.mx
- La Cronica www.cronica.com.mx
- Milenio Diario www.milenio.com
- The New York Times www.nvt.com
CD ROMs
Proceso 1976-2000 
La Jornada 1997-2000
Internet
INEGI: http://www.inegi.gob.mx
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico: http://www.shcp.gob.mx
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